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To Joel Fein,
Who seems to have made it.

Preface
This book is likely to be misunderstood. With the Culture
Wars in full cry, many readers are more apt to be concerned with
defending their own beliefs than with reevaluating why they
hold them.
Nowadays, liberalism is in crisis. Whereas conservatism suffered a profound meltdown during the Great Depression, today
it is liberals who must confront the disconfirmation of many of
their cherished beliefs. Sometimes, it seems as if a few are behaving like teenaged rebels, trying to prove that they will not buckle
under adult hypocrisies. Yet, despite refusing to conform, they
reflexively align themselves with the symbols of their sedition.
Festooned with tattoos, body piercings, and spiky green hairdos, they insist they have arrived at these fashions independently. Liberals similarly take positions without acknowledging that
these derive from groupthink. Like the journalists described in
Myrna Blyth’s Spin Sisters, they chatter about political issues as
vacuously as if they were sitting in a high school cafeteria. Aware
that the unspoken price of communal status is an acceptance of
the consensus positions on abortion or affirmative action, they
comply. Brent Bozell experienced a similar political conformity
when he appeared on a television talk show. After its technicians inadvertently failed to turn off his earpiece, he was treated to the show’s directors hooting about his conservative views
while he was on the air. Much like a pack of fraternity brothers,
these erstwhile professionals reveled in making sophomoric jokes
about opinions they did not share. Impartially evaluating opposing views was not part of their intellectual repertoire.
The same, I fear, may be in store for the unorthodox
observations that follow. Because they are different, they are
apt to be dismissed by both sides of the Culture Wars. This
is unfortunate, for if I am right, they offer a third path out of
the ideological morass into which the Middle-Class Revolution
has led us. Secular, but not collectivist, these views offer a
decentralized and professionalized solution to the inevitable
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paradoxes of hierarchical power. A century ago, Max Weber
worried that modernization would trap humankind in a
bureaucratic “iron cage,” but there may be another possibility.
Individuals who are both well-informed and emotionally mature
may be able to make personal and social decisions that redound
to their individual and joint benefit. While not perfect, this is a
superior alternative to the socialist Big Brotherism or laissez-faire
Social Darwinism that has hitherto been prevalent.
Many sociologists have, nevertheless, virtually ignored the
middle class. Trapped in a leftwing ideological ghetto, they have
been distinctly unsympathetic to the middling orders. More
fascinated with the upper and lower reaches of society, they
concentrate on exposing the defects of social elites. It is the
poor for whom they feel sympathy. Those perceived as weak are
identified as their natural allies, and an effort is made to promote
an egalitarian utopia deemed beneficial to them. The extent of this
allegiance is revealed in how the American Sociology Association
reviews professional books. Contemporary Sociology, the
organization’s flagship journal for reviews, organizes its entries
under a number of headings. The first of these is “Inequalities.”
Though the editors might have referred to “social stratification”
or “social hierarchies,” they preferred an inherently tendentious
classification. Inequality, of course, implies a moral judgment.
It suggests that equality is the normal human condition and that
anything other is abnormal. This implies Marxist assumptions,
but these are not admitted. Nor is the collectivist purpose of
including a subheading such as “Social Movements.” Because
many sociologists having been reared on the belief that capitalism
is unjust, they conceive of their mission as assisting in its demise.
As a result, they consider themselves “movement people,” with
the movement to which they are dedicated being the impending
overthrow of market-based selfishness.
Since its inception, sociology has been in rebellion against
modernism, which means it also has been in rebellion against
middle-class influence. The discipline began as a collectivist
reaction to the Industrial Revolution, and to this day most of
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its practitioners believe that evidence of human sociality proves
their natural state is a version of socialism. (Indeed, research
shows that only four percent of sociologists identify themselves as
conservative.) As a consequence, they see no point in objectively
studying the nature of social hierarchies or of morality. Wrenching
these topics out of context, it is assumed that all that needs to be
known about them is already known. The goal is instead to get
down to the business of improving the human condition. Even
though Marx himself put forward an historical account of the
evolution of human society, they see no reason to examine this
in further detail. The current circumstance of the middle class is
therefore left dangling. Treated as a didactic fable, its emergence
is never dissected with scientific rigor.
Both on the left and the right, the fashion has become to
lament how society has developed. On the right, the primary
complaint is that tradition has been violated. Its Cassandras
mourn the advent of decadence and a decline in personal
responsibility. On the left, the lament is about stymied progress.
Here the forces of reaction are said to be selfishly preventing
utopian solutions. Both sides, however, share a moralistic point
of view. More concerned with making evaluative judgments
than with understanding what has been happening, they ignore
plainly visible trends. With even social scientists caught in this
snare, they don’t ask “why?” but rather “what should we do?”
No wonder so little has been written about the millennia long
processes that have eventuated in the emergence of a middleclass society. What follows is an attempt at a corrective. The
object is to bring a colossal historic spectacle into better focus, to
help us understand the social crisis entailed by the middle-class
revolution and the potential of professionalization. Premised
on the need to apply more “head” than “heart,” it seeks to
substitute mature reflection for passionate reaction. Too much
of what has been written in the name of progress has been selfindulgent. Rather than exemplify genuine compassion, it has
sought to comfort the purportedly afflicted. With the best
of intentions, intelligent observers have allowed this to take
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precedence over disquieting facts. Sadly, this is self-defeating.
The post-modernists notwithstanding, the truth is the truth, and
unless it is assessed with an unjaundiced eye, our roadmap to the
future is likely to promote many a wrong turn. Although even
an accurate understanding of our social situation cannot protect
us from every pitfall, it can at least make for a less bumpy ride.
Melvyn L. Fein
Kennesaw, GA
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Chapter 1

Greedy Conformists?
Little boxes on the hillside,
Little boxes made of ticky-tack. (1950s folk song)
Greed is good! Greed it right! Greed works! Greed will save
the U.S.A.! (Oliver Stone, Screenplay for Wall Street)
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood
of everyone of its members… The virtue in most request
is conformity. (Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays, First
Series)
Rodney Dangerfields
The picture is not arresting. Little houses, boxy houses, lined
up one after another on a California hillside, each one exactly like
the one beside it. The folk song from which the image is derived
has mostly been forgotten, whereas the sentiment behind it has not.
According to the lyric, the residences all look alike, but what is worse,
the people inside are also virtually identical. Conformist clones, they
are archetypes of the tawdry emptiness that has overtaken modern
America. The song bemoans the cheapness of West Coast social
climbers, but might as well have assailed the barren life of Long Island’s
Levittowners.1 Among the earliest of the postwar suburbanites, for
many years their inexpensive, stand-alone, suburban redoubts were
the epitome of tasteless conventionality. Indistinguishable inside
and out, they were renowned for a lack of distinction.
Despite the fact that the United States has become the first
truly middle-class country in the history of the world and despite
the fact that its middle class has become socially dominant, those
who occupy this status receive little respect.2 They have become the
Rodney Dangerfields of social stratification. Who, with a modicum
of sense, aspires to become one of their number?3 Ordinary men
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and women may wish to grow rich or famous or socially prominent;
they may long for a bigger house, a fancier car, or more opulent
vacations, but they do not yearn to become a part of the middling
orders. Asked to which class they belong, almost 90% claim that
this is already where they fit in. While they may fantasize about
being elected president or making a landmark scientific discovery or
building a major corporation, they do not pine for a vulgar suburban
orthodoxy.4 In their eyes, being middle class is tantamount to being
mediocre. It is to be average, that is, to be like everyone else. And who
would want that? Worse still, who would wish it on their children?
Although the American Dream5 is honored as the quintessence of
the good life, to equate it with being average is to condemn it as
routine. This would mean to abjure rising to a more stellar status,
to settle for the ordinary, for being part of the common ruck. Those
in the lower middle classes may secretly dream of the perquisites of
the upper middle class, especially the respect accorded to doctors,
lawyers, and their ilk, but otherwise, being middle class is universally
spurned as trite, boring, and undistinguished. Occupation within
its precincts is reserved for the other guy; the one reconciled to being
second rate.
A half-century ago, just at the middle classes were emerging to
preeminence, the sociologist C. Wright Mills articulated what was to
become the conventional wisdom. Casting a jaundiced eye on the
transformations of the modern world, he perceived what seemed to
be a precipitous decline. Most people might be growing richer, but
their moral standing was deteriorating. In his introduction to White
Collar,6 he writes that “the uneasiness, the malaise of our time is
due to this root fact: in our politics and economy, in family life and
religion—in practically every sphere of our existence—the certainties
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have disintegrated or been
destroyed and, at the same time, no new sanctions or justifications
for the new routines we live, and must live, have taken hold.”
Who, he inquires, is to blame for this impasse? The answer, not
surprisingly, is none other than the middle classes. “Among [these]
white collar people, the malaise is deep-rooted; for the absence of any
order or belief has left them morally defenseless as individuals and
politically impotent as a group.” Alienated at work and at home,
they have been transported into a Kafkaesque realm of insane rules
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and impotent wheel-spinning. As salaried employees, middle-class
workers do not make anything. Unable to contemplate the pleasures
of craftsmanship, they go “year after year through the same paper
routine[s]” with their leisure time ever more dedicated to the “ersatz
diversion” and the “synthetic excitement.” No wonder they are
“bored at work and restless at play, and [that] this terrible alternation
wears [them] out.”
But that is not all. Mills’ indictment goes deeper: “In his work
[the middle-class person] often clashes with customer and superior,
and must almost always be the standardized loser: he must smile
and be personable, standing behind the counter, or waiting in the
outer office.” Virtually incapable of fighting back, these “new little
Machiavellians, [practice] their personable crafts for hire and the
profit of others, according to rules laid down by those above them.”
Ultimately, “the calculating hierarchies of the department store and
industrial corporation, of rationalized office and government bureau,
lay out the gray ways of work and stereotype the permitted initiatives.
And in all this bureaucratic usurpation of freedom and of rationality,
the white collar people are the interchangeable parts of the big chains
of authority that bind the society together.” Evidently ineffectual
ciphers, they cooperate in their own demise, either from cowardice
or greed. For Mills the small-scale salesperson is the quintessence
of white-collar vapidity. He/she is said to live a life dedicated to
appearance, all in the service of purveying someone else’s inferior
products. Know-nothings by choice, such individuals do not even
seek to comprehend their situation. Because genuine knowledge
would interfere with the synthetic skills for which they are famed,
they keep their blinders firmly in place.
The noninspirational characteristics of the middle classes are
alleged to be legion. Mediocre Babbitts7 at best, like Sinclair Lewis’s
fictional hero, they congratulate themselves on their successes, all
the while having sold their souls for messes of flavorless pottage.
Seduced by their bosses into a vacant materialism, they have become
little more than the lapdogs of capitalism. Pawns of the rich, they
do what they are told, a Hallelujah Chorus intent on imagining
that this conformity was self-selected. In Karl Marx’s8 universe, the
nineteenth-century bourgeoisie was pitted against the proletarians
in a life-and-death struggle for supremacy. The middle classes were
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said to be marginal to this social warfare, but in occupying the front
offices of the corporations, they identified with their bosses. As
industrial bookkeepers and foremen, they were not in charge of what
went on, but nevertheless they emulated the portly indolence of their
superiors. This was why they wore the white shirts of which they
were so proud. These symbolized liberation from the dirty labor
of the proletarians. This was also why they saved their money to
buy suburban houses loosely modeled on those of the higher-ups.
Although others perceived them as little more than impoverished
mimics, they remained oblivious to this state of affairs. Believing
themselves intrinsic to the authority of their betters, they strutted
with a bloated self-importance belied by their deeply ingrained
subservience.
This lack of insight is supposedly recapitulated in the dull,
plodding realities of today’s middle-class existence. As Mills says,
these cogs in an industrial/commercial matrix continue to prop up
the institutions that enforce their obedience. In order to achieve this,
however, they must impose a debilitating blindness on themselves.
Insensitive to their condition, they are also oblivious to good taste and
social decency. As early as the 1920s, Lewis bemoaned the vulgarity
of the nouveau riche. Once it acquired more money than its parents,
the glitter left its members so dazzled that they enthusiastically
supported a pointless boosterism. Genuinely in awe of the inflated
language they used to praise their own accomplishments, they did not
realize its shallowness. This ignorance was expressed in the garishness
of their purchases. Unable to distinguish quality from trash, they
flaunted the mass-produced symbols of their vulgarity with all the
smugness of the supercilious. Huge automobiles, cookie-cutter art,
and bouffant hairdos revealed their lack of depth. What mattered to
them was facade rather than substance. Flash-and-dash was sufficient
to those who never peeked beneath the exterior manifestations of
their ersatz Hollywood lifestyles.
Alleged to be noncreative, these middle-class nonentities are
excoriated for mindlessly pushing paper and counting beans. Because
a more subtle comprehension of their environment might interfere
with the slavishness intrinsic to their occupations, they make certain
to keep their scholarship within predictable bounds. Anti-intellectual
to the core, they never ferret out root causes but instead accept
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conventional shibboleths. What their neighbors spout is what they
believe. If they read books, they are escapist novels; if they turn on the
Internet, it is for amusement or stress-free shopping. Were a neutral
observer to eavesdrop on their conversations, one would hear talk
dominated by sports and celebrity gossip. Barry Bond’s latest homerun count or Pamela Anderson’s most recent husband consume their
chatter. Fine-grained conversations dedicated to genuine problem
solving are, on the other hand, as rare as hen’s teeth.
Nor do their dialogues sparkle with the compassion of delicately
tuned intellects. Insecure and selfish, members of the middle classes
inadvertently reveal themselves as phony philanthropists. Although
they trumpet a concern for their less fortunate fellows, their attentions
are really directed toward social climbing. Giving to charity is part
of their routine, but they are actually more worried about seeming
to be generous than with the outcomes of their liberality. Insincere
to the marrow, they smile and mouth the socially correct words, but
they care no more about the welfare of others. Broad grins go with
the territory; they do not bespeak an interior kindness. More akin to
Willy Loman, they are dedicated to selling themselves as much as to
marketing their wares.
Television-watching bigots, rather than altruistic citizens,
denizens of the middle class pass their callous self-involvement on
to their children. These nonentities-in-training are also encouraged
to become empty fortresses dedicated to safeguarding a purposeless
existence. Appearing to be well connected, that is, to being part of
the in-crowd, is the height of their aspirations. The music lessons
and soccer tournaments of their youth are, in fact, aimed at getting
a good job and marrying well, not at becoming insightful adults.
Honed in their vacuity by being given automobiles when aged
sixteen and credit cards at eighteen, they are experts in conspicuous
consumption. Aspiring jocks or journeymen mallrats, they are well
schooled in purchasing the material objects that substitute for inner
strength. Quickly learning that new BMWs have more cachet than
second-hand Chevys and that the logos of prominent designers
are more highly regarded than is good taste, they eagerly display
advertisements of their conformity. Eventually, they, too, become
accomplished hangers-on, more infatuated with personal visibility
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than earned merit. For them, seeming to be important counts for
more than actually being important.
Dominance
In reality, the scurrilous allegations lodged against the middle
classes are green-eyed libels.9 Their crass conformity and materialist
vacuity are more a figment of their critic’s imaginations than a
portrait of their actual circumstances. Marx had it as wrong as do
the balladeers who sing laments about ticky-tack hillsides. A drive
through today’s Levittown should disabuse the intellectually honest
of the community’s obsessive sameness. When originally built, its
houses were indeed dreary in their uniformity. Erected with industrial
efficiency, standardization was a means of keeping costs down and
of making home-ownership available to the less affluent. But once
the proprietors of these dwellings acquired the means, they raced to
individualize them. Far from being conformists at heart, they made
additions reflective of their diverse tastes and needs. Most even went
out of their way to landscape their domains to suggest a pleasing
pastoralism. Flowers, trees, and imitation waterfalls sprouted almost
as quickly as did the homes themselves.
Marx vilified the few white-collar workers who populated the
proprietor-owned businesses with which he was familiar. For him,
they were inconsequential drones, who, in their stiffly laundered
shirts, paraded an authority they did not possess and a prosperity
they would never attain. Marx’s universe was dominated by
egotistical entrepreneurs whom he predicted would one day succeed
in impoverishing almost everyone but themselves. In allowing their
workers little more than subsistence wages, they would amass wealth
beyond the dreams of Croesus. Conversely, their employees would
struggle in torn garments and seedy tenements, nourished solely
by crusts of dry bread. This image of degraded poverty has been
enshrined in the concept of exploitation. To this day, class warriors
generate cheers by invoking the alleged penury of working men and
women. Supposedly imposed by the powerful, this underprivileged
condition is in theory nearly universal. The trouble, of course, is
that it obviously is not. Social predictions are frequently difficult
to evaluate. Because they tend to be subtle, interpretations differ.
Marx’s prophecy, however, does not fall within this sphere; it is
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demonstrably wrong. The majority of people today are anything
but poor. Their possessions may not measure up to those of a Bill
Gates, but they too own houses, cars, and even stock portfolios. In
what has become the most prosperous era ever, they are emphatically
not starving. If anything, their midsections reveal an overindulgence
in calories. Neither are they mere drones. Better educated and
more active than previous generations, their interests are deeper
and broader than those of their parents. They have become the true
monarchs of the contemporary scene.
In an historical revolution that is notable for its invisibility, the
middle classes appropriated the management of the modern world
unto themselves.10 Dating from not long after the Second World
War, the United States experienced a unique tipping point. Before
any other nation, it came to be dominated by its median elements.
Although still individually deferential to those in the upper stratum,
these persons collectively assumed the leadership role. The middle
classes now set the social standards for all others. Their tastes and
manners pervade the habits of those both above and below them.
Their goals became the nation’s goals; their behavioral patterns
the country’s patterns. In short, they became society’s designated
organizers. First, they calculated what needed to be done; then they
implemented the most important projects. Where once the country’s
key judgments descended from on high, they now emerged from
these intermediate sources. Ordinary people across the land took
jurisdiction over their destinies and those of their contemporaries.
If power can be calibrated by who gets to make essential decisions,
then those who had previously been the helpmeets of the elite have
now usurped their prerogatives. They have arrogated to themselves
the responsibility for what happens and what does not.
The nature of this change can be discerned in what occurred
within the military. There was a time when warfare was an aristocratic
prerogative. In medieval Europe, kings, earls, counts, dukes, barons,
and knights controlled the business of combat. From childhood,
they trained in the martial arts, and when battle was in the air, they
surged to the forefront. Indeed, the term “duke” is derived from a
term meaning “war leader.” Ordinary people, that is, the infantry,
were not allowed the armor or the warhorses of their chiefs. They
had to make do with farm implements and padded blouses. When
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battle came, they were a rabble fit only to be slaughtered by their
betters. This distinction was later codified in the division between
commissioned and noncommissioned officers. The former came
from the nobility, albeit its lesser ranks, whereas the sergeants and
corporals came from the lower stratum. While the officers were in
the army for life or until they resigned their commissions, those to
whom they gave orders served for specified periods after which they
were required to reenlist. No matter how competent the latter were
as front line fighters, they were not permitted to assume command on
the battlefield. This was the privilege of the aristocrats, irrespective of
training or experience. In theory, since only commissioned officers
served at the pleasure of the sovereign, only they could share in his
authority.
The resultant disregard for military competence extended almost
into the modern era. Reverberations of it were still present during
the American Civil War.11 Many of its generals, such as Grant and
Lee, were graduates of West Point, but many were not. Of these
latter, more than a few were political generals who received their
commissions because they could provide crucial support at the polls.
One of these, Benjamin (Beast) Butler, scandalized New Orleans
with his unprofessional insults to the femininity of its gentle ladies.
Some, to be sure, were gifted amateurs. An obvious example would
be Nathan Bedford Forrest, perhaps the South’s best cavalry officer,
who obtained his command by funding a company from his personal
fortune. Many others merely muddled through. The point is that
professionalism was not then decisive. Most people still thought
bravery and social prominence were all that was necessary.
A mere half century later this was unacceptable. By World War
I, the American Expeditionary Force was much better trained. It
was not sent overseas until thoroughly indoctrinated in the new
tactics and even then not assigned to the front lines without further
preparations in France. Harry Truman could serve as a lower-level
field officer, but more responsible roles went to career officers. By the
time of the Second World War, former civilians were still receiving
commissions but only after undergoing standardized schooling for
their future commands. These ninety-day wonders were not widely
respected, but they were a far cry from the Duke of Medina-Sedona
who was appointed to command the Spanish Armada that Philip II
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sent against Elizabethan England. Medina-Sedona’s credentials were
limited to the circumstances of his birth, as became apparent when
his fleet encountered the enemy’s race-built galleons. American
officers had at least to be college graduates before they were accepted
for instruction.
After the middle-class tipping point, a nonhereditary
professionalism became more prevalent. No longer were aristocratic
pedigrees or political connections sufficient. Military competence
became mandatory for those who expected to receive an appointment
or a promotion. The Gulf War and the subsequent Iraq War
confirmed the ascendancy of professional skill over social position.
Middle-class criteria of merit had irrevocably supplanted standards
of family prominence or extraneous power. Those who witnessed
the crushing efficiency of the American military must be impressed
with the effects of this preparation. Professionalism had become the
norm up and down the line. Run of the mill soldiers spent years in
training for their specialties, while their leaders devoted even more
time to planning for the myriad contingencies of the battlefield. In
the event of combat, officers and men alike were so well practiced
that they could adjust to unexpected emergencies on the spot. Even
enlisted personnel formerly consigned to unquestioning obedience
could calmly organize flexible responses under withering fire.
Intimations of this coming middle-class ascendancy can be
seen in Colonial America. Despite the disrespect characteristic of
contemporary commentators on class, many of the nation’s earliest
heroes foreshadowed its coming bourgeois virtues. Perhaps the
most prominent of these are Benjamin Franklin and John Adams.
Although personally and temperamentally at odds, each epitomizes
the individualism and integrity that has come to signify the best
of middle-class achievement. Both were self-made men, and both
exulted in personal accomplishment. Vain in distinct ways, they
nevertheless had a great deal to be vain about. Expert in different
skills, each was motivated to make his mark, and as such participated
in decisions of lasting impact. They were precursors of a modern
middle class that explicitly extolled the values that later facilitated a
comparable professionalism.
Let us begin with Adams,12 even though he was the younger man.
He started life as the son of an ordinary New England farmer. Sent
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to Harvard to become a Congregationalist minister, he gravitated to
the law instead. Not priggishly religious, he nevertheless inculcated
enough of his puritanical Calvinist roots to fret about doing good,
not merely making good. In his case, this was demonstrated by a
devotion to duty that enabled him to become both a patriot and
the defense attorney for a British soldier accused of murder during
the Boston Massacre.13 Ultimately, he was celebrated as the Atlas
of Independency. Without his tenacity and persuasive skills, it is
doubtful that the Declaration of Independence would have come
to be. Thomas Jefferson is frequently accorded the credit for
writing it, but it was Adams’s individualism and ambition that led
to its adoption. Like the middle class leaders who were to follow,
he exhibited a confidence in his abilities and his right to assert
them. Adams believed in merit and responsibility. Undeterred by
his inauspicious origins, he assumed that he was entitled to rise as
high as his talents could carry him. Beyond this, he argued that his
countrymen possessed the same birthright. Though he has been long
celebrated for his forthrightness and integrity, only recently have his
other superior qualities been fully recognized.
Even more endearing is Franklin.14 Remembered for the twinkle
in his eye and the amusing stories on his lips, he is the friendly
founder. Beginning less auspiciously than Adams as the son of
a candle maker, by the age of seventeen he had run away from a
Boston apprenticeship at his brother’s print shop to an uncertain
future in Philadelphia. Utterly self-educated, he became the colonial
equivalent of a publishing magnate. His Poor Richard’s Almanac,15
as well as the fruits of his talents as a self-promoter and business
franchiser, enabled him to accumulate the resources to retire while
still in his forties. As one of the leather-apron crowd, he appreciated
those who each day earned their own livings while simultaneously
seeking to better themselves. Proud to be one of the middling sorts,
he was to become their prophet. Throughout most of his career
as a politician and an author, he penned influential paeans to hard
work and ingenuity. An independent-minded do-gooder, he wanted
everyone to be the same.
Among Poor Richard’s middle-class aphorisms are the following:
“Early to bed, early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise”;
“Don’t throw stones at your neighbors, if your windows are of glass”;
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“Nothing can be said to be certain except death and taxes”; “Time
is money”; “A used key is always bright”; and “God helps them that
help themselves.” Franklin believed all this. Almost always busy, he
honored initiative over conformity. Unlike Mills’s hidebound losers,
he led a life filled with activity and enterprise. Not for Franklin was a
passive reliance on instructions from above. Continuously aboil with
ingenious schemes, he became the archetypical networker. While
still in his early twenties, he organized a Junta of like-minded artisans
dedicated to improving their skills and to sharing opportunities.
This soon became the launching pad for civic improvements such as
a lending library, several volunteer firefighting companies, a hospital,
and what was to become the University of Pennsylvania. Ultimately
he was to participate in writing the Declaration of Independence, the
Treaty of Paris, and the American Constitution. Along the way, he
even had time to invent the lightening rod, investigate the properties
of electricity, examine the nature of the Gulf Stream, and speculate
about the meteorology of Nor’easter storms. No one could call
Franklin boring or vacuous. In his day, Europe’s most sophisticated
philosophers and scientists considered him a peer.
Yet Franklin attributed his success to classic middle-class virtues.
During his formative years, he developed what he called a “moral
perfection project.” First, he compiled a list of desirable qualities,
and then he kept track of how well he exemplified them. Among
these virtues were temperance, order, resolution, frugality, industry,
sincerity, justice, and moderation. In other words, he would be
sober, hard working, and honest. He later added humility as a goal,
but this was never to be more than a public-relations ploy. Unlisted
entirely was the virtue of tolerance, yet this was an attribute he was to
exemplify until his dying day. Completely without religious bias and
in his later years an abolitionist, he reveled in interdenominational
observances. Above all, he took satisfaction in being what he unselfconsciously described as mediocre. In America, said Franklin, “People
do not enquire of a stranger, ‘What is he?’ but, ‘What can he do?’
Achievement, not nobility of birth, was, by his lights, the correct
measure of merit. Thus he was able to proclaim, “The almost general
mediocrity of fortune that prevails in America, obliging its people
to follow some business for subsistence, those vices that usually
arise from idleness are in a great measure prevented.” Recently, the
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historian Gordon Wood16 has observed of Franklin’s contemporaries
that “by absorbing the gentility of the aristocracy and the work
of the working class, the middling sorts gained a powerful moral
hegemony over the whole society.” And as Franklin’s biographer
Walter Isaacson17 further notes, no one deserves this sort of accolade
more than Franklin himself, for, “he represented and helped to make
[these values] integral to the new nation’s character.”
Paradoxically, Franklin was not able to make these virtues integral
to the lives of his immediate posterity. The attractions of aristocratic
privilege were to remain potent for many years to come, even within
his own family. Largely thanks to Franklin’s efforts, his son William
was appointed the Royal Governor of New Jersey. Nevertheless,
though surrounded by examples of middle-class self-sufficiency,
when the American Revolution came and sides were chosen, William
decided to stand with his monarch rather than his father. In the end,
he lived out his final years in England, trying to ape its aristocracy,
albeit without much success. His son, Temple, too would opt for
the life of a dandy. Despite being set up on an American farm by
his grandfather, he preferred to chase women and opulence on the
Continent.
What compounds this paradox is that two centuries later even
the British royal family has been infected by Franklin’s middle-class
virtues. So dominant have these become that the mother country’s
Prince Charles learned, to his chagrin, that he was expected to live
according to these standards and not his ancient regal prerogatives.
Thus, in his marriage to Diana, Princess of Wales he was expected
to uphold a conventional fidelity. Although millions of American
women fantasized about the magic of being a princess, they
demanded a modernized version of the Cinderella fable. For them
and their British counterparts, happily ever after means a mom and
dad and two kids in a single household, even if opulent. Princess
Di appeared to keep up her end of this bargain. Besides dressing
well, she made regular excursions in support of solid middle-class
causes. Better still, when her marriage began to crumble, she went
before the television cameras tearfully to indulge in the same sort of
psychobabble spoken by any betrayed housewife. Charles was less
astute. When he first met Camilla Parker-Bowles on a polo field, she
reminded him that her great-grandmother had been the mistress of
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his great-great-grandfather, Edward VII. Edward was able to engage
in this sort of liaison without reproach, but his descendant could
not. Charles was to be hounded by the press as an unfaithful cad.
Even his private telephone conversations were tapped and publicized
to demonstrate his disloyalty. Although his attachment to Camilla
demonstrated a genuine love, this was trumped by his flouting of
middle-class marital ideals.
Today, middle-class values and middle-class decision-making
have become the norm. From top to bottom, the people Mills
dismisses as compliant drones govern society. Far from being
empty-headed conformists, they have been transmuted into the
seat of its expertise and energy. Still, their social dominance is not
always visible nor always celebrated. Human communities live by
symbols, but these can be out of joint with underlying realities. This
is our current situation. The sort of life that Franklin recommended
and that Adams embodied has triumphed. No doubt this victory
has been incomplete and is fraught with difficulties, but it is also
more substantial than its critics allow. The middle-class nature of
our contemporary world is not sufficiently appreciated, in large
part because it has become so ordinary. People do not notice the
ubiquitous background noise of their daily rounds. Nor do they
treasure the constraints that personally bind them. Forced to respect
middle-class sensibilities, they bridle at requirements that often feel
onerous. Mills is but one of many voices chafing at the restrictions
current in our present society. “No rules; just right,” boasts a popular
restaurant chain. “Think outside the box,” goes the advertising refrain
of another. People hate being imprisoned by middle-class dictates,
and they say so. The theme is clear: they want this hegemony to be
challenged. They long to be free to be whatever they wish. What is
not investigated, however, is what are their actual options. Is there an
alternative to middle-class domination? Can contemporary society
function without their supremacy? Can people survive the conflicts
brought on by their own uncertainties? We shall see.
The New Middle Class
“Eighty years ago, there were three quarters of a million middle
class employees; by 1940, there were over twelve and a half million.”
Thus wrote Mills before the middle class revolution reached its crest.
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In fact, he begins his chapter on the new middle class by observing
that “in the early nineteenth century, although there are no exact
figures, probably four-fifths of the occupied population were selfemployed enterprisers.”18 Most of these, of course, were farmers
and independent artisans. Part of what made the United States’s
labor force different from that of Europe was the freedom it enjoyed.
Journeying across a broad ocean to take possession of a continent
bereft of an indigenous population—thanks to the depredations
of European diseases—a bold set of adventurers had either fanned
out to carve homesteads from the wilderness or remained behind
in coastal cities to pioneer newfangled varieties of commerce. In
both cases, they had been liberated from the oppressive traditions
of aristocratic supervision. Caucasian Americans were never serfs
in America. Some may have begun their careers as indentured
servants, but they were not required to stifle their ambitions to suit
the needs of hereditary ruling class—this despite the best efforts of
their royal governors. The resultant sense of autonomy not only
laid the foundations for a successful political revolution, but once
the Industrial Revolution took hold, it facilitated an explosion in
middle-class occupations.
Mills distinguished between an old and a new middle class. The
chief differences between these were a diminution of the percentage
of farmers and an increase in salaried professionals, salespeople, and
office workers. By his calculations, 62% of the old middle class
consisted of farmers, whereas, by 1940, this proportion was reduced
to 23%. The shift had clearly been toward commercial employment.
People were no longer producing for their own consumption or that
of their immediate neighbors. More likely to be market-oriented
than subsistence farmers and factory workers rather than shopkeepers,
their profit-making orientation had become broader. Even within
the manufacturing sphere, employment swung toward the needs of
the marketplace. Thus, according to Mills, whereas, in 1870, 77% of
workers were directly engaged in production, by 1940, scarcely 46%
were thus engaged. The growth areas had switched into service jobs,
which went from 13% to 20% of the total; into distributing jobs,
which went from 7% to 23%; and into coordinating jobs, which
went from 3% to 11%. There had clearly been a reallocation of
effort from making goods to getting them to the customer.
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By the beginning of the new millennium, the changes were even
more dramatic. An elaboration of the details of this development
will await a later chapter, but for the moment it may be adequate
to observe that managerial and professional employment has gone
through the roof, while entrepreneurial efforts have held their
own. The economists Herbert Stein and Murray Foss19 calculate
that, between 1958 and 1998, blue-collar employment declined
from almost 40 % to just under 25 %. Meanwhile white-collar
employment jumped from just over 40% to almost 60%. This said,
rather than beginning our survey of what happened at the high end
of the occupational continuum, it makes more sense to start at the
opposite end of the spectrum, where jobs were lost and from whence
a transformed workforce arose.
When England was establishing its North American dominions,
its promoters expected their raw materials to keep the mother country’s
manufactories humming. Initially, this seemed the case. Even Ben
Franklin assured British opinion makers that they had nothing to
fear regarding cross-Atlantic competition. There was simply so much
land available that the vast majority of his fellow subjects would be
attracted into agriculture for the indefinite future. No one could
foresee that within little more than two centuries the percentage of
farmers would decline to less than 2 % of the population. Ironically,
because of advances in technology, the quantity of foodstuffs was
greater than ever. Indeed, so efficient has productivity become that,
by 1992, the Census Bureau calculated that there were fewer than
100,000 farm enterprises, with barely more than a half-million farm
workers toiling on them. Johnny had long since deserted his rural
home for the more opulent accommodations of the city or, better
yet, for the more comfortable habitations of the suburbs.
Similar trends have been visible in manufacturing. At the height
of the Industrial Revolution, it was assumed that, as the young people
left the farms, they would automatically swell the ranks of factory
workers. By the 1930s, the unions were so confident of this trend
that they believed these growing numbers would inexorably enhance
their influence. This prophecy, too, was doomed to failure as union
membership soon sank to below 15%. As might be expected, the
proportion of those engaged in production fell as well. By 2001, the
U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics20 estimated
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that, out of almost 130 million workers, slightly more than 11
million were directly involved in production, whereas approximately
9 million were engaged in transporting the handiwork of the factory
to other locations. More than this, over 13 million were engaged
in sales, and another 23 million were office workers. Many years
earlier, Karl Marx had derided individuals not occupied in physical
production as parasites. His labor theory of value argued that wealth
was created by the act of fashioning objects for material use. All
other employments were subsidiary, he declared. Because capitalists
and their lackeys exploited the efforts of real workers, they deserved
to be relegated to the ash heap of history. As if to spite him, however,
during the intervening decades, the vampires who sucked the blood
of the honest proletarians multiplied disproportionately to their
contributions. Although Marx had speculated that the bourgeoisie
would decline in numbers as they concentrated material assets in
their own hands, this has not happened. Not only was there not a
revolution of the downtrodden, but the lap dogs of the affluent have
proliferated into a conquering army.
Mills, in his analysis, was fascinated by increases in the clerical and
sales forces, yet the upsurge in numbers of managers and professionals
has been even more spectacular. Management occupations now
top over seven million, and closely related business and financial
occupations are approaching five million. Professional occupations
are more difficult to assess and are broader in scope, but if these are
taken to include computer and mathematical occupations at almost
three million; architecture and engineering occupations at nearly two
and a half million; life, physical, and social-science occupations at a
million; community and social service occupations at a million and
a half; legal occupations at almost a million; educational occupations
at seven and a half million; health-care practitioners at over six
million; and art and entertainment occupations at another million
and a half, the total is impressive. These figures may be misleading
in that they include paraprofessionals, but they still give a good idea
of the range of professionalization. Moreover, they do not include
some traditionally blue-collar occupations, such as that of police
officer, that have also been professionalizing. Nor do they include
service occupations that work in tandem with professionals, such
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as health-care support workers (e.g., medical assistants) or personalcare workers, such as cosmetologists and child-care workers.
Also missing from this compendium is the list of contemporary
entrepreneurs. According to the 1997 census,21 over fifteen million
American companies had no employees. These were evidently
enterprises of self-employed persons ranging from independent
professionals to dogwalkers. Another six million plus establishments
had employees and, therefore, presumably, autonomous bosses.
These would range from the owners of family-held corporations to
the partners in stand-alone medical offices and law firms. Some of
these persons might even parallel the success of a Steve Jobs, who has
successively been the moving force behind Apple Computers, Next
Computers, and Pixar Animation. More than mere drones, these
venture specialists focus on introducing and implementing new ideas
and new products.
Now that professionals, managers, and entrepreneurs
have captured the most important leadership positions of our
postindustrial age, their skills, rather than the honorable sweat of
traditional laborers, have proven to be the key to obtaining power.
Occupational sociologists have long made a distinction between jobs
that entail working with people versus those that entail working with
data or with things. The modern middle classes specialize in dealing
with the former two, whereas the historic proletarians were occupied
with the last. As commercial activities have proliferated, an ability
to deal with customers or to coordinate battalions of workers has
assumed greater importance, whereas dealing with machines has
declined in significance. Likewise, a competence in engineering new
products or in organizing their distribution has taken precedence
over physically manipulating materials in an increasingly automated
environment. All of this has made a difference. The emergence of
complex technologies and of mass marketing placed a premium on
coping with sophisticated conceptions and unpredictable situations.
Long gone is the repetitive manual toil of the chandler. Ben Franklin’s
father was by all accounts a hard worker, but the skills to be mastered
in manipulating tallow were relatively few, even when compared
with those of his son. In the elder Franklin’s day, an independent
productiveness could make a man a pillar of his community,
including of his church. Today’s assembly-line worker, albeit turning
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out far more candles per day, earns little respect. Compared with the
decision-makers guiding his output, his contributions are regarded
of lesser value.
Contemporary factory workers learn that it is not effort but
the relative complexity of one’s employment that produces social
esteem and, therefore, influence. In contrast to their own tedious
jobs, professionals are generally experts in their fields of endeavor.
Trained to unprecedented levels of proficiency, they know things
that others do not. It is for this reason that they receive deference.
Likewise, managers must be knowledgeable about human relations.
They receive more respect for their people-handling skills than for
their affluence. Though sometimes disparaged, good management
takes a courage and perceptiveness that is not universal. Years of
experience and nowadays of college preparation contribute to an
ability to organize the tasks of others. Lastly, entrepreneurs receive
esteem, in part, because they wield the power of a boss; in part,
from controlling the resources derived from economic success; and,
in part, from the courage and knowledge implied by being able to
organize a business from scratch. Evidences of successful risk-taking
are their tickets to a higher status.
The increased complexity attaching to high-status occupations
is manifest in the growing emphasis on formal education.22 It has
become a cliché that social success is linked to years of schooling.
At present, to be illiterate is virtually to be a social outcast. Parents,
teachers, and even politicians obsessively warn children that being
a dropout is tantamount to being a failure. The result has been the
longest schooled, if not the best educated, society in the history of
the world.
Times have manifestly changed. Although New England
Puritans encouraged literacy in order to promote Bible reading, even
states like Massachusetts could not boast a significant high-school
population until the end of the nineteenth century. Indeed, college
attendance did not become commonplace until after World War
II, when implementation of the GI Bill of Rights opened college
to millions with working-class backgrounds. If we look back to
1869-70, that is, to just after the Civil War, barely more than fifty
thousand students were studying at all of the nation’s institutions of
higher learning combined. By 1899-1900, this figure had risen to
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something over 237,000. By 1939-40, the period to which Mills
refers, the total enrollment was 1,494,203. By 1999-2000, this had
multiplied ten fold to 14,791,224. True, the national population
also increased substantially, but the adjusted five fold gain was still
dramatic. Put another way, soon more than half the country will
possess college degrees, including formerly excluded women. As of
now, 24% of those over 25 do so. Already about half of all recent
high-school graduates receive some college education. Moreover, in
1998, a whopping 83% of Americans over the age of twenty-five
were high-school graduates. This is especially impressive when one
considers that the figure includes the very old, as well as immigrants
from Third World countries where secondary education has been out
of the question.
As might be expected, greater education is correlated with greater
occupational success. Not only do college-educated individuals
make more money, but they encounter a larger market for their
talents. Contemporary employers frequently seek those with degrees
even when the tasks at hand do not require the sort of knowledge
acquired at a university. What is desired is something different; it is
evidence of being self-directed. Being able to cope with the demands
of a postsecondary education provides an indication of personal
discipline. Thanks to this quality, those who obtain a degree are
assumed to be able to master workplace uncertainties without close
supervision. As a result, they are trusted to be self-starters and reliable
finishers. Indeed, being self-directed and capable of managing
uncertainty is the hallmark of the middle classes. The sine qua non of
their leadership, it provides the stratum it mandates. It is, therefore,
not surprising that they should endorse the delegation of authority
that a superior education underwrites.
The rewards for education and occupational authority are equally
evident. It is often taken for granted that wealth is equivalent to
power. Those who are obscenely rich are believed to be potent to the
same degree that they have been able to amass possessions. When Bill
Gates can accumulate a personal fortune approaching one hundred
billion dollars, some conclude that he must be a million times more
dominant than an engineer earning fifty thousand per annum.
But this is misleading. Undoubtedly Gates is more dominant.
Undoubtedly, too, most members of the upper classes are individually
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more powerful than members of the middle class. But millions of
times more powerful? This is absurd. Collectively, the middle classes
are, in fact, more influential than the 2% to 3% of our society who
belong to the upper classes. Even on a personal level, some of the
former have more impact on events than do the wealthy. Arguably,
the researchers who developed Post-it notes™ (not to mention the
transistor) fit into this category. Their contributions influence our
daily lives more profoundly than the frolics of jetsetters.
This collective clout is also reflected in the material prosperity
of the middle classes. Marx predicted that most workers would be
reduced to subsistence, but this too did not happen. Though on
paper less well off than the privileged few in terms of their personal
comfort, professionals more than hold their own. In terms of what
they possess and the activities in which they can engage, they are
richer than medieval princes. Whether we are talking about indoor
plumbing or vacations in the Caribbean, they can do things of which
Henry VIII never dreamt.
Let us consider the houses in which they live. In 1997, two
thirds of all Americans owned their own homes.23 In a nation of
about 280 million, over 65 million were owners as opposed to 34
million who were renters. This compares with about half of all
families that were owners in 1900. The real change, however, has
been in the size of dwelling per resident. In the 1960s, the average
house was 1400 square feet. By the end of the century, this had
increased to 2100 square feet. Since family sizes had simultaneously
declined, the number of persons per room had gone from well over
one per room to less than one per every two rooms. This gave
the average American almost four times as much living space as the
average Russian.
But comfortable housing is not the only advantage of middleclass opulence.24 Americans no longer walk. Nor are they confined
to trolleys or subway cars. In 1997, there were a total of 776 internalcombustion vehicles per 1000 of the population. That is almost one
vehicle per person, including children. As is well known, middleclass houses are now routinely built with two-car garages, and of
the machines these accommodate, one is apt to be a sports utility
vehicle. Once Americans fretted about gas consumption, but today
their concern is with demonstrating that they can drive up Pikes
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Peak if they so desire. Even teenagers are no longer satisfied with the
jalopies of previous generations. These days, they believe new BMWs
are their rightful legacies. Of course, this is not the only indicator
of middle-class affluence. There is also the fact that almost every
household has multiple television sets, with most of these hooked up
to cable or satellite dishes. Increasingly, home entertainment centers
boast flat screens and rear-projection monstrosities. Then, too, there
are the computers, the DVDs, and the cellphones. All in all, the
middle classes have invented a mobile, creature-comfort-rich, style
of life that is best characterized as suburban. Both academics and
public intellectuals hate the suburbs, but these are the fastest-growing
sections of the country. Once they earn a sufficient income, people
have been voting with their feet or more properly, with their cars.
The suburbs are scorned as sprawl, but they enable people to engage
in the sorts of activities that accompany affluent decision making.
Living longer, healthier, more varied lives, the new middle classes
tend to be self-satisfied. They do not perceive themselves as mediocre
Babbitts or, as Mills opined, in the thrall of a deep-rooted malaise due
to “the absence of any order or belief [which] has left them morally
defenseless as individuals and politically impotent as a group.”
Members of the middle class tend to feel good about themselves,
their families, their friends, and their jobs. Still, they are also aware
that as group they are not respected, ergo their verbal unwillingness
to aspire to be that which in their daily lives they clearly value. This
disconnect is exacerbated by circumstances of which they relatively
unaware. Having been carried along by a vast wave of change, they
do not discern how they got where they are. Although troubled by
a disdain for the middle classes, Mills was on to something when
he observed that “the certainties of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries have disintegrated or been destroyed and, at the same time,
no new sanctions or justifications for the new routines we live, and
must live, have taken hold.”
This rumination is best understood in light of William
Ogburn’s25 concept of “cultural lag.” Introduced in the 1920s,
this insight pointed to the fact that as technological innovations
accelerated, people had difficulty adjusting to the new realities.
Older generations continued to prefer horses to automobiles or,
more recently, desk-bound instruments to cellphones. Yet cultural
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lag is also applicable to personal attitudes and social institutions.
Ways of behaving and methods of organizing appropriate to a bluecollar world that are no longer useful in a professionally dominated
environment are nevertheless preserved. Many people, who by
occupation are undoubtedly middle class, mentally and behaviorally
reproduce patterns from their lower-status childhoods. They cling to
the familiar and comfortable, not because it works, but because it is
what they understand.
Clearly related to this problem are the depredations of the
Culture Wars.26 People who do not understand the source of their
dissatisfaction nevertheless crave solutions. Moreover, be they
liberal or conservative, they believe they recognize how things can
be improved. Yet, because they are operating from a platform of
ignorance, they become adamant in assertions they cannot validate.
Ideologues rather than pragmatists, they maintain that their way is
the only way. Each side of what has become a polarized battle is
certain of its virtues and, therefore, of the merit of destroying the
opposition. As self-appointed guardians of the keys of the kingdom,
they insist upon being allowed to open the door.
This unrequited culture gap is a much larger problem than is
generally recognized. Because the middle-class revolution has been
so extensive, millions of people have been swept into positions for
which they were neither emotionally nor intellectually prepared. Also
significantly, society itself has been unprepared for the dislocations
thrust upon it. Because no one could have perceived where events
were leading, no one could groom himself or herself to accommodate
them. Worse still, because none had practice in an untried future,
none could predict the innovations it would demand. Although
many have engaged in prognostications, most of their guesses have
been wrong; hence, attempts to implement them have often made
things worse. Instead of fixing what went awry, they introduced
new, and sometimes unnecessary, problems.
A Stealth Revolution
To put this in perspective, the contemporary Middle Class
Revolution is embedded in a more comprehensive series of changes.
If we are to recognize the gravity of what has transpired, it is necessary
to appreciate that human societies have undergone several magisterial
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transformations. These may be respectively designated the Symbolic
Revolution, the Agricultural Revolution, and the Commercial
Revolution. The first of these megatransformations began when
Homo sapiens moved out of Africa.27 Some sixty thousand years
ago, our ancestors were clustered in several thousand foraging bands
around East Africa’s Rift Valley.28 Perilously close to extinction
following the nuclear- winter-inducing eruption of Sumatra’s Tuva
caldera, something happened to trigger an exodus that took our
species to every corner of the globe, not excluding the ferociously
inhospitable Antarctica. Opinions differ on whether this was a
cultural or a biological advance, but the available evidence suggests
that our symbolizing abilities took a quantum leap forward.
Anthropologists’ find indications of novel art objects at
approximately the same time as the earliest of these migrations.
People began crafting beads and almost concurrently drawing pictures
on rocks. Contemporaneous evidence also suggests technological
advances, such as spear throwing, which dramatically expanded
hunting options. Paleontologists have even found remnants of
sewed clothing and musical instruments (i.e., flutes). All of this
has been interpreted as signaling a greater capacity to manipulate
mental symbols, especially linguistic ones.29 This expanded human
aptitude for communicating about things and events not present in
the immediate environment transfigured our ancestors’ abilities to
coordinate social activities.30 People could now plan their activities
with unprecedented subtlety. Whether as hunters or gatherers, they
found the efficiency of their actions improved sufficiently to provide
an edge over competing carnivores.31 Unlike, let us say, lions, our
forefathers could now plan ambushes of unsurpassed refinement. In
any event, this Symbolic Revolution saw better-equipped and betterprovisioned human beings march across Asia into Australia, Europe,
and, ultimately the Americas. With their lifestyles profoundly
altered, within a few short millennia, they had multiplied to several
million globetrotting souls.
This advance continued until the oscillations of the Ice Age
placed stress on their mounting populations, most notably in the
Middle East.32 As previously well-watered areas became desiccated,
the inhabitants turned to expanding the acreage devoted to local
cereal crops. By some ten to twelve thousand years ago, this strategy
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had evolved into protoagriculture. First embodied in a diggingstick horticulture, within a few thousand years, irrigated cultivation
launched the Agricultural Revolution.33 Instead of depending upon
the bounty of untrammeled nature, farmers could manipulate plants
and animals to increase the available foodstuffs. This quickly initiated
a spectacular growth in population densities. More than this, it
changed how humans were distributed. Where before virtually
everyone was nomadic, a majority now settled down to tend their
crops. Farmsteads almost immediately evolved into villages, thence
into towns, and, in due course, into cities. Soon enough, village
headmen developed into kings and emperors. As a result, there were
not only more people, but they were consolidated into larger political
entities. They also acquired greater wealth. Wandering bands can
accumulate little property. Because they must physically carry
whatever they possess, these objects cannot be unduly burdensome.
Village dwellers, in contrast, can own houses, some of which can
be impressive brick edifices. Moreover, they can supply these with
furniture, hanging decorations, and extensive wardrobes. They are
able, in short, to acquire extensive goods that others may come to
covet and wish to appropriate for themselves.34 This transforms
clashes between foraging bands over hunting territories into piratical
warfare in quest of booty. Villages raid other villages and kingships
conquer other kingships. In a sense, this is the origin of history as
we know it,35 with protonations contesting with one another to see
which could extend its sway over the largest and most prosperous
areas.
Thomas Hobbes36 in his pioneering social speculations imagined
a state of nature in which a war of all against all was endemic. This
could be said to describe the earliest political entities in that these
appropriated what superior martial strength enabled them to seize.
But, as Hobbes made clear, this is a tenuous way to improve one’s
material condition. Rather than risk the losses endemic to brigandage,
people soon developed mechanisms of trade. They would now
exchange the goods they produced with others who possessed objects
they desired. This was safer and became widespread. Indeed, trade
existed long before agricultural prosperity enhanced its attractions.
Archeological digs make it plain that pre-sapien hominids engaged
in long-distance transactions. Scarce, yet highly coveted, resources
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such as flint for tool making or seashells for necklaces have been found
far from their point of origin. What the Agricultural Revolution
accomplished was to swell these contacts in terms of the volumes
traded, the types of materials exchanged, and the distances covered.
Finally, this trade became so extensive that it triggered a change in
kind. The exact cause of this transformation is difficult to pinpoint,
but the advent of money seems the likeliest cause. What transpired
may be designated the Commercial Mega-Revolution. Like its
predecessors, it initiated huge modifications over an extended period
of time. Neither its Symbolic, nor Agricultural, antecedent achieved
its ends within tens or even hundreds of years; each literally took
millennia to unfold. The same is true of the Commercial upheaval. It
began over six hundred years before the Common Era and continues
to wreak massive alterations in how people subsist. Some trace the
starting point of this progression to the invention of literacy.37 They
suggest that as agricultural production rose, it became necessary to
keep track of inventories. Taxing agencies, such as the pharaoh’s
temples, needed to identify who had paid them what, how much
was on hand, and how much of this was to be distributed where.
Symbols that mutated from the spoken word to scratches in mud
or dyes on parchment served the trick. Soon, it became apparent
that this technology could amplify commerce by facilitating longdistance communication and by reducing misunderstandings. In the
long run, without writing, the bookkeeping attendant to large-scale
economic operations would not have been possible.
Nevertheless, the invention of coinage seems to have been
more crucial. Before there was a standardized medium of exchange,
merchants depended upon barter. They would swap an agreed
upon volume of olive oil for a specified amount of grain. This was
inconvenient in that it was difficult to determine commensurate
value. Even more upsetting was that fact that what one person had
for exchange might not be what the other desired. Money solved
this problem by providing an instrument that could be exchanged
at a later date for a third product from a third party. The result
was an inducement to business that has not subsided in over two
thousand years. Where once the possession of land and its riches,
and before that of a hunting territory and its bounty, made for social
power, the treasures of the marketplace became paramount. These
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now dominate our world and have converted our species into the
masters of a planet.
Karl Marx, in what is still the dominant interpretation of social
evolution,38 attributed the shape of human societies to economic
matters. In priding himself on being a hardheaded materialist, he
asserted that those who controlled the means of economic production
dominated succeeding civilizations. Where once aristocrats were
supreme because they owned the land from which agricultural
wealth was derived, capitalists replaced them by monopolizing the
machinery from which industrial affluence arose. To many, this
reading of events has seemed unduly mechanistic. They protest
against its antihuman quality and insist that spiritual and emotional
factors also be considered. Although it may sound as if in talking
about agricultural and commercial revolutions, Marx’s materialism is
merely being updated, this would be a mistake. Economics matters,
but it is not the whole story. True, how people produce and distribute
goods influences lifestyles, but this does not occur in a vacuum. For
starters, economics is not, as it were, the prime mover of all events.
Production and distribution also have their causes. The Agricultural
Revolution, for instance, might never have occurred had not climatic
changes forced hungry Middle Easterners to look elsewhere for food.
Nor would they have been able to find the precursors to the wheat
and barley that saved them from starvation had not the aridity of
their region favored the biological evolution of large-seeded grains.
Second, economics has influences that redound to alter its own
conditions. The way people earn livings can modify their social,
political, medical, technological, and religious situations such that
their economic institutions are themselves profoundly affected. It
is, therefore, as essential to understand their dynamics as those of
the economy. There is such an interplay among them that one who
is only concerned with economics can never understand the large
picture.
From the foregoing discussion, we can begin to examine the Great
Middle-Class Revolution. As we shall soon see, this has been a social
revolution, not merely an economic one. In recent decades, there has
been increased interest in social change in general. The conditions
of modern existence have transmuted so rapidly that ordinary people
cannot but notice the consequences. Forced to adjust to unexpected
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experiences, they wonder from whence these derive and, as important,
where they are headed. Will progress continue or does a new Dark
Age impend? Anxieties about a nuclear winter, global warming, and
the cultural wars jostle with dreams about technological wizardry,
egalitarian democracy, and a Methuselah-like old age. Although
futurists bombard us with their predictions, the range of divergent
explanations makes it difficult to determine which is correct.
Most of the revolutions to which contemporary prophets refer
are grounded in technological change, and the reason is plain. Who
can deny that recent advances in manufacturing and engineering
have been impressive? The plethora of automobiles, jet planes, and
electronic gadgets with which we are surrounded is nothing short
of magical compared with the standard equipment of our forebears.
A St. Thomas Aquinas could scarcely have imagined transmitting
his image via electromagnetic waves. Nor could he have fathomed
earthmovers that gulp tons of rock in a single operation. That this
physical power might be under the control of one man would have
seemed an illusion foisted upon him by the devil. It is, therefore, fitting
that we bracket the accumulation of these wonders under the rubric
of the Industrial Revolution.39 The enormous progress in our ability
to manipulate the environment, beginning with James Watt’s steam
engine deserves to be celebrated. So do more recent developments in
science, automation, and communications. Commemorating these
by designating specific eras the Atomic Age, the Age of Automation,
or the Information Age makes sense. Computers, in particular,
have clearly inaugurated a tremendous difference. They have made
it possible to manage unprecedented volumes of data and to apply
them to controlling vast agglomerations of machinery—virtually
without error. The problem with this emphasis, however, is that
it minimizes the human element. People are portrayed as having
to adjust to novel technologies, not as having undergone enormous
changes in how they organize themselves. Yet the resulting social
changes too have been vast.
Social scientists have not been totally oblivious to this conundrum.
In consequence, many have described contemporary developments
under such rubrics as modernism and postmodernism.40 These
concepts, like the more sociologically technical term Gesellschaft,41
are related to the emergence of mass societies in which, although
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they are interdependent, most people are strangers to one another.
They may live in massive urban agglomerations, jostle one another
on crowded sidewalks and highways, and partake of the same plasticwrapped consumer products without ever taking note of one another’s
existence. The difficulty is that most of us would be hard pressed to
define these concepts. What exactly is modernism and how does it
differ from postmodernism? Beyond the fact that these are somehow
related to what presently exists, to what do they refer?
References to a Middle Class Revolution do not suffer from
this difficulty. Social Class is obviously social in its orientation. It
refers directly to a crucial aspect of human relationships. People
are hierarchical animals. They naturally rank themselves in terms of
relative power. This has been true of every society, beginning with
those of our remote hunter-gatherer ancestors. It is even more the
case with the mass societies with which we are familiar. Nevertheless
the patterns through which social stratification are expressed have
varied with time and place. Social class is not the only way that
people have ranked themselves. They have also constructed casteand estate-based civilizations. Indeed, the prominence of social class
can be traced directly to the Commercial Revolution. Absent the
economic dominance of market-based relationships, people could
not make the distinctions between upper, middle, and lower classes
that they do. Nor, of course, could they discuss a Middle-Class
Revolution.
This reordering of social connections has, in turn, produced
a myriad of related changes. In order for the middle classes to
function in their appointed tasks, there have been modifications
to other social institutions. Not just how economic transactions
are conducted, but family relationships, politics, education, and
morality have undergone striking transformations. Nowadays, we
have grown accustomed to the resultant cultural dislocations. The
media are filled with illustrations of liberals and conservatives battling
each other over the proper way to reorganize a society they both
bemoan as out of joint. The liberals declare a preference for progress,
whereas the conservatives are alleged to be slaves to tradition. Each
year the particulars of their disputes change, but their themes remain
constant. Liberals generally clamor for more equality. They insist
that women, minorities, and gays deserve the same rights as everyone
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else. This, they declare, can be achieved by increasing the role of the
federal government in enforcing fairness. To this, conservatives reply
by demanding more freedom. They hate government interventions,
especially when these impinge on family values. Their central concern
is with merit and untrammeled competition.
So vociferous have these counterclaims become that few seem
concerned about their roots. People identify with one side or the other,
then direct their energies toward winning, not toward understanding
what is happening. A systematic exploration of a Great MiddleClass Revolution can cut through this Gordian knot. It can explain
how this heated opposition evolved. More particularly, it can clarify
how a cultural lag has contributed to misunderstandings and false
projections. According to this view, the central problem confronting
us is that those who have not fully embraced what it means to be
middle class continue to cling to idealizations that have no hope of
fruition. Both on the left and the right, individuals and associations
harboring imperfectly internalized middle-class attitudes defend
these with fantasies grounded in jejune hopes rather than careful
evaluations. When members of the middle classes are characterized
as greedy conformists, often by elements of their own stratum, our
overall understanding of the operative machinery is distorted. Yes,
some people are selfish and monotonously conventional, but others
are commensurately clever, perceptive, and selfless. Crass censure of
the middle classes per se attacks surface behaviors rather than analyzes
underlying dynamics. This is a mistake the following chapters aim to
correct. They will begin by taking a hard look at the nature of social
class. Before achieving an accurate impression of what the middle
classes have become, or are likely to develop into, it is essential to
determine the parameters of what is taking place. This cannot be
attained without first appreciating how people rank themselves.
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Chapter 2

Social Class
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of
class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebian,
lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word,
oppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to
each other, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden,
now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a
revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the
common ruin of the contending classes. (Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto)
From each according to his abilities, to each according to his
needs. (Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program)
I am more and more convinced that man is a dangerous
creature and that power, whether vest in many or a few,
is ever grasping, and like the grave, cries “Give, give!”
(Abigail Adams, Letter to John Adams)
Hierarchies
Karl Marx had a dream.1 He imagined a world of perfect
egalitarianism. The spirit of competition instilled by capitalism
would be erased once communism took effect. First personal
property would be abolished. As long as people vied to determine
who could acquire the most wealth, they would inflict injuries to
maintain their advantages. Once everything was owned in common,
the motivation to obtain a bigger portion of the pie would vanish.
After this, government itself would wither away. Since its primary
function was to protect the property of the rich, it would lose its
raison d’etre and become an anachronism. As a consequence, people
would gain control over their own destinies. Choosing whether to
go fishing in the morning or to amble down to the factory in the
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afternoon, would be at their discretion. No one would be anyone
else’s master; hence, not only would everyone be equal, all would be
free.
The problem with this vision is that it is utterly fanciful. No
human society has ever been totally without property or totally
emancipated from competition. Nor has any large-scale society been
able to subsist without a government. Capitalism did not cause these
things; hence ridding ourselves of the marketplace cannot save us
from them. To repeat a truism affirmed in Chapter 1, we human
beings are hierarchical animals. We are biologically evolved to rank
ourselves against one another. An accumulation of property is one of
the standards used to establish relative position, but it is not the only
one. Nor is property a recent, or arbitrary, invention. The rudiments
of personal ownership go back to before there were modern human
beings. Even monkeys hoard bananas. For that matter, monkeys
also have hierarchies. They, too, make distinctions between what
ethologists designate as alpha, beta, and gamma animals.
Even so, Americans have been peculiarly vulnerable to egalitarian
appeals. As early as the 1830s, the young French visitor, Alexis de
Tocqueville,2 was impressed with how equal everyday relationships
seemed to be. Ordinary workers, that is, those of Ben Franklin’
apron-wearing class, would approach him on terms of absolute
parity. As a member of his own nation’s minor nobility, he was at
first taken aback. At home, none of the peasants in the village for
which his family was named would have dared grab his hand and
shake it the way these ex-colonials did. So far as Americans were
concerned, everyone was created equal, with no one inherently
superior to anyone else. Some, to be sure, were wealthier, but this
was deemed a temporary condition. As Tocqueville also observed,
even the lowliest citizens seemed to have an eye for the main chance.
They were all sure that some day one of their speculations would
pay off. Their land holdings in the West would sell at an enormous
profit, or the small business they were about to start would flourish
on a scale comparable to Franklin’s. Then, it would their turn to be
honored as self-made men.
Tocqueville was ambivalent about this. Although he had come
to the United States to study why its democracy, as opposed to
France’s, had taken root, he continued to believe that aristocratic
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privilege was the surest guarantee of civilization. That a barely literate
backwoodsman such as Davy Crockett could get elected to Congress
struck him as folly. Americans might have a greater opportunity to
get ahead, but “the democratic sentiment of envy was expressed in
a thousand different ways.” Because they were convinced that they
could succeed, undistinguished provincials resented others who got
there before them. But, herein lay a paradox. Americans might
deny the inequalities in their midst, overtly acting as if these did
not exist, but they nevertheless pursued personal advantage with
gusto. From the lowest to the highest, they admired, yet resented,
the accomplishments of John Jacob Astor.3 Who was he to grow
rich on the fur trade while they were plodding along in comparative
obscurity?
One of the odd contradictions that has persisted into modern
times is the presence of social climbing cheek by jowl with an
antipathy toward it. Marx assumed that people would one day be
motivated by generosity rather than covetousness. This, however,
has not been the New World experience. Many publishers have filled
their coffers by purveying books that simultaneously celebrate success
while ridiculing its excesses. Henry James4 did this in his novels;
Vance Packard5 did it in his nonfictional The Status Seekers; and Paul
Fussell6 accomplished it in Class: A Guide Through the American
Status System. Each of these works clucks about the absurdity of
trying to be better than the next guy but in its very details reveals
an obsession with the trivia of social stratification. More recently
in a book the Los Angeles Times called the best of the year, Joseph
Epstein7 dissected the ins and outs of snobbery. His subject (i.e.,
the symbols that people flaunt in order to demonstrate their preeminence) was sufficiently fascinating to make the book a bestseller.
The games that people play to increase, or appear to increase,
their status are legion. If Epstein is to be believed, more ingenuity is
expended in the pursuit of invidious prominence than on attaining
substantive achievements. Snobs, as he makes plain, are people who
engage in social climbing by means of the external manifestations
of success. They hold themselves a cut above others because they
can distinguish a rare wine from vin ordinaire or a Bentley from a
Rolls Royce. Where they live, the schools their children attend, and
the clubs to which they belong take on a life-and-death significance.
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God forbid they wear a sharkskin suit; someone might suspect them
of being a Mafioso. Theirs is a world filled with awards, pointless
philanthropies, and mind-numbing cocktail parties. It is also one
permeated by superficial relationships chosen for their networking
opportunities rather than their emotional depth. And yet, these
people are doing what feels important. Even their phony status
seems of inestimable worth. Were they to inhabit a Marxist utopia,
they might take consolation in being able to do the giving to others
in need on the assumption that liberality garners status points.
This mania with social standing is not exclusively human. Many
social animals are hierarchical. They too spend inordinate amounts
of time seeking and defending status, as opposed to food or sex.
The primatologist Frans de Waal8 has documented this propensity
for a variety of species. One of these is the Rhesus monkey. De
Waal begins a chapter on ranking systems among these primates
by apologizing for drawing an analogy with social-class behavior,
but this comparison is altogether apropos. These creatures, too,
develop biologically linked orders that determine with whom they
will socialize and how well they will prosper. According to de
Waal, “being on top of the social ladder is not merely a pleasant,
comfortable position for a wild monkey: it determines her life span
and reproduction.” A dominant female will get to eat better than
her lesser-ranking peers, while her babies will stand a better chance
of surviving into adulthood. Engaging in fights to determine who
is more powerful, is not due to meanness of temper or momentary
boredom. She may not consciously understand what is at stake,
but evolution has provided the motivation to seek victories in such
conflicts. Indeed, those she defeats are similarly motivated; hence
when they lose, they are dismayed.
Thanks to Newt Gingrich, de Waal is best known for his
observations of chimpanzee hierarchies. Gingrich recommended
Chimpanzee Politics9 as instructive about what happens among
human beings; as indeed it is. Our nearest relatives were once thought
of as cute circus entertainers, but this was because most people were
exposed only to juvenile animals trained to give such performances.
Adult chimps were not used because they are too large, too strong,
and too aggressive. On their own, they can be lethal to human beings
and to troop mates. As a result, it was not until the last half century
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that their natural behaviors became known. Careful surveillance in
the wild and in naturalistic zoo settings made it plain that they were
not merely endearing; they could also be assertive and obstinate. De
Waal did his initial studies at the Netherlands’ Arnhem Zoo where he
quickly discovered that male animals, in particular, were preoccupied
with asserting dominance.
These dominant males seemed to take joy in violent displays
of power. They would race around their enclosure with their fur
standing on end to magnify their size, screaming as loudly as they
could and throwing loose items in the direction of bystanders.
Intimidation was the obvious aim of the exercise. Lesser-ranking
males and females were given to understand who was in charge, with
fear the best way to instill this knowledge. But isolated outbursts
were insufficient. No male, no matter how strong, could stand up
against the united fury of the entire band. What was essential to
maintain control was alliances. Two or three males in concert could
defeat most challenges from below. As a consequence, the males
were continuously jockeying for position amongst themselves. If
two of them established what seemed to be a firm coalition, a third
might plot to disrupt their comity. If he succeeded, the one who was
displaced would scheme on how to return the favor. Sometimes,
even the females entered these doings. When an especially oppressive
male obtained control, the females might insert themselves into the
fray to remove the bully from his perch. So serious were the shifting
tides of these conflicts that death might end the reign of a hitherto
unchallengeable ruler.
Among people, too, contending for dominance is more than a
game. Human struggles for hierarchical paramountcy can sometimes
be deadly, as in the case of warfare. But they are also a sport, something
literally pursued for fun. Despite their denials of ambition, even the
most democratic human beings hate to lose. They love the idea of
winning so much that they invent opportunities for victory over and
above those generated by contests for actual social power. Why else
do people play baseball or football? Why else do they exult when
someone on the home team hits a home run or crosses the goal line
to score a touchdown? These objectives are utterly arbitrary, but,
as markers of success, they make people feel good. Beyond this,
symbolically stomping an opponent into the ground is experienced
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as joyful. Indeed, there is so much delight in figuratively climbing
to the top of the heap that mere fans chant in excitement when their
team is number one. In this respect, if none other, they feel dominant
and will taunt the losers for their comparative weakness.
Women, as well as men, take pleasure in victory. In this age of
feminist rhetoric, political correctness demands that cooperation be
valued above competition. We are all supposed to contribute to the
same team and, following Marxism, are forbidden to assume that
we are better than anyone else; but this is theory. Even feminists
like to win, and when they do not, as when Clarence Thomas was
appointed to the Supreme Court, they hold a grudge. Like one of de
Waal’s chimpanzees, they conspire for the day they can depose their
tormentors. Nor do women bestow their favors on men who are
complaisant. Although avant-garde women boast of seeking sensitive
partners, they never crow about their being losers. If anything, in
their self-righteous posturing, these feminists position themselves as
morally superior to their less enlightened rivals. In short, hierarchical
aspirations are universal. How they are expressed may differ from
person to person and society to society, but the underlying objective
is similar. In contemporary America, the most noteworthy venue for
these longings is social class. Such yearnings may be disparaged, yet
they are enormously consequential. Paradoxically, they are also a vast
improvement over conceivable alternatives. Social-class ambitions
are thought of as malicious and vapid but only in comparison with
more idealistic vanities. The middle classes, as silly and nasty as they
occasionally are, have contributed immensely to the triumph of
human comfort and achievement. Their relatively gentle dominance
has paid off handsomely, not just for them, but for mankind in
general.
A Range of Options
Human hierarchies take many forms.10 Some social scientists
have denied their existence because they are so variable. They say
that people can organize themselves anyway they please, including in
complete parity. According to this view, since all human behaviors
are learned, if parents raise their children to be egalitarian, the next
generation will be classless. This was the objective of the Soviets
in promoting indoctrination to create the communist man.11
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Contemporary feminists have a similar goal. They seek to instill
androgynous attitudes wherein the genders are absolutely equal.12
Despite this, human variability does not correspond to such a
thoroughgoing plasticity. There is a broad range of possibilities
wherein people operate, but this is far from infinite. The parameters
within which specific pecking orders evolve are bounded by biological,
environmental, and social imperatives. These limitations may not be
obvious to those engaged in scuffling for social advantage but can
be discerned by examining their scope. Moreover, it is critical to
do so because what is unique about class systems, and particularly
about the middle classes, cannot be appreciated without perceiving
them in context. It is easy to disparage the drawbacks of their social
arrangements when perceived in isolation. When measured against
the shortcomings of competing schemas, however, they become
attractive.
In sociology, it is rarely possible to do experiments. Societies
hardly ever present themselves for objective manipulation. Frequently,
the best that can be done is to analyze naturally occurring test cases.
Fortunately, recorded history has been kind. Diverse civilizations
have come and gone leaving sufficient residues for us to speculate
about why they might have differed.13 And they have differed
often amazingly so! If we start with the smallest of communities,
namely hunter-gatherer bands, we discover a way of life that has
largely disappeared but that was nevertheless the one from which
we evolved. Even today, people limit themselves to small numbers
of close friends, very much in accord with the conditions of these
earlier groups. Up until a mere ten thousand years ago, all human
beings functioned as foragers. Yet, the demise of this way of life has
been so complete that we are forced to speculate about preliterate
social arrangements. True, there are contemporary hunter-gatherers,
but they are marginalized exceptions. Thrust by more powerful
civilizations into challenging environments such as the Arctic Circle
or the Kalahari Desert, their relatively egalitarian dealings may be
a product of having lost clashes with their more successful cousins.
The Inuit and the Khoisan must of necessity travel in undersized,
super-cooperative units precisely because their homelands provide
few resources and many dangers. When a meager several millennia
ago foraging was the norm, our forebears journeyed through more
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generous landscapes, the social specifics of which must per force
remain unknown.
The sort of small-scale society then extant has been called
Gemeinschaft.14 Most wandering groups probably never topped
one hundred and fifty before they split into rival communities. The
reason was simple. Foragers need space to find sufficient provisions
to keep them alive. Because any given territory will contain a
limited supply of prey animals and edible plants, survival depends
on population control. As Thomas Malthus15 conjectured, this
could be accomplished through famine, disease, or warfare. In any
event, people got to know each other intimately. Having grown up
together, faced hardships together, and overcome adversity together,
these early humans formed relationships that were intensely personal.
Daily engaged in face-to-face activities, they encountered ongoing
opportunities to take each other’s measure. This enabled them to
become familiar with one another’s weaknesses and to take these into
account when determining rank.
Although modern collectivists like to imagine an idyllic past
during which everyone was completely equal, hunting bands—
especially when they survived by killing large game--- probably could
not have managed this way. We know from their middens that our
remote ancestors were capable of bringing down mammoths. Yet,
it is impossible to imagine their doing so without tightly controlled
hierarchies. Someone had to be in charge of the chase, and this
person had to be obeyed. The alternative of freelancing would have
entailed starvation or, more probably, a gory death. To further their
joint plans, the participants probably turned to a prominent hunter
for guidance and discipline.16 Nor would discovering who was best
suited for command have been difficult. Direct observation would
have exposed hunting skills, personal magnetism, and comparative
knowledge. Until old age slowed him down, one of the elders would
likely have assumed this role. In a world without written records, a
hunter with years of experience would have proven a fund of wisdom.
No one else would be as familiar with the habits of the game animals,
no one else as acquainted with the tricks of the chase.
Similar considerations applied to the gatherers, that is, to the
women. The circumstances of their contributions differed, but they
too would have valued insight and skill.17 Almost surely, an older
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woman with personal charisma and years of expertise in uncovering
suitable vegetation would achieve prominence. Given that gathering
requires less coordination, she might have exercised a control over
the group that would not have been as strict as that of her male
counterpart, but she would unquestionably have been treated as
possessing superior powers. She might also have benefited from
distinctive skills such as those of midwife or arbiter of domestic
disputes. In any event, not everyone would be considered equal.
Furthermore, the attendant respect would spontaneously have
translated into social control. This hegemony might not be absolute,
but it would have provided material and psychological advantages.
Once the Agricultural Revolution kicked into gear, the need for
hierarchy intensified, whereas the criteria for attaining prominence
changed. Larger populations, more settled living conditions, and
altered economic circumstances placed the emphasis on other
qualities. One of the first forms of distinction that took root was
that of the big man. As today can be perceived in the highlands
of New Guinea,18 village-centered horticulturalists trust their
leadership to men who display unique interpersonal talents. Almost
always articulate and productive, these persons gain status by being
role models and social intermediaries. Their associates respect them
for how they manage their gardens but, more important, for their
energy and skill in settling communal disputes. Big men tend to be
community-minded. They tirelessly develop schemes from which
others benefit while contemporaneously reducing the tensions that
arise when individuals work in close proximity. More socially astute
than their fellows, they demonstrate sufficient self-control to mediate
among antagonists who are less perceptive. Not surprisingly, this
translates into respect and influence.
Eventually, agricultural communities grow. This makes superior
status yet more problematic. With more people to know, fewer of
them can be known well. This, however, coincides with greater needs
for social discipline. Specifically, as prosperity increases, people
acquire more property. This gives rise to covetousness and a plethora
of disputes. Agriculturalists principally need ways to resolve issues
over land ownership. As a result, chieftainships evolve. Big men
societies depend on the spontaneous manifestation of individuals
of superior talents, but larger communities require a more reliable
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source of leadership. This is often achieved by making the position
of supreme authority elective or hereditary. The village may unite
to appoint a headman, or it may develop a tradition that the child
of the deceased headman (usually the eldest son) takes over. Here,
the trappings are a bit less personal. The qualities of the chief also
become more mystical. Less subject to direct observation, they are
as likely to be projected as perceived.
This tendency is exacerbated as agricultural communities burgeon
in size. Under these conditions, chieftains metamorphose into kings
and eventually into emperors. Small settlements amalgamate into
large towns, and the paramount leadership role becomes more
remote from ordinary villagers. Especially when irrigation becomes
prominent, there may develop what has been called hydraulic society.
Irrigation both enlarges the volume of production and creates the
need to cooperate in developing public works. The villagers must
somehow arrive at an agreement on how to divide the water supply
and the means of distributing the edible products of their labor.
This increases the desirability of powerful leadership. Under these
circumstances, a king must have the leverage to enforce his will.
Understandably, this emerging disparity in authority is apt to amplify
the monarch’s taste for command. Eventually, his power becomes
so immense that he is perceived as superhuman. Now perhaps
considered a god, he demands the perquisites of a deity and receives
them. Kingdoms and empires are hierarchies where the distance
between the top and the bottom has enormously expanded in scope.
Especially within empires, which are traditionally composed of
unrelated peoples, the leader may have little in common with those
who are led and may cease even considering them human. Under
these conditions, supremacy tends to be coercively enforced. Not
only are relationships no longer face to face, but, from the perspective
of the participants, they may appear impervious to challenge. The
comparative superiority of some seems a fact of nature one that
may be regretted but is nevertheless deemed impossible to revise.
Indeed, it may not even be regretted but be celebrated as the best of
all conceivable arrangements.
If we switch our focus from the top of the pecking order to
the next segment down, we come to the aristocracy. In kingships,
membership in the nobility is as likely to be perceived as hereditary
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as the top spot. Often biologically related to the monarch, these
individuals too may have powers conceived as divine. This sort of
hierarchy, which is widespread in agriculturally based societies, is
frequently designated an estate system. As recently as the beginning
of the French Revolution,19 France was divided into three such
estates. The clergy was theoretically on top, then came the nobility,
and finally the third estate, the commoners. Different societies
have divided these orders in distinctive ways (e.g., the Romans were
famously partitioned between the patricians and the plebeians).
What these arrangements have in common is that their alignments
are supposedly fixed. If a person is born into one of these estates, he
will theoretically die in it. Aristocrats are always noble, even if they
fall on hard times, whereas merchants are always ignoble, despite the
riches they may acquire. The rationales for these distinctions differ,
but they are generally interpreted as natural. Thus, a noble station
will sometimes be attributed to better blood or superior breeding
and at other times to Divine Right. Either way, everyone within the
hierarchy is expected to accept his/her fate.
Closely related to estate systems are caste systems.20 The difference
between these is that the latter are more rigid. Usually drawing their
legitimacy from religious sanctions, their paradigm is found in India.
Under Hinduism, it has been believed that souls migrate from one
lifetime to another, in each incarnation being reborn in line with
the karma accumulated in the previous materialization. Those who
were righteous might return as a Brahmin, with all the privileges
due this priesthood, whereas those who were evil would return as
Sudras, that is, as lower status peasants. (The intermediate castes
were the warrior Kshatriyas and the merchant Vaishas.) Changing
one’s status was, therefore, impossible. It would be tantamount to
a zebra wanting to be a horse or a horse a human being. Analogous
to caste systems are slave systems. These too offer less mobility than
estate societies. In the latter case, merchants sometimes cross the line
to become squires, but slaves are regarded as property. They cannot
rise any more than a walking stick can strike out on an independent
journey. Classified by no less an authority than Aristotle as naturally
inferior, they are thought not to possess the abilities to manage
autonomously. Biologically closer to the beasts than human beings,
they are obviously destined to be owned by their betters. Since their
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inadequacies are indelible, even manumission cannot remove the
stains of their births.
All of this contrasts markedly with social-class systems, which are
associated not with agriculture but commerce. They are the legacy
of an expanding marketplace and are characterized by greater social
mobility. Class systems, too, have an upper, a middle, and a lower
designation, but these are neither predetermined nor permanent.
Relative status within them can change, particularly when wealth
changes. A person born a peasant, if he becomes a prosperous
merchant, thereby elevates his standing within the community.
People may remember his roots but will be dazzled by his later
munificence. It is even possible for him to mount to the summit of
such a society. To cite an obvious illustration, John D. Rockefeller21
began life in obscurity yet ultimately climbed to be the equivalent of
royalty. During his lifetime, he and his ilk were disparaged as robber
barons. Though not literally aristocrats, they lived as opulently and
with as much influence as their medieval counterparts.
Also characteristic of social class is a decentralization of power.
Decision-making is less concentrated on the top, with people lower
in rank having greater control over their own fates. Generally, they
too get to determine local issues, such as where to live or what job
to perform, frequently in an idiosyncratic fashion. Moreover, classoriented societies are characterized by their anonymity. Because they
are massive agglomerations, such societies are populated by people
who do not personally know each other. Their relationships are not
face-to-face; hence, even though they depend on one another for
their daily sustenance, they cannot directly judge relative power.
Under these conditions money becomes a surrogate for power, albeit
an imperfect one.
Social class could not exist outside market-oriented communities.
The requisite mobility and anonymity are not possible without the
flexibility inherent in large-scale commerce. To begin with, trading
property provides opportunities for an accumulation of wealth that
are not available in agricultural societies. By the same token, the
sorts of power that facilitate social prominence are market related.
Many, such as a talent for numbers, are directly connected with what
is needed to flourish in commercial ventures. Of special relevance
to the Middle Class Revolution is that such capabilities become
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increasingly concentrated in the middle classes. To an unprecedented
degree, members of this stratum monopolize the skills needed to
organize a modern economy. As a result, their impact and control
rise. And with control comes respect and enhanced status.
Still, the middle classes have been reluctant to assume the mantle
of their success. Many among them deny their prominence and
continue to think of the upper classes as in charge. The inevitable
question is Why? Why they are not as proud of their preeminence
as were their predecessors? The answer lies in the circumstances of
its achievement. Because their positions are inherently mobile and
anonymous, they are individually bedeviled by insecurities. Never
quite sure of where they stand or how long they will stand there,
they adopt a defensive modesty or, conversely, a defensive snobbery.22
Either they hope to be camouflaged by being unassuming in their
claims or they attempt to be intimidating by professing unsupported
ones. Theirs is an ambivalence born of uncertainty. This is why
contemporary Americans display a discomfort in acknowledging
the reality of inequality side by side with their fascination with its
manifestations. While this may seem strange, a closer examination
of the nature of hierarchies should dispel the apparent contradiction.
Perhaps, it might even make this protective ignorance less necessary
by reducing the need for the destructive romanticism in which social
class has so often been cloaked.
Fundamentals
Hierarchy is a puzzling phenomenon.23 Instead of examining
how ranking systems are created and maintained, even social scientists
tend to be concerned with the way power is distributed. They want to
know who ranks higher and lower rather than why. More than this,
they are often intrigued with the possibility of rearranging these ranks.
Themselves human and, therefore, part of the status game, they play
it with enthusiasm. Usually scions of lower-status families, they have
sympathized traditionally with the underdogs. As a consequence,
rather than study social class per se, they become absorbed with
exploring the social movements they believe will promote a more just
allocation of influence. This has attracted their attention to larger
social arrangements rather than to the smaller processes of which
they are composed. As a result, scholars have missed the fundamental
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mechanisms through which status is negotiated. Nevertheless, these
instruments are not particularly strange nor difficult to understand.
Indeed, they will be instantly recognizable to most readers. Nor
are they unique. Although they differ in detail from some other
hierarchical mechanisms found within the animal kingdom, they are
continuous with them. The central machinery is essentially the same
distinguished among humans primarily by a greater complexity and
greater dependence on the intricacies of symbolic communication.
The most important building block of hierarchies is the test of
strength.24 Individuals determine where they stand in the scheme of
things in concrete clashes whereby they compare their power with
specific others. They literally face off in activities designed to exhibit
their relative vigor. Just as rams butt heads to settle who is physically
more powerful, people engage in analogous matches. They match up,
perhaps in a fistfight, to see who will win. After this combat is over,
one is acknowledged the victor and the other the loser. Typically the
loser breaks off the engagement by signaling deference to his now
determined superior. Among sheep and other animals, this victory
is rewarded by access to fertile females; among humans, the forms of
compensation are more extensive. Reproductive benefits may follow,
but so does access to greater resources and superior authority within
group activities.
One of the major differences among humans and other animals
is that our tests of strength cover a greater range of powers than
do theirs. With rams, the arena is biologically determined. The
battle will be horn against horn, the triumph going to the physically
more potent. Among people, there are similar contests, with the
laurels going to the better wrestler or the more skilled rifle shooter.
Nonetheless, what counts as stronger can widely vary. Because we
use tools to augment our muscle power, success can depend as much
on the skillful manipulation of a weapon as on brute force. More
than this, because we are social creatures, the person who prevails
may be the one with better social skills. As we shall shortly see,
alliances matter; hence, the person who can demonstrate superior
communicative abilities may prevail over the one who has spent years
working out in a gymnasium. Good talkers frequently outmaneuver
the heavy-fisted in a manner that no male sheep could emulate.
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The test of strength, however, is but the starting point of
hierarchical supremacy. Winning one changes the conditions
under which the players operate. Of crucial significance is the
transformation in their reputations.25 Owing to human cognitive
abilities, the combatants will note what has occurred and modify
their behaviors accordingly. To begin with, the victor obtains a
reputation for being more powerful, which discourages the loser from
challenging the outcome. Correspondingly, the loser is judged less
powerful and, therefore, easier to defeat. These beliefs stabilize their
relationship such that the victor is recognized as stronger and his
position is not challenged—that is, until the circumstances appear to
have changed. By the same token, bystanders will be impressed by
these events. They, too, will reckon the victor stronger and the loser,
weaker. This will then influence their own hierarchical standing in
that it may decide whom they attempt to challenge. Clearly, they
will shy away from confronting those with commanding reputations
but will be undeterred by those with weaker ones. In the end, this
results in a comprehensive ranking system without every participant
having to engage in a test of strength with every other participant.
Because power is deemed transitive, the players tend not to dispute
those who appear to be stronger.
As suggested above, people also differ from other social animals
to the degree that their tests are collective events. Humans derive
their potency not merely from tool use but from the social methods
used to exploit these implements. Experience has demonstrated
that cohesive hunting parties are more effective than lone operators.
The same applies within social groups. Cohesive alliances can
defeat individual opponents in tests of strength irrespective of the
abilities of the isolated person. In almost every case, numbers matter.
This places a premium on assembling and maintaining coalitions.
Individuals with an aptitude for doing so thereby acquire a reputation
commensurate with the powers of their supporters. Being articulate,
that is, being persuasive, is, therefore, reckoned an advantage, as is
skill at log-rolling or horse-trading. As important, those who know
how to distribute rewards so as to collect pledges of loyalty have their
personal clout multiplied by the span of these promises. All of this
is encompassed under the rubric of politics. As the art of coalition
formation and management, it is at the heart of human stratification.
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More broadly, so too are intergroup relationships. Because a person’s
reputation may depend upon the group (or groups) with which he/
she is identified, the corporation for which he works,26 as well as the
ethnic community to which he/she belongs, can establish how he/
she will be treated. This may not be fair, but it is how things are.
Already it should be apparent that hierarchy formation is quite
complex. But things get worse. Human mental abilities being what
they are, people devote their intellects to scheming for hierarchical
advantage. When they lose a test of strength, they do not simply
quit; they plan ahead for an opportunity to reverse the decision.
The horizon for this preparation can cover a lifetime, and beyond.
Politics, after all, is a devious game. Prospective leaders spend years
laying the groundwork for a run at the top. They even dedicate
Herculean efforts to building political capital for the ideologies
to which they are committed. Though this may not allow them
personally to rise in status, they will have the satisfaction of believing
their party will. What is more, the ingenuity occasioned by these
plans can be awe-inspiring. Subtle ruses, abstract theories, and
multistage conspiracies all contribute to their fruition, so may an
ability to think on one’s feet. Since victory does not always go to the
best-designed strategy, one adjusted to unexpected contingencies can
fare best. Flexibility of thought, not raw intelligence or effort, thus
becomes the determining factor.
To all this must be added a further layer of complexity which
applies specifically to social-class systems. In the hierarchies
characteristic of hunter-gatherers, all of the players know one
another. Their reputations for power are personal reputations
and their alliances are finite combinations. Because the number
of players is small, all are observable to all. This capacity vanishes
once a community’s size passes a certain threshold. In societies in
which social class operates, the limit has long since been surpassed.
The anonymity of these communities has already been noted, but
its implications have not. In a world of strangers, it is impossible
for everyone to be familiar with everyone else. It is, therefore, also
impossible for them to compare their personal strengths directly. They
depend instead upon appearances. Symbols of strength substitute
for demonstrations of potency, as may symbols of party affiliation for
visible attachments. In creatures with as finely tuned communicative
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skills as ourselves, refinements of language, variations in fashion, and
the material opportunities of wealth are adapted to send messages
about relative positions. As we know, the accents with which a
person speaks, the labels on a shirt collar, and the horsepower of an
automobile can all declare the social stratum to which one belongs.
Yet, as we also know, these symbols can lie. They may be used to
indicate powers and associations that do not exist. Is this not what
snobbery is about? It exists because an ability to put on airs makes it
difficult to establish the correct rankings. Nevertheless, this sort of
manipulation is part of the game. Nature imposes no rules against
deceit or impression management in establishing status. Indeed, it
provides the instruments for doing so.
It must also be noted that symbols are related to signs. Some
social theorists suggest that the symbols of rank are arbitrary.27
They complain that the upper classes routinely invent indicators of
supremacy in order to lord it over their subordinates. This, however,
reverses the order of appearance. Most symbols of power arise from
signs of power. That which is associated with strength—sometimes
even causative of it—can be confounded with power itself. To be
more concrete, during the Middle Ages, members of the aristocracy
owed their positions largely to a monopoly on military leadership.
Born to be warriors, they often made their rounds armed with the
tools of their trade. These were eventually transmuted into symbols
of status. Wearing a sword, which began as a sign of one’s noble
occupation, transmuted into a symbol of membership in the upper
class. When merchants ultimately acquired the means to aspire to
titles, they, too, took to girding themselves in swords. It mattered
not that these were irrelevant to their trade; they made a statement
nonetheless. Even less directly associated with power were epaulets.
These shoulder boards were originally used as protection against
sword strokes. As such, they too were a sign of military connections.
When, however, they came to symbolize power, the affectation spread
far beyond its initial rationale.
Another common error is depicting emblems of power as
symbols of violence. Critics of status are offended by the implied
coercion, yet this is an overreaching. Being able to quote Shakespeare
might convey the message that one is culturally sophisticated, and,
ergo, of higher status, but it is not intended to inflict physical injury.
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The central goal is to intimidate, not destroy. Symbols of power
are designed to produce victory in tests of strength. If an opponent
can be convinced that the way one speaks betokens aptitudes and
alliances that cannot be surmounted, he may back down without
resorting to a confrontation. The idea is to avoid violence. If the
loser feels injured after such a clash, this pain remains less than would
be that of the alternative. Indeed, many animals use symbols of
strength to limit the need for jarring battles. Baboons, for instance,
show off their formidable canine teeth before they sink them into an
opponent’s flesh. Better for all concerned if the loser decides to back
off from this alone.
The strengths that decide status, and their symbolic manipulations,
have varied with the historical period. Clearly, neither swords nor
epaulets wield the powers they once did. The underlying notion of
relative power has not changed, but how this is expressed has been
dramatically modified. Some authorities insist that status is socially
constructed and from this they erroneously draw the conclusion that
it can be reconstructed any way they wish. In the sense that tests
of strength create realities that did not exist before them, they are
correct. But in the sense that they can independently and arbitrarily
alter the results of these contests, they are not. As theorists, they
imagine that they stand outside the fray directing traffic within it,
but they cannot. Like anyone else, they are able to revise hierarchies
to the extent that they are contingent upon the powers brought
to bear. If these are inferior to those who oppose them, the odds
are they will fail. Nor can they redefine the symbols of power to
accommodate their personal whims. Merely declaring these to
have been “reconstructed” does not impose new meanings. Actual
historical contexts are responsible for such amendments.
The question that must now be considered is what constitutes
strength in a society dominated by the middle classes. Clearly,
what predominates in an industrial society will not be the same as
what did among hunter-gatherers. Neither will what constitutes
power be identical within every segment of such a society. That
which earns status among professional baseball players is not what
produces respect among college professors.28 Complex societies,
including social-class societies, are composed of multiple overlapping
hierarchies. In fact, people can simultaneously belong to many
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different ranked communities. Thus, one might be a person of great
consequence among one’s lodge brothers but of little moment on
the loading dock. Power is not indivisible; hence neither is relative
power. Someone can be influential in one area but not in another.
This may be confusing, but it provides opportunities to rescue one’s
self-respect from defeat in one area by compensating with a victory
elsewhere.
What this means is that there is a fundamental indeterminacy
in the ranking systems of large-scale societies. Even an omniscient
observer could not precisely locate every participant. Despite this,
there is a tendency to crave exactness in a way that is only superficially
possible. Because people want to know where they—and others—
stand, they make arbitrary divisions that are at best approximations.
Social class is, in reality, a dynamic continuum. People may be
higher or lower in specific respects at selected moments, but there
are no official barriers separating their statuses. Individuals talk
of there being just two classes (the rich and everyone else) or of
three classes (the upper, the middle, and the lower), but these are
provisional political demarcations. A Marxist might prefer to defend
the twofold division since it implies that almost everyone can be
recruited to overthrow the capitalists. Someone proud of personal
accomplishments might, on the other hand, insist on a middle rank
to which that individual can belong. As has often been remarked,
the way things look depends upon where one stands. But it can also
depend on one’s objectives. Republicans and Democrats see things
differently, in part, because their incomes differ but more so because
they view voting patterns differently. Since each side wants to win
and doing so depends on assembling far-reaching coalitions, they
perceive these potential assemblages through polarized prisms. They
figuratively divide the territory they observe based on their hopes
not merely on their personal resources, the one party discerning
a nation of haves and have-nots, the other decrying class warfare.
In any event, the underlying continuities of social class should not
be forgotten. Their ambiguities will have an impact irrespective of
whether these are acknowledged.
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Sources of Power
The sources of hierarchical strength have modified over time,
but their outlines are fairly clear. Primary among these is military
strength. People hate the idea that might makes right, but there
is a sense in which it does. Those who can compel others to do
their bidding also exercise control over how they think and feel. The
respect they extract surrounds them with an aura that makes them
appear righteous no matter how much pain they inflict. Hitler29
was genuinely loved before his Wehrmacht was dismantled. So was
Stalin,30 even as his policies starved millions of Kulaks to death. It
has become a cliché that the victors rewrite history in their favor,
but their advantage kicks in long before that. Their raw ability to
threaten harm draws admiration from those forced to look up at
them. This may at first be grudging, but in the end it is often wholehearted.
Power is the ability to get people to behave in specified ways even
if they wish to do otherwise. It can be exercised gently, as through
persuasion, but when the crunch comes, it can be brutal. If coercion
is possible, and nothing else works, it is likely to be employed. Tests of
strength may not be about violence, yet, when all else fails, aggression
is frequently the only source of intimidation at hand. The problem
with physical force, of course, is that it can be met with countervailing
force. People get hurt when someone decides to impose his will no
matter what the cost. The victim of violence may be its target, but
it can also be the assailant. Initiating a battle does not inoculate an
attacker against defeat. Nor are innocent bystanders guaranteed free
passes. Violence has a way of spilling over in every direction. In fact,
it may intentionally be focused on the innocent in the expectation
that their defeat will send a signal to one’s competitors. Despite
their prospective damage, military confrontations are a constant.
As far as it is possible to tell, belligerent skirmishes long preceded
the advent of recorded history. Death and destruction were the fall
back position in tests of strength, even when inflicted by spears and
arrows.
Physical strength continues to be a fact of everyday life. People
judge one another on their apparent ability to trounce others.
Feminists are fond of pointing out that, in a mechanized world,
muscle power is not as indispensable as it once was. This may be true,
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but it is still a sign of power to which people react. Tall people are
at first glance assumed to be stronger and smarter than more petite
colleagues. Should the long and the short walk into a room side by
side, it is the long that invites attention. Yet, experience can reverse
this judgment, as occurred with the Civil War’s Phil Sheridan.31
No more than five foot, four inches in height, Sheridan was not
initially perceived as officer material by President Lincoln. However,
after Sheridan’s dashing cavalry victories in the Shenandoah Valley,
Lincoln opined that he was just the right size. Actual physical success
impresses people. This is so much the case that during the Middle
Ages legal disputes were sometimes settled in trials by combat. He
who could best an opponent in a test of military skill was assumed to
have earned a divine imprimatur.
Before the arrival of agriculture, a community’s best fighter might
be regarded as a hero and rewarded with leadership in battle and
deference afterwards. Even later, as recorded in the Bible, pastoral
peoples regarded their champions as special, hence the tale of David
and Goliath. Still retold with admiration, this chronicle of how a
boy felled a giant exemplifies the bravery that is a steppingstone to
kingship. Unfortunately for the cult of the lone Hercules, more
organized military prowess soon gained hegemony. Because personal
power pales in comparison with the armed energies of a community,
organized warfare became the standard of hierarchical superiority.
The Greeks32 could regard themselves as a natural aristocracy after
inflicting decisive defeats on the Persians at Salamis and Platea.
Their phalanxes and fleet operations proved capable of repelling far
greater numbers.33 More impressive yet were the conquests of Julius
Caesar.34 Caesar was able to overcome Celtic hordes despite their
large personal size and imposing broad swords. His legions, armed
as they were with the shorter gladius, could prevail on the battlefield
thanks to superior discipline. Well trained and intelligently led, they
could cooperate to a degree their more individualized foes could
not. Blue war paint and ferocious demeanor did not compensate
for shields stubbornly held alongside one another, especially when
accompanied by sword thrusts from below. This ability to bring
dependable alliances to the battlefield made the Romans masters
of Europe and Caesar the dictator of an empire. It even produced
a month of the year named after him. In this case, collaborative
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military prowess elevated the Italics to cultural dominance over a
continent and their commander-in-chief to dominance over the state
and historical imaginations.
Later, the Romans would fall to the resurgent barbarians. No
longer able to impose coercion over now better-organized antagonists,
they fell victim to alliances more potent than their own. Notably,
the military power of these invaders constituted the foundation of
later European nobility. The descendants of these adventurers might
attribute their ascendancy to divine favor or bluerblood than their
villeins, but their actual supremacy was won in a more sanguine
manner. Indeed, they could not have maintained their paramount
status were they unable to sally forth from their castles to cut down
peasants foolhardy enough to challenge them.
Another source of individual and collective power is religion.35
Stalin may have inquired of his Western allies how many divisions
the Pope commanded, but this grossly underestimated the strength
of shared beliefs. Compared with the vast expanse of nature, human
beings are puny. Small and weak measured against with the forces
of a hurricane, we are worse because we are aware of the disparity.
Ironically, superior cognitive abilities have the drawback of alerting
us to our inferiority. Much as we hate it, sooner or later, everyone
learns that he cannot dictate to destiny. Things happen—often quite
terrible things—that we cannot forestall. Loved ones die; famines
devastate entire nations; and dreams crumble to dust. At such
moments, we look for help from those who stood by us in the past,
but often they too prove frail. Our parents cannot protect us from
the death of child; our spouses cannot forestall layoffs in an industry
in decline; and trusted politicians cannot forecast a secret attack on
Pearl Harbor. Surrounded by such reverses, we long for a powerful
defender. We want someone who can rescue us as our parents once
did when we were small.
This someone is typically personified as a deity. God (or the
gods) is conceived as supernaturally powerful. Whether depicted
anthropomorphically or not, He/she is imagined to be strong enough
to intimidate any potential foe. Able even to call forth miracles,
this deity possesses such power that no ordinary rival can withstand
his/her might. An individual with God as an ally is, therefore, a
formidable adversary in a test of strength. As a result, he/she can
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attain status by terrifying others into submission. When particular
persons are perceived to be on good terms with heaven, these favored
few may thereby claim social precedence. Priests and prophets, not
just kings, can demand subservience on this basis. In promising to
visit the wrath of a hidden world on obdurate opponents, they compel
believers to do as they desire. Rather than go to hell, these others
kneel before the bishop, bequeath their riches to his church, and
sacrifice their lives in a crusade aimed at liberating their holy land.
Lest it escape notice, a theological ability to command obedience
is readily convertible into military power. The pope may not lead
organized legions, but he can inspire sanguine battles. Stalin’s
successors discovered this when a Polish pope motivated resistance
among communist Eastern European vassals. So did Saladin when
he sought to evict the Franks from the Levant. The knights with
whom he jousted wore crosses on their chests, but they were inspired
by faith in their hearts. Though ultimately forced to retreat, these
champions put up a stout resistance that was only overcome by
warriors motivated by a counterbelief.
Beyond the physical power that is thought to cling to the
supernatural, there is the potency of the normative.36 Religion is
not just about gods, it is also about moral imperatives. While still
at their mothers’ knees, children are taught that some behaviors
are unacceptable. They learn that eternal punishments await them
for violating these crucial rules. Such prescriptions then become
internalized to guide subsequent actions. Do not tell a lie is
transformed from an external command into a personal commitment.
Guilt subsequently arises at the mere thought of telling a falsehood
and prevents one from yielding to temptation. Because morality,
even when detached from religion, creates standardized obligations,
it can also create anonymous alliances. Individuals become more
powerful than their personal assets warrant when they can depend
on others to back them. This is precisely what happens in the case
of morally inculcated norms. The wife who has been betrayed by an
unfaithful husband can count upon members of her community to
frown upon a man who violates the commandment against adultery.
She will be considered the good one and (historically, at least) receive
the greater honor. The same applies to theft, where the power of the
group can come to bear in defeating the machinations of the crook.
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Indeed, a moral consensus can even provide the impetus to combat.
The Japanese learned to their sorrow that attacking the United States
before declaring war was regarded as an immoral stab in the back that
cried for retaliation. They also discovered that in losing this conflict
they could no longer maintain the pretense of being a master race.
Lastly, economic potency lends itself to prevailing in tests of
strength. As with physical and religiomoral potency, it can persuade
an opponent to accept defeat. In the days of the hunter-gatherers, the
more successful hunter garnered kudos for bringing home more meat
than his fellows. He was respected for his prowess and sought after
as good provider. When matched against his rivals, he cowed them
with a competence they could not match. Oddly enough, expertise,
too, is intimidating. When people go head-to-head over a skill, the
one who is more proficient demonstrates a strength that can be as
frightening as muscle power. It is disconcerting to be confronted
with an aptitude that makes one look weak, which is why people
hate to play tennis with someone who is better at the game and it is
why the poor feel uncomfortable being friends with the rich.
Human beings have become our planet’s dominant species, not
because we are physically stronger than other animals, but because
we can overpower them with our skills. Intelligent tool use is our
hallmark. It is the means through which we acquire the resources
to survive. Demonstrable economic prowess is thus a sign of this
supremacy.37 It is of value for what it can produce but also because of
the respect it commands. In any event, the economically successful
have surplus resources with which to influence the behaviors of others.
In a direct confrontation over power, the economically superior
can bribe their opponents to desist. These poorer others may be
offered goods as an incentive to break off challenges and rewards for
assisting in rebuffing third parties. In a sense, even formerly neutral
bystanders can become mercenaries in the incessant battles over
status. This is what happens to the employees of a corporation when,
in consideration for a paycheck, they find themselves defending the
interests of their bosses.
Nor should economic power be considered divorced from
military power. Dwight D. Eisenhower38 warned of the dangers of
a military-industrial complex. On departing office, he explained
that businessmen could control government decisions by bribing

Social Class

57

generals to favor their plans. This is nothing new. The bankers who
lent them the wherewithal to pay for their armies thereby exercised
influence over medieval monarchs. Then, as now, soldiers sometimes
fought because a charismatic hero inspired them, sometimes from
a transcendent spiritual cause, but often because they received
compensation for doing so. On occasion, the rewards came from
confiscating the property of the enemy; nevertheless, more dependable
benefits derived from paymasters with the means to afford their
services. As Red Barber might have said, this put the economically
successful in the catbird’s seat. The wealthy, to be blunt, can buy
military power. To this day, they finance the weapons upon which
battle depends. In the Middle Ages, these resources allowed kings to
purchase the cannons necessary to reduce the castles of recalcitrant
barons; in contemporary times, they have allowed the United States
to become the world’s dominant superpower.
To sum up, human power has many bases. As we will shortly
see, even military, religious, and economic potencies themselves have
numerous starting points. Today it has become commonplace to
refer to social capital.39 Some people, or groups, are said to get ahead
because they possess more of this mysterious something. Economic
capital, in contrast, is easy enough to understand. This concept
has been in use long enough for us recognize the machinery, the
technologies, and the financial resources to which it refers. Social
capital, however, is more opaque. It seems to have something to
do with the democratic principles that enable modern nation states
to function and also with the educational assets that enable persons
to prosper within them. The problem is that the requisite norms
and skills, and indeed the social networks, to which it refers, are not
specified. No doubt there are some conditions that allow individuals
and communities to rise above others to permit them to function
at higher levels. In a sense, talk of social capital is functionalism
for nonfunctionalists. It enables critics of capitalism who wish to
deny it success to admit that some qualities facilitate social and
personal survival without having to acknowledge that the winners
might somehow be better. They can thus be egalitarian in their
pronouncements while admitting competition to their pantheon
under another name. What follows will be more direct. The specific
talents that have enabled the middle classes to become dominant will
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be identified for what they are. Moreover, how economic power gets
transmuted into hierarchical supremacy will be examined in detail,
for unless these issues are confronted head on, their mysteries will
remain.
Forms of Alliances
Over the course of history, the types of alliances that have fostered
hierarchical success have succeeded one another with a dizzying but, in
retrospect, is a predictable regularity. What has constituted military,
religious, and economic power has been modified according to the
kinds of coalitions that have been brought to bear. Not surprisingly,
as the ways people have lived were transformed, what determined
who was likely to associate with whom did likewise. Specifically, as
social, environmental, and economic conditions evolved, so did the
sorts of bonds that made a difference. People were thrown together
in diverse circumstances where they discovered that what enabled
them to do well in tests of strength had correspondingly changed.
In the beginning was the family. Evolutionary psychologists
have made a fetish of explaining how genetic bonds influence
altruistic behavior.40 Fascinated with the metaphor of selfish genes
that are dedicated to perpetuating themselves, they argue that a
relative helping another relative to survive is almost the same as
perpetuating one’s own chromosomes. On these grounds, the closer
the genetic relationship, the greater the DNA overlap and, therefore,
the stronger the motivation to be of assistance. Although this sounds
fairly mechanical, elementary observations confirm a tendency to
family solidarity. Those who share parents and grandparents may
fight like cats and dogs, but when an outsider threatens a member
of the clan, they close ranks. In moments of danger, they function
as allies.41 Personal relationships based on kinship thus channel
individuals into coalitions that enable them to overcome threats
from other coalitions. The bonds based on these connections can
also set preemptive strikes in motion. Individuals who trust one
another based on shared biological roots can collaborate in asserting
dominance over others. In combination they can claim, and defend,
hierarchical priority.
Family relationships would seem to have been a prime source
of status in hunter-gatherer societies. Who was whose son and who
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married whom helped determine who rose to a dominant position.
This was so within the local band, where the prestige of a parent might
rub off on a child or the support of one’s brothers could overawe a
rival who had only sisters. This was also so between bands, in which
primitive politics could establish interfamily alliances capable of
defending favorable territories. Family connections were so important
within small-scale communities that the details of kinship became
highly formalized. Anthropologists have discovered that preliterate
societies have more complex classifications than do technologically
advanced ones. Given their greater political, economic, and social
import, this makes perfect sense.
But family relationships do not lose their value as societies
increase in scope. They are also crucial within estate systems. In
societies such as medieval Europe,42 the elite stratum was controlled
by family lineages. Who was related to whom determined who
inherited what lands and which titles. The isolated individual was
as good as vanquished in a world where the primary duty was to
blood. Even more so than in less elaborate communities, alliances
consummated by marriage were the rule. Kings gave their daughters
to the sons of other kings on the principle that this would unite
their houses. In due course, a conjoined genetic destiny created a
larger political agglomeration that assisted in dominating less astute
lineages. By the same token, within one’s own lands, a fertile union
could enable one’s house to keep unruly barons from usurping the
prerogatives of their betters. This logic was so compelling that it was
replicated down the social ladder. Perhaps the best known example
is the vendettas of Southern Italy.43 Not only did the leading families
build towers to fend off the attacks of competing dynasties, peasants
too engaged in bitter feuds over apparently minuscule plots of land
and seemingly trivial questions of honor. Nor was this propensity
confined to the Old World. Americans well into the twentieth century
were transfixed by the feuds of the Hatfields and the McCoys. Cut
off from the larger society in the remote borderlands of Kentucky
and West Virginia, the families were featured in lurid accounts of
how they slew each other over profit and jealousy. Neither has this
tendency been restricted to the poor; equally mesmerizing was the
nepotism of Camelot. The nation followed the rise and fall of the
Kennedy44 clan not only because a glamorous young president headed
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this procession but because he was accompanied by a multitude of
siblings and, eventually, nieces and nephews. Cloistered in their
private compounds with their magic only intermittently on display,
they could bestow honors on one another almost at will, be it as
Attorney General or as Senator.
Closely allied to coalitions based on family are those grounded
in comradeship. Going back almost as far as genetic bonds are those
related to the hunt. Men who together pursued large game developed
durable allegiances. Compelled by circumstances to trust their
safety to one another, they became as close as brothers. Emotionally
prepared to sacrifice all for the survival of the team, outsiders had best
beware. Since these hunting bands were frequently interchangeable
with military bands, the same loyalties applied to raiding parties.
Fighting as a unit against a determined enemy further solidified the
partnership. This, too, as with the family, enabled the parties to
promote their separate positions. Their relationships constituted
a bulwark available to individual tests of strength. In the case of
European nobility, warriors who fought together became comrades
in arms in defending their superiority over those they conquered.
Even after the initial occupation receded into a mythical past and
members of the aristocracy were no longer personal friends, a
communal fealty, that is, a pledge of honor, bound them in a network
of shared interest.
Indeed, this sort of military comradeship was the forerunner
of what evolved into government. Stabilized groups of individuals
prepared to impose their will, ultimately through physical coercion,
were at the heart of the territorial state. Machiavelli45 prudently
advised his prince that it was better to be feared than loved on
the assumption that someday he might need to terrify recalcitrant
citizens into submission. In practical terms, this required loyal
fighters prepared to jeopardize their lives in order to perpetuate his
ascendancy. Generals have long been aware that rock-solid discipline
is decisive on the battlefield. Experience taught that the army that
can maintain orderliness in the teeth of danger is apt to triumph.
Rulers are, therefore, dependent upon military élan for power.
Equally vital to maintaining a government’s integrity is the political
solidarity that guides the actions of its soldiers (or constabulary). In
analyzing the sources of social stratification, Max Weber46 highlighted
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the significance of party. He theorized that political alliances were
often the key to social control. James Madison47 implied as much
when he warned that political factions rise up as naturally as weeds
and need to be controlled if tyranny is to be avoided. Personal
relationships among political activists are, therefore, fundamental to
attaining and perpetuating social superiority. These must possess a
constancy of discipline, especially in an environment where alliances
shift with the alacrity of television commercials. Because political
combinations need not be grounded in biology, factors that cultivate
remote loyalties are essential. This glue may be based on personal
interest, tradition, greed, or passionately held beliefs; the options are
legion, but they are indispensable.
For this reason an entirely different source of social solidarity
can become paramount. Alliances that create interpersonal strength
derive not only from personal relationships but also from impersonal
commitments. Indeed, moral and religious duties often take
precedence over family or private political ties. They provide the
impetus for coalitions of greater breadth than those that depend on
individual attachments. When people have internalized particular
rules, beliefs, or rituals, they thereby acquire a loyalty that transcends
time and place. Such mental allegiances may even feel eternal.
Depending as they do on emotional, cognitive, and volitional
factors that are inherently conservative, they persist long after
people consciously decide to jettison them. Violating a deeply held
conviction can be experienced as a betrayal of one’s very existence;
hence it occurs less often than treachery toward friends or relatives.
This makes moral and religious convictions an appealing source
of social coordination. If people believe the same things, they can
dependably collaborate on the same projects—even if they dislike
each other, even if they do not know each other.
Just as governments and kinship systems formalize coalitions
based on personal relationships, churches and ideologies do the
same for moralities and cosmologies. They specify the places where
members of the same denomination can assemble, and they stipulate
the procedures through which they can affirm their solidarity. For
many people, religion is their central identity. They would happily
sacrifice their welfare for the spiritual community to which they
belong. Perhaps convinced of a heavenly reward for their piety, they
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may also be motivated by a sense of doing what is right. Either way,
established creeds identify what is true and what is good. Established
churches provide designated prayer leaders, agreed upon scriptures,
and inspirational places of worship. In so doing, they furnish formal
procedures that instill emotional and communal assurances of faith.
The effectiveness of these can be seen in the sweeping reach of Al
Qaeda. From the mountains of Morocco to the rice paddies of
Indonesia, millions of Muslims root for its victory over the Great
Satan. Utter strangers to one another, as communicants of Islam,48
they are united against outsiders who do not pray as they do. Believers
in the Koran, they are prepared to assist in killing foreigners who are
not.
An equivalent cohesion has underwritten theological states such
as Iran. Its ayatollahs command military allegiance from volunteers
intent on preserving the one true faith. Many tens of thousands
of recruits charged into Iraqi machine gun emplacements with the
words of the Prophet on their lips. More spectacular still was the
religious enthusiasm that fueled Islam’s initial conquests. What
to the losers of these encounters would have been experienced as
unprincipled aggression furnished the victors with proof of a divine
sanction. Whereas the nonbelievers perceived such convictions as
fanatical conformity, the believers viewed them as portal salvation.
Many secular individuals find this incomprehensible, yet
they place their faith in political ideologies that are every bit as
conventionalized. An ideology is a formalized belief system that
tells its adherents how the world works and specifies what needs
to be done to correct its shortcomings. The Communist Party,
just as might a church, has functioned as such a quasitheological
communion. Its faith, namely communism, explained that the evils
of the world owed not to the devil but to the oppressive machinations
of capitalists. It similarly promised that all this could be undone, not
by being transported to paradise after death, but by constructing
a heaven on earth after instigating a sweeping revolution. Arthur
Koestler condemned this movement as a “God that failed,” and it is
more than a metaphor.49 The Communist Party has had its prayer
leaders, sacred texts, and spiritual shrines every bit as much as have
the Roman Catholics. Civic morality too can be formalized. In the
United States, obeisances are paid to democratic values with as much
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fervor as the encomia once offered to Lenin. Even the free-market
system has been the object of moralized tributes. Libertarians,
for example, are fond of extravagant praise of unrestrained market
activities. The entrepreneurial heroes of Ayn Rand50 have been as
lavishly glorified as any Christian saint. Weber described this sort
of hierarchical priority as status which operates by elevating people
for demonstrating deeply admired qualities. Moral champions
thus receive prestige for embodying the principles to which their
communities are committed. They are respected and, therefore,
obeyed. Such power comes not from coercing those below them
but from eliciting their voluntary compliance. Moral exemplars, as
it were, tap into internalized springs of motivation. They draw upon
deeply inculcated drives. As a consequence, people can become
social winners if they hit upon ways to instill these impulses. As
counterintuitive as it may appear, the divine messenger and the
brilliant social forecaster can hold as much sway as the conquering
general.
Which brings us to the economic aspects of alliances. People
can agree to follow a leader, not merely from fear or inspiration, but
for instrumental reasons. If they believe they can profit from joining
the winning side, merging with it may indeed tip the balance in its
favor. When hunting was the primary source of wealth, the skilled
hunter could gain power by distributing his surplus to those who
offered support in exchange. When agriculture took over, control
of land became more important than mastery of a weapon.51 Those
individuals who could bestow acreage upon which crops could be
grown were rewarded with gratitude and fealty. The same applied to
those who could protect the harvest from raiders or who could increase
the yield by organizing irrigation projects. In each of these cases, a
magnate could offer patronage that encouraged loyal adherents. On
one level, allegiance was being traded for a straightforward reward,
but, on another, this devotion was to become traditional. The squire
was the squire, not necessarily because he conferred a benefit but
because he and his father had always been squires. His ownership
of the land and, therefore, his ability to legitimize a peasant’s control
over his portion of it was unquestioned. It emanated not from a
demonstrated ability to protect or distribute property but from a
widespread perception that it was his to allocate. To those born into
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such a system, it would seem natural. They may even have attributed
it to divine providence.
Once the commercial revolution began to accelerate, settled
relationships based on land tenure came under challenge. Profits
drawn from doing business could be used to purchase estates from
an impoverished gentry. Here, too, patronage could come into
play, but the benefits to be dispersed derived from commercial
opportunities. Merchants whose wealth and connections enabled
them to dominate the marketplace could exchange their goodwill
for devoted submission. Those with fewer assets conformed for
the privilege of sharing in the reflected glory of such a benefactor.
Ultimately, clients became employees whose fate was closely attached
to the person who paid their wages. This world of the entrepreneur
and his associated workforce was the one Marx knew. The goal, as
a result, was to disrupt the attachments that provided the boss his
social clout. Without compliant subordinates, he would merely be
a bloated imposter who could not hold his own in a brawl with the
lowliest laborer.
Marx came on the scene just as the Industrial Era was picking
up steam. Large-scale factories were coming into existence, but
their implications remained uncertain. A growing impersonality
was beginning to have a disquieting effect, yet the consequences of
mass production and technological progress could not be predicted.
That these would change the relationships between bosses and their
workers, and hence the shape of their social alliances, was not evident.
Amazingly, Marx could not discern the impending preeminence of
the middle classes.52 They, too, seemed to be low-level employees
open to as much exploitation as any machine operator. He could
not perceive that a dependence on their expertise would change the
conditions of their association with their bosses. As far as he was
concerned, they remained relatively weak, whereas, in truth, they
were accumulating the strengths to alter the balance of power with
their superiors.
The alliances of the marketplace were to be further destabilized by
the advent of a postindustrial economy. By the time of its arrival, the
volume of commerce had expanded to such an extent that keeping its
arteries flowing required additional expertise. Complex professional
skills,53 not merely a knack for bookkeeping, were now in demand.
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This often put the putative employee in control of the enterprise.
Out of touch with what needed to be done to keep their coffers full,
bosses depended upon knowledgeable subordinates to direct their
businesses. Many of the old alliances remained intact but not on
the same terms. The emergence of the middle classes dramatically
altered the contours of social dominance. There was still an upper
class, but its writ did not extend as far as it had. Weber, like Marx,
was aware that class was a crucial determinate of social stratification;
nevertheless, he too missed these developments. Focused on the
advent of bureaucratic organizations, he perceived these as fashioning
an iron cage that would hold employees immobile. The formalized
regulations constraining their jobs would prevent them from
exercising initiative. But this was not how things turned out. The
arrival of extensive professionalization54 would once again change
the ground rules. It would offer freedom and creativity on a scale
perhaps dreamt of but never before realized. A self-directed expertise
would guide the development of coalitions that literally remade the
world. Hierarchy would not disappear,55 but power would be more
broadly diffused than ever, that is, at least since hunter-gatherer
times. Despite a rising chorus complaining about oppression, the
opposite was more nearly true.
Middle Class Powers
In the entrepreneurial universe that Mills suggests preceded
the nation’s descent into a white-collar nightmare, individual
proprietors controlled private businesses. They owned their tools,
places of employment, and profits. Ben Franklin was a prototype
of this sort of businessperson. Starting from nothing, he accrued
the funds to purchase a printing press and to finance its operation.
A few journeymen and apprentices worked for him, but he was in
control of the enterprise. Franklin believed in hard work. Because
the fruits of his labor were exclusively within his control, what he
did was for himself and his family. Though notoriously thrifty,
through perseverance he acquired the resources to achieve a stout
independence. In his world, ownership spurred initiative. It
motivated him to do well because he was in charge of his exertions
and was the chief beneficiary of performing them well. On top of his
own little mountain, he ruled his domain to suit himself.
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This was all well and good several hundred years ago, but how can
responsible authority endure in today’s less personalized world? In an
industrial and now post-industrial economy, is it possible to motivate
leaders to do competent jobs when they do not own their companies?
Given the emergence of huge impersonal agglomerations in which
ownership is detached from management, why do people not slough
off? If acquisitive proprietors do not directly supervise them, why do
they not cover their tracks by doing just enough to escape blame? In
fact, most do not. Productivity is higher in the modern world than
it has ever been. The solution to this paradox is found in the progress
of the middle classes. Their power derives largely from an ability to
be self-motivated. Not only do they know what they are doing, but
they can be trusted to do it without close supervision. Important
social decisions have been delegated to them because they make good
choices followed up by sound implementation.56 But why is this so?
Why, if they are not proprietors, do they care?
First, let us consider today’s managers. For the most part not
proprietors, they regard themselves as professional administrators.57
Corporations organized as bureaucracies hire them to occupy these
positions. They do so in the conviction that they are self-starters who
will pursue the organization’s interests with as much dedication as
would its titleholders. In this, their superiors are rarely disappointed.
For the most part, modern executives pride themselves on producing
healthy bottom lines and growing market shares. Although the
majority is scions of the middle and working classes, they spend
years grooming themselves for the responsibilities of command.
Having, often from childhood, dreamt of becoming successes,
they are unwilling to wreck their opportunities through neglect or
ineptitude.
Particularly revealing is how prospective supervisory personnel
prepare for their roles. Even those who attain their positions through
family connections are likely to have been formally instructed in their
duties. Contemporary managers are generally the product of college
educations. Many boast not just bachelor’s degrees, but a masters
in business administration. Working one’s way up to the executive
suite from an apprenticeship on the shop floor was once the stuff
of romantic legend, but no more. A mania for professionalism has
swept into the front office, as it has in most seats of power. Fredrick
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Taylor’s58 Scientific Management is today accepted gospel. A century
ago it may have been necessary to proselytize on its behalf; nowadays,
it is assumed that leadership requires an expertise analogous to that
of an electronic engineer.
The paradigm of the professional is the physician.59 Medical
doctors habitually rank toward the top of surveys of occupational
prestige. They are admired and trusted so greatly that stereotypical
mothers routinely urge their children to study hard enough to get
into medical school. Physicians actually occupy one of the first jobs
designated a profession. The concept comes from the notion that
theirs was a calling. God instilled the motivation to help mankind
into their souls, and they responded to his command. As a result
of this divine mandate, they could be counted upon to devote their
abilities and energies to doing their best. When one went to the
doctor, one did not have to worry that the level of service would be
commensurate with the fee paid. Though one was feeling vulnerable
from disease, the doctor voluntarily risked his life rather than do
harm. One did not need to fear that he/she would depart in the
middle of an operation on a beautiful day for golf.
This sort of dedication was implanted via an extended period of
socialization. To begin with, physicians underwent an extraordinary
technical education. The knowledge needed to become a competent
healer was so all embracing and so demanding that it took years of
devoted study to acquire. In its current manifestation this entails four
years of college, four years of medical school, and perhaps another
four years of training in a board-certified specialty. Even afterwards,
the learning continues. Physicians are expected to read professional
journals, to attend seminars in new techniques, and to participate in
conferences of like-minded practitioners. Many also contribute to
advances in medical knowledge by engaging in research. They are
not allowed to rest on their laurels but must remain on the cutting
edge of science.
More than this, the discomfort of their education is so great
as to constitute rites of passage. Years of arduous scholarship and
long hours of stressful practice are not for the faint of heart. Only
the most committed persist in the quest, and, when they complete
it, they discover that their personal identity has been transformed.
Much as the rigors of an initiation ceremony convert college
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freshmen into steadfast members of fraternities, so having survived
the harsh demands of medical training modifies a person’s mindset.
Emotionally and intellectually reoriented, the newly minted physician
feels the part. He/she has internalized the goals of the profession
and now pursues them as a matter of course. A failure to do so
would henceforth violate his/her sense of self and be perceived as an
intolerable breakdown. This newfound motivation is what enables
physicians to be trusted. Technical skills, without the commitment
to apply them conscientiously, are useless. Alone they would not
warrant the authority bestowed on professionals.
Other professionals partake of a similar, if less painstaking,
socialization.60 They too develop technical competence and
internalized motivation. Lawyers, college professors, and mechanical
engineers are all allowed to operate independently on the assumption
that they are prepared to make the decisions within their span of
control. To be concrete, engineers are relied upon to make the
mathematical calculations regarding whether a bridge can endure the
stresses to which it will be subjected. Having studied how materials
such as steel stand up to wind and weight, they are expected to
come up with the correct answer. This they generally do because
they were thoroughly indoctrinated in their specialties and because
they are loath to surrender their reputations to momentary lapses in
judgment.
Professionals are also participants in professional communities;
a primary source of social support comes from members of their
vocation. These peers are the best adjudicators of their competence
and the most strongly motivated to provide solidarity. In the same
boat, they have an interest in guarding hard-won prerogatives.
Principally through professional associations, they maintain the
contacts that enable them to coordinate the defense of their separate
and joint welfare. Natural allies, their individual powers, when linked
in a common cause, can be fearsome. Should their goals coalesce in
the same direction, they possess the power to make their wills felt
throughout society. Indeed, they generally have the clout to make
their desires felt within the local organizations in which they are
increasingly embedded. The bureaucrats who are their official bosses
tend to listen. Whether in hospitals, HMOs, colleges, or law firms,
they have considerable influence over their daily routines. Despite
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legitimate complaints over a loss of autonomy, their voices are more
persuasive than those of nonprofessionals. All of this translates into
muscle that elevates their status over those who cannot compete with
their authority.
To return to managers, as noted above, their middle-class power
also benefits from professionalization. The point of becoming better
educated is to acquire a comparable expertise and a similar reputation
for reliability. Having more or less achieved this, executives are as
likely to identify with their fellow professionals as with old-line
entrepreneurs. This increases middle-class influence overall. Even
the salespersons that Mills so casually dismissed benefit from these
trends. He portrays them as shallow ciphers, but fewer of them are
clerks in charge of ringing up retail transactions. Merchandising,
especially on the industrial level, has become a specialty operation.
Its practitioners not only need an expertise in their products but skill
in communicating with potential customers. They must have the
sophistication to understand others’ goals and the patience to deal
with their psychological quirks. This is not easy. It involves far more
than smiling vacantly and repeating a sales pitch transmitted from
a distant proprietor. Getting a liberal college education goes a long
way to producing the personal flexibility necessary to cope with the
uncertainties of face-to-face commerce with strangers.
Ironically even entrepreneurs have been professionalizing. They,
too, understand that they must operate within a middle-class milieu.
This requires that they sometimes play the games of those upon
whose services they depend. If they somehow escaped exposure to
the language and ethos of the Middle Class Revolution, they would
soon find themselves adrift in a sea of consumers whose needs they
could not fathom and of production assistants whose skills remained
a mystery. Under these conditions, how would they make money?
Who would buy what they manufactured or operate the machines
that assemble their products? As a result, they, too, get college
educations or, failing this, rely on their family ties to socialize them in
middle-class mores. Bill Gates61 famously dropped out of Harvard,
but his compulsive envelopment in a computer culture, plus a father
who was a successful lawyer, provided what was necessary to launch
Microsoft. Better educated, but part of the same community of
influence, were the founders of Federal Express and Amazon.com.
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They too exercised middle-class powers honed in academic settings
to rise to the top.
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Chapter 3

A Way of Life
You could not step twice into the same rivers, for other
waters are forever flowing in to you. (Heraclitus, On
the Universe)
Socrates: A Simple thing enough; just what is commonly
said, that a man should be temperate and master of
himself, the ruler of his own pleasures and passions.
(Plato, The Gorgias)
A decent boldness ever meets with friends. (Homer,
The Odyssey)
What Do You Want to Be?
The choices used to be simple. When asked what they wanted
to be when they grew up, children would answer a policeman,
a cowboy, or a mommy. Later on were added the options of an
astronaut, an athlete, a rock star, or the first woman president.
Adults, of course, knew that this menu was too short. Having been
forced to make a concrete selection, they learned firsthand how
broad the span of potential employments is. They also discovered
that most of the available selections were not visible from their earlier
vantage points. When they were children, a few of the most salient
professions attracted their attention. The simple, the dramatic, and
the newsworthy got noticed despite limited experience, whereas most
of the positions they would one day occupy were not so much as
suspected. Only as they grew older did they ascertain their existence
of these new roles or their attributes.
Ours is a world filled with hundreds of thousands of distinct
occupations. Indeed, the federal register, The Dictionary of
Occupational Titles,1 is the size of a phone book. Many thousands
of distinct trades crowd its pages and boggle the mind with
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surprising details. This multiplicity began to attract attention years
ago. As sociology was becoming a separate discipline, pioneers such
as Herbert Spencer2 and Emile Durkheim3 discerned the degree to
which modernization had swollen the number of specialties. Spencer
even theorized that this was a driving force behind emerging forms of
social organization. He explained that newfangled spheres of expertise
required more sophisticated means of integration, which, in turn,
changed the nature of how people lived. Durkheim elaborated upon
this insight by discussing the implications of a convoluted division
of labor. He insisted that vocational interdependence altered the way
that people networked. They now cooperated with each other not
merely because they were similarly motivated but because what they
contributed to the whole was dependent upon what their peers added
to the mix. Without an awareness of, and a respect for, this mutual
dependence, all would suffer. Like a large multicelled animal, society
was composed of separate organs each of which collaborated with the
others so that the entire organism could survive. Farmers refusing to
feed city folk or city folk declining to assemble tractors, would be as
if the heart refused to pump blood to the lungs or the lungs declined
to aerate the blood for the heart.
The extent of this mutual reliance can be determined from
an overview of the health professions. Ensconced in one of the
fastest growing segments of the economy, these have proliferated in
manifold directions. Increasingly, technologically advanced, they
reveal a pattern of integration replicated many times over in other
occupations. Among the pursuits enumerated by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics4 under the heading of Healthcare Practitioners are
Chiropractors, dentists, dieticians and nutritionists,
optometrists, pharmacists, anesthesiologists, family
and general practitioners, internists, obstetricians and
gynecologists, pediatricians, psychiatrists, surgeons, physician
assistants, registered nurses, audiologists, occupational
therapists, radiation therapists, recreational therapists,
respiratory therapists, speech-language pathologists,
veterinarians, medical and clinical laboratory technologists,
medical and clinical laboratory technicians, dental
hygienists, cardiovascular technologists and technicians,
diagnostic medical sonographers, nuclear medicine
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technologists, radiological technologists and technicians,
emergency medical technicians and paramedics, dietetic
technicians, pharmacy technicians, psychiatric technicians,
respiratory therapy technicians, surgical technologists,
veterinary technologists and technicians, licensed practical
and licensed vocational nurses, medical records and health
information technicians, dispensing opticians, orthotists
and prosthetists, occupational health and safety specialists
and technicians, and athletic trainers.
As extensive as this inventory is, it does not include personnel such
as nursing aides. These are listed elsewhere under healthcare support
occupations. Nor does it itemize the jealously guarded subspecialties
found among internists and laboratory technologists. Podiatrists,
sports doctors, dermatologists, plastic surgeons, or serologists are not
among these enumerated. Nor does this compendium indicate the
vigor with which distinct turfs are defended. A tour of any psychiatric
hospital would reveal that psychiatrists insist on maintaining a separate
identity from psychologists and that psychologists grow huffy when
confused with social workers. For that matter, diagnostic specialists
are as adamant about distinguishing themselves from clinicians
as PhDs are from EdDs. Those unfamiliar with this minefield of
distinctions can set off skirmishes by trampling on the sensibilities of
competitors intent on protecting the dignities of their own terrains.
This endless expansion of specialties has several consequences.
One is that the occupants of each niche become expert in their
domain of operation. Individuals whose attentions are concentrated
within a narrow scope can become quite skilled. They have the time
and the energies to uncover obscure facts that might escape the notice
of others. They also have the space to become proficient in their
applications. A full-time cardiovascular surgeon is sufficiently intimate
with the architecture of the heart to achieve the dexterity to replace
a defective valve. In order to maintain control over their domains,
these specialists are also motivated to stay ahead of potential rivals.
New knowledge and skills are developed to insure that chiropractors
or hypnotists do not encroach on medical territories with their
nonsurgical techniques. Specialization, in other words, provides the
impetus to professionalization. An ever-elaborating division of labor
is a spur to increased expertise and superior performance.
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Another consequence of more finely divided occupational
territories is the need to harmonize activities among adjacent
specialties. The surgeon who does not know how to join forces with
an anesthesiologist is likely to be incompetent. This means that the
players must possess rudimentary knowledge about one another’s
contributions. As role partners,5 they learn that this is the only way
to be responsive to one another’s tasks. Moreover, with knowledge
goes respect, and this respect goes a long way toward fostering good
will. Those who are too provincial in their interests tend to become
isolated and ineffective. Put another way, a professionalized world is
of necessity a cosmopolitan one.
Besides enhanced expertise and improved cooperation, a
highly developed division of labor tends to produce internalized
motivation. Because the participants are engaged in tasks that
few others comprehend, they must be their own supervisors. If
the manufacturers do not care about turning out quality products,
they would lack the impetus to do so would be lacking, and the
entire social edifice might collapse. As a result, the incentive to
internalize personal determination is very strong. Society as a whole
has an interest in ensuring that practitioners such as physicians are
individually driven to serve their patients hence the comprehensive
training demanded of them. Hence also social licensure, which can
be subject to withdrawal in cases of demonstrable ineptitude. Not
all occupations are sensitive to personal incompetence, but even
the motormen who operate subway trains need to be alert to their
duties. If they do not care enough to refrain from substance abuse,
the potential for carnage is acute. As a consequence, individuals
are vetted to determine their private habits before they are hired for
these positions.
With so many jobs subject to elaboration, the modern world
is ablaze with change. So great is the turnover that it has become a
cliché to bemoan its instability. At the beginning of the Commercial
Revolution, the Greek sophist Heraclitus taught that one could not
step in the same river twice. Before one had an opportunity to lift
one’s leg, the water rushed past and could not be brought back. In
this, he was warning of a social environment in constant flux. As
a wise man for hire, he had a job to teach clients to cope with the
requirements of emerging democracies. Since many of them, as

A Way of Life

81

citizens, would be obliged to plead cases before courts composed of
their fellow citizens, they needed to understand things from their
judges’ perspectives. Were they inflexible, they might offend the very
people upon whom their fate depended.
Commerce and competition having progressed far beyond
that of Ancient Greece, and the scale of change has grown apace.6
Technologies and merchandizing techniques mutate before our
eyes. No sooner has one become accustomed to soft cream cheese
than it is flavored with onions and chives. Merchandisers are ever
intent upon moving the fruits and vegetables around the produce
section of the supermarket. They have discovered that if they shift
their locations, customers are forced to pay closer attention and,
in the process, alight on items they had not intended to purchase.
All this unrest, amazingly, is for relatively unchangeable products.
Other commodities have the added fillip of themselves mutating.
With electronics, the rate of discovery produces innovations almost
hourly. Virtually everyone old enough to vote can remember when
mobile phones were a novelty, yet each year they keep getting smaller.
These days many cell phones boast the ability to transmit voice and
pictures, a capacity beyond Dick Tracy’s once magical wrist radio. So
common have these contraptions become that they have modified
how people conduct business. Salespersons, for instance, can have
instant communications with their front offices even while driving,
so can mothers with their children and wives with their husbands.
Spouses are now effortlessly instructed to pick up Chinese takeout
on their ways home from work.
All this turmoil has placed a premium on being able to adjust.
There was a time when every son knew he would grow up to be a
farmer and every daughter that she would raise children and keep
house. More recently, factory workers understood that once hired by
U.S. Steel, they would enjoy steady employment for the rest of their
careers. On the home front, they correspondingly recognized that
marriage was for life. Expected to be loyal both to their companies
and to their spouses, they expected reciprocal loyalty. Today, of
course, corporations relocate to foreign climes, and love lasts as long
as it takes one of the partners to crave self-discovery. Those who
cannot distinguish when the earth has moved beneath their feet
or who lack the suppleness to move with it find these dislocations
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painful. Unwavering in their resolve to live by the rules of their
childhood, they may, as a result, descend into poverty and isolation.
Another kind of change derives from the omnipresence of
diversity. Society has become a patchwork quilt of disparate cultures,
ethnicities, and races. Those conversant with history will be aware
of previous eras when ethnic migrations changed the composition
of Europe. The collapse of the Roman Empire7 signaled a period of
unrest during which Germanic tribes, such as the Lombards, Vandals,
and Visigoths, removed from homelands adjacent to Scandinavia and
took up residence in Italy, Spain, and Tunisia.8 This passage is still
recorded in place names such as Lombardy and Andalusia. Ours is
an era of even greater transience. More people are moving than ever
before. They are going longer distances and staying put for shorter
durations. The difference now is that they are moving as individuals
and families rather than as tribal units.
In a world in which the demands of commerce have improved
transportation and communication to previously unrecognizable
levels, emigration has become normal. People not only move from
one country to another but also within the same one. Clearly,
the African diaspora altered the complexion of the New World, as
did a European diaspora before it.9 These brought Negroids and
Caucasoids to a continent formerly inhabited solely by Mongoloids.
Today, Hispanics are moving north from Mexico and South America,
and Asians are traveling east from India and China. Americans
have grown accustomed to migrants crossing their borders, but so
have the Spanish, Germans, and British. Where once it was French
colonialists who overran Algeria, and British sahibs who lorded it
over Indians, the direction of traffic has reversed. Nor is the volume
of resettlement declining. Mestizos continue to be smuggled over
the Mexican border, and Muslims persist in entering Christian
strongholds.
Yet, internal migrations dwarf this international traffic.10 At the
time of the American Revolution, New York City had a population
of barely twenty thousand.11 Its numbers were soon swamped by a
comparable number of invading British troops. Today’s overflowing
urbanism is a gift of the Industrial Revolution. This upheaval
prompted an urban stampede that has now been replaced by suburban
sprawl. Rural populations have long since decamped for places where
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there were jobs. To illustrate, between World War II and the end of
the twentieth century, the sleepy depot town of Atlanta grew more
than ten times in size. Because of its location at a transportation
hub, as commerce increased, so did the need for those who managed
the traffic. This transformed the North Georgia mountains from
an Appalachian backwater into a supplier of human capital. More
than this, once it became customary to move from the farm to the
city, it became acceptable to move from one city to another in search
of a better job. These days, Atlanta is inhabited by hordes of damn
Yankees who have transformed its ambience. Likewise, throngs of
former Southerners have emigrated to Los Angeles to return the
favor. The United States has become a nation of gypsies who, on
average, move every seven years, often going much farther afield than
from one neighborhood to an adjacent, more affluent one.
The resultant diversity has placed a strain on those comfortable
only with their ancestral environments. Contemporary Americans
require a more expansive view. Living and doing business with people
who were formerly strangers demands flexibility. Fortunately, the
qualities needed to adjust to a multitude of intersecting occupations
are useful in accommodating a swarm of exotic neighbors. People
talk of becoming tolerant when they really mean they are becoming
ecumenical. Southerners now understand that Northerners can be
decent people, and vice versa. Nor do Mexicans, despite linguistic
differences, seem subhuman. Just as a greater division of labor
prompted broader horizons, so has the mixing of populations.
Bigotry is universally condemned, but its comparative rarity is not
fully appreciated. Nor is it recognized that middle class dominance
has contributed to this achievement. People who are concerned
with amassing money and power cannot afford to reject potential
customers, or coworkers, merely because they are superficially
different.
To sum up, the modern world is astonishingly more complex and
varied than its predecessors.12 Filled with surprises and uncertainties,
it exemplifies the fact that that which can instantly change presents
significant challenges. Under these circumstances, people are often
compelled to act without knowing what is best. Those who would
be their leaders are, therefore, hard-pressed to provide reliably
constructive plans and coordination. Yet, to do less would risk injury
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to themselves and to those dependent upon them. This is the social
emergency the middle class way of life has evolved to meet. The
skills, attitudes, and values it promotes were adopted within this
diversified, ever-mutating milieu.13 Furthermore, were its members
unable to cope with these complexities, they could not sustain their
own status. Power derived from competent marketplace stewardship
would vanish were it overwhelmed by unpredictable exigencies.
What then are the capacities required to survive such difficulties?
Though these are varied, central among them is an ability to be selfdirected.14 Those who would specialize in contemporary leadership
must be able to make independent determinations even when they
are not certain of what is optimal. To do so, they must be confident
and competent; but above all, they must be their own people. Each
must possess an internal compass and the emotional and intellectual
resources to follow it.
Self Direction
Mark Twain is reported to have declared that golf is a good
walk ruined. He could not understand why anyone would want to
contaminate the beauty of a park like setting by indulging in one of
the most frustrating pursuits ever invented. Nevertheless golf has
become the favorite diversion of American presidents. Even duffers
like Lyndon Baines Johnson felt compelled to take to the links, if for
no other reason than to heighten the perception of the presidential
qualities. Certainly, since Dwight Eisenhower, it has been recognized
that golf is the quintessential middle-class activity. Unlike bowling,
which has more plebian connotations, golf is indelibly associated with
the country-club set and the informal business meeting. Somehow,
the sorts of behavior called forth by hitting a small sphere down a
well-manicured lawn is regarded as an indicator of status. It appears
to bespeak a decorum that goes well with power.
This is in stark contrast with how things were during the
Middle Ages.15 The kings of yore felt obliged to demonstrate their
credentials by periodically participating in joust. They would don
richly embellished plate armor and enter the lists, as might any selfrespecting member of the aristocracy. So enticing was the prospect
of demonstrating military prowess that they risked death to achieve
it. Some, in fact, died in the process. This was the fate of Henry II
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of France, who perished when a lance pierced his helm and lodged
a splinter in his brain. These days, this sort of bravery is no longer
honored. Presidents do not have to prove their military courage.
They may be commanders-in-chief of the armed forces, but they are
not expected to lead from front lines. Instead required to exercise
sound judgment, these must show the nerve to look danger squarely
in the eye; that is what is venerated. That is what brings victory
now.
Golf is associated with these qualities because it requires
internalized controls. Just as Twain intimated, it can be an
enormously frustrating endeavor. Hitting the little ball exactly right
takes both skill and an ability to maintain one’s equilibrium. Even
becoming slightly flustered can result in an errant shot. Moreover,
one must be patient. One shot may be followed by another, but
only after an interval of catching up to its predecessor. This leaves
plenty of time to think and plenty of time to second-guess. Bowling,
in contrast, offers instant gratification. This working class pastime
allows its players the satisfaction of sending wooden pins careening
into a backstop. It also offers the pleasing sound of plastic on wood
contact and an almost tangible feel of power. Bowling, while it
requires personal control, does not do so for nearly as long or under
as exasperating conditions. It is golf that tests the mettle of the man
or woman; golf that pushes self-control to its limits.
Some years ago Melvin Kohn16 conducted a series of studies
relating work and personality. These began as inquiries into the sorts
of values parents expected of their children. He wanted to know if
the kind of demands varied with social class. It happens that they do.
His investigations uncovered consistent, internationally corroborated
correlations. The world around mothers and fathers seeks to instill
the same sorts of attitudes that they possess, that is, depending upon
their occupational status. Roughly speaking, those in the uppermiddle classes favor self-direction, whereas those in the working
classes prefer conformity. In diametric opposition to the speculations
of C. Wright Mills,17 Kohn showed that the middling sorts selected
innovation over conventionality and personal autonomy over blind
obedience.
What Kohn found was that higher status respondents wanted
their children to be considerate of others, to be interested in how
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and why things happened, and to exercise self-control. Lower
status parents, however, placed more emphasis on children who
had good manners, were neat and clean, and obeyed their parents.
Because the former occupied jobs that demanded an understanding
of what they did, they groomed their young to deal with similar
pressures. The latter, in contrast, found themselves subservient to
bosses who demanded compliance, and they unconsciously passed
this requirement onto their offspring. While they would never have
admitted to promoting conformity, their personal frustrations drove
them to issue preemptory commands within the confines of their
families.
Let us consider the working conditions of a physician. Kohn
describes occupations such as this one as involving substantive
complexity and hence intellectual flexibility. On most days, a medical
doctor cannot know what problems he/she will encounter. Patients
come in with an assortment of complaints that must be diagnosed on
the spot. To achieve this, the physician must internalize encyclopedic
knowledge about the body and the maladies to which it is prone.
This can never be complete, but it must be sufficient to know where
to search should further information be needed. Surgeons are under
even more stress. Beyond specialized knowledge, they must also
possess the manual dexterity to wield scalpels. There may be other
specialists in the room to assist in operations, but what is to be cut is at
the surgeon’s discretion. A surgeon cannot call time out or suddenly
plead for a supervisor to take over. In short, surgeons must be
personally competent. They may engage in consultations with other
surgeons, and those with whom they confer are also professionals.
A mere hierarchical superior would be an inappropriate source of
advice. What, indeed, could a hospital administrator contribute to
an anatomical procedure?
At home, these same surgeons want the best for their children.
They understand that professional success depends on developing
individualized competence. Because they recognize that discrete
credentials allow entry to particular employments, they emphasize
getting a good education. But it is also understood that a professional
must perform proficiently once on the job. These professionals have
learned that being interested in how and why things happen instills a
curiosity that pays off in a comprehension of facts that may some day
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be useful in deciding what to do when the answers are not obvious.
Clearly, the more complex the task, the greater the uncertainties;
whereas the more knowledgeable the practitioner, the more diverse
the options from which to choose. Higher status jobs also require
complex interactions with other human beings. One’s role partners
may be peers or subordinates, but in either case successful coordination
is apt to depend on understanding them. Recognizing their motives
and capacities facilitates cooperation. Being considerate is thus not
merely a matter of respect. Taking account of who people are when
soliciting their assistance is crucial. This is, therefore, the sort of
psychosocial sophistication middle class parents encourage.
Self-control is also essential for applying knowledge to people
and things. A middle class organizer must be suitably self-contained
so as to think when thinking is appropriate and to be considerate
when consideration is demanded. Going off half-cocked was
problematic when this phrase referred to flintlock rifles; it is more
so amidst knotty social situations. Kohn, for that reason, suggests
that middle class parents support sound judgment, responsibility,
and an ability to face facts. They want their progeny to survive
under pressure. If a military hegemony celebrated physical courage,
middle class endeavors favor social courage. In this case, grace under
pressure means keeping one’s wits despite the possibility of being
blamed should things go wrong. A contemporary leader must be
able to look someone in the eye without panicking, irrespective of
encircling confusions. This courage with people is not about being
physically fearless but about being able to function even when others
are upset. Indeed, tests of this facility occur daily within commercial
spheres. Under these conditions, individuals who freeze when their
authority is questioned cannot be effective planners.
Working class occupations occur under markedly different
circumstances. As representative, let us consider an ordinary machine
operator. His job may be to stamp out automobile fenders on a huge
hydraulic press. Unlike the physician, when he comes to work, he is
not in control of his activities. Others, namely his bosses, tell him
how many units are required. They also inspect the quality of his work
and make suggestions about improving his techniques. Although he
may have years of experience, a fresh-faced engineer straight out of
college can countermand his decisions. As might be imagined, this
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is rarely appreciated. It makes a person feel not respected. But what
is someone located toward the bottom of the pecking order to do?
The answer is very little. He may seethe internally, but this venom
cannot be directed above without serious ramifications. As a result,
it tends to be displaced downward. Lest it escape notice, downward
are to be found his spouse and children. They are subordinate to
the man who has endured eight hours of enforced inferiority. Kohn
describes the feeling as alienation, but it is also humiliation. No one
likes to be on the bottom; no one enjoys feeling like a loser. It is
these frustrations that are unleashed upon the family.
The workman who is required to obey a boss all day naturally
wants his child to obey him. It would be degrading to feel subordinate
to one’s offspring. As a consequence, the son or daughter who is
too independent is reined in. Doing what one is told, when one is
told to do it, is the order of the day, every day. Insolence, even the
appearance of insolence, is insufferable; hence the vigor with which
impudence is punished. Conformity is inculcated, not for its own
sake, but as a means of enforcing deference. Ironically, those who
are subservient on the job hate to conform. They do not consciously
wish this on their children either, but they impose it, as it were, in
self-defense. By the same token, they enforce good manners and
neatness and cleanliness, not because they love etiquette, but because
they want their youngsters to display the symbols of higher status.
Good manners and cleanliness are associated with white- , not bluecollar, jobs. Strangely, middle-class parents are less concerned with
these matters, not from a tolerance of filth, but because they expect
them to be learned automatically. It is those with dirty jobs and surly
coworkers who hope to reverse their destinies.
Surprisingly, Kohn also found lower-status parents more
committed to teaching respectability, truthfulness, and success. In
addition, they want their children to perform many tasks well. As
counterintuitive as this seems, this too is a consequence of relative
failure. Those who are not respected crave deference; those surrounded
by defensive lies seek truth (from others); those trapped by limited
success lust after more; and those constrained by a narrow expertise
value an all-encompassing adroitness. They fantasize, as it were,
being James Bonds who are at ease in any potential crisis. The trouble
is that it is the appearance of these things that is desired. Just as the
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poor dream of large houses and fancy cars, it is the external signs of
success, rather than its internal proficiencies, that are treasured. This
is confirmed by the self-conceptions of the respective classes. Those
toward the top of the scale exude self-confidence, do not engage
in self-deprecation, and are not fatalistic, anxious, or conformist.
Meanwhile, those toward the bottom, in marked contrast, do not
feel in control. Troubled by self-doubts and haunted by a sense of
impotence, they try to compensate by affecting the accoutrements of
success at least for external consumption.
Within the privacy of their homes, the self-confidence of social
winners is communicated to their young whereas in the houses of
losers doubts are transmitted to their progeny. The mechanisms
through which this occurs are too numerous to recount, but a sample
should do. The middle-class parent, when asked a difficult question,
patiently attempts a logical answer couched in terms appropriate
to a child’s age. The working-class parent, when confronted with
a similar query, is more likely to dismiss it as impertinent. In this
case, the child is either ignored or attacked for placing his parent in
an awkward position. Similarly, the middle-class parent punishes a
misdeed by requiring a child to retreat into his/her room to ruminate
about it. Told not to come out until she understands why she has
been disciplined, she is concurrently being taught how to introspect.
The working class parent, in comparison, is apt to resort to a heavier
hand. Her child will be struck across a sensitive body part and
ordered to desist. He probably will do so, but the resentment will
linger. A desire for revenge, rather an understanding of what went
wrong, results. The upshot is that the middle-class child internalizes
a desire to comply, whereas his inferior is primed to be rebellious.
Paradoxically, an education in conformity instills an oppositionalism
that makes for mutinous employees. An excessive demand for
obedience breeds not leaders but rebels without a cause. Yet, none of
this is planned. Neither middle- nor working-class parents are fully
conscious of the long-term effects of their actions. They simply react
as their life circumstances have prepared them to react.
The self-direction of the middle-classes has the effect of
sustaining the decentralization implicit in a social class system.
Decision making could not be broadly distributed without a
large proportion of the population prepared to make competent,

90

The Great Middle Class Revolution

independent determinations. Moreover, many skills and attitudes
must be inculcated in childhood if they are to be reliable. Only
deeply ingrained orientations provide the steadfast motivations and
spontaneous expertise upon which proficiency depends. This applies
particularly to emotional and moral dispositions. These may seem
trivial, yet without them, the flexibility essential to an advanced
commercial society is not possible. What is involved in moral and
emotional maturity requires a closer look. But, first, some more
general skills must be examined. The question of how the various
skills that underwrite middle-class dominance arise must also be
resolved.
People Skills
During his travels through the United States, Alexis de
Tocqueville18 was fascinated by the tendency of Americans to be
joiners. Unlike in France, here ordinary people spontaneously
gathered together to perform acts intended for the common good.
Without a government official to order their participation, they
might decide to build a school because they collectively concluded
one was needed. This was the sort of volunteerism for which Ben
Franklin was renowned. Not alone in organizing libraries and fire
companies, he exemplified civic initiatives that bespoke the virtual
mania for self-help that gripped the nation. De Tocqueville thought
this significant. He speculated that these associations were seedbeds
of democracy in that they provided opportunities for average people
to practice the skills of interpersonal compromise. Communal
endeavors demanded that conflicting positions be negotiated, and a
knack for this could be transferred to governmental operations where
it could allow a wider distribution of authority.
The political scientist Robert Putnam,19 in studying democratic
reforms in Italy, came to the conclusion that the provinces that
adapted them most readily were the ones with a tradition of civic
involvement. Tuscany, which had long enjoyed self-rule, surged ahead
of Sicily, a region that had suffered under despotic aristocrats. Tuscan
citizens were better versed in individual initiative and, therefore, more
effective in creating grass roots institutions. Turning his attention to
his homeland, Putnam20 argued that a history of civic associations
indeed had the effects de Tocqueville theorized. The problem, as
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Putnam saw it, was that these habits were eroding. As society grew in
size, people were less inclined to join communal projects. The nation
was being transformed into an agglomeration of strangers, which
boded ill for its democratic foundations. Emblematic of this decline
was what seemed to be happening to bowling. Bowling leagues
were falling on hard times and he concluded that more people were
bowling alone. Instead of coming together with regular associates,
they indulged in private pleasures.
In investigating this phenomenon, Putnam speculated that
this was a generalized occurrence that everything from religious
attendance to participation in the PTA was contracting. For a
while, the scholarly debate was heated. In time, however, other
investigators found not an absence of civic participation but a shift in
its focus.21 Bowling leagues might have declined in enrollment, but
the number of children participating in soccer leagues was increasing.
Similarly, main-line churches might be losing their adherents, but
evangelical congregations were flourishing. Even the PTA figures
were deceptive. This organization turned out to have been captured
by the teachers’ union; hence, many parents organized competing
PA associations that were expanding. The swing seemed to be not
so much moving away from combining with others toward going
it alone as moving toward associating in ways more appropriate to
changed circumstances. One of these circumstances was none other
than the burgeoning of the middle classes.
Members of the middle classes remain joiners. They belong
to professional organizations, political parties, chambers of
commerce, book clubs, sports clubs, neighborhood associations,
social clubs, ethnic societies, labor unions, veterans groups, public
interest organizations, the Boy and Girl Scouts, and local churches.
Volunteering and charitable giving are up, not down. The most
popular collaborative efforts no longer back teetotalers or suffragettes
but have migrated to the Sierra Club and the American Association
of Retired Persons. If bowling went down and soccer went up, it was
because soccer was more congenial to a middle class ethos. People
also continue to participate in local government. They go to zoning
board meetings and vote for school bonds in record numbers. They
even run for and were elected to grass-roots institutions such as local
school boards.
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Civic associations, it must be observed, are noncoercive alliances.
People enlist in them not from compulsion, but from personal desire.
In so doing, they augment their personal strength in quest of goals
they find mutually significant. Nevertheless, they can win struggles
of supremacy with competing associations, associations that may
have different objectives, only by maintaining cohesion. What
makes this solidarity problematic is that these alliances are largely
among strangers. Where once hunter-gatherers stood shoulder to
shoulder because they were like-minded relatives, modern Americans
need to cooperate with people with whom they only share interests.
In a mass-market society most affiliations are perforce with relatively
unknown associates. Unless these people can find common ground
under these conditions, they are destined to fragment. Instead of
achieving their goals, they will split into smaller units whose energies
will be dissipated in fruitless squabbling.
Francis Fukuyama,22 another political scientist of note, has
emphasized the role of interpersonal trust in these affairs. He argues
that in countries like the United States people exhibit a high degree
of trust in strangers,23 whereas in more traditional societies, such as
China, they do not. The Chinese, and for that matter the Sicilians,
place their confidence in their families. Unfortunately, this interferes
with doing business in a market-oriented economy. If people are
only willing to engage in commercial transactions with those whom
they have known for decades, the scope of their operations will
be limited. In this setting, the mass production of an industrial
society is impossible. Happily, people with social-class-dominated
civilizations routinely make purchases in supermarkets from others
with whom they are only casually acquainted. They know that they
may occasionally be cheated when a sale price has not been entered
into the store’s computer, but they also know that these errors are
relatively trivial. For the same reason, they are prepared to deposit
their paychecks over the Internet. Were they reluctant to do so, the
financial infrastructure of the economies on which they rely would
unravel, and they would soon find themselves out of work.
What are some of the interpersonal skills that enable people to
collaborate in a world full of strangers? One is relatively simple. If
they are to organize and inspire one another, they must be able to
communicate with each other. In the highlands of New Guinea, tribes
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living within miles of one another are mutually suspicious, in part,
because they speak incomprehensible languages.24 Multiculturalists
dismiss the utility of a lingua franca, but those who would be social
mobile must be able to converse with a larger community. Absent
a common idiom, they can not make their opinions known beyond
their home territory. They definitely can not be persuasive before
audiences unable decipher their messages. But from a middle-class
perspective, even this is not enough. Those who hope to lead broad
coalitions must be articulate. They must command a vocabulary and
a clarity of expression that renders them credible. To be well spoken
is to be admired, and to be admired is to be influential.
It has become commonplace to refer to ours as an Information
Age. But, since most data are transmitted by means of language,
information implies competence with words. Furthermore, language
is disseminated through channels of communication. One reason
information is characterized as central to modernity is that it is
conveyed more widely, and effortlessly, than before.25 The telegraph,
the telephone, the radio, the television, and the computer provide
instant, worldwide connections. Those who command these can,
therefore, commandeer a larger constituency than was previously
available. This has thrust the media into the forefront of alliance
formation. Those who have access to its channels and are skilled
in their manipulation, become opinion leaders. They can persuade
strangers to unite behind a popular war or to undermine the
prosecution of an unpopular one. It was through these channels that
pre-existing commitments to democratic values were appropriated
to turn feminism into an intoxicating juggernaut. It was also
journalists that convinced millions of viewers that diversity26 is
distinct from affirmative action.27 Less well appreciated is the fact
that the skills to perform this sort of magic is, in large part, cultural
skills. They depend on a familiarity not merely with language but
with conventionally credible symbols. And as we shall later see, an
acquaintance with the subtle connotations of culture is intimately
tied with educational and entertainment institutions.
But people skills are also intimate. Individuals become proficient
at influencing others when they know where they are coming from.
In sociology, this ability is called role taking.28 Role partners typically
coordinate their activities by imaginatively placing themselves in one
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another’s shoes. Thus, a husband who knows that his wife hates to
peel onions can do this for her before she asks, thereby gaining her
gratitude. Likewise a teacher who detects a student’s confusion over
algebra can facilitate the learning process by intervening at a critical
moment. This roletaking, in turn, depends on a bevy of skills. In
order to be responsive to another’s intentions, one must first be able to
perceive them. To provide a simple example, everyday conversations
would be impossible without turn taking.29 Lest they step on each
other’s words, speakers must be able to recognize when the other
party is about to relinquish the floor. Yet, discerning this depends
on having a sense of what the other is saying, in other words, on
seeing things from another’s perspective. This standpoint cannot be
a complete mystery if one’s response is to exhibit good timing or a
semblance of relevance.
But responsiveness itself is a complex skill one that begins with
self-knowledge. Before a person can decode another, he/she must
possess insights into the human heart. This, however, commences
with self-awareness.30 Young children tend to be selfish because they
act on impulse. If they want something, they want it now, irrespective
of the desires of others. Many parents teach them to overcome this
egotism by asking how it feels when someone takes a cookie from
them. Once children recognize their own potential chagrin, they
can be queried about how another child would feel were this is done
to them. Obviously the older we get, the more we learn about our
own psychodynamics and thereby about the dynamics of those with
whom we interact. Some, of course, are better at introspection than
others, which gives them a subtle entry into the worlds of their role
partners. Long ago, at the beginning of the Commercial Revolution,
Socrates recommended self-knowledge to those who would be wise.
Even then he understood the value of personal awareness in social
relationships.
But, in a world of strangers, self-knowledge is not enough. There
are ways in which all humans are alike, but others in which they
differ. The more extended the community, the more likely individual
motives will vary.31 Multiculturalists insist on the need to respect
diversity, and in this they have a point.32 They also recommend
that people be nonjudgmental, but they take this too far. People
need standards. They cannot refuse to make distinctions, for to
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do so is tantamount to being amoral. Nevertheless, understanding
that cultures can be at odds is crucial. Individuals have competing
religious beliefs, diverse family arrangements, and conflicting
values. One may not agree with a neighbor’s love of shish kebab,
but a failure to recognize this preference can inevitably result in
squabbles. Even the personal circumstances of another’s life can
produce incomprehensible responses when perceived out of context.
A friend’s hatred of being confined in tight spaces might appear
irrational if it were understood that in growing up he was punished
by being confined to a closet. Recognizing these factors permits us to
allow for idiosyncrasies. Indeed, one of the more salient differences
between adults and children is that the former have a broader range
of experiences from which to draw nuanced interpretations.
This subtlety comes in handy in the complex negotiations33
that permeate contemporary social relations. With so many
people pursuing divergent agendas, finding common ground takes
extraordinary competence. Engaging in these mediations requires
both flexibility and problem solving. If two people are to join in
collaborative efforts, they must somehow agree on a unified plan
that may vary from what either at first contemplated. Personal
flexibility allows for these adjustments. Only if a person’s cognitive
understandings and emotional commitments are malleable can that
person make the requisite compromises. This suppleness permits
the person to perceive another’s requirements and make appropriate
concessions. In the end, people cooperate because they derive
something from the deal. Flexibility allows them to recognize that
what is relinquished is compensated for by what is gained.
Closely related to this plasticity is a problem-solving orientation.
Individuals who enter a negotiation intent on resolving emerging
difficulties have a greater opportunity to work things out. Those
who insist that their demands are nonnegotiable not only put their
adversaries on the defensive, but they close their eyes to potential
solutions. They cease looking for unanticipated options and can
precipitate a contagious rigidity. As it happens, people who feel like
winners are less likely to insist on total victories. Confident in their
ability to elicit respect, they do not need to destroy their opponents.
The result is a willingness to cede a portion of the pot to others.
This, in turn, educes good will and cooperation. As a consequence,
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a combined effort can contribute to a larger pot from which all can
draw. In short, competent negotiations launch spirals of success. For
this reason, they are integral to middle-class dominance. They are
also derivative of it. Success generates the confidence that permits
the flexible bargaining that produces further success.
Technical Skills
People skills are clearly germane in an environment dependent on
social alliances. But, this does not mean that technical skills should
be slighted. They, too, are pertinent in a society dominated by the
middle classes. As professionals, or professionalizers, their members
obtain much of their power from their technical proficiency. Our
civilization has produced technological wizardry that could not be
sustained without scientifically and methodologically proficient
personnel. People must be able to operate the wondrous machines
upon which they depend and to fix them when they break down.
They must also make sure that the transportation links keeping their
bounty flowing are in good repair. As the sociologist Michel Crozier34
has demonstrated, an important source of interpersonal power is an
ability to control these uncertainties. Those who understand how to
keep the goose laying its golden eggs receive deference in exchange
for the benefits they confer. Once more, the middle classes emerge
as the guardians of our collective prosperity and, therefore, as virtual
titans in the battle for social prestige.
Among the economic sectors dependent on technological
expertise are manufacturing, marketing, agriculture, entertainment,
communications, transportation, government, health maintenance,
and science. Millions of people would starve to death if fertilizers
and pesticides did not get to the farms. Many millions more would
perish if the harvest did not arrive at customers’ door. Disease, too,
would be rampant without modern medicine; poverty, unendurable
without well-administered welfare programs, and daily life, infinitely
more stressful without labor-saving machinery. Even our daily
routines would be pallid without readily accessible amusements. The
ordinary person may not know the difference between alternating
and direct current, but someone must if the television set is to turn
on when the button on the remote is pressed.
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The density of what must be known is apparent in the case of
medicine.35 It was not until about the time of World War I that going
to the doctor improved one’s chances of recovering from an illness,
but, since then, the quality of life has improved enormously. Today,
people take it for granted that infants will survive to a span of almost
four score years. They also expect that these will be active years, free
of debilitating disorders. The physician is expected to insure this.
If not, a malpractice suit may well ensue. To preclude this, doctors
are required to endure a rigorous technical training before they are
licensed. Just how demanding this is can be confirmed by anyone
who has taken courses in organic chemistry, anatomy, or physiology.
So much must be committed to memory, and so much of this is
contingent upon superior analytical skills, that doctors are renowned
for their intelligence.
Yet, the extent of technological expertise is better demonstrated
by what has happened to policing. Historically, the police were of
blue-collar origin. They were expected to be burly men who, when
placed out on the street, dressed in uniforms equipped with guns and
nightsticks, could keep social order. Being physically intimidating
and reasonably honest were about the only job requirements. Today,
this definition would be considered laughable. Although most lawenforcement agents are still of working-class origin, they are rapidly
professionalizing. More and more, they are expected to obtain college
educations. Criminal justice has graduated into a quasi-science.36
As with business-school graduates, criminology majors aim to
acquire a rationalized approach to their jobs. Future police officers
are instructed in the rudiments of criminal procedures, forensic
sciences, abnormal psychology, substance abuse, domestic violence,
comparative legal systems, criminal law, profiling techniques, sexual
deviance, white collar and Internet crime, and community policing.
They are required to know what constitutes a legal arrest, how to
testify in court, and the best ways to deal with a diverse public. Those
who cannot exercise personal control or think on their feet are not
deemed good candidates. They are less likely to benefit from the sort
of education now considered mandatory across the board.37
This is apparent in the explosion of formal education. Only
recently have politicians taken to promising a college education
for almost everyone.38 Slogans such as “leave no child behind”
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have extended to providing bachelors degrees to some of the least
academically adept pupils. Based on the premises that everyone
should be equal and that no one can compete without advanced
schooling, the goal is to turn everyone into an expert. Ironically,
this has produced little more than grade inflation. The notion that
supplying everyone with an express elevator to the top can eliminate
social ranking is discredited by differences in personal aptitude.
Some are simply better learners than others, hence when the time
comes to contend for precedence in the real world, they can invoke
the know-how to prevail. One of the qualities of the members of the
middle classes is that they tend to be disciplined learners. They make
the effort to read assigned materials and to study for impending tests.
They are also lifelong learners. When experience indicates that they
need additional information, they go out to get it. In essence, they do
their homework. In contrast, those who fall behind frequently come
from backgrounds where going through the motions is regarded as
sufficient. They do not understand that expertise requires not an
appearance of proficiency but the real thing.
Needless to say, technological expertise is also conditional on
scientific competence. The insights provided by a disciplined search
for knowledge are essential to what has been achieved. Without
the discoveries of physics, chemistry, and biology, industrialization
could not have occurred. There would have been no steam engine,
no television sets, no antibiotics, no CDs, and no rockets to the
moon. Yet the ascendancy of science emerged from a hard won
struggle. During the medieval period, human dissections were not
permitted; hence, it was not known that the heart is a pump rather
than a furnace. Similarly, during the Renaissance, the Church was
scandalized that the earth might revolve around the sun; so it refused
to allow Galileo39 to publish The Starry Messenger. Accepted truth,
that is, truth based on faith or authority, was not to be challenged.
As a consequence, it could not be disconfirmed. But as Karl Popper40
has taught, unless an assertion can in principle be shown to be false,
it does not convey truth-value. It is, in essence, a tautology. Science
is, therefore, concerned with carefully testing truths, even when they
are unpopular. This takes courage, not only because scientists can be
censured, but because they can be wrong.
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Here, too, status plays a role. First, in being the custodians of the
truth, the middle classes acquire an edge in tests of strength. By using
science to make it less likely that these assertions will be disproved,
their assertiveness is thereby enhanced. Second, the clout that comes
with status enables them to defend the very enterprises from which
they obtain legitimacy. Though others may wish to forbid scientific
investigations that might prove embarrassing to their pretentions,
these naysayers can be overruled, and progress proceeds. As an
example, feminist ideologues were not able to prevent psychologists
from confirming biologically based gender differences. Despite their
strenuous objections, they could not outlaw the neurological studies
they feared. The scientists, those who funded their inquiries, and the
universities that employed them would have none of this. Their own
reputations were dependent on breaking new intellectual ground;
hence, they persevered despite the opposition.
Emotional Maturity
So far, the middle class way of life has been associated with
both interpersonal and technical skills. Nowadays, part of attaining
higher rank clearly depends upon learning to deal with people and
with obtaining good practical educations. Yet, there is something
more fundamental to success. This is personal discipline. Those
who cannot control their impulses are not able to concentrate their
assets on the fitnesses needed to work in these other areas. They
cannot acquire the necessary skills nor apply them appropriately. As
a consequence, they are not capable of exercising the internalized
restraints upon which decentralized societies rely. Unqualified to
make good decisions without supervision, they are not given the
leeway to do so.
Yet personal discipline is itself dependent upon emotional
maturity.41 Unless a person can control his or her strong feelings,
that person is vulnerable to rash actions. Instead of thinking
through the best way to cooperate with role partners, a person will
allow intemperate desires to take over. Rather than concentrate on
acquiring difficult skills, an individual takes the easy way out and
settles for shortcuts. The emotionally immature are like children;
they want what they want when they want it. Theirs is not a world
of resolution or determination. When they are hurt, they cry;
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when they are frightened, they run; when they are angry, they try
to get even. As a result, little gets done, certainly little that must be
done cooperatively. Not surprisingly, those who exhibit emotional
incompetence are not respected. They are not sought out as allies
nor held in awe as adversaries whose enmity is to be dreaded.
Several decades ago Edmund Muskie was expected to be a
shoo-in for the Democratic nomination for president. As Hubert
Humphrey’s running mate four years earlier, he had made so solid an
impression that the respect lingered. Then, one inopportune day, he
mounted a soapbox in front of the offices of the Manchester, New
Hampshire, Union-Leader and decried its editor’s attack upon his
wife’s integrity. Affirming that although he had not been personally
injured, he considered it his duty to defend her honor, he proceeded
to unleash a tirade. So far, his words were unobjectionable, but
then Muskie broke down and cried. His voice choked up, and tears
streamed down his face. Until that moment, he had exuded an aura
of craggy manhood, but suddenly he was revealed to be a crybaby.
The nation gave a collective shudder and came to the conclusion
that this man was too delicate to be entrusted with the stresses of
its highest office. Almost immediately, his approval ratings sank,
and within weeks he was forced to withdraw his candidacy. He
had demonstrated emotional incompetence, which was judged
incompatible with the strength needed in a paramount leader.
Decades later, Governor Howard Dean of Vermont, addressing his
supporters at a campaign rally after losing the Iowa caucuses, made
a comparable blunder. Intending to fire up his troops, he gave what
came to be called the “I have a scream” speech. Delivered with such
fire that it confirmed the worst fears about his inability to control his
temper, his speech also drove his candidacy out of contention.
An analogous fate had earlier befallen Joseph McCarthy.42 After
several years as the scourge of Communist agents in government
employ, the senator was cornered by his enemies during what came
to be called the Army-McCarthy hearings. His chief interlocutor,
Joseph Welch, was the Army’s counsel. A folksy New Englander,
he came loaded for bear. But this experienced attorney confronted
a lawmaker who had already been unnerved. Long denounced as
an unprincipled fascist, McCarthy had grown unsure of his ground.
In an effort to manage his doubts, he had taken to drink. That
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morning, evidently suffering from a hangover, he was relentlessly
quizzed about the names of a gaggle of alleged Communists. Finally
driven to respond, he informed Welch that one of his own younger
colleagues had such ties. To this came the famous rejoinder, “Sir, at
long last have you no decency.” Thrown back on his heels, McCarthy
could offer nothing but a whiny denial. The contrast could not have
been more stark. On one side sat a genial, grandfatherly defender
of justice, and on the other, a shrill bully intent on destroying the
career of an innocent. Welch was obviously a sensitive adult, whereas
McCarthy was an emotional cripple. That, alone, would be sufficient
to decide the issue. An emotional weakling could not be allowed to
set the nation’s agenda. Within years, a media vendetta crumpled
tail-gunner Joe into a pathetic shadow of his former self, and he was
soon dead, too.
Emotions matter. They are at the heart of tests of strength.
These contests are, after all, usually won by means of intimidation.
Accordingly, feelings are vital to attaining interpersonal, and even
technical, skills. Over the last several decades psychologists and
educators have come to recognize this. One popular concept to
emerge from this ferment has been that of EQ. A coinage of Daniel
Goleman’s,43 it refers, imitating the intelligence quotient or IQ, to a
postulated Emotional Quotient. Drawing upon theories of multiple
intelligences, it suggests that possessing emotional competence is
equivalent to being smart. Although there is no accepted measure of
this faculty, Goleman alleges that without it, a person may get hired
but will have difficulty keeping a job. On paper a person might have
the qualifications to do what is required, but, in practice, a prickly
personality would prevent participation in a team.
The crucial element in this, one that is confirmed in actual
relationships, is emotional maturity.44 Just as human beings are
born with a capacity to learn languages, they come equipped
with an aptitude to experience a wide range of emotions. But, as
with language, the ability to apply these develops over time. For
competent speech, there is a vocabulary to be learned and a syntax to
be mastered. For emotions, there are communication and motivation
factors to be managed. Feelings must be socialized. Children must
learn how and when to express them. More importantly, they need
to discover how to apply them to achieve desired goals. The passions
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that send convulsions coursing through infantile frames are primitive
in operation. They are stereotyped and virtually automatic. Thus,
when angry, a baby issues an aggravated cry. The face screws up, and
a bitter hoarseness conveys displeasure. In most cases, the mother
recognizes this irritation and tries to assuage it. Yet, were an adult
to be as inarticulate, the confusion would be general. A mature
person is expected to verbalize sources of displeasure and, in the best
circumstances, to indicate what would diminish them.
Primitive, childish emotions simply erupt. They are what they
are. The very young do not control them because they have not yet
learned how to control them. The problem is that many adults do
not master them either. Especially when feelings become intense,
they overstep their boundaries. In this situation, anger becomes
rage, and fear becomes panic. Even love can become obsessive. Yet,
chronological maturity does not guarantee that someone will have
discovered how to suppress what is inappropriate. Under these
conditions, an individual’s influence will shrink. Impulsively berating
the wrong person, at the wrong moment, is a sure ticket to defeat.
Uncontrolled passions reveal an internal defect that is interpreted as
weakness, and weakness, of course, invites attack. It is a sign that a
person is a loser who will buckle under pressure. Thus adults who
are given to temper tantrums are regarded as puerile. The louder
they become, the more they are ignored. Though their histrionics
at first gain attention, this soon degenerates into farce. Controlled
emotions, in contrast, are effective and powerful. They induce others
to act as one hopes.
One of the most dependable indicators of interpersonal strength
is emotional courage. Physical courage is appropriate in a militarized
society, but an ability to deal with emotional confrontations is
more functional in a commercial one. Both in the marketplace
and the political arena, people seek to intimidate others through
expressive displays. They issue protests, make demands, and
convey disappointment, all in an attempt to motivate compliance.
Those who are sufficiently self-confident can withstand such faceto-face coercion, whereas those who are not either back off or
overreact. In so doing, they signal a relative frailty, with predictable
consequences. A renewal of affective attacks then serves to reduce
their confidence further. In the end, people sort themselves out
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according to their emotional reserves with the tougher going to
the top and the hypersensitive bottoming out. To compound the
trouble of the emotionally fragile, anxious about interpersonal
confrontations, they hang back when in quest of people or technical
skills. Intuitively aware that acquiring these competences might
expose them to further emotional tests, they fail to apply themselves
adequately. Particularly with respect to people skills, they shy away
from developing the capacities that might discredit their excuses for
not asserting themselves. Deliberately, if not intentionally, they fail
to learn about themselves or others, expecting that they need not
employ what they do not understand. This, sad to say, has been one
of the factors holding back progress among African Americans who
refuse to study Euro-American customs on the grounds that these are
irrelevant to their personal experience.
In any event, emotional socialization45 is not evenly distributed.
Though it is the sine qua non of self-direction, members of upper
social classes are much more adept at inculcating these disciplines
than are those in lower orders. Themselves under control, as parents,
they both model and enforce affective restraint. Winners tend to
beget winners. Because they are less frustrated than losers, they can
afford to be more deliberate. On the assumption that they are in
good shape, they take their time before reacting. By the same token,
higher-status parents are more patient with their children. When
the latter lose control, they understand that this can be a temporary
condition. Having personally experienced control, they know it
is possible. They also know how valuable it is. They, therefore,
expend considerable effort to teach self-discipline. In so doing, they
explain what is needed, provide opportunities for timeouts, and
exert moderate, albeit persistent, pressures to maintain composure.
Even the pastimes they favor support emotional control. Reading
novels, listening to classical music, and playing golf all promote selfrestraint. Take golf; it does not reward the intemperate. Those who
throw tantrums on the links find it difficult to stand quietly over
their ball as they adjust their swings. By the same token, players who
learn how not only lower their scores also find it easy to cope with
change and with difficult people. Having discerned the secret of
mastering uncomfortable emotions, they inadvertently discover how
to manage external uncertainties. In essence, having discovered how
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to remain calm under stress, they possess an advantage over those
who have not.
Those from the lowest quarter of the social spectrum find
powerful feelings problematic. Years of enduring failures leave them
not nearly as optimistic as the more fortunate. Often frustrated to
the point of distraction, they fear the worst and chafe at the prospect
of repeated impotence. Their tendency is to react immediately and,
therefore, impulsively. Primitive emotions rise to the surface and
spew forth indiscriminately. An obstreperous child becomes an
occasion for rage; a bad report card, from a teacher an occasion for
panic; a disappointed spouse, an indicator of betrayal. Instead of
focusing on what their children need to learn, they convert them
into objects of corporeal punishment. A parent’s need for emotional
release supersedes all else, and this is the lesson which is transmitted.
To compound the difficulty, the child who must endure the back
of a father’s hand becomes further enraged. His goal will now
be to get revenge, whether or not this entails additional violence.
Ultimately, such training produces an adult who is suspicious of
almost everyone’s intentions. No one seems capable of control, and,
therefore, all must be kept at bay, often with preemptive strikes. This,
of course, intensifies the internecine warfare among friends, relatives,
and coworkers, and with it the anger and fear of those trapped in
such hostilities. Powerful emotions are more likely to be expressed in
primitive forms and, consequently, to reinforce a cycle of defeat. The
end product is that losing begets more losing. It produces offspring
who are uncomfortable with change, with confusing subtleties, and
with unfamiliar role partners. In short, it grooms them to be future
members of the lower classes.
None of this should be construed as indicating that higher status
individuals are less emotional than those below them. Emotions,
including intense ones, are universal. The primary hierarchical
distinction is in how they are expressed. The emotionally mature
can be simultaneously passionate and intelligent. They learn to
turn down the heat before they act so that when they do, they can
calculate the best strategies for success. By directing their feelings
where they will do the most good, they derive added power from
them. Thus they may vent their displeasure at a subordinate, while
concealing it from a superior, knowing full well where it will have
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the desired impact. The immature, in contrast, are liable to explode
when touched off. If not, they simmer with impotent rage. In a
sense, they embody the sound and fury warned in the play, Macbeth,
as signifying nothing. Unguided missiles frequently land in their
own backyards. Nowadays, it is conventional to assert that crime,
including violent crime, is distributed evenly throughout society, but
the truth is that its ferocity is concentrated at the lower end. It is
there that violence is most destructive.
Middle Class Values and Virtues
So far we have discussed the means through which the middle classes
exercise their dominance. Emotional controls, interpersonal skills,
and technical competence all contribute to superior performances.
They enable people to best others by being more effective in activities
that matter. Yet, which goals claim their attention? What are they
aiming to achieve? The means people employ are important, but so
are the ends to which these are harnessed. Of special significance are
the generalized ends called values. A value is a moral objective.46 It
is an end state deemed particularly worthy of consummation. Some
goals may seem unconditional, but they, in fact, evolve over time.
The sorts of values that animated theocratic or militaristic societies
are different from those that permeate commercial ones. More
specifically, middle-class values dominate contemporary societies.
Moral objectives, such as honesty and freedom, having been found
essential within market-oriented environments, become everyone’s
standards. Closely related to these are middle class virtues. A virtue is
an internalized disposition to seek particular goals. In moral terms, a
virtuous person is inclined to pursue what is good, not because others
demand it, but because the motivation to do so is deeply ingrained.
Middle-class virtues include such familiar qualities as responsibility,
individualism, and tolerance.47
Among the ancient Greeks who gathered beneath the walls
of Troy to avenge Helen’s abduction, a different set of appraisals
governed.48 Theirs was largely a pre-commercial society. Trading
did occur among the Mycenaeans and Minoans, but it was small
scale compared with what followed. Indeed, the distinction between
a merchant and a pirate was still evolving. Theirs was a world of
adventurous souls who took to their small wooden vessels in search
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of profit or booty. Often at the mercy of dangerous seas, when they
came to call on a foreign port, they could not expect commodious
accommodations. Since hotels had not yet been invented, these
people depended upon the hospitality of the natives, and since a
welcome would be extended only if it were reciprocated, hospitality
became highly valued. Those who provided it were respected,
whereas those who did not were reviled. Today, with commercial
establishments available everywhere, this attitude seems quaint.
Nevertheless, within its own context, it was the height of ethical
behavior. Hospitality was a sacred goal, and those who provided it
were men of virtue. Correspondingly, those who accepted it were
bound not to abuse this goodwill by kidnapping their host’s wife.
Cheek by jowl with this protocommercial outlook subsisted
a military tradition that prided itself on courage. The hero was a
man who exhibited unusual physical bravery. He charged, unafraid,
into battle and cut a swath of destruction in his path. During the
epoch preceding the development of the Greek phalanx, individual
valor counted most. Muscle power and skill with weaponry won
the day and hence, were admired. To back down from a challenge
was considered cowardly and would ruin a warrior’s reputation. The
quality valued above all others was honor. A man, to be a man,
had to be honorable. Much as a Star Trek Klingon would rather
be dead than display weakness in battle, so might ancient Greeks.
They would rather perish than live as dishonored nobodies. This
attitude survived up to the first days of the American experiment.
Alexander Hamilton49 preferred to face death in a duel than refuse
to accept Aaron Burr’s challenge. The middle-class dominance of
the contemporary frame of mind is no better demonstrated than by
the puzzlement nowadays registered at this decision. Contemporary
Americans cannot understand why honor would demand such a
course of action. Because their values do not contain a similar code
of conduct, they find it incomprehensible.
The values to which people subscribe are tested in the crucible
of their experiences. Although social goals change over time, their
origins can be ascertained and their ramifications charted. We are,
in point of fact, in the midst of a period of turmoil regarding social
standards. Over the preceding decades, there has been much talk
of culture wars. Conservatives have been pitted against liberals in
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symbolically sanguine battles over what is best. Each side describes
itself as defending truth and decency and condemns the other for
fomenting what is opposed. So pregnant is this with social-class
implications that the nature of this struggle deserves close attention.
As we shall see, much of this controversy can be interpreted as a
consequence of cultural lag, which merits a full analysis. In the
meantime, the core values and virtues of the commercial middle
classes can be examined. Most of these are familiar, but their
repercussions may be less so.
One might assume that wealth would hold the place of honor
within a commercial society, yet paradoxically it does not. People do
aim to get rich, and they admire those who excel in this quest, but
this admiration is grudging, with exceptional wealth often equated
with greed. Acquisitiveness per se is not deemed a moral quality. It is,
if anything, associated with the upper classes, especially the nouveau
riche. Thus, it is considered gauche and frequently disguised with a
patina of middle class respectability. One buys a Bentley, not a Rolls
Royce, because one intends to be appropriately modest. The truly
wealthy are even expected to give away a substantial portion of their
assets. Unless they are avid philanthropists, they are dismissed as
social parasites.
A more solidly middle-class virtue is responsibility. If Alan
Wolfe50 is to be believed, most Americans hold this attribute to be
almost sacred. In his national survey of values, he found almost total
agreement that this quality is highly valued. Why it should be is not
a mystery in a society in which most people aspire to make important
decisions. They understand that being entrusted with this assignment
is contingent upon making first-rate choices. They also realize that
responsible people are committed to such choices. Prepared to accept
the blame when things go wrong, they stick by the efforts they put
into deciding them well. If a decentralized system is to work, that is,
if leadership is to be widely dispersed, a professionalized dedication to
accountability is essential. Were decision makers casually to slough
this duty off onto others or automatically to shift the blame in times
of trouble, the community would be plagued by incompetence.
Those who seemed to be leaders would melt into the scenery, and the
nation would be without direction.
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Going hand in hand with responsibility is a dedication to merit.
In a market-oriented society, individuals compete for preeminence.
On the most basic level, they vie to see who can produce the most
desirable products. Some goods are reckoned to be better than others,
and some producers are superior to others; otherwise such struggles
would make no sense. The winners meet the higher standards. To be
sure, critics of capitalism complain that this is a fraud. They contend
that merchants seek to defraud their customers and, therefore, their
alleged merit is a sham. Obviously, this is sometimes true. But were
it the norm, the technical improvements that so clearly tower over
the current landscape would never have emerged. Max Weber’s51
analysis comes close to the truth. Rationality, which he considered
the central characteristic of modernity, is essentially a means of
pursuing merit. It utilizes careful calculations in an attempt to
achieve designated aims efficiently. Part of this process is obviously
a commitment to science. Its deliberate efforts to unravel nature’s
secrets are integral to the enterprise. The point of science is to
focus empiricism, accumulated knowledge, and a careful logic on
determining what is best. As with merit, were it not assumed that
there is a best (or at least a better), it would make no sense to rank
the competent over the less able. Nor would it make sense to value
responsibility if its outputs were indistinguishable from those of the
bungling.
In the United States, the pursuit of merit has intimate ties to
pragmatism. For centuries its citizens have taken pride in a practical
know-how. Across the land, a tinkerer mentality hatched battalions of
home-schooled inventors. Utilizing what they would have described
as common sense, they sought what worked, not what academics
considered valid. Before William James or John Dewey52 lent their
prestige to this philosophy, Thomas Edison, more proud of his
perspiration than his inspiration, tested hundreds of materials to find
a suitable filament for an electric light. Contemporaneously, John
Roebling set his sights on straddling New York City’s East River. His
Brooklyn Bridge became the world’s longest suspension span because
he and his son Washington dared to adjust their methods as they went
along. Experience also mattered to the Wright brothers. They could
never have flown at Kitty Hawk had they not previously built a wind
tunnel to explore the best wing shape. Even American politicians
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have joined the bandwagon. John Kennedy was celebrated for his
pragmatic approach to dealing with such problems as the race issue.
All of this has lent an ambivalence to American attitudes toward
education. More highly prized than ever, education still leaves most
Americans uncertain about intellectualism. The benefits of suitable
credentials are obvious to all, but individuals too dedicated to
scholarship are dismissed as nerds. Ordinary people are suspicious
of a lack of practicality and apparent narrow interests. Nonetheless,
middle-class parents encourage their children to become accomplished
learners. Parents want their children to be intellectually nimble
enough to grasp what is needed to in order to move ahead. Emotional
maturity, providing clear heads, accompanies an orientation toward
reading and inquisitiveness.
Another virtue linked to responsibility and merit is individualism.
Middle class Americans like to think of themselves as sturdy loners.
As with the cowboys to whom Henry Kissinger compared them, they
perceive themselves as self-reliant non-conformists. Out riding the
range on their own, they make unaided decisions for which they
are happy to take the credit or blame. This, say Robert Bellah53
and his associates, has characterized them since frontier days. When
the continent was an expanse of under-populated forest and plain
and one’s next-door neighbor could be miles away, one had to
fend for oneself. Carried into a corporate context, this orientation
continues to allow for innovation and idiosyncrasy. Novelty persists
in the marketplace because many individuals remain unafraid to be
different. Asked why they go their own way, most refer to a legacy
of freedom. Freedom is probably the master American value. It was
written into the nation’s founding documents and lingers on the lips
of children at play. Jealously guarded by volunteer armies over the
centuries, the liberty to say what one thinks, to pray as one desires,
and to vote as one pleases is taken for granted. The country has never
had internal passports or I.D. cards, enforced occupations, or noble
privilege. What this adds up to is social mobility. People have an
opportunity to select their own pathways, including those that result
in increased chances for success. Equality, on the other hand, is less
valued. Class warfare may have been imported from Europe, but it
never got too far. Americans like the prospect of standing out from
the crowd. As long as the game is not rigged in favor of particular
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players, they are prepared to live with the outcome. The equality
they endorse is Jeffersonian. It sanctions an equality of rights, not
of conclusions. Jefferson54 himself supported an aristocracy of merit
and was not contradicted by his fellow citizens. If anything, most of
them decry class jealousies as petty.
This, however, does not mean that the middle classes approve of
oppression. They wish to protect the underdog. To do less would be to
become a bully. Still, theirs is not a dedication based on equivalence;
rather it is grounded on tolerance. As Wolfe indicates, they believe
in a live-and-let-live attitude almost as much as in responsibility. If
people wish to be different, as long as this does not interfere with the
rights of their neighbors, they do not mind. Originally associated with
religious forbearance, as in George Washington’s55 recommendation
that each be allowed to pray under his own fig tree, the attitude has
expanded to include ethnic differences in the wake of massive foreign
immigration. It has also come to encompass racial variation. The
Civil Rights Movement may not have brought complete integration,
but it did lift a yoke of de jure segregation from the necks of AfricanAmericans. They are now believed to have a right to social mobility.
If they choose not to associate with European-Americans, this is
considered their choice.
Not long ago, most Americans left the doors of their homes
unlocked.56 They assumed that their neighbors were trustworthy. In
this, they were usually justified. Even today when surveys indicate
that dishonesty is expected of politicians, most people presume
something better from of their personal acquaintances. As important,
they generally offer something better themselves. Fukuyama’s counsel
that trust is essential to civic cohesion is heeded in action, if not
belief. Most people still attempt to be respectable. They may bend
the truth when advertising a new product or occasionally cheat on a
college term paper, but they usually keep their promises. Strangers
still approach one another to ask directions and are rarely led astray.
Similarly, members of the opposite sex go on unescorted dates, with
few terminating in rape. Drivers sometimes drive too fast, but the
overwhelming majority stops for traffic lights. Despite Cassandras,
the sky has not fallen. People still step outside without fear of being
mugged and do business without fear of being cheated. Riots do not
break out when the electric grid fails or when a hurricane devastates
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the coast. Trust and integrity have not disappeared; they have merely
undergone a cultural assault.
The middle classes have also maintained a tenacious hold on
family values. Divorce might have escalated passes levels once thought
imaginable, but romance and personal loyalty are still respected.
People want to fall in love and stay in love. They want to have children
with faithful spouses and to raise their youngsters to be responsible
adults. Irrespective of media clucking about multicultural families,
old traditions have been remarkably resilient. The heterosexual
nuclear family is still the norm and promises to remain so. Even if,
with tolerance, variations are allowed, the old standbys are privately
encouraged. Those who are able to remain faithful are prized for
their examples. When some succumb to something less, this is seen
as failure. It is not the paradigm but an uncomfortable reality. Only
the determinedly postmodern would demur.
In recounting its ideal type, Weber57 described bureaucracy
as overcoming the limitations of earlier forms of organization. Its
motto was, he declared, sine ira et studio. Usually translated into
English as “without fear or favor,” the expression declares that a
rational system would not sanction coercion or favoritism. To
be more precise, it would not enforce coordinated action via the
terror of military regimes nor the partiality of family based ones.
Competent personnel needed to be enlisted and motivated by the
reasonableness of working efficiently together for the benefit of all.
Because this coordination would be to their advantage, it would
suppress centrifugal tendencies. In the end, expertise would rise to
fill the positions that only expertise could manage. Unlike previous
systems, terror or genetic ties would not distort assessments of who
was best. Such alliances that developed would be based on calculated
gain, not the accidents of birth or physical aggression.
Adam Bellow58 has recently suggested that this is wrong. The
son of the novelist Saul Bellow, he argues that nepotism has always
contributed to social welfare that, in point of fact, favoring one’s
family need not entail favoring the incompetent. Yet, he makes
a distinction between new and old nepotism. In the prejudicial
variety, relatives are hired irrespective of their abilities, whereas in
the new version one’s children are groomed for success because they
are one’s children. Without a doubt, the offspring of the successful
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have an unearned advantage over the progeny of the unsuccessful.
Their status does tend to be inherited. Nevertheless, whereas status
was once directly bestowed in terms of a job, property, or wealth, it is
now bequeathed through social training. Higher-status children get
a better education for the demands of the marketplace than do their
more deprived peers. They are, therefore, better prepared to prevail
in the tests that await them. This is not so much a consequence
of going to better schools as of having ingested superior habits and
values. They are more likely to acquire the assets of a good education,
self-discipline, and personal responsibility. Thereby prepared by
precept and example to be competent learners and leaders, they
perceive themselves as their own loci of control. The opposite of
fatalists, they eventually assert themselves to good effect. Justifiably
more confidant than their competitors, they take risks that pay off.
The practice of parents preparing their children for independent
success should, in fairness, be distinguished from nepotism. This
propensity is, as Bellow acknowledges, a biological legacy. Not only
is it natural, it is essential to a social-class system. Stable social strata
could not exist were social mobility chaotic. The fact that the odds
are stacked in favor of the offspring of the middle classes prevents
anarchy. It encourages the perpetuation of the qualities necessary
for social survival. Instead of merit emerging willy-nilly, it surfaces
within a social network prepared to shepherd it to where it is needed.
Few would argue that society suffers when Bobby Bonds or Ken
Griffey, Jr., profit from having a father who was a talented baseball
player. The example and sponsorship that came from within their
families helped their careers, but they would have meant nothing if
these players had not been able to stand on their own feet. Then,
again, keeping operational control within the family has probably
hurt the New York Times. Pinch Sulzberger turned out to be much
more ideological than his father Punch. Under his stewardship, what
was once the nation’s newspaper of record has arguably become a
partisan broadsheet. Insulated from competing opinions, he has
been able to dilute the quality of a once proud journal.
The campaign against nepotism is in many ways a movement in
favor of weak as opposed to strong social ties. Family relationships
do not preclude effective alliances, but if these were exclusive, they
might rule out others. In a commercial society, so much talent is
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required that it must come from diverse sources. The point of a
social class, such as the middle class, is that it has many members and
room for many more. Most of these do not know each other; they are
certainly not family. Nevertheless, they may be associates. They are
affiliated in networks of acquaintances. Because these linkages are far
more ramified than family ties, they provide a broader venue from
which to draw talent. When contemporary members of the middle
class declare that the job should go to the best qualified, not to the
best connected, they are asking for more open competition, not an
absolute one. They recognize that not everyone can be considered
for every position; hence they accede to some narrowing of the pool
so long as merit is a significant factor in hiring. In discouraging
nepotism, they in essence promote weak ties, not because these
always provide superior candidates, but because the strong might
otherwise swamp the weak. Norms of fairness are just that. If they
are stacked against favoritism, it is because favoritism can take care
of itself. A modern economy must, in essence, protect against a bias
toward family preferences.
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Chapter 4

Origins
To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to
remain always a child. For what is the worth of human
life, unless it is woven into the life of our ancestors by the
records of history? (Cicero, Orations)
They [the Greeks] were the first Westerners; the spirit of the
West; the modern spirit, is a Greek discovery and the place
of the Greeks is in the modern world. (Edith Hamilton,
The Greek Way)
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the
society but the people themselves; and if we think them
not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a
wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion. (Thomas Jefferson,
“Letter to William Charles Jarvis”)
Waves of Change
The expression that one cannot see the forest for the trees has
become a commonplace because distinguishing the whole from the
part is difficult to do. Distracted by what is immediately before
them, people often miss the context in favor of the particular. This
is especially so with respect to historic trends.1 Grounded in the
present, people are apt to regard the past as irrelevant. That our
ancestors lived differently from how we do seems impossible. That
these differences might have been a prelude to what now appear to be
eternal verities sounds ridiculous. Nevertheless, that which is could
not have been without that which went before. This is as true of
middle-class dominance as anything else. It could not have come to
fruition had not earlier achievements preceded it. The consequences
of these steppingstones cannot, however, be perceived if they are
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not viewed in perspective. A long-term outlook, literally over many
millennia, is necessary to appreciate what has happened and why.
As significant, such a view is crucial if we are to see where we are
going.
The current status of the middle classes did not arrive fully formed
resembling, as it were, some conventional Venus on a clamshell. Their
prominence has been part of an incoming commercial tide, but this tide
was itself comprised of a series of waves. Advances have occurred and
been challenged and consolidated, then swept away in an undertow
of reaction. These periodic reversals of fortune have been temporary
but compelling. Still, time and again, however deep the trough, the
ineluctable power of the marketplace has reasserted itself and in so
doing reinforced the power of the middling orders. The very utility
of social class mobility and decentralized decision making eventually
contributed to a commercial eminence. As a result, the value of
their services thrust self-directed doers into leadership positions, and
in the process, transformed the foundations of social power. Where
family and military alliances, then religious associations, were in
their turn supreme, relatively impersonal economic forces ultimately
moved to the fore. Hierarchy has remained crucial throughout, but
its outlines metamorphosed beyond what would once have been
considered possible.
By the same token, the skills and attitudes underlying the Middle
Class Revolution have evolved more slowly and inexorably than many
social critics care to contemplate. Political reformers, in particular,
tend to be oriented toward ideas. They develop a mental conception
of what society should be and then assume that if they can convince
others to adopt it, their ideal will swiftly emerge. Nineteenth-century
anarchists, to cite one instance, truly believed that murdering heads
of state would bring about total, government-free, equality. These
deeds, as they called them, would be all the impetus needed to
restructure society. Yet actual social circumstances proved otherwise.
Real life entails relationships too complex to be fully fathomed and
too unyielding to command instant compliance. Indeed, much of
what happens can only be comprehended in retrospect. Even then,
the human mind is too blunt an instrument to assimilate all of its
contradictory elements.
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Especially confusing are conflicts over supremacy. Human tests
of strength are, of course, ubiquitous, as are the shifting alliances
of the combatants. Despite episodes of apparent stability, rebellion
and strife always lurk just below the surface. These insurgencies
are, in fact, the stuff of history. So multifaceted are their political
crosscurrents that historians continuously reevaluate their details
to ascertain what really happened. Nevertheless, because most of
these skirmishes are shrouded in a haze of obfuscation, the truth is
elusive. The players lie to themselves and to others as an integral part
of their stratagems for success. Even the scholars who assess these
matters are enmeshed in webs of lies. Because they too are human,
they cannot be completely disinterested observers. Biased by their
own political, personal, and moral commitments, they frequently
misperceive what they see. History is then reinterpreted because the
inconsistent preconceptions of its chroniclers impel them to uncover
additional evidence to bolster their favored explanations. Since no
one is free of these limitations, what is momentarily asserted must, in
consequence, be taken as tentative, including what follows.
Social progress, if that is the appropriate term, generally comes
by way of unconscious experiments.2 Individuals try out new ideas,
not in the controlled manner of laboratory trials, but helter-skelter
as the mood and opportunities take them. It is not that they do not
think things through so much as that their narrow viewpoints prevent
them from perceiving the shape of things to come. What occurs is,
therefore, a naturalistic separation of the wheat from the chaff. Some
things work, and others do not. Some developments fill in the gaps
left by previous experiments, while others float like orphans until
time passes them by. The innovators, some of whom are not even
aware that they are innovating, rarely do this from altruism. More
usual, they perceive a problem within their own lifespace, and they
attempt to correct it. The results are frequently beneficial, that is,
with respect to those innovations that are perpetuated, but this is
not the motivating force. A cultural survival of the fittest ultimately
crafts a structure made of many incremental advances, which only in
retrospect appear intentional.
During their own eras, players may overextend their victories,
engage in irrational oppositionalism, and pursue collective fantasies.
They habitually imagine that they understand what they are doing,
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even as they are hopelessly out of touch with reality. W.I. Thomas3
cautioned that what people perceive to be real can be real in its
consequences. Even the most outrageous visions, if they are believed,
influence what individuals do. Nonetheless, identifiable mechanisms
do seem to underlie what is at work. The nature of human hierarchies,
the facts of the physical and biological environment, and the laws of
economic transactions are a given. They are the substantial sculptors
of events, whether or not this influence is recognized. The question
is how do these work in practice. The potential permutations are
so vast that no supercomputer is capable of working them through;
hence the best that can be done is to achieve a rough impression
through a rearview mirror.
Another word of caution is in order. The account presented
below is largely drawn from a Western perspective.4 The same sorts
of pressures that influenced European developments also affected the
Middle East,5 India,6 and China7 but with disparate implications.
Similar patterns can be discerned across their spectra, but diverse
conditions produced diverse outcomes. In China, for instance, the
Tang and Sung dynasties fashioned something comparable to the
West’s Industrial Revolution. Nevertheless, this did not terminate
with the ascendancy of commercial interests. The power of a
centralized agricultural state could apparently countermand the
aspirations of uppity merchants however great their temporary
successes. The European experience and its subsequent American
extension do not indicate what was inevitable but what was possible.
All the same, they are germane to the Middle Class Revolution
because this upheaval was an outcome of what happened there. Like
it or not, the supremacy of the West is fundamental to the triumph
of the contemporary professional class. Northern Europe and the
United States were not merely where this journey began but also
where it reached its apex. It was here, especially in the United States,
that the middle classes took a lead they have thus far refused to
relinquish.
The Monetary Nexus
Money matters.8 This has been said many times before, but it
remains true. Cash may be crass, but it has been a potent force since
its inception. In the West, the starting point was approximately 650
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B.C.9 Coinage was invented in Asia Minor and quickly spread to
the Mediterranean littoral zone.10 Croesus may have been renowned
for his wealth, but it was the Greeks who were first infected by the
displacements inherent in a rampant commercialism. Inhabitants
of a rocky and agriculturally stingy terrain, they abutted a great sea
that beckoned as a highway for traders. Blessed with good harbors,
they could sail their cargo-laden vessels from the far reaches of
the Black Sea to beyond the Pillars of Hercules. Very quickly, it
became apparent that reliably weighted pieces of gold, silver, and
electrum could make these ventures more flexible and, therefore,
more profitable. Citystates quickly began to flourish because urban
areas were the natural abodes of commerce. Their concentrated
populations facilitated business by allowing merchants to engage in
the face-to-face exchanges then necessary to close deals. Thus was
born the agora that became the heart of the Greek civilization.11
Nourished by this upsurge in traffic were the previously tiny
outposts of Athens, Corinth, and the Ionian Islands. In retrospect,
Athens has become emblematic of this transformation. As business
increased, the town’s human density soared, and the nature of
its economy was made over.12 Subsistence farming declined in
importance to be replaced by commercial olive farming, silver
mining, pottery making, and shipping. Merchants flocked to cities
in search of riches and excitement. The settlements changed their
complexions, becoming far more cosmopolitan. Not only did
strange Greeks come to call, but so did visitors from other nations.
Moreover, the Athenians themselves ventured forth. Their worldview
grew immensely larger as they sought potential markets. Forced to
explore unfamiliar shores, they were also compelled to interact with
unfamiliar cultures.
Commerce is frequently depicted as philistine, that is, as
insensitive and money-grubbing. Its practitioners are considered
uncultured boors, who, in their materialism, overlook the finer
things of life. The irony is that it is commerce that made cultural
advances possible. Traders must, of necessity, cease being provincial.13
Because they deal with strangers, they need to accommodate them.
They cannot afford to be shocked when they encounter alien
languages or exotic religions. Were they to reject what is different
out of hand, they would also close the door to profits. They must,
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instead, tolerate perplexing differences. More than this, they need to
understand them. Merchants tend to be most successful when they
are familiar with their customers. If they recognize their sensitivities
and perceive their needs, they can furnish what is desired without
offending their sensibilities.
Nevertheless, the human mind is uncomfortable with
contradictions. As Leon Festinger14 has pointed out, people dislike
cognitive dissonance and attempt to resolve it. This is what happened
as commerce burgeoned. What was strange provoked attempts to
come to terms with it. People were forced to think about things
previously taken for granted. What was the nature of the gods?
Which was the most satisfactory way to live? Most basic of all, Why
was the world the way it was? All this provoked introspection and
a questioning of conventional wisdom. The marketplace became
alive with conversations regarding these pressing issues. Socrates15
was but one of many who indulged in this enterprise. The simple
answers, such as the idea that the gods were the same albeit with
different names in different places, were soon found wanting. In
due course, this ferment produced a sophistication that even now
inspires admiration. The classical culture studied in contemporary
universities was taking shape, not as a means of confusing future
generations, but of satisfying its own.
In the arts, in philosophy, and in the sciences16 a recognizable
modernity emerged. The plays that entertained the ancient Greeks
continue to entertain us. Aeschylus, Euripides, Sophocles, and
Aristophanes touch our hearts just as they did those of their times.
Because the characters these plays portray are recognizably human
and their dilemmas timeless, they remain instructive. Having
engaged in an honest examination of the human condition for
audiences also interested in this subject, playwrights were able to
analyze predicaments in a way that is useful for another community
also absorbed in developing interpersonal skills. Greek philosophers
were likewise studying what made humans unique. Best known
today are Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,17 but they were preceded
by the Sophists,18 who also were philosophers. These itinerant
scholars were much in demand as tutors. Well versed in a myriad
of subjects, including rhetoric, they are remembered for preaching
that man is the measure of all things. In other words, their attention

Origins

125

had transferred from the divine to the mundane. Emboldened by
the worldly achievements that made their profession possible, they
conceived of themselves not only as understanding their environment
but as modifying its shape. Less dependent on religion and more on
their own efforts, they reflected a middle class hubris.
The contemporaneous scientists, including physicians and
astronomers, correspondingly assumed they could encompass all of
creation. Archimedes even speculated about his ability to move the
earth if given a lever long enough and a place to stand. Theories
abounded about the elements composing matter and the structure
of the celestial spheres. Aristotle, well known for having proclaimed
that men are rational animals, was a compulsive systematizer.
Everything needed to be labeled and assigned its place by a scholar
shrewd enough to comprehend them. Earth, air, fire, and water, and
in some circles, atoms, could be reconfigured to produce all things
in heaven and on earth. Crude observations also taught that objects
moved in straight lines and went up and down in search of their
proper places in the firmament. Hippocrates19 took science a step
further and applied it to the human body. He taught that people
became diseased when critical elements were out of balance. As long
as blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile were in equilibrium all
would be well. When they were not, treatments such as bloodletting
were required.
Also, historians came to prominence. Herodotus20 and
Thucydides21 are read to this day for their accounts of the Amazons
and the Peloponnesian wars. Their interest in these events was no
doubt sparked by the upsurge in political activity in which they
partook. One of the reasons the Greek experience has remained
relevant is that it is acknowledged as the source of Western
democracy.22 Athens, in particular, is recognized as a font of this
ideal. But this form of government did not come to prominence
until the Commercial Revolution upset preexisting arrangements.
One of the first changes is attributed to Solon, who in 594 B.C.
(after the introduction of coinage), freed the serfs. Almost a century
later in 506 B.C., Cleisthenes23 established the city’s first democracy.
During the preceding period, the economy had expanded so rapidly
that ordinary artisans achieved prosperity. It was their unhappiness
at living under a tyranny that contributed to a successful political
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revolt. This was then ratified by extending the franchise. The power
a former rabble possessed simply became too great to ignore, even by
the aristocratic class.
In modern terms, an elite still ran Athens.24 Neither women
nor slaves nor foreigners could vote, but the political class had
enormously increased. Because the city was small compared with
today’s metropolises, it was possible for the citizens to gather together
in a single place to decide significant issues. They could also be
assembled in huge juries of many hundreds to determine the fate of
individuals under arrest such as Socrates.25 The broad consent this
allowed permitted them to support Pericles’26 policies. His building
program during the height of Athenian power turned temporal
success into stone monuments. The elegance of the city’s Acropolis
and Parthenon are attributable to these communal decisions. So, too,
is the humanism of their sculptures. Previous to the works of such
artists as Phidias, who was commissioned to create a representation
of Athena, statues had a stiffly artificial mien. After the democratic
reforms, people were portrayed as people, and gods were, too. They
might be idealized, but they were unmistakable likeness of individuals
who were proud of themselves and their accomplishments.
As important was the effect that commercial prosperity and
democracy had on warfare. The initial defeat of the Persians at
Marathon was owed to the valor of the Athenian phalanx. Ordinary
Athenians, that is, their version of the middle classes, trained to fight
in concert in armored ranks of spearmen. The effectiveness of this
tactic depended upon physically conditioned combatants who were
sufficiently disciplined to hold their place in line. This was insured,
first, by citizens who voluntarily participated in gymnastics to keep
fit and, second, by their motivation to cooperate. Were they less
committed or less able to exercise personal control, their lines would
have wavered, and they would have been put to flight. As it was,
they were able to destroy the cohesion of a larger enemy’s coercively
recruited troops.
Victor Davis Hanson27 provides an even better example of this
democratic solidarity in his discussion of the evolution of Western
military power. The battle of Salamis, which decisively crushed
Persian sea power in its second, more extensive excursion to conquer
Greece, was impressive. Before this decisive encounter, opinions had
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been divided. Some Athenians wanted to fight the invaders in the
city, while others wanted to withdraw to the safety of the Corinthian
isthmus. Themistocles wanted to gamble all on a naval ambush. As
the military commander of this enterprise, he was able to convince
his fellow citizens that trapping a numerically superior fleet within
the confines of a narrow channel would throw the odds in their favor.
Upon agreeing to this plan, the men abandoned the city and took
to their boats. Despite their earlier disputes, the fact that they had
en masse participated in determining the strategy stimulated them
to heroic exertions. Citizens who felt that they controlled their own
destinies were able to inflict one of the most fateful defeats on record.
At the close of the day, tens of thousands of Persians had drowned
off their coast, and Athenians had affirmed that they were their own
masters.
In sum, a commercial people had asserted its individualism
and worth. Having been trained in making decisions as merchants
and artisans, these people acquired the skills to make cooperative
determinations and to carry them out with vigor. Not so much
bound by family or religious ties as by an awareness that their
liberties and achievements depended upon voluntary collaboration,
they had triumphed. Able to think independently and to value this
accomplishment, they were able to overcome daunting odds. In this,
they set the stage for what was to come.
What came immediately thereafter were the Romans. The Greeks
had learned to harness their individualism in the arts, the sciences,
and the battlefield but not in the disputes among rival city states.
Notoriously fractious, as revealed in the fragile inter-communal
alliances of the Peloponnesian Wars, a pride in their own polities
prevented them from joining with their neighbors. In essence,
their middle-class mentality had narrow boundaries. They might
tolerate foreigners, but they were not about to meld into a single
extended community. Nor could they do so and maintain their
democratic institutions. Since common consent depended upon
gathering together at a defined location, this would be impossible
when multiple locations were involved. In the end, the Hellenes
were overthrown by a mini-nation state, Macedonia. Subsequently,
a mighty empire, Rome, would swallow both.
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Rome too began as a city-state.28 Indeed, its initial source of
prosperity was agriculture, and an aristocracy dominated its youthful
political structure. Yet, in the early stages to becoming a continental
superpower, it was fortunate to absorb lessons from the more
commercial Greeks and Etruscans. Afterwards, it was to surpass
them both in its genius for the eclectic. Assembling bits and pieces
of what was available, it created a composite civilization that lasted
several hundred years. The first Romans lived under a king, but
these rugged farmers did not begin to prosper until they emulated
their enemies by collaborating in well-disciplined legions. These
citizen soldiers, much to their own surprise, were able to throw off
the suzerainty of the Gauls, the Greeks, and the Etruscans. Under
a republican constitution, they collectively defended, then enlarged,
what they perceived to be their own nation. Like the Athenians
before them, they also moved to a more commercial economy by
taking advantage of their Mediterranean location to dominate its
marine trade. Initially out-competed by the Carthaginians, after
trouncing them in the Punic Wars, they became the undisputed
masters of an essentially maritime empire.
One of the peculiarities of this domain, at least from a
modern perspective, was its reliance on slave labor.29 A side
effect of commercialization was an increased demand for material
products and, in a society based on muscle power, the necessary
industrialization depended on human beasts of burden. In their
marches and counter-marches across Europe, North Africa, and the
Middle East, the Roman armies converted many of their humbled
foes into bondsmen.30 The Roman attitude was that those who
were defeated in battle essentially forfeited their lives. Slavery was,
in Roman minds, more humane than summary executions. These
captives could then be put to any sort of employment their owners
found profitable. The movies have taught us that many became
household servants and gladiators, but they also worked in the mines,
as longshoremen, in the brothels, and in industries such as the linen
trade. Bondsmen were even a primary source of tutors for the rich
and scriveners for the government bureaucracy.
Status was quite important among the Romans.31 Slaves were on
the bottom of the heap, whereas the aristocracy remained on top. On
the one hand, becoming entrepreneurs, in imitation of the Greeks,
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these patricians augmented their wealth by dominating business.
On the other, they politically dominated first the Republic, then the
Empire. Able to buy elections, only they could serve in the Senate
or hope to rise as high as a consulship. Nevertheless, there were local
elections that were open to participation by other citizens. More
than this, citizenship was extended to conquered peoples as they were
assimilated. In acquiring the common language of Latin, they could
interact with the centers of power, albeit as provincials. This allowed
for wide public involvement, notwithstanding at unequal levels.
One of the tensions that plagued the system was the ambition of the
lowly to rise. Freedmen, in particular, were considered troublesome.
These former slaves, once liberated, could take advantage of the
marketplace to make money and afterward aspire above their station.
Much of the literature of Rome is concerned with keeping these
parvenus in their place.
Concomitant with this was the development of Roman law. The
courts and lawsuits flourished in an environment where commercial
regulation became more specific. The Greeks too had rules for doing
business, but these guidelines became both more institutionalized
and more rationalized under the Romans. In hindsight, the Romans
seem more practical and the Greeks more creative. The former were,
in fact, pragmatic systematizers, more technologically sophisticated
than artistic. They, too, had their authors, philosophers, and
scientists, but these were largely derivative. Terrence, Ovid, and
Horace were talented, but less universally focused or applicable
than their predecessors. Virgil’s Aeneid likewise, some might say,
is a pale reflection of the Iliad. The same applies to historians such
as Livy, Tacitus, and Plutarch,32 and to philosophical movements,
as exemplified by Marcus Aurelius’s Stoicism. The Romans were
builders rather than visionaries. They constructed roads to facilitate
the movement of their troops, but these also facilitated trade. They
erected aqueducts to bring water to their cities, which enabled
them to grow larger. They invented concrete to aid in all sorts of
construction, which permitted them to construct domes as impressive
as the Pantheon’s.
Yet the greatest Roman achievement was maintaining political
dominance for so long. This was contingent on a variety of social
adhesives. Some of these were family oriented, as with the continuing
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influence of the aristocratic clans, but others depended on military
fraternity. Once the state grew too large for quasidemocratic
institutions, the Empire reverted to legionary authority. Augustus,33
the first Emperor, was the adopted son of Julius Caesar, but he won
his own ascendancy on the battlefield. Styled both a Caesar in honor
of his family connections and an Emperor in recognition of his
military leadership, he was able to bequeath his position to less able
descendants largely through skillful political manipulations. But
this did not last. Once the Praetorian Guard discovered the power
of assassination, the generals realized they could seize the throne
through force of arms. With no established middle class to resist and
a tamed aristocracy willing to play this power game, there seemed no
alternative. Bribery and cronyism became the order of the day, with
pitched battles among rival claimants often deciding the matter. In
time, the commander best loved by his troops or more accomplished
on the battlefield came to the forefront. Observers might bewail the
chaos, but they could not dispel it.
One of these contestants, Constantine,34 found another avenue
to success. Almost accidentally, he alighted upon religion as a
source of anonymous allies. He discovered that his soldiers were
better disciplined as Christians than as pagans. For some time, the
old Gods had gradually been losing their legitimacy as contending
faiths from the periphery sought to invade Rome. Cults of Isis and
the Gnostics and followers of Jesus all claimed to be best. What
the Christians had going for them was their monotheism and
their promises of redemption. A single god could be a universal
god and a redemptive divinity could offer peace in an empire riven
by dissension. Constantine’s innovation was in harnessing this
hopefulness to the interests of the state. Believers in a single religion,
convinced of its efficacy, could work in harmony against skeptical
heretics. Determined to solidify these nonpersonal alliances for his
own purposes, he convened the Counsel of Nicaea to endorse a shared
orthodoxy. Out of this came the doctrine of the trinity, and shortly
to follow was a standardized Bible. Together these constituted the
foundations of a Church that was to outlast the Empire.
Unfortunately for the Romans, their nation was afflicted
with terminal arteriosclerosis. Its successful militarism had been
underwritten by circumstances that were eroded by this very success.
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Conquests that became too large to be managed by the existing
administrative instruments became burdens. Distant borders had
to be guarded by legionnaires who needed to be paid for their
services as more patriotic motives evaporated. But now by abutting
deserts, impenetrable forests, and competing empires, opportunities
for expansion had disappeared. This meant that as the supply of
slaves dried up, so did fresh lands with which to reward the troops.
Long gone were the citizen soldiers of the Republic, now replaced by
barbarian auxiliaries. So too was the robust commercialism of the
early Empire. It had been driven to its knees by taxation. In desperate
need of funds for their mercenaries, the emperors froze the economy
and squeezed it to its limits. This made entrepreneurship impractical
and encouraged a reversion to local subsistence. Eventually the
turmoil of barbarian incursions thoroughly interrupted commerce
and sent city dwellers scurrying for the protection of the latafundia.
For all its magnificence, Rome never evolved an independent
middle class. With business and government dependent on
chains of patronage, that is, with quasifamilial alliances, a selfsufficient professionalism never came to the surface. Ultimately, the
parochialism of this familism, battered by an increasingly unstable
militarism, sounded the death knell of a vibrant marketplace. The
bonds of religion were able to forestall this decline for a while, but in
the West this was not very long. With the arrival of the Germanic
hordes, the first great flowering of the Commercial Revolution was
at an end. Soon to follow were Dark Ages during which wealth and
learning were in retreat throughout most of Europe.
The Medieval Revival
The second wave of the Commercial Revolution took centuries to
gather. When the continent’s new masters arrived on the scene, they
were a combination of agriculturists and pastoralists.35 Seminomadic
tribesmen, they knew almost nothing of the ways of merchants.
Despite their skills as metalworkers, their primary orientation was to
the land and secondarily to battle. As a result, while they stood in
awe of Roman technical accomplishments, they did not comprehend
them. Neither literate nor bound in complex political federations,
they could not emulate the achievements of a faltering empire.
What attracted them most was the opulence of the Roman estates.36
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Never themselves urbanites, they saw no point in moving to centers
of commerce. But large manor houses surrounded by productive
fields were another matter. These remnants of the latafundia could
be converted into the beginnings of medieval fiefdoms. On these
intensely local establishments, the natives who had previously sought
rural protection could be turned into serfs37, thenceforward tied to the
land and dedicated to serving their overlords. The emerging nobility
meanwhile depended upon family ties and pledges of military fealty
to maintain their advantage over those they had come to rule.
What did not persist was long distance trade.38 The roads fell into
disrepair, ships were no longer built; and money was driven out of
circulation. Gold was used for decoration rather than for exchange,
with much of it bequeathed to the Church as a sign of devotion.
Literacy and technology skills also declined. Few large buildings were
attempted, and only churchmen kept the art of reading alive. Beyond
this, with no central authority to maintain order, brigandage became
endemic. Even if there had been merchants who wished to maintain
trade, their goods would have been looted by the highwaymen who
infested the few tracks that remained open between now isolated
communities. If there was a source of large-scale cohesion, it came
from the Church. With the invaders themselves converted to
Christianity, a common faith became the lingua franca. In a literal
sense, it was the Latin kept in circulation by clerics that enabled the
nobility to communicate with distant brethren.
Into this disarray, impulses toward power and order continued
to arise. The kings, though they were often reduced to the level
of local warlords, pressed ahead in quest of supremacy, and, in the
case of Charlemagne,39 achieved considerable success. So too did the
Church, initially in the form of monasticism. For a while, however,
all this was put in peril by external invasions that a decentralized
nobility was hard pressed to repel. Vikings from the north, Magyars
from the east,40 and Muslims from the south penetrated to the heart
of the continent. Eventually a wave of castle building provided
a parochial bulwark against these aggressors.41 This created the
image of feudalism with which most modern people are familiar.
With armored knights ensconced in fortifications from which they
could sally forth to maintain control over the adjacent lands, the
fortunes of the elite were affected by isolation. The stability thereby
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established convinced even the Northmen to settle down and become
traders instead of raiders. Small hamlets began to huddle together
for protection under the castle walls and from these grew vigorous
commercial entities. Unplanned from above, urbanism and long
distance exchange gradually revived to become counterweights to the
powers of the aristocracy.
Part of this progression was owed to the Church.42 In its effort
to survive the commotions of the darkest periods, it invested in
monasticism. Establishments such as those of the Benedictine, and
later those of Cluny became self-sufficient reservoirs of economic
activity.43 Eventually the Cistercians would consolidate these efforts in
a commercialized agriculture, thereby helping to generate the capital
from which more secular efforts would benefit. Also implicated in
this revival were fairs such as those near centrally located Champagne.
Once or twice a year each of these drew merchants from the north
and the south, the east and the west. Ultimately all of this stimulated
a dynamic urbanism that in time spurred what has been called the
medieval Industrial Revolution. In places like Flanders, towns such
as Bruges sprouted to importance. Dominated by merchant guilds,
they grew rich from businesses that included the textile trade. During
this period it was proudly said that city air made one free. Serfs
who escaped from rural servitude could find employment and selfgovernance in these enclaves. If they did sufficiently well, they could
even become the masters of their own shops, employing journeymen
and apprentices to magnify their personal efforts. As the towns
grew, the newly prosperous might move to neighborhoods created
by extending the municipality walls outward. These so-called bourgs
became the home of the bourgeoisie; which by this means produced
the title of infamy future members of the middle-class would bear.44
Simultaneous with these developments was a restoration of
coinage.45 Money was as necessary under the evolving conditions as
it had been for classical commerce. Arts too began to flourish, with
the newfound affluence channeled into guildhalls, town halls, and
cathedrals. Gothic elegance replaced Romanesque heaviness, both
in architecture and sculpture. Part of this owed to developments
in technology. As during the earlier wave of commercialism,
an increased demand led to efforts to provide what was desired.
Although the Middle Ages is generally considered to be backward
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times, it boasted many advances over what the Romans46 wrought.
This was the period when waterwheels and windmills came into
their own and, therefore, the first period when mechanical energy
made a significant contribution to production. This was also a time
when small improvements such as the pocket and the button made
their appearance, and likewise when the wheelbarrow, the crane, and
mechanical clock47 entered construction sites. It was, in addition,
the historical moment when universities were started. First dedicated
to training the clergy for a resurgent church, the university quickly
became a place where scholars and lawyers could prepare for their
callings. This was consequently when the liberal arts came to the fore
and established the rudiments of what it meant to be an educated
person—even if one were a layman.
One of the unique aspects of the medieval revival was the degree
to which military, religious, and commercial forms of organization
interpenetrated one another.48 Family/military alliances49 remained
active throughout the period, grounded in agriculture but borrowing
funds from newly affluent commoners. The Church too prospered
under these conditions. Still benefiting from contributions from
parishioners who were genuine believers, it also drew recruits from the
younger sons of the nobility. With secular inheritances preserved by
devices such as primogeniture, the disinherited members of aristocratic
lineages could nevertheless receive appointments as bishops and
abbots. This connection culminated in the Crusades.50 Popes could
rouse their devoted to shunt an unruly young generation of warriors
into attempts to conquer Jerusalem. The most universal institution of
the era, the Roman Catholic Church, thereby generated cooperation
among individuals more usually dedicated to usurping one another’s
prerogatives. Then, too, even the merchants were believers. They
were happy to contribute to the endeavor. As aficionados of the
Robin Hood saga will realize, it was they who supplied the ransom
to rescue Richard the Lion-hearted from captivity on his way home
from the Holy Land.
Proud though this presocial class world was, its heyday was
short-lived. During its expansion, it recruited trading towns as
far east as Poland under the umbrella of the Hanseatic League, but
this association seems51 to have been in defense of an impending
retrenchment. For reasons not completely understood, this period
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saw a weakening so profound that Barbara Tuchman52 dubbed
it “the calamitous 14th century.” One source of the collapse was
probably overexpansion. Then as now, businessmen were prone to
overoptimism. In creating supplies greater than what the market
could absorb, they may have undermined their own prosperity. There
was also the disaster of the Black Death. During the middle of this
interlude of curtailment, the bubonic plague entered the continent,
probably disembarked from a trading ship arrived from the Black
Sea, and promptly propelled rings of despair rippling north. Within
a decade, perhaps a third of the population was wiped out—especially
in the towns. Utterly unaware of the germ theory of illness, their
inhabitants had no way of knowing that this disaster was spread by
rats infested with diseased fleas. To many, the devastation seemed
divine retribution for the sin of pride.
Also practically invisible to the afflicted were the tribulations
instigated by the Little Ice Age. Unbeknownst to all, the weather
had taken a turn for the worse. For several centuries, the snow belt
had drifted south with catastrophic consequences for agriculture.
Crops failed, and people starved for reasons that could not be
apparent to those innocent of meteorology. What they could see
was the generalized conflicts that accompanied these calamities.
England and France entered a war that lasted, on and off, for over a
hundred years, and Italy, thanks to its internecine conflicts, invented
the condottiere. These were mercenaries who, when released from
employment, took to freebooting. For the better part of a century,
they visited destruction so widespread as to make commerce too
hazardous to maintain at its previous levels. Even the Church was
not exempt from these disorders. In order to escape the wrath of
the Roman mob,53 a French-born Pope removed the papacy to
Avignon. This Babylonian Captivity eventuated in a Great Schism,
with a Pope and an Anti-Pope—one in France and the other back
in Rome—competing for the allegiance of the faithful. This low
point in prestige reduced the Church to virtual irrelevance. It also
constitutes a convenient marker for the end of the second wave of
the Commercial Revolution.
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The Renaissance
The third phase of the Commercial Revolution is traditionally
called the Renaissance, which means rebirth.54 In many ways, it
was. Daniel Bell55 traces the beginning of capitalism to this period.
He points to the development of Italian financial institutions as
the origin of the accumulation of resources that enabled large
investments in new enterprises. Another hallmark of this epoch
was the invention of printing. In the middle of the 15th century,
Johann Guttenberg developed movable type and a press that could
turn out reams of materials for outrageously low prices. Prior to
this, books were laboriously copied by hand, which meant that
only the rich could afford them and that only the most sacred texts
would be reproduced. Printing meant not only cheap bibles, but an
unprecedented diffusion of knowledge. This advance was associated
with humanism.56 Scholars discovered in the ancient classics, as
reproduced by entrepreneurial ventures such as Venice’s Aldine Press,
a dedication to secular, as opposed to purely religious, knowledge.57
Works newly imported from a collapsed Byzantine Empire58 and
a reconquered Spain also expanded acquaintance with Greek and
Roman sources. No longer was Aristotle the limit of awareness. The
old myths about the Olympian gods and the emotional subtleties
of the Athenian playwrights came to attention with a profound
effect on consciousness. Educated people now began looking
toward themselves in the present, rather than focusing merely on
the afterlife.
Fundamental to these innovations, beginning first in Italy, was a
remarkable resurgence of commerce. Cities such as Amalfi, Florence,
Venice, and Genoa became beehives of mercantile activity.59 Located
hard by the Mediterranean, as had been their classical predecessors,
they too were sovereign urban entities. Unfettered by the suzerainty
of a monarch or an emperor, they controlled their own affairs, as
had the Athenians before them. Sandwiched between a reviving
continent and the opulence of the Muslim Levant, they served
as a conduit for goods that originated farther east. Moreover,
this increased activity acted as a spur to improvements in trading
technology. Foremost among these was the invention of banking.
The Italians learned how to manage credit. Although the Church
forbade usury, these merchants made profits by charging interest on

Origins

137

paper transactions. While they did not know it at the time, presentday economists could have told them that credit expands the money
supply. Because multiple loans can be based on the same collateral,
the effect is as if more coins have been put in circulation. And since
additional currency means a greater ease in commercial dealings, the
volume of trade can swell. So advantageous were the Italian moneymanagement skills that they were able to set up remote outposts as
far afield as London. To this day, Lombard Street commemorates
the time when Northern Italians dominated the city’s banking. With
this extra trade, of course, came greater wealth. And with wealth
came power.
Among the chief beneficiaries of this munificence were the
Italian merchant princes. The Medici of Florence and the families
that dominated the council in Venice were exemplars of how
business success could be converted into political domination.
Operating in compact territories, they translated their assets into
military power ample to maintain status. Influential beyond their
borders, they served as models for the magnates of Genoa60 and the
Fuggars61 of southern Germany who were to grow so rich that they
eventually became indispensable creditors to nation states. Within
their own boundaries, the Italian commercial princes were affluent
enough to emulate the sumptuousness of these monarchies. Despite
their diminutive size, they eagerly participated in international
diplomacy. Florence was soon to fall to the more numerous French
and Spanish, but tiny Venice, thanks to the navy it acquired for its
trading interests, was able to ally with Spain to defeat the Turks at the
battle of Lepanto.62 Indeed, for a while, the city was able to defend
holdings, such as the island of Crete, against this formidable foe.
So wealthy were the Italian city-states that they were able
to patronize the artists and scholars that made the Renaissance
synonymous with culture. Beginning with Dante Alighieri’s Divine
Comedy,63 a growing self-assurance enabled them to sponsor literature
in the vernacular. Previous to this, the languages of the ordinary
people did not have a sufficient audience to merit artistic use. Hopes
for the favor of his ruler also encouraged Nicolo Machiavelli64 to
jump start political science by writing a how-to guide for princes.
Often mistakenly thought of as a craven opportunist, this skilled
diplomat intended to promote Italian unification by assessing how
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power was actually wielded. More congenial today, of course, are
the achievements of the painters and the sculptors. Together with
the humanism that epitomized the period came a pictorial realism
that echoed the achievements of the classical period. Thus a
Michelangelo65 could both paint and sculpt people that looked like
actual human beings, rather than stylized tributes to biblical stories.
Deeply immersed in the use of perspective, Renaissance masters
placed their heroes in a physical world that modeled the one they
saw outside their windows. They could also emulate the autonomy
of their patrons. Although dependent upon the rich and powerful
for commissions, they became recognizable figures in their own
right, celebrated in a way that the architects of the Gothic cathedrals
were not. Michelangelo, for instance, was able to wrangle with Pope
Julius II about how to render the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. In
this we see the glimmerings of the bohemian sensibilities that were to
drive Victorian sponsors to distraction. Both groups of artists were
cultural specialists whose talents enabled them to exercise power over
their own endeavors.
Also associated with Renaissance commercialism was a plethora
of mundane technologies. Not tangible per se but readily convertible
into income was double-entry bookkeeping. One of the imports
from the East had been Arabic numbers.66 This Hindu invention
made it possible to calculate profits and losses more precisely than
Roman numerals allowed. So cumbersome were Roman numerals
that during the medieval revival national budgets were worked out
by manipulating piles of coins on checkerboards. The rationalization
of financial computations subsequently made it possible to evaluate
investments more efficiently. Also crucial to mercantile effectiveness
was a dependable system of laws. Trade inevitably entails conflicts,
the frictions of which, unless they are resolved, interrupt business.
This stimulated a further evolution of Roman based jurisprudence.
Not only were classical regulations and procedures reintroduced, but
they were extended to meet emerging conditions.
On a more tangible level, the technological advances were
epitomized by the advent of the mechanical clock and the vacuum
pump. Now commonplace, the clock then seemed miraculous. Its
numerous finely machined gears, meshing as closely as they did,
came to seem an analog for the universe itself. The instrument’s
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introduction not only prompted a rash of mechanical toys, but the
more precise scheduling of business transactions. Once people could
coordinate their meetings by consulting a shared apparatus, they
did not need to waste time unproductively. The pump meanwhile
became the model for how blood circulates through the body. Were
it unavailable as a paradigm, William Harvey might never have
conceived of the heart as impelling a liquid through tubes. Progress
also came through medical dissections. Only after secular power
was sufficient to challenge the Church’s supremacy were restrictions
against cutting into the body loosened. This made anatomy possible
and eventually a rationalized surgery. Even the invention of spectacles,
which helped reading, was to play a part in the establishment of
modern science. Experience in grinding lenses was furthermore
to lead to the invention of both the telescope and the microscope,
which in their turn opened unimagined vistas to closer observation.67
Nor should the achievements of Leonardo da Vinci68 be neglected.
Although most of his inventions remained unbuilt speculations,
much of his reputation rested on the military devices he did construct
for ambitious lay rulers. His paintings deserve the acclaim they have
received, but his output in this area was too small to have warranted
his contemporary repute. Copernicus, too, deserves a mention.69
Though a Polish cleric, he was infected by the temper of the times.
Were it not for the concurrent upsurge in scholarship, it is doubtful
that he would have hypothesized a heliocentric universe.
Competing with this commercially based turmoil was the
emergence of the nation state. If a rekindled expansion of trade
enhanced social coordination via marketplace relations, political
power grounded in agricultural domination and military alliances
had not disappeared. In larger continental territories such as France70
and Spain, the kinds of relationships that prevailed in city-states
could not succeed. Neither communication and transportation nor
the political institutions of representative democracy were adequately
advanced to foster cohesion over long distances. It was instead
necessary to impose order by the sword. Only the sorts of coalition
capable of dictating their desires on the battlefield could command
the obedience of far-flung barons. Yet because the parochial remnants
of the Germanic invasions continued to hold sway over remote
counties, they could still launch challenges to their overlords. These
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had to be met, and only leaders capable of commanding personal
respect could get the job done.
Nation building did not begin during the Renaissance, but it
reached a milestone at this time.71 In the midst of the medieval
revival, the primary underpinnings of later unification were already
perceptible. Foremost among these was the appearance of military
and judicial dominance. On the military side, kings and emperors
had long been able to assert periodic dominance. The example of
Charlemagne lingered within the memories of those who wore the
crown; hence, they too hungered for the glory of extending their
territory. The problem was that what could be won in battle could as
easily be lost in it. Nevertheless, some regal victories foreshadowed
the national entities to follow. In France, for instance, Philip
Augustus was able to revive the fortunes of his domains by defeating
the Plantagenet challenge.72 For a time it appeared that Henry II,
though based in Anjou, Acquitaine, and England would be able to
displace his legal sovereign. To the surprise of most, with the aid of
Henry’s sons, most of what afterward became France was recovered.
Somewhat later, Philip the Fair would further strengthen the throne
by increasing its revenues and asserting its power over the Church. It
was he who was able to tame the Pope by offering him the protection
of an Avignon residence.
Later still, and more decisively, Charles VII reasserted national
integrity by expelling the English from the northern part of his territory.
Assisted by the inspirational Joan of Arc, he became the embodiment
of the state. One of the reasons the English lost this struggle was that
their Burgundian allies deserted them.73 This prosperous tributary
of France sought a separate identity by assembling the provinces
from Italy in the south to the Netherlands in the north into an
independent state. Were this to have come to fruition, it might have
been one of the more potent states in Europe, for it would have join
the most important commercial centers of the continent and would
have possessed the resources to finance its powers. Unfortunately,
its king, Charles the Bold, was humbled by Louis XI of France74 and
then undone at the hands of the Swiss. In one of his campaigns for
territorial aggrandizement, he ran into their halberds and lost his life.
The Swiss, who had hitherto been considered unsophisticated yokels,
in defending their independence from the Austrians discovered the
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value of disciplined battle formations. Like their Greek antecedents,
they could hold off more heavily armored foes by maintaining the
integrity of lines of spear points.
The importance of military discipline had earlier been
demonstrated by the English in their startling victory over the
French at Agincourt. Henry V was able to defeat a much larger
force via control of his archers. These yeomen were renowned for
their skill with the longbow. But what made them more than the
match of fully armored French knights was the latter’s disorder on a
narrowing battlefield made treacherous by acres of mud. As a result,
a handful of commoners cut down the flower of an unruly nobility by
the thousands. Strangely, no other army emulated this achievement
because the training requirements were too stringent. What could
be copied, and this was the embryo of the national army, was hiring
qualified specialists loyal to a king who paid them. Because his
national treasury was larger than that of his rivals, he could employ a
greater number of mercenaries. The coffers of his centralized counting
houses, not incidentally, were simultaneously being filled from taxes
levied on the rehabilitated commercial interests. These same monies
could also be used to purchase the recently perfected cannon. One
of the reasons Da Vinci and other scientists were prized was that
they could calculate how to fire them. Accuracy was important in
order to blast holes in the fortifications protecting local barons from
an overlord’s displeasure. Once these barriers could be breached
with ease, organized resistance to a national sovereign became less
practical. In time, the disciplined use of gunpowder was to extend
to battalions of musketeers and grenadiers, with even greater benefits
to state formation.
The judicial element in the creation of nation states goes back
at least as far as Henry II of England.75 His attempts to consolidate
his hold over the country he inherited entailed an effort to supplant
local justice with his own. Provincial cases were generally settled
in baronial courts, until Henry II sent judges out in circuit courts.
The trouble had been that what happened in these baronial castles
was not standardized. Arbitrary, and often biased, these institutions
were supplanted by Henry’s appointees who were instructed to avoid
being capricious or to curry favor by being fair and judicious. They
were also empowered to impanel groups of local citizens to act as
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witnesses in individual cases. Herein lay the beginnings of juries and
the common law. In time, this systematized justice was to provide
an ingredient in the monarch’s authority. As convener of the courts
of last resort, he thus had the last say. Moreover, in successfully
applying legitimate coercion within his borders, he gained prestige.
Rather than have unpredictable personal brawls decide differences of
opinion, order was maintained by convincing a broad constituency
to defer to his less subjective procedures. Subsequently stabilized
by tradition and a paid constabulary, this mode of civic regulation
replaced personal allegiances with more homogeneous, impersonal
bonds.
As earlier occurred in citystates, the King’s justice facilitated
trade within his larger territories. Brigandage was less of a problem
when highwaymen feared the monarch’s troops, and fraud was more
manageable when charlatans dreaded the verdicts of his judges.
So dependent did commerce become on these developments that
Shakespeare’s Henry VI’s quote is often cited: “The first thing we
do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” Lawyers were hated by the bard’s time
because they had become integral to conducting ordinary business.
Members of one of the first professions, these legal specialists might
be reviled, but they were also respected. Representing power in a
world where written contracts increasingly defined interpersonal
relations, they had an influence that mattered. Kings even conscripted
them in managing national affairs. Where once only clerics such as
Thomas Becket could rise to be Lord Chancellor, by the time of the
Renaissance, a lawyer, Sir Thomas More, might be selected for the
position.76
The Church too had undergone sweeping dislocations in
response to the resumption of commerce. Within Italy, once the
Pope returned from his French sojourn, the Papal States became
a player in local power politics. Julius II was more enthusiastic a
warrior than a patron of the arts. In a world where money talked,
secular supremacy held a greater appeal than did the sacred. Indeed,
Alexander VI became infamous for using his election to the seat of St.
Peter to feather his family’s nest. His children, Cesare and Lucrezia
Borgia, are still remembered for the ferocity with which they sought
temporal power. This was because Alexander not only believed the
papacy was to be enjoyed he also wished to establish inheritable
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domains for his progeny. If this entailed assassinations and treachery,
so be it. In fact, the term nepotism came into currency during this
period. Based upon the Italian word for “nephew,” it alluded to
bestowing benefits on illegitimate children who, for purposes of
decency, were referred to as “nephews.” Paradoxically, both the ease
with which Church doctrines were violated and the disapproval with
which this illegal favoritism was met were signs of a rising commercial
tide. Nepotism had not been considered a problem when family
connections were the primary source of alliances. It became a threat
when it promised to undermine business dealings based on profit. If
genetic ties were allowed to count for more than reliable streams of
revenue, then bankruptcy and a descent from grace might be in the
offing for unconnected tradesmen.
Once the Church became entangled in these contradictions, its
legitimacy too was in question. One of the ways popes attempted
to generate the funds needed to erect the symbols of their power
was through the sale of indulgences.77 These passes to get out of
purgatory could become objects of commerce only in a society where
the marketplace had ascended to prominence. They would never
have sold had not ordinary people resources to spare. Still, the fact
that they were for sale offended religious sensibilities. Martin Luther
was one who had such sensibilities.78 He could not abide what he
perceived as a betrayal of faith. His resultant challenge to the Church
led to the Protestant Reformation because many others felt as he
did. They were not willing to be associates of a religious institution
that did not respect their commitments. Fortunately for Luther, this
dissatisfaction coincided with several other developments. One of
these was a growing north-south split in Europe. Another was the
fracturing of the Holy Roman Empire. A third was the spread of
literacy.
If Italy was the font of the Renaissance, within a century its
economic ferment spread to the former seat of medieval industry.
Bruges might be in decline, but Antwerp had risen to replace it.
In so doing it became a financial center to rival its Mediterranean
precursors.79 But in time, it would be supplanted by Amsterdam. The
Low Countries, like the Italians citystates had access to water borne
transport. Located at the confluence of the Rhine River and the
North Sea, once the lateen sail was developed, they could participate

144

The Great Middle Class Revolution

in Atlantic traffic. The lateen sail, which is triangular in shape,
permitted a ship to sail at an angle into the wind. This facilitated
oceanic voyages. In the more placid Mediterranean, oars could make
up for what the wind did not do, whereas in the heavier seas of
the Atlantic human power was inadequate. After this changeover
occurred, the north too became prime commercial territory. With
this, the Flemings and Dutch joined the pursuit of riches.80 The
Germans, incidentally, benefited as well. Also connected to the
sea by rivers, they were eager to do business with their Hollander
cousins.
Luther, a loyal German, was appalled by the avarice of the
Romans. So too were German merchants and princes who perceived
the Italians as political and commercial rivals. Happily, declaring
their religious independence would provide a dividend in autonomy
and market reach. This declaration, however, would not have been
possible had there been as potent a German state as there were
French and Spanish states. The Holy Roman Empire, which during
the height of feudalism was reckoned a superpower, in an era of
incipient nationalism was an anachronism. Fragmented beyond
the power of an elected emperor to unite, individual duchies and
electorates vied with one another for an hegemony that none had
the strength separately to impose. This allowed some to defy the
central authority of an emperor such as Charles V. A ruler might be
a loyal son of the Church, yet his military prowess depended not on
taxes but the voluntary cooperation of vassals who were not prepared
to cooperate. War, when it occurred, was, therefore, inconclusive.
In the end, Luther and his allies survived the wrath of those who
would have liked to have condemned him as a heretic. Unlike those
of previous reformers, his innovations outlasted him, thanks to the
resources mustered on his behalf. A rise in commerce, coupled with
a decline in feudalism, made possible the alliances that tipped in
his favor. Paradoxically, although Luther was very much devoted to
spiritual solutions, his success skewed events against religious power.
The Catholic Church was to lose much of its dominion, and the
emerging Protestant denominations were too numerous for any one
of them to exercise a comparable authority.
There were also the effects of literacy. Printing made books readily
available. Not surprisingly, Guttenberg’s first project was a Bible.81
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This enabled Protestants to urge their adherents to read the good
book for themselves. Instead of having priests interpret its meaning,
they could develop personal relationships with the deity. This allowed
for an autonomy of spirit that had not previously been encouraged.
Max Weber emphasized a Protestant Ethic that urged communicants
to seek riches as a sign of being one of God’s elect. This motivation,
grounded in a submission to divine providence, theoretically
provided the discipline needed to generate the capital for economic
growth. Perhaps more important, however, was the rigor needed to
confront eternity on one’s own. Beginning with the internal controls
necessary to read a ponderous book unaided, consciously coming
to Christ likewise required a level of introspection that was useful
in confronting other independent operators in the marketplace. If
good Christians could be entrepreneurs in interpreting a sacred text,
why not be entrepreneurial in seeking commercial opportunities?
As the Renaissance upsurge of the Commercial Revolution
approached its conclusion, the Netherlands and England, two
Protestant nations, rose to prominence. Henry VIII of England
began his reign slavishly devoted to Italianate fashions but ended
as an implacable foe of the Pope.82 The winds of reform would
soon eventuate in Puritan excess, but in the meantime they inspired
collective efforts to preserve an independence from Rome. In other
words, the disciplines of Protestantism were social as well as personal.
This was obvious in John Calvin’s Geneva, which decreed strict
adherence to a common code of conduct and a dogmatic set of beliefs.
This would unexpectedly provide practice in establishing voluntary
interpersonal bonds. One day, civic associations and industrial
corporations would dominate the landscape, but for the moment the
protomiddle classes were caught between the marketplace and a need
to protect their eternal souls.
The Enlightenment
The starting point of the next83 wave of the Commercial
Revolution is difficult to pin down. In many ways the Enlightenment
was an acceleration of the Renaissance. It was a period during which
the emphasis resolutely shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic
littoral. The historian Ferdinand Braudel84 chronicles an everquickening rotation of the wheels of commerce, wherein capitalism
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became a recognized phenomenon and the tentacles of trade spread
across the globe. This was the era during which the West asserted its
dominance over the rest of the world. In 1529, immediately before
hegemony began, the Turks besieged Vienna in a near-run thing.
When they retreated, they nevertheless remained the terror of the
Balkans. By 1683, in contrast, conditions had drastically changed.
A renewed invasion was still able to put Vienna in jeopardy, but
this time once the city was relieved, the Ottoman Empire85 began its
fateful decline. The Austrians, although they were on the fringe of
European civilization, were able to liberate Hungary on the way to
eventually freeing almost all of Turkey’s Christian dependencies. The
cause of this reversal was nothing less than the relative prosperity of
a market driven economy. In making money ever more effectively
through trade, the West had stolen a march on everyone else. What
had been a forested backwater when the Romans arrived was about
to leap ahead of all its rivals.
Every schoolchild is taught about Columbus’ voyages of
exploration.86 Undertaken during the Renaissance, they would
revolutionize the ground rules within a century. When the
Portuguese under the direction of Henry the Navigator began their
cautious descent down the African coast, they did so in caravels
capable of carrying cargo. Soon the Portuguese would outflank the
Venetians in the spice trade. The Spanish were so eager to follow,
they inadvertently discovered the New World. But it would take
time before this venture was profitable. Initially what followed was
the gold and silver fever of the Conquistadors, but presently the
West Indies would be found to be ideal for raising sugarcane. This
crop encouraged the development of a sweet tooth back home that
could be satisfied at a generous return. So lucrative was this trade
that other European powers joined the quest. England, France, and
the Netherlands rapidly established their own Caribbean outposts.
Thanks to the importation of black slaves from Africa, these
investments also paid off handsomely. Ironically, the dominance of
capitalism kick-started an institution that later proved at odds with
its central ethos.
In the late Renaissance and early Enlightenment industrial power
was still largely provided by muscle power, whether of humans or
draft animals. Because sugar cultivation turned out to be intensive,
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in order for it to be practicable cheap labor was needed to cut the
stalks and press them into juice. Once introduced, slavery unfolded
according to a logic of its own. Thus, when the English decided to
exploit the North American mainland, they too acquired bondsmen
to grow tobacco, cotton, and indigo.87 Originally intending to take
advantage of the lumber and turpentine trade, the speculators who
funded these operations switched to where the money was. In so
doing, they sought to emulate the fortunes being made to their
south. These riches also had an impact on the mother country. They
enabled the adventurous to go abroad relatively impoverished but to
return with the wherewithal to invest in homegrown commerce. A
favorite outlay of these parvenus was in land and its improvements.
Still living in the shadow of feudalism, the objective was to imitate
the accoutrements of aristocracy while continuing to derive an
income from the marketplace.
The Enlightenment would also receive an impetus from the
evolution of absolutism. As nation states developed, the temptation
to centralize became profound. Newly established kings sought to
enlarge their dominions. Even before the Renaissance, Edward I of
England attempted to consolidate his rule by claiming Wales and
Scotland. In Spain, Ferdinand and Isabella united the crowns of
Aragon and Castile, but they also expelled the Moors from Granada.
Flush with Middle Age devotion, they also initiated the Inquisition
designed, to cleanse their realm of heresy. Not yet commercial in
mentality, they assumed that a common religion was essential to
social cohesion. After Spain captured Mexico and Peru, this attitude
became evident in the hidalgos who led the occupation, who saw little
reason to treat pagan Indians with compassion and less to encourage
commerce. Later, Philip II inherited a Spain distinct from the
Hapsburg regions in central Europe in which he cultivated a Spanish
nationalism.88 While the centralized unity he achieved might have
facilitated an economic self-sufficiency, he, and his subjects, were too
dedicated to an anachronistic glory to pursue such an objective.
In France, Francis I consolidated his rule in opposition to that of
Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire and Henry VIII of England.
He was sufficiently powerful to devote huge expenditures to chateau
building and sufficiently attuned to scientific developments to
induce Leonardo to come to work for him. Nevertheless, it was not
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until his successors Louis XIII89 and Louis XIV in the 17th century
that absolutism fully flowered. Louis XIV90 is still remembered as
the Sun King who declared that he was the state. The builder of
Versailles, he planned his vast palace complex as a place where his
nobility could be forced to reside under his watchful presence.91 As
long as they were in his company, he could rest assured that they were
plotting social conquests, not his overthrow. Among those upon
whom Louis bestowed his munificence and his personal control were
the nobility of the sword and the nobility of the robe. Those of the
sword traced their eminence to the military aristocracy of medieval
times, whereas those of the robe gained their ascendancy from service
to the king. Often of merchant origin, they helped gather taxes and
administer justice. Even more than affluent Englishmen, they aspired
to aristocratic status. Louis cultivated this propensity by investing
in luxury industries. Instead of being oriented toward commerce,
he found his inspiration in competition with Spain. Rather than
capitalize on the peace his absolutist rule brought, he preferred to
patronize the manufacture of mirrors and tapestries.
In stark contrast were the developments unfolding within the
Netherlands.92 Mercantile prosperity had prompted the Dutch first
to seek independence from the Spanish and then to defend it from
encroachments of the French. Sturdy burgers, as opposed to foppish
aristocrats, they were prepared to take to their ships as beggars of
the sea rather than submit to foreign domination. Though theirs
was a tiny territory, they were the most advanced naval architects
of the time. Masters of a fleet that could be dedicated either to
war or to peace, they had the tenacity to outlast all comers. As a
result, these burgers became the vanguard of a transition to the
Enlightenment. Despite their small numbers, they ventured across
the globe on business. Ferocious competitors, they wrested the Spice
Islands from the Portuguese and used the proceeds to fund a middle
class lifestyle. Although they paid deference to the local nobility, the
prevailing ambience was that of the merchant class. Those of noble
descent might lead them into battle, but associations of prominent
citizens undertook most of the ordinary business of governing.
These sensibilities are still on display in the art that they financed.
Rembrandt van Rijn was one they patronized and paintings such as
his Night Watch demonstrate the pride they took in regulating their
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affairs. A miller’s son, Rembrandt also provided a wonderful portrayal
of a surgeon guild’s satisfaction in its members’ skills. Prominent too
among the works of the Dutch masters were evocations of domestic
life. Rembrandt depicted the Jewish Bride, while Frans Hals
presented a gallery of merchant portraits commissioned for their
own glorification. Perhaps the best of the middle-class chroniclers
was Jan Vermeer. His intimate interiors give a glimpse of ordinary
life among the comfortably affluent. Some have suggested that he
achieved the striking realism of his compositions by utilizing a recent
scientific innovation, the camera obscura. If so, both his subject
matter and his methods reflect the advances of the moment.
The Dutch became legendary not merely for their prosperity
but also for their tolerance. Like their Greek counterparts, they
understood that accepting the idiosyncrasies of one’s customers was
good business. As a result, their nation became a refuge from the
religious storms that ended the Renaissance, attracting among others,
Spinoza93 from Spain and Descartes94 from France. Also renowned
for their financial speculations, the Dutch originated what became
stock markets. As with the invention of banking, this promoted
commerce by providing the funds for dicey opportunities. Taking
risks is a defining characteristic of commercial societies. Because
they cannot be certain where the profits lie, business types must
possess the confidence to take the well-researched plunge. An ability
to assume calculated gambles, despite their uncertainties, is thus a
keystone feature of the middle classes.
Across the channel in England an intermediary series of events
was unfolding. Somewhere between the absolutism of the French and
the mercantile common sense of the Dutch was the predemocratic
turmoil of this island realm. Building on the political unity and
financial reserves established by his father, Henry VIII began his rule
with absolutist aspirations.95 Almost by accident, his desire for a
male heir and, therefore, for a divorce produced the conditions for
an upheaval. Strong enough to confiscate the wealth of the Roman
Catholic Church on his way to instigating an Anglican Protestantism,
he unleashed a sequence of currents and countercurrents that remade
his domain. The fight over whether England would remain Protestant
or return to Roman Catholicism eventuated in a constitutional
monarchy. Bloody Mary was succeeded by Elizabeth I, who, in part
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to retain her position, remained the Virgin Queen. This opened
the way for James I, who relocated from Scotland, could never hope
to restore Henry’s supremacy. His son Charles I96 intended to do
so, but by then it was too late. The Puritans had developed a taste
of autonomy they were not about to relinquish. Eventually, led by
Oliver Cromwell,97 their Parliamentary party acquired the clout
to win a civil war. Once Cromwell died, the executed king’s son,
namely Charles II,98 resumed sovereignty. Yet there were conditions.
He was to rule together with parliament with the stipulation that
he be a Protestant. This he did with such aplomb that the nation
backed him in a victorious war against the Dutch.99 His brother
James II, who succeeded him, was a different story. He was the Duke
of York, the man for whom New York was named, but he was a
miserable failure as king. His high-handed tactics in attempting to
restore Roman Catholicism were so offensive that they prompted his
removal. The Dutch stadtholder, William of Orange, the husband of
James’s daughter Mary, succeeded his father-in-law in what came to
be called the Glorious Revolution. But the price of this victory was
a further reduction in the monarch’s power. Scattershot, the nation
achieved a parliamentary unity, and this novel, democratized stability
provided the conditions for the coming Industrial Revolution.
The English experience has been recounted in some detail
because its innovations were crucial to the evolution of the middle
classes. Under Henry VIII and even Elizabeth I,100 the sovereign
could control the economy by conferring mercantile monopolies on
favored subjects. This was the inspiration of the colonial ventures in
Virginia and Pennsylvania. Yet, as Protestantism grew, parliament
became less indulgent in such matters. Even so, because its members
too wished to distribute largesse, there gradually arose a Whig
squirearchy dedicated to serving its own interests. Local magnates,
in concert, asserted their ascendancy largely through control of
parliament. Some of the resources that brought them prominence
came from the West Indies, but much of these were the result of
an enclosure movement. England had long been a commercial
backwater. It was a supplier of raw materials rather than a trading
depot or industrial hub. The enclosure movement, therefore, fenced
in common lands that had once been open to the public so that
they could be devoted to crop cultivation. This provided surpluses
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for the marketplace. At the same time wool previously shipped to
Flanders was rerouted to local production. Previously, sheep, after
being shorn, provided wool shipped to Flanders. This brought
the landowners into a money economy and gave them a stake in
safeguarding market institutions. Irrespective of the desires of the
weakened monarchy, they had an interest in promoting legislation to
protect their property rights.
Into this world burst the Scientific Revolution that constituted the
intellectual underpinnings of the Enlightenment. Galileo may have
been Italian, but before the 17th century ended the center of gravity for
scientific discoveries had shifted to London. The home of the Royal
Society, it became the switching center for the latest developments.
With English ships beginning to establish the hegemony that would
allow succeeding generations to sing of Britannia ruling the waves, the
need to facilitate these journeys was acute. This turned eyes skyward
in the belief that the stars might provide the key to navigational
accuracy. The titan of the age was Isaac Newton,101 preceded by
Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes, champions of empiricism and
analytic geometry. Newton created a breathtaking synthesis based
on accurate observations and advanced mathematics. His theory
of gravity, coupled with the laws of motion and the discovery of
integral calculus, explained the movements of the planets. Johannes
Kepler had revealed that planetary orbits were elliptical, but Newton
educed why. He calculated the moons’ wanderings so precisely that
eclipses could be predicted and patterns of tides illuminated. So
exact were his measures that Edmond Halley could forecast that
the comet named after him would return in seventy-five years. For
good measure, Newton even explained the refraction of light into
rainbows. So impressed were his contemporaries that Alexander
Pope102 penned the immortal couplet, “Nature and Nature’s laws lay
hid in night/God said, Let Newton be! And all was Light.”
It is difficult to imagine a more pithy expression of the awe in
which his achievements were held. One also gains a sense of the
emerging prestige of science.103 When, as recently as the lifetime
of Galileo, the Church had been able to assert that empiricism was
trivial compared with revelation, observation now loomed supreme.
In essence, the rationality of business had triumphed. Numbers used
to bring order to commercial transactions were doing the same for
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the universe. Others besides Newton joined the hunt for secular
knowledge. Robert Hooke, secretary of the Royal Society, was his
competitor in investigating gravity and optics; Robert Boyle was
making progress regarding the compressibility of gasses; and across
the channel, a draper, Anthony van Leeuwenhoek, had taken time
from his shop to peer into a drop of water at the tiny animalcules
swimming there. Amateurs, later to be regarded as dilettantes, were
on the cutting edge of this enterprise.104 Instrument makers, lawyers,
and soldiers were involved. Nothing less than a societywide mental
reorganization had occurred, one that prefigured the professional
expertise of the future.
Concurrent changes took place in philosophy, literature, and the
law. In philosophy, Thomas Hobbes105 pioneered a social contract
theory of political relations. Caught up in the turmoil of the English
Civil War, he speculated that only a monarch could keep order among
unruly individualists. John Locke106 writing at the time of Glorious
Revolution was, in contrast, an apologist for the parliament, not
for the king. A personal friend of Newton’s, he postulated thought
processes based on mental associations. As a confirmed empiricist,
he provided a rationale for popular sovereignty. Across the water in
France, and almost a century later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau107 became
the prophet of revolution. Postulating a loving human nature,108
he declared that government, which on the continent was still in
the hands of the nobility, corrupted the innocent. He preferred
that general will guided communal decisions. Either profoundly
democratic or inchoately fascistic, this placed ordinary people at the
center of the equation. Philosophy too was on the verge of entering
the marketplace. Rousseau might be preaching to the aristocracy in
their salons, but he was also selling pamphlets to a populace eager to
hear of its prospective liberation.
Much of what was occurring had political implications. France’s
Voltaire109 was every inch the iconoclast, but also a friend of Frederick
the Great of Prussia. Meanwhile Jonathan Swift,110 an Anglican
prelate in English-held Ireland, perfected the art of the satire. More
significantly, Scotland’s Adam Smith111 was heralding the advent
of laissez-faire economics. The cornerstone theorist of supply and
demand, he perceived wealth as created in market transactions.112
Denis Diderot, back in France, was trying to systematize all this into
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a massive Encyclopedia, while William Blackstone was attempting to
bring order to the perceived anarchy of English law. Law, it should
be noted, as emphasized by Montesquieu,113 was a theme of the time.
His Spirit of the Laws underlined the desire for the neutrality of
objective regulations. Instead of the personal whims of the ruler
deciding who received what, formal standards applied equally to
all. This rule of law, as opposed to a rule by men, eventually made
democracy possible, but, as important, provided predictability within
the marketplace. Commerce was inherently uncertain; it did not need
to be further complicated by the caprices of the powerful. Reason
needed to prevail everywhere, not just in the countinghouse.
Out in the field, innovations were piling up with dizzying
alacrity. Overland transportation had been revolutionized by road
construction. For the first time since the days of Rome, new corridors
were being blazed for both stagecoaches and cargo wagons to wend
their way. Of still greater value to merchants were the canals being
cut through the countryside. Inland barge traffic could now carry
volumes of freight previously confined to rivers and seas. All this
made for larger urban agglomerations. Cities like London and Paris
grew past their earlier limits, because their populations were fed from
a broadened countryside. Within their precincts further novelties
promoted an explosion of business. Thus coffeehouses sprouted to
provide venues for discussing mutual interests and innovative ideas,
such as the provision of insurance, were exchanged among patrons
who sought to reduce the risks of the road. These facilities also
provided the foundations for a democratic chatter similar to that
which once animated the Athenian agora.114
Coming in at the tail end of the Enlightenment was the American
experiment. Planted on the shore of a veritable wilderness but in
communication with the old world by way of the sea, it produced a
synthesis of European traditions and frontier improvements. By its
very nature populated by risk-takers, these colonials needed to find a
way to tame their backwoods while simultaneously reproducing the
amenities of the mother country. Once more Benjamin Franklin
is an exemplar of what was evolving. Walter Isaacson115 describes
Franklin’s antecedents thus: “During the late Middle Ages, a new
class emerged in the villages of rural England: men who possessed
property and wealth but were not members of the titled aristocracy.
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Proud but without great pretension, assertive of their rights as
members of an independent middle class, these freeholders came to
be known as franklins, from the Middle English word ‘frankeleyn’
meaning freeman.” Largely autonomous artisans and shopkeepers,
these men (and women) managed their own affairs, often with
considerable dignity. Adam Smith was to refer to England as a
nation of shopkeepers, and though this appellation was derisively
hurled back at him, it denotes an admirable self-reliance. It was this,
rather than aristocratic pretensions, that were transplanted into the
wilds of a new continent.
Franklin, it will be recalled, was a printer. In this, he copied his
brother in establishing a newspaper. Both, however, were imitating
earlier journals published in London, such as Joseph Addison’s The
Spectator.116 In this, they revealed that a literate populace was in
place on both sides of the Atlantic. Evidently schooling sufficient
to make reading common was of value in societies where books and
pamphlets were readily available. Education and the knowledge it
provided were helpful within a commercial environment. Information
about what was for sale, what was on the political horizon, and where
fresh opportunities might be found was eagerly sought. Ordinary
people wanted to know what was going on and what their neighbors
were thinking. So inquisitive they, so ravenous for data, they turned
Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanac into a runaway bestseller. He
became the herald of the middle classes, not merely because to
this was his community, but because tens of thousands of others
shared his aspirations. Theirs was a world of initiative and personal
responsibility. Franklin was well loved for the on-point advice he
offered via deft, non-preachy, humor. Unlike the nobility of old, he
did not force his ideas on readers but allowed them to adopt what
they would.
An anecdote told about Franklin illuminates what was
happening to a nation on the threshold of becoming substantially
middle class. Between 1739 and 1741, George Whitefield toured
the colonies sermonizing on behalf of Methodism. In one of the
crowds attracted to his Philadelphia crusade stood Franklin himself.
At the time a deist not much enamored of organized religion, the
great man was nevertheless mesmerized. According to his own
account he was so charmed that, much against his inclinations, he
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ended up prepared to empty his pockets into the collection plate.
His fellow Americans felt the same way. Calls to comply with
strict moral rules revitalized their faith during a colonywide episode
labeled The Great Awakening.117 John Wesley had previously
instigated a religious reform that provided a reason to trust strangers.
To the degree that they were evangelized into following his method,
they could be expected to keep their promises and to refrain from
cheating. Essentially a step in inculcating the internal disciplines
critical to maintaining a continentwide marketplace, this converted
his admirers into members of the same moral fraternity.
Not long afterwards, Thomas Jefferson118 participated in
solidifying the foundations for political trust. In the Declaration of
Independence, following the lead of John Locke, he affirmed that
ordinary people had the right to replace their ruler if he violated
the compact wherein he promised them protection. Tyrants could
be overthrown because God had created everyone with equal rights
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Indeed, when these
were infringed upon, citizens had a duty to rectify the situation.
Jefferson almost went as far as Locke in declaring that they had
a right to property as well. Private ownership was so integral to
the commercial communities in which both lived that it was
unimaginable that the government could peremptorily violate that
right. With these assurances in place, both the merchant class and
ordinary landowning citizens could rely on elected officials to refrain
from despotism. Having grown accustomed to regulating their daily
affairs without undo intrusion, they had no intention of replacing
one autocrat with another.119
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Chapter 5

Industrialization
So naturalists observe, a flea
Hath smaller fleas that on him prey;
And these have smaller still to bite ’em;
And so proceed ad infinitum.
(Jonathan Swift, On Poetry)
All systems of either preference or of restraint, therefore,
being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple
system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord.
Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of
justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his
own way, and to bring his own industry and capital into
competition with those of any other man or order of men.
(Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations)
The Great Depression was a government failure, brought
on principally by Federal Reserve policies that abruptly cut
the money supply…. High unemployment lasted as long
as it did because of New Deal policies that took money out
of people’s pockets, disrupted the money supply, restricted
production, harassed employers, destroyed jobs, discouraged
investment, and subverted economic liberty needed for
sustained business recovery. (Jim Powell, FDR’s Folly)
Art is a revolt against fate. (Andre Malraux, Voices of
Silence)
The Industrial Revolution
Evidently based on Leeuwenhoek’s observations, Swift’s1
understanding of fleas upon fleas neatly fits the nesting waves
characteristic of the Commercial Revolution. It also corresponds
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with the many oscillations manifest within the Industrial Revolution.2
Often reckoned to be a single cohesive movement, this period can
be resolved into a series of succeeding intervals. The details may be
debated, but that there was a multistage progression cannot. The
social capital today so palpable within middle class was not a unitary
achievement. Rather, there were regular and advancing stages.
The self-direction and internalized discipline that allow for
commercial and political decentralization did not appear spontaneously.
They grew out of a sequence of innovations. Emotional maturation,
for instance, could only have evolved through a long series of shared
experiences. Adam Smith was wrong in asserting that a simple system
of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. An invisible
hand may direct the marketplace, but even it could not operate
without the preexistence of appropriate interpersonal conditions.
To be more precise, whereas systems of preference and restraint
are universal, the controls that keep them within specific channels
take time to evolve. Unfairness and coercion never completely fade
away; hence, no one is ever perfectly free to pursue his unhampered
interests, but how these interests express themselves depends on the
rules and personal assets the players bring to the table. The norms,
values, and beliefs of societies and their members are significantly
amended over time. What is not possible in one era may become
the conventional wisdom of another. In truth, both internal and
external controls mutate in accord with emerging social conditions,
such that everyone, not just members of bureaucracies, live in quasiiron cages. Of particular interest to the Middle Class Revolution is
the normative emotional restraints that facilitate or deter particular
forms of economic and political cooperation. Of these, the evolution
of expressive self-control was crucial to the emergence of bourgeois
authority. Only its arrival enabled ordinary human beings to work
harmoniously on ever more complex tasks without submitting to
tyrannical external constraints.
The unfolding of the Industrial Revolution was integral to
this succession. As the need to work with machines progressed,
it imposed unprecedented demands. These unfamiliar challenges
nevertheless took many years to understand and assimilate. It took
decades and sometimes centuries for norms, values, and beliefs to
make the unknown routine.3 It also took time for newly formed

Industrialization

165

alliances and institutions to tame apparently threatening innovations
and to tamp down the extreme feelings that accompanied them.
Until fear, overreaction, and denial could be overcome, mistakes were
inevitable. Daniel Chirot4 has speculated that this developmental
sequence unfolded in a series of upheavals that succeeded each other
as new technologies came forward. The first wave began in England
about the middle of the 18th century.5 It was launched because the
preceding commercial explosion had dramatically increased the call
for goods. Not unnaturally, the suppliers of these commodities
sought more effective means to take advantage of this opportunity.
Among the innovations that sprang up were the use of coal to replace
depleting stores of wood, iron smelting to replace more fragile nonferrous materials, and the steam engine to replace muscle power. Of
these, the steam engine was of paramount significance. For the first
time in history, a means had been found to inject almost boundless
reserves of energy into the economy. Prior to this, the number of
human beings required to accomplish a task limited how much of it
could be achieved. Now, mindless pieces of machinery worked the
day around. People were relieved of traditional drudgery but in the
process were reduced to tending these devices. Some thought this a
demotion; nevertheless, it allowed each worker to turn out far more
goods than was possible previously.
James Watt6 brought the steam engine, which began with
Newcomen’s more inefficient contraption for pumping water out
of mines, to commercial fulfillment. Fueled by abundant coal and
fabricated of newly available iron, it liberated production from the
marginal locations to which industrialization had been confined.
Previously, factories had been situated adjacent to rapidly flowing
streams needed to turn millwheels. These, not surprisingly, tended
to be in upland regions where transportation was difficult. Watt’s
newfangled devices made it possible to build industrial plants in
cities where labor was plentiful and where canals could bring in raw
materials and carry away finished products. Once more, the volume
of trade took a leap forward. The earliest applications of this advance
were in the textile industry. England had historically supplied wool
to continental manufactories, but now James Hargreaves’s spinning
jenny, Richard Arkwright’s water frame, Samuel Crompton’s mule,
and Edmund Cartwright’s power loom introduced change. With
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this technology, raw fiber could be processed more efficiently at home
than abroad. As a result, the country quickly became the center of
cloth manufacture for the entire world.
All this triggered a profusion of social changes.7 The growing
output turned Midland towns like Manchester into booming
cities and converted farm laborers into factory workers. Textile
production had previously depended on a putting-out system.
Individual entrepreneurs carried unfinished materials to individual
contractors who performed their discrete tasks in their own homes.
But because the new machines required a central location, employees
now had to journey to them, with home and work thereby separated
as never before. Likewise, the capitalists, that is, those who
invested in the machines and organized their operations, became
substantial personages. As the nexus of production, they exercised
more influence than had their predecessors. Flushed with success,
they unleashed further waves of entrepreneurial spirit. Ambitious
individuals now sought the main chance in the marketplace rather
than the battlefield. These formerly anonymous souls hoped to grow
rich and powerful by coming up with ingenious ideas. Ordinary
life was similarly revolutionized. To begin with, the new cheaper
cloth supplanted the homespuns of yore. Average people could now
purchase store-bought materials for less, thereby elevating the quality
of their daily lives. No longer were they limited to the products they
could produce with their own hands.
Over in France, another sort of revolution was brewing.8
The French looked with envy toward England, hitherto deemed
inferior.9 Across the ocean in the United States, they also perceived
the rapid advances of an upstart democracy they had helped
install. Unfortunately, bankrolling American independence had
put a strain on French finances. This exacerbated an economic dip
that energized a growing discontent with the country’s governing
absolutism. Sparked at first by an entrepreneurial aristocracy that
hoped to benefit by restricting the monarchy, this dissatisfaction was
soon appropriated by the bourgeoisie. Through the agency of the
Estates-General, it managed to topple the ancient regime. Although
inexperienced in the ways of democracy, these ambitious parvenus
manipulated the Paris rabble into becoming the cannon fodder for
their coup. In the process, cartloads of heads were severed from
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their bodies, and the nobility was sent scurrying for the safety of the
borders, all in the name of liberty, equality, and fraternity.10
Into this turmoil rode Napoleon Bonaparte.11 After taming the
passions of the street, he directed his fellow’s interests and energies
outward toward the conquest of an empire. Since the efficacy of
his armies depended on harnessing an insipient patriotism, perhaps
his greatest achievement was getting ordinary Frenchmen to identify
with the interests of the nation. Without millions of individually
motivated citizens ready to die to expand their nation’s borders, he
could not have swept away the detritus of European autocracy. As
Emperor, he also ostensibly made the rule of law supreme by means of
the Code Napoleon. Not he, but the people, were now theoretically
in charge. A nation of former peasants came to perceive itself as on
the vanguard of democratization. This idea, if not its reality, was
clearly implanted in the collective psyche. In fact, it was nationalism
that had been firmly established. The individual French became the
collective French and not merely a collection of disparate provincials.
Concomitantly, the glory of their subsequent victories instilled a
nascent nationalism among the defeated Germans and Italians.
England meanwhile had been drawn into this continentwide
conflict. Regarded by the Emperor as his chief adversary, it was
able to sustain the struggle in part due to its industrial and financial
superiority. The British had earlier created a national bank to
oversee its currency. This could now be turned to generating the
loans that kept its military in the field. Contemporaries were
terrified of the debt thereby acquired, but the cumulative effect
was to keep the economy and government running. Once more,
by inadvertence, an innovative means of sustaining commerce had
come into being. In addition, Britain’s parliamentary institutions
were found more resilient than their French counterparts. They, and
not their more radical continental competitors, were the genuine
pioneers of democracy. After the dust of the Napoleonic period
settled, the French too realized the virtues of industrialization, if
not of democratization. Though briefly returned to a monarchial
government, old-line aristocrats such as Saint-Simon12 advocated
science and technology as a method for catching up with their old
enemy. The trouble was that he, and many of his countrymen, took
a romantic approach to this task. Instead of the pragmatics of the
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marketplace, they were fascinated with utopian communities where
an idealized spirit of cooperation would provide the edge.
On the other side of the Atlantic, more sweeping innovations
were occurring.13 Almost every contemporary who contemplated
these matters was convinced that the new nation would forever
remain an agricultural storehouse. Blessed with what seemed
unbroken horizons, there was too much cheap land to make industry
feasible. It would clearly be more economical to import finished
goods from Europe. One small ripple of dissent was furnished by
cotton. This inexpensive fiber had become enormously profitable as
the Midlands textile mills cranked up their operations. But it also
became more plentiful once Eli Whitney’s cotton gin could remove
the seeds from unprocessed bales. Since the trading interests of the
East Coast did not want to be left behind, they clamored for textile
factories of their own. These shortly make New England a facsimile
of its namesake.
The patron of these protoindustrialists was Alexander Hamilton.14
The emergent government’s first Secretary of the Treasury, he
anticipated the eventual arrival of prosperous manufactories. To
prepare their way, he insisted that the federal government assume the
debts incurred by the separate states during the American Revolution.15
His rationale was that fiscal responsibility would create strong credit
and that this was good for business. In his view, financial stability
would enable businessmen to borrow the money they needed to
expand and provide the permanence to predict market conditions.16
In short order, Hamilton was proved right. The budding American
industries emulated, and even stole, British technology. Among their
best moves was to develop techniques for fabricating interchangeable
machine parts. This allowed the assembly of mechanically superior
and, therefore, competitive products—among which were to be
breach loading rifles.
Within two decades, a member of the French nobility reported
on what he observed in the former colonies. Alexis de Tocqueville17
ventured across the ocean ostensibly to study the new nation’s
prison system. His real concern, however, was in determining what
made American democracy successful.18 Uncomfortably aware that
equality had not taken root in his own country, he was obsessed
with discovering the cause. Too young to have witnessed his nation’s
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revolution, he was nevertheless infected with its liberal aspirations.
In his travels across the United States, the young man encountered
a myriad of surprises. One was the egalitarian comportment of the
population. Even ordinary workers would approach him as a peer.
Unlike their French counterparts, they would shake his hand and
greet him like a long lost brother. Evidently, believing that all men
were created equal had spilled into their politics. De Tocqueville
sourly noted that even an illiterate backwoodsman such as Davy
Crockett could get elected to Congress.
Another phenomenon commented upon by de Tocqueville was
that these people were addicted to self-help associations.19 Much in
the manner of Ben Franklin, they, on their own initiative, united
to solve common problems. They became members of fraternal
organizations, the Grange, the Masons,20 political parties, chambers
of commerce, and school boards. If, in rural Michigan, there was
no school for their children to attend, they came together to build
one. They did not wait for the central government to act but
inaugurated the enterprise themselves. Evidently, in a nation as
large as theirs, excessive dependence on a central authority would
have been unproductive. Washington was simply too far away. This
decentralization had several other effects. First, in cooperating to
help themselves, ordinary people gained experience in democratic
action. They learned how to negotiate with one another and to make
the concessions to get things done. Second, they developed a sense
of independence. The frontier, in requiring them to face dangers
with the resources on hand, promoted both cooperation and a
sturdy individualism.21 Third, this need for self-reliance encouraged
pragmatism. Americans came to pride themselves on their knowhow. Since most jobs got done only when they did them, they made
sure that what they did worked.
Closely related to this orientation was a rampant commercialism.22
The shipping interests on the east coast needed to be assertive if they
were going to carve out markets in a world dominated by more
powerful nations. As a result, they took delight in an entrepreneurial
spirit that contributed to their reputation as Yankee traders. Out in
the hinterland a similar disposition was taking shape. Speculation in
land, and the products that came from it, was rife. Everyone dreamed
of striking it rich long before the advent of the California gold rush.
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This produced the side effect of muting jealousy of the wealthy. One
day they too would move from their present homestead, to where
they would build the mills that would make their fortunes. Crockett
attempted this and nearly succeeded. Social mobility was a universal
birthright. People did not passively accept their fates, but actively
prepared for better ones.
De Tocqueville was also much taken by the common culture
that enabled people to move a thousand miles from home and
still interact with their neighbors. North and South, East and
West, all spoke the same language. Being able to understand what
strangers said made everyone feel part of a single extended family.
As significant were shared values. In addition to a common desire
to grow rich, they honored a common religious tradition. More
than their Protestantism, they had inherited a legacy of religious
toleration. With no established church (as there had been in France)
people enjoyed a freedom of conscience they were pleased to extend
to others. Most were quite sincere in their faiths, but also sincere in
their respect for a plethora of distinct denominations. Then, too,
there was litigiousness. Americans were prepared to sue one another
at the drop of a hat. This might seem to betoken an antidemocratic
divisiveness, but as Tocqueville recognized, it indicated the opposite.
Ordinary Americans had faith in their courts. They believed that their
laws were just and fairly administered. Able to participate as jurors,
they readily submitted their grievances to outsiders for resolution.
This had the effect of containing potential conflicts. In a mobile
country continuously becoming more populous, these traditions
enabled its populace to live in peace without everyone’s belonging to
the same church or acquiescing to a shared overlord.
Occurring at about the time of Tocqueville’s journey was The
Second Great Awakening.23 This religious revival was evangelical
in the manner of its predecessor but more ecumenical. As
industrialization spread across the land, a more secular-oriented
religion began to assert an internal discipline more appropriate to the
changed conditions. In places like Rochester, New York,24 factories
were growing commonplace. By the 1820s this upstate town
was one of the fastest developing cities in the country, its fortune
founded on an auspicious location astride the falls of the Genesee
River. Surrounded by flat plains perfect for cultivating wheat and
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intersected by the newly constructed Erie Canal, it was ideal for
grinding grain into flour, then shipping it to the trading centers down
the Hudson. The transformation that began this voyage occurred in
mills powered by water which were reasonably large operations the
profitability of which was contingent upon keeping the machinery
running. Like most factories, they required workmen who arrived
on time and preformed their duties dependably. They could not be
drunk, lest they fall into the gears and clog the works.
The trouble was that imbibing alcohol had been a frontier
tradition. With transportation limited, turning grain into spirits,
then consuming roughly three times as much as modern Americans
do, was the norm. This is where the interests of evangelicals appeared.
They were invited to towns by business interests to preach temperance.
Workers who went to church instead of the saloon would be better
for the bottom line. This began a century-long alliance between
industrialists and the religious. Because industrialization required
internal controls not only from the capitalists but also from the
workforce, sacred motives were used to instill secular virtues. These
commercially requisite emotional restraints did not arise because
those involved recognized their rationality. Quite the reverse, for
preexisting emotional commitments were redirected into novel
channels.
At its early stages, many thought industrialization could not
be tamed.25 The thinkers theorized about a need to withdraw into
family-like utopian communities.26 Not only Saint-Simon,27 but
Charles Fourier in France and Robert Owen in Britain attempted
to organize such ventures. Fourier’s ideal inspired Brook Farm and
Owen’s prompted the founding of New Lanark in Scotland and New
Harmony in Indiana. Each of these places seemed at first to be a
refuge for souls determined to salvage human decency from the hardheartedness of the marketplace. If the goal of making money was to
convert human beings into extensions of the machine, perhaps it was
better to renounce the whole project. The Luddites28 might have
been too extreme in attempting to destroy Nottingham’s knitting
machines, but peaceful cooperation among like-minded individuals
might prove the epitome of what seemed to be a reasonable idealism.
Sadly, these experiments in anti-industrialism collapsed. Members
simply could not cooperate for the long run. Nevertheless, they
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heralded a romantic reaction to the march of commercialism. The
Industrial Revolution had so disturbed social relationships that a
widespread desire to undo it had emerged, one that has reverberated
into the twenty-first century.
The Victorians
Queen Victoria29 came to the British throne at the end of the
1830s. By this time, industrialism was firmly established in her
country. Though she surely did not intend it, she was to become the
symbol of the next stage of its evolution. In 1840, just having entered
her twenties, she married her first cousin, Prince Albert of SaxeCoberg-Gotha. Though she was at first reluctant, she settled into a
committed domesticity that became an example for her middle-class
subjects. A devoted wife and mother, she ceded many of her powers
to her consort. When Albert died in 1861, her grief was inconsolable.
She immediately withdrew from public life, dressed in black for the
rest of her life. When she reemerged into view, after a prolonged
period of mourning, she came to be regarded as an affectionate
mother figure.30 She was the embodiment of respectability, and
her dedication to moral behavior became synonymous with her era.
Victorianism, now thought of largely as sexual restraint, was in its
time more closely associated with family values.
Also symbolic of her reign was an undertaking of Prince Albert’s.
He planned and implemented the Crystal Palace Exposition in 1851.
Essentially a World’s Fair, it was a celebration of the nation’s industrial
achievements. By this time, Great Britain was far ahead of the rest
of the world; hence, the idea was to showcase its ingenuity and
productivity.31 The building in which the exhibitions were situated,
i.e., the Crystal Palace, was itself a singular demonstration of power.
Built of cast iron and glass, it would not have been possible without
recent advances in technology. It would not even have been possible
to amass that much iron. Another aspect of the extravaganza was
equally revealing. One of the public’s favorite attractions was a garden
featuring sculptures of dinosaurs. These were crude affairs, not really
representative of the huge reptiles upon which they were supposedly
modeled. Nevertheless they made an enormous statement. Not only
had technology been stimulated by industrialization, so had science.
Everywhere people were digging into the earth for construction
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projects, but also from curiosity. Indeed, curiosity was the hallmark
of an age in which prosperity opened a wider world to individuals
who increasingly felt able to master it. When they unexpectedly
encountered huge bones, they had the confidence and the knowledge
to identify these as belonging to long deceased animals. Where pious
ancestors suspected similar finds belonged to biblical giants, geology
now taught them better.
Approximately twenty years before the Exposition there had
been a glitch in the march forward. Before industrialization, periods
of economic distress had plagued society, but these were generally
associated with events such as famines and wars. Now, the business
cycle swung into operation. As Daniel Chirot32 explains, one of the
worst of these reversals occurred when the market for textiles was
temporarily saturated. Entrepreneurs had simply produced more
than the market was prepared to absorb. Watching this event, a
German university student named Karl Marx observed the suffering
of workers who were losing their jobs, and he concluded that this was
due to contradictions inherent in capitalism.33 In their greed, business
owners had attempted to wring excess profits from the sweat of their
wage slaves’ brows. Against all reason or justice, the actual producers
of wealth were left to absorb the pain of their bosses’ mistakes.
Marx’s solution was to encourage laborers to throw off the yokes of
their oppressors.34 Once they realized they were being exploited,
they could band together to eliminate the property ownership that
was the underlying cause of their discomfort. Then, they could
exercise joint ownership through the good offices of a government
they controlled. After this, thanks to their intrinsic goodwill, they
would cooperate for the benefit of all. The increased productivity
initiated by the bourgeoisie would thereby be channeled to its true
creators, and everyone would gain access to what was necessary for
personal comfort. Machines would finally be harnessed to the needs
of human beings, rather than the other way around.
Marx’s message resonated with his contemporaries because the
dislocations of economic progress discomfited so many of them. The
proliferating factories and cities displaced millions from traditional
employments. No longer living in the countryside, people found
that the cultural imperatives that had dictated the tempo of their
daily routines lost their authority. As we shall also see with respect
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to the middle-class developments of the twentieth century, changes
in lifestyle have a cultural lag. The old rules cease to apply to what
people are doing or how they are interacting before newer, more
appropriate ones have yet to emerge. This leaves individuals adrift.
They are uncertain where to turn but clamor for answers that might
provide a sense of security. The collectivist visions of the communists
and socialists furnished consolation. They explained, with what was
declared to be scientific exactitude, what was happening and where it
was destined to lead. They also provided an enemy to hate. Because
it is easier for people to cope with human malice than with economic
and sociological imperatives, vast numbers were happy to embrace
a story that focused their wrath in a tangible direction. In the long
run, this might not help them adjust to the emergent circumstances,
but it supplied temporary relief.
In any event, the economy was about to roar forward once again.
A new wave of technological innovations provided the impetus for
further growth. Foremost among these developments were those in
transportation35 and communication.36 Earlier in the century, the
steam engine had been applied to running cars on rails and powering
boats through the water. Toward the middle of the century, the train
and the steamboat came to prominence. They opened vast markets
within continents and ultimately across the seas. Fulton’s37 invention
converted the Mississippi River into a broad avenue of commerce and
coastal waters into conduits of produce. Where before barges could
float raw materials down to New Orleans, it now became possible for
paddleboats to carry finished goods up river to Cincinnati and St.
Louis. A flurry of railroad construction extended this activity. With
tracks stretched from the east coast to Kansas, cattle were driven
from the Texas plains all the way to New York City’s Delmonico’s
Restaurant. Americans acquired a taste for beef and for mechanical
inventions—such as reaping machines. Since these could be shipped
anywhere by rail, markets mushroomed everywhere and, with
them, the potential for profits. One who took advantage of these
opportunities was Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt.38 From his
beginnings as a poor boy in Staten Island, New York, he assembled a
fleet of ferries, then one of oceangoing craft, and finally a network of
railroads. In the end, he became synonymous with wealth.
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Another innovation of the age was the telegraph.39 It allowed
immediate communication over huge distances, which was to come
in handy in coordinating the operations of the railroads. Later came
the telephone, which permitted voice communication over vast
expanses. That device seemed so miraculous that it was featured
at Philadelphia’s Centennial Exposition of 1876. This celebration
of a hundred years of independence was modeled on the Crystal
Palace and was America’s proclamation that it had come of industrial
age. All sorts of mechanical inventions were on display. Of equal
note, however, was the coming of steel. This tougher version of
iron, which could now be cheaply smelted, was more versatile. Its
introduction led to a frenzy of skyscraper construction. Likewise,
crude oil, extracted from the ground, now replaced whale oil. Initially
refined into kerosene for lamps, it contributed the fuel for internal
combustion engines. In the process, Andrew Carnegie40 and John D.
Rockefeller41 came to rival Vanderbilt in their fortunes.42
With this rush of commercialism came a multiplication in scale.
Back in Franklin’s day, business was conducted from storefronts.43
Tradesmen’s goods were displayed and vended in spaces open to the
streets, while journeymen in the back rooms fabricated the products.
Upstairs, the families of owners and his family had their apartments.
With burgeoning production came not only a separation of the
factory from the home, but of the salesroom from the factory. The
centers of what came to be much larger cities sprouted business
districts replete with department stores. Ordinary people could now
take streetcars to patronize multistory structures dedicated solely to
marketing a widening variety of items. Clothing, food, and sundries
of all sorts were suddenly available in one location. This enabled
millions of people to reside within the same municipalities. Both in
Europe and the United States, Westerners were becoming urbanites.
Unfortunately, cities had historically been sinks for disease.44
People in close proximity transmitted communicable diseases with
frightening speed. In the past, the solution had been for prosperous
citizens to retreat to country estates, but now there were too many
people of modest or smaller means. Increasingly, lethal epidemics
needed to be controlled. In this, the scientific advances accompanying
the technological ferment provided the answers. Intentional
investigations demonstrated that pestilences such as cholera were
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spread by infected water supplies. With innumerable outhouses
leaching germs into the soil and this witches’ brew trickling into
rivers and wells from which public drinking water was drawn, a cycle
of death was inevitable. Once this was understood, city fathers began
investing in sewer systems to conduct the offending agents elsewhere.
Good hygiene became the order of the day.45 It was at this point that
people began saying that cleanliness was next to godliness. Where
previously baths were the exception, and even grandees covered their
body odor with generous doses of perfume, now everyone including
working people began to take weekly soakings.
Hygiene also extended to medicine. At the turn of the century,
physicians ridiculed midwives for washing their hands before
delivering infants. They considered this insistence on sanitary
conditions a superstition and saw no difficulty in moving with
bloodstained fingers from one operation to the next. Paradoxically, as
science became more prominent, this meant that a greater proportion
of middle class women went to the hospital to give birth. The result
was a rise in rates of septicemia. This epidemic provided a stimulus
for the rise of the germ theory of disease. Animalcules had long been
known to pervade the environment, but their connection with illness
had been dismissed out of hand. Now a variety of investigators,
some with medical and others with chemical credentials, postulated
such a linkage. A Hungarian physician named Ignaz Semmelweis
sounded the alarm about puerperal fever and agitated for doctors
to wash their hands. Meanwhile, Louis Pasteur,46 a Frenchman
whose pasteurization preserved his nation’s beer industry, disproved
the spontaneous generation of microscopic creatures, while also
demonstrating their agency in causing rabies. Robert Koch, a
German country practitioner, likewise invented stains to make visible
the bacterial sources of tuberculosis and cholera. In short, modern
medicine was born, with all its ensuing benefits for life expectancy
and personal comfort.
Other biological breakthroughs also occurred. The cell theory
of large creatures became well established, with its implications for
anatomy and physiology. As important was the introduction of a
viable theory of evolution. For more than a century there had been
speculations that complex animals developed from simpler ones.
This made sense in light of concurrent advances in geology.47 A close
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inspection of the rocks convinced prudent observers that the earth
was older than the six thousand years Bishop Ussher had proclaimed.
The up-and-coming gradualist hypotheses proposed that features
such as river valleys came into existence by being continuously and
uniformly eroded. Divine interventions would not be necessary if
one judged from the perceptible environmental processes. These
hypotheses also made the geological strata of alternating stone
formations explicable. This, in turn, called for an elucidation of the
fossils that kept turning up. These seemed to be stacked as in a
layer cake, with the simple at the bottom and the more complex near
the top. If this sequence was related to time, and common sense
said there must be millions of years of time involved, then, animal
morphology would likely be modified. The problem was that there
did not seem to be a mechanism for bringing about these changes.
It was this dilemma to which Charles Darwin48 addressed himself.
The suggestion that a competition for survival weeded out some
creatures, while bolstering the existence of others, was electrifying.
Natural selection is what Darwin called this process, and it converted
the mysterious into the palpable.
Also mysterious were the myriad peoples discovered in
remote corners of the globe. Unbridled commercialization sent
traders to formerly inaccessible regions. At the beginning, there
strange inhabitants were treated as nuisances. With the advent of
imperialism, however, such consideration was impractical.49 The
natives could not all be exterminated; they had to be governed. But
to be governed, they had to be understood. No longer were travelers’
tales of faraway wonders sufficient. Science must be brought to
bear,50 as it was with the invention of anthropology.51 Meticulous
scrutiny of unfamiliar ways of life provided insights beyond those
held by the ancient Greeks. Of particular utility was the concept of
culture.52 Preliterate people could now be understood as possessing
techniques for coping with diverse environments. Instead of being
dismissed as savages, their humanity could be appreciated in context.
By the next century, this would progress to ideas of cultural and
ethical relativism. All perspectives then would be declared equally
valid, with no overarching criteria available to discriminate among
them.
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Also laying the foundation for developments was modern
chemistry.53 The Greeks had introduced an atomic theory of matter,
but it was during the Victorian era that the modern atomic theory
took root, leading to veritable land rush to discover new elements.
Having determined that recognizable materials joined together in
measurable ratios to form compounds with emergent properties,
scientists scrutinized the details of these chemical reactions. As
significant were associated advances in electricity. Franklin was
celebrated for having elucidated the nature of electrical currents,
and Luigi Galvani had invented the electrical battery, but now
Humphrey Davy connected the two with his investigations into
electrochemistry. Hard on his heels came Michael Faraday’s
invention of the electric motor and, later, James Clerk Maxwell’s
discoveries regarding electromagnetism. Most exhilarating of all was
Thomas Alva Edison’s54 fabrication of a practical electric light. The
arc light and the limelight had already made appearances, but they
were not suitable for domestic employment. Edison’s was, and it
revolutionized society. Here was another fundamental source of nonhuman energy. For the moment, mostly a curiosity, within decades
it was to contribute momentum for another wave of industrialism.
All of these changes had repercussions for how business was
done. The glimmerings of industrial discipline present during the
Second Great Awakening became a roaring bonfire as the factory
system accelerated. Definitely in America, but also in England,
reforms piled upon reforms, generally with the goal of developing
a more reliable workforce. Isolated objections to imbibing alcohol
escalated to crusades against demon rum.55 Before the century was
out, the temperance movement was a regular feature of middle-class
sobriety. Neither businessmen who calculated figures nor laborers
who ran machines could afford the sloppiness which accompanied
intoxication. Drunkenness was not rational; it was not profitable.
Nor was alcoholism good for family life. This most salient of Victorian
institutions was threatened by bibulous husbands who would not
uphold their responsibilities as breadwinners nor refrain from beating
their wives when under the influence. This was proclaimed society’s
foremost problem,56 especially when immigrants57 from across the sea
or the surrounding countryside began to congregate in inner cities.
Everyone knew these communities were rife with drunkenness.58 It
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was, therefore, imperative to civilize their inhabitants by teaching the
rudiments of abstinence.
Also of momentous import was abolitionism.59 Holding
slaves was the birthright of the United States60 and the foundation
of the British textile industry. In America, the founding fathers
contemplated abolishing the institution,61 but the greed of Southern
aristocrats forbade it. Nevertheless, the logic of commercialism
militated against slavery. Both in Britain and in its former colonies,
the swelling ranks of factory workers resented the competition from
unpaid labor. In order to get people from the land and working
the machines, they had to be compensated. Bondsmen could
not be machine tenders because they were not motivated to be
vigilant. Slave labor had always been notoriously inefficient, but
this did not matter when there was no alternative.62 But mechanical
energy changed this situation. Conscientious freemen working for
wages in steam-driven factories could produce far more than sullen
chattel driven by the whip. The very success of the marketplace in
increasing the demand for goods undercut the source of power. As a
consequence, there was agitation against slavery. Ordinary workers
loathed the peculiar institution63 because they saw it as a menace to
their earning power. But even the commercial elites were arrayed
against it. They might like the idea of cheap cotton, but they knew
that real wealth was being generated on the factory floor, not on the
Southern plantation.
Like temperance, a religious ideology impelled the abolitionists.64
Despite biblical references honoring slavery, people now interpreted
shackling others in bondage as against God’s will.65 In America,
sermons were preached all across the North. This moral indignation
motivated the efforts that provided the muscle for the Civil War.66
What is as interesting was the nature of this religiosity. A more
homogenized and secularized Christianity had evolved to lead the
attack. Today religion has often been thought of a conservative
force, but this was not the case in the 19th century. Activists
modified the fire-and-brimstone tirades of Puritan forebears to serve
a more worldly purpose. As is common in human history, these
people adapted the tools at hand to novel circumstances. Their new
civic religion employed generalized spiritual objectives to promote
secular goals. A universalized belief in a merciful God, one that fit
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comfortably into most Protestant denominations, could be publicly
proclaimed without offending particular doctrines. As significantly,
it could tap into a desire to do good that had been reoriented toward
an innovative definition of what was good.67
This malleable religiosity was also directed toward the centerpiece
of Victorian morality.68 As earlier mentioned, the 19th century is
now identified with a prudish sexuality.69 Husbands and wives were
certainly urged to remain faithful to each other and their children.
The use of sexualized language, the promulgation of nude pictures,
and, most especially, the practice of prostitution were discouraged.
Truly strenuous efforts, extending to those by England’s Prime
Minister Gladstone,70 were undertaken to reform prostitutes and
to close down the houses of ill repute. Even masturbation was
suppressed. Children were told that playing with themselves led
to blindness or insanity. Only wholesome sex within marriage was
sanctioned. The missionary position was the lone honorable one,
and women, as everyone knew, were to participate in coitus from
duty, not for pleasure. Marriage was sanctified by God.71 This meant
that having children out of wedlock was strictly forbidden. Though
hampered by their poverty, the poor too believed in marital fidelity
and actively sought the prestige of respectability. This was promoted
from pulpits, by politicians, and by neighbors. Sexual restraint was
considered a sign of broad restraints. It indicated that a person was
self-disciplined and, therefore, trustworthy. Critics of the Victorians
tend to disparage this public virtue as hypocritical, but the level of
illegitimacy during this period was, in fact, dramatically reduced
from what it had been.
The family became sacrosanct because it was the anchor of
capitalistic achievement. Victoria, and her apparently straightlaced brood, were symbols of domestic stability.72 They modeled
the calm dependability needed if budding industrialists were to keep
their fortunes intact. Money earned could not safely be bequeathed
to a raucous crowd of bastards. It had to be conferred on progeny
who knew what to do with it. In former times, land could be
willed to rowdy heirs who kept the lineage going merely by being
its caretakers. The complexity of industrial operations made this
strategy impossible. Children needed to be groomed in the internal
disciplines necessary to direct these agglomerations.73 Only a close-
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knit family characterized by love and careful supervision could instill
what was required. Thus conventional wisdom held that families
that ate together, interacted together, and socialized together, stayed
together. Sunday mornings were to be spent in the family pew,
while evenings were to be dedicated to singing lively songs beside the
family piano. Ironically, the family home simultaneously became
a bastion for personal privacy. The goal was to have what Virginia
Woolf74 later celebrated as a room of one’s own in which one could
think private thoughts, privately defended. This was epitomized by a
fad for diary-keeping.75 In these precious volumes pubescent young
women and ambitious older men alike poured secret sentiments,
thereby both elevating their importance and enabling them to analyze
their significance. The ultimate objective of all of this was not merely
to pass along technical knowledge but also to infuse an emotional
attachment to upholding family dignity in individuals who were
eventually to be their own people. Only this sort of demonstrative
intimacy could produce the level-headed loyalties and independent
decision making that had become so imperative.
An obsession with personal dignity was likewise expressed in the
clothing styles of the period.76 The now familiar distinction between
white- and blue-collar workers originated among the Victorians.
Not unexpectedly, both the new entrepreneurs and their middleclass minions performed most of their tasks in offices. As such, they
prided themselves on a clean environment. Whereas factory workers
became greasy, stainless raiments declared that office workers did
not. Always neatly starched, their detachable collars remained
spotless. Also emblematic of status was the wearing of suits and ties.
So significant were these external advertisements of prominence that
many upwardly mobile families dressed formally for dinner. Female
fashions too mirrored a desire for formality. Elegant dresses, fitted
over corseted bodies, bespoke a dedication to following the rules,
irrespective of the discomfort in doing so. A high point of this trend
was the bustle. Uncomfortable in the extreme, it did not allow for
ease in sitting. Nevertheless it was proof of a Victorian gentleman’s
financial success that his wife and daughters did not have to engage
in manual labor in order to add to their income. Likewise the tassels
in their overstuffed living rooms confirmed prosperity and decorum.
The level of maintenance these items demanded demonstrated the
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presence of substantial resources and also the absence of the wild
behavior that might destroy their delicate orderliness.
Marx would have us believe that the nascent middle classes
consisted of ink stained clerks who were becoming impoverished,
but the evidence is otherwise. One sure marker of the growing
power of these classes was the spread of democracy. It was not for
naught that the Statue of Liberty became emblematic of an entire
nation. If Napoleon needed to inspire his soldiers by giving them
the appearance of liberty, industrial workers required something
more substantial. If they were to care about their jobs, they needed
an assurance of independence. Laborers who lacked a feeling
of autonomy performed with as little diligence as slaves. Roman
citizenship earlier put the steel into redoubtable legions; democratic
citizenship did the same for growing industries. The result was a
dispersal of the franchise. Where pre-Revolutionary America
insisted upon property ownership for voting rights, suffrage became
universal on both sides of the Atlantic in the 19th century. Political
leaders might still be drawn from the elites, but they needed to widen
their appeal to get elected. Soon enough, the wealthy would find
themselves seeking public influence through the mediation of more
modestly born politicians.
Women, too, were becoming aware and involved. Their suffrage
did not come to fruition immediately, but agitation in its favor
was vigorous. With larger numbers of women working outside the
home, suffrage was to become a practical necessity. The more their
contributions were required in commercial ventures, the more likely
they were to insist on independent voices. The changing of the
gender guard began with teenaged females in New England textile
plants, but in short order spread to factory offices. The invention of
the typewriter gave the impetus to the rights of the distaff secretary,
exemplified by the superior fine motor skills of women. Similar
reasons brought married women to work in the garment trades. In
this case, it was the introduction of the sewing machine that placed a
premium on manual dexterity. Women also began to migrate into the
teaching professions as an expansion of education demanded more
teachers. Added to this was the bicycle. As the historian Gertrude
Himmelfarb77 points out, its appearance facilitated female autonomy
by permitting unfettered movement. Cheaper than carriages, and
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more compact, bicycles enabled a woman to jump on board and
pedal to the market without asking her husband’s permission.
Also fundamentally democratic was the introduction of the civil
service.78 When governments were small and their contributions to
prosperity marginal, many jobs were allocated as patronage plums.
In the United States, this translated into positions for individuals
who helped politicians get elected. This, however, was inadequate
for technologically sophisticated tasks. Hiring friends and cronies
likewise imperiled fiscal responsibility. The all-purpose label for
these nepotistic shenanigans was corruption79 and it was increasingly
despised. Alliances within a commercial society, and all the more in
an industrial one, were contingent on competence. What was being
discovered was that graft and competence were largely incompatible.
The consequence of public contempt for these abuses were civilservice reforms that made employment conditional on passing
appropriate examinations. Qualifications were to be tested, not
assumed. Objectively certified abilities would allow people to rise to
the positions for which they were prepared.
So hectic did economic activity become that the era immediately
succeeding the Civil War became known as the Gilded Age.80
Speculation was so intense that within a few years the United
States overtook England as the world’s richest industrial state. The
Rockefellers and the Fisks gained the reputation for being robber
barons who accumulated obscenely large fortunes. Their monopolies
were so inclusive that it seemed their power would eclipse that of
the government. The upshot was a competition between laissezfaire policies and a desire to tame the trusts. Capitalistic affluence
seemed to endorse Adam Smith’s81 belief that complete liberty for
businesspeople meant liberty and prosperity for everyone. However,
the ability of Rockefeller to dictate oil prices was manifestly
dangerous.82 One man, however well intended, could not be allowed
to be that arbitrary and potentially vindictive. It was, therefore,
imperative to set limits on private enterprise. The initial efforts at
this restraint were provided by the labor unions.83 Ordinary workers,
manipulated by their bosses, exposed to unconscionable dangers, and
marginally remunerated, manifested the Marxist impulse to unite.
During this stage of development, their numbers were small and they
were outmuscled by their employers, but they laid down a marker

184

The Great Middle Class Revolution

that would eventually be picked up. Some of what they achieved
was obstructionist, but their movement eventuated in a respect for
employees that redounded to the benefit of all.
Much of the Victorian opposition to capitalist domination
came from the bohemians.84 A prominent faction of the Romantic
reaction to industrialization, these artistes were among its most
passionate critics. Romanticism85 is a term that came to be applied
to a literary, artistic, and musical movement that celebrated emotion
and personality. Its chief architects were stereotyped as being
antibusiness, antiscience, antidiscipline, antirational, and antifamily.
Their quintessential hero was the loner dedicated to self-expression
and aesthetic rapture. John Keats,86 one of the first of their number,
wrote, “’Beauty is truth, truth beauty’ —that is all/ Ye know on earth,
and all ye need to know.” Although when taken out of context, this
is literally nonsensical, the evident purpose this proclamation was
to rejoice in the dominion of art over science, in personal responses
over practical achievements. The Romantics evidently did not want
to be submerged in the economic advances of the era. As such, they
were rebels, albeit not political ones. By their very nature, they were
disorganized. Along with Jean-Jacques Rousseau,87 some admired
the noble savage. Primitive though many of them were, they were
respected for an honesty that refused to knuckle under to emerging
industrial elites.
Among the more colorful of the Romantics, the bohemians wrote
or painted emotionally arousing works in lonely garrets in places
such as Paris’s Left Bank. Determined to be beholden to no one,
they scorned the patronage earlier generations of artists had eagerly
cultivated. As a result, they could produce works that repudiated the
bourgeoisie. Their agents might sell their productions to the middle
classes, but they personally resisted associating with them. Novelists
such as Honore de Balzac,88 Gustav Flaubert,89 and Victor Hugo90
vented their spleens at the follies and oppression of the moneyed
class. Portrayed as amorously inept or terminally avaricious, these
emerging capitalists were condemned as congenitally disposed to
hunting good men down for the mere offense of pilfering a loaf of
bread. Even death seemed preferable to being trapped in the loveless
social embrace of their hangers-on. Meanwhile, painters such as
Edouard Manet and Claude Monet founded Impressionism91 in
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opposition to the cloying realism of the officially sanctioned artists
displayed by the academic salons. Probably in antipathy to the
fidelity of the newly developed photography, they attempted to
capture the transient of everyday life. Vincent Van Gogh carried
the trend to a likely conclusion. Unable to sell his works during his
lifetime, he recorded the madness consuming him on canvasses that
suggest the torture that one might experience in an overly routinized
society. In music, similar accomplishments were achieved by the
more mainstream Richard Wagner,92 Peter Tchaikovsky, and Frederic
Chopin.93 Composing for the public at large, they renounced the
formalism of the chamber music that was originally intended for
the amusement of effete aristocrats. Throwing decorum to the
winds, they might alternately be loud and commanding or soft
and amorous. Wagner, for instance, became the lyrical voice of a
resurgent German nationalism, while Tchaikovsky voiced Russian
feelings. That someone as gifted as Chopin or Keats wasted away
from consumption only added to their exotic reputations.
The Proud Tower94
In 1893, Chicago hosted the Columbian Exposition. Intended
to honor the five hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America,
its high point was The White City. One hundred fifty buildings
constructed of a marble-like material and executed in Romanesque,
Renaissance, and Greek styles shimmered when illuminated by electric
light. The effect was startling. Like the Eiffel Tower of by four years
earlier, this was a proclamation of economic might and broadcast
to the world at large that the United States had genuinely arrived.
An advertisement of the country’s industrial triumph, it suggested
that this nation’s accomplishments surpassed those of the ancients.
The event was thus steeped in optimism and self-satisfaction. All of
these wonders proved that the modern world had mastered the idea
of progress and was poised to ride it into a future of unexampled
marvels. The control of its destiny seemed to lie in its own hands.
Others had dreamt of such grandeur, but none before had managed
to grasp it. Visitors to the fair were convinced that this was not
arrogance that it was merely the truth. They could not predict that
within decades their world would be shaken by a series of seismic
shocks. Industrialization had not reached its culmination. More was
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to come. Though people did not realize, painful adjustments were
in the offing.
In the meantime, the prosperity was unprecedented. No previous
generation had ever been as rich or as powerful. After some dips in
the business cycle, the Gilded Age was replaced by the beginnings of
modernism. The industrial order was again kick-started by a fresh
wave of innovations. As in the past, technology was part of this
cavalcade. Leading the way was the internal combustion engine.
Lighter than its predecessors, it could power self-propelled vehicles.
Within years the automobile replaced the horse and carriage, and
the dream of flying heavier-than-air machines became a reality.
That which had seemed impossible not only had occurred, it had
proliferated. Thanks to Henry Ford’s95 assembly lines, streets formerly
mined with manure became crowded with Model T’s. While the
skies were not as quickly congested, the Wright brothers inspired a
host of imitators, creating airplanes with specifications more complex
than their own. The heavens were also being challenged by a race to
erect the tallest skyscraper. Steel had proven able to provide sturdier
skeletons for tall buildings than had cast iron. Coupled with Otis’s
safety elevators, downtowns became canyons of stone and glass.
Among the other major technological advances were those in
chemistry. In this area, the Germans stole a march on the rest of the
world. As trivial as it seems in retrospect, their mastery of the test tube
produced coal-tar-based dyes that enabled textiles to boast a rainbow
of color. Coal, incidentally, became easier to extract from the earth
after the invention of dynamite. Mining, in general, benefited from
Alfred Nobel’s96 development of an explosive that was safer and more
powerful than gunpowder. To be sure, this same material could also
be exploited on the battlefield. Bombs filled with this substance
inflicted more damage than did solid metal balls. Less lethal was the
introduction of vulcanized rubber. Before tires were fabricated of
this plastic material, iron-rimmed wheels on cobblestone roads had
made riding a jarring experience. Afterwards, automobile passengers
could travel comfortably at amazing speeds.
Among the nontechnological advances that multiplied production
was the corporation. As industrialization proceeded to concentrate
the manufacturing and distribution of goods, companies became
bigger. In Karl Marx’s imagination, individual capitalists owned
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and controlled individual enterprises. But this picture was rapidly
going out of focus. The level of investment in the steel industry or
the railroads was too great for even the wealthiest entrepreneur to
muster. If a company was instead turned into a trust that could be
owned by multiple stockholders, pooled resources could meet these
greater challenges. As importantly, stockholders could share the risks.
Newly invented legal arrangements provided this limited liability,
which made it easier to gamble on untried markets and products.
All this elevated the position of bankers and financiers. Men like
J.P. Morgan97 did not run specific companies; they merely oversaw
those who did. Many, such as Morgan himself, made a career of
rationalizing enterprises by assembling them into conglomerates that
could take advantage of the economies of scale. Morgan’s crowning
achievement was U.S. Steel. Not quite a monopoly over this industry,
it was still large enough to dominate it. For providing this service,
Morgan grew enormously wealthy.
These newfangled corporations were to have another effect.
Because they were so large, they demanded rationalized forms of
control. No individual, no matter how smart or energetic could
understand the operations of U.S. Steel. The company itself had
to be organized in a way that made coordination possible. This was
achieved through the invention of bureaucracy. Protobureaucracies
had been around since Roman times. They had been incorporated
into the Roman Catholic Church and national armies, but their
structures were now to be perfected. Max Weber,98 who chronicled
their emergence, provided an idealized description of their elements.
First, there had to be an organizational goal.99 Unless the entire entity
shared a mission, it would be torn by irreconcilable crosscurrents.
Second, there had to be a functional division of labor. Multiple,
necessary tasks could not be efficiently accomplished if they were
not broken down into interlocking duties. Third, these duties could
not be performed effectively if they were not assigned to specific
individuals. Such defined offices would indicate who was to do what
and, therefore, allowed people to be assigned according to individual
expertise. Fourth, there needed to be a hierarchy of authority. Unless
the participants understood who was in charge of what, they might
spend more time competing for power than in doing their jobs.
Hierarchy was not a novel idea, but specifying its dimensions this
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precisely was. Fifth, specific tasks were to be performed, not according
to the whim of the individual, but according to the most effective
procedures. Standard forms of operation replaced idiosyncratic
adventurism, to better the bottom line. Six, strict records would be
kept of what had been done and who owed what to whom. As the
memory of the organization, these files would enable the business
to keep running even if the personnel changed. Together, these six
dicta constituted a control mechanism so potent that Weber dubbed
it an “iron cage.” No individual player could be responsible for the
whole, but neither could those involved extract themselves from its
mandates without penalty. If they attempted to do so, the mass of
stabilized relationships in which they were entangled would bring
them back into alignment.
Fundamental to this bureaucratic machinery was its managers.
Most of those who gave orders were not classical capitalists. They
did not own the corporation nor independently decide its directions.
On the contrary, they were professionals. Making executive decisions
was their job; it was not a consequence of possessing the means
of production. They were hired because they were self-motivated
and self-directed, and they proved their worth by increasing the
profitability of the whole.100 No wonder these administrators found
Frederick Taylor’s101 scientific management so attractive. It promised
to promote efficiency by discovering the optimal procedures. This
would enable expertise in defined offices and authoritative directives.
Subsequently, instead of ambitious children hoping someday to
establish their own businesses—although many did—a greater
proportion aspired to become presidents of corporations operating
under the mandates of boards of directors. In their imaginations, they
would become Horatio Alger102 heroes recognized, and rewarded, for
meritorious contributions to the organization.
Science, too, continued to provide new understandings. Thus,
physics reasserted its centrality with a vengeance. New fundamental
particles were discovered within the atom and the range of
electromagnetic waves was extended to cover X-rays and gamma
rays. All of a sudden, physicians could peer into living human
tissue and astronomers out into a more capacious universe. But
what really concentrated attention was Albert Einstein’s103 theory
of relativity. Not since Newton had there been such a profound
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reorganization of how nature was understood. Quite unexpectedly,
matter and energy were connected in an equation that has had
momentous implications. Yet, science also looked inward. Until
this point, psychology had been slow to develop because no one
could figure out how to measure something as ephemeral as the
workings of the mind. Now Pavlov introduced the idea of the
conditioned reflex and Freud104 that of the unconscious. It would
not be long before psychoanalysis and behaviorism were the rage.
In the competition between these, there would develop a tug-of-war
between introspection and objective manipulation. Sociology, too,
was being organized as an independent discipline. Plagued, as had
been psychology, by measurement difficulties, Emile Durkheim105
provided a rationale for social facts and Weber106 catalogued many of
these. Not surprisingly, as the social division of labor continued to
differentiate, investigators were stumbling onto its implications.
The political world too was under renovation. Progress was not
confined to the business or scientific realms. Nation states were more
powerful than ever. A shining example was the Dreadnaught. The
first truly modern battleship, it was steam powered, heavily armored,
propeller driven, and studded with countless heavy guns. Britain
led the way to naval modernization, but even the isolationist United
States followed suit. Now able to project power around the world,
Teddy Roosevelt107 commissioned its circumnavigation by the Great
White Fleet. Roosevelt also arranged for Panama to proclaim its
independence so that it could serve as the site for a canal uniting
the Atlantic and Pacific. In an era when economic power had been
converted into imperial power, he wished his nation to play. Not to be
outdone were the political journalists. Given an increasingly literate
public, newspapers became more influential than ever. This enabled
William Randolph Hearst108 to incite the Spanish-American War.
With little provocation, his version of jingoistic yellow journalism
portrayed the Spanish as murderers. When the battleship Maine
was blown up in Havana harbor, he convinced his readers that this
was a deliberate act, which, as a powerful people, they were required
avenge. As a consequence of the ensuing victory, his country acquired
imperial outposts in Puerto Rico and the Philippines.
All in all, people were acquiring greater control over their
universe.109 And they were enjoying it. The rich certainly learned
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how to celebrate. Thorstein Veblen110, in 1899, wrote The Theory of
the Leisure Class based on his observations of the wealthy. One of his
lasting contributions was the concept of conspicuous consumption.
He noticed that the wealthy (and, to a lesser extent, the middleclasses) made purchases in order to make an impression. That which
visibly cost large sums of money demonstrated the power relative
to those who lacked such resources. J.P. Morgan111 exemplified this
attitude in remarking that someone who needed to inquire about the
price of a yacht evidently could not afford one. Also opulent were
the cottages being erected in places like Newport, Rhode Island.112
In actuality, they were palaces furnished with the leftovers of their
European forerunners and were designed as stagesets for lavish social
gatherings. Maintained by corps of servants, they emulated the
noble establishments of times past. Though the middle classes were
growing, they were still subservient to this moneyed elite. This was
why the superrich looked above historic models and not below in
deciding how to disperse their resources.
The working classes, too, improved their condition.113
Marx postulated that they would be reduced to privation, but
industrialization furnished a significant portion of its bounty. Better
clothed, fed, and housed than their ancestors, they also had more
leisure time. Instead of working from dawn to dusk, they were on
their way toward the eight-hour day and the five-day week. This
meant that, during good weather, they had the freedom to picnic
in city parks or, in summer, to take streetcars to newly opened
amusement parks. In order to drum up business, the trolley tracks
were extended to places like New York’s Coney Island.114 An early
prototype of Disneyworld, its Dreamland enticed average workers
with rides and games of all sorts. Dressed in finery once reserved
for church, shopgirls flaunted hats decorated in exotic feathers while
invisible breezes blew their dresses up over their ankles. They even
dared to put on bathing suits to enter the surf and show off their
nubile figures.
At home, there were also improvements. Labor saving devices
proliferated to make housekeeping less burdensome. Iceboxes
became commonplace. Perishables, such as milk, could be purchased
in advance, without fear of spoilage. Gas ranges replaced fireplaces.
This made it possible to cook exotic dishes without danger. Indoor
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plumbing also made its appearance. With indoor flush toilets,
no longer was it necessary to traipse to the outhouse in the dead
of winter. For a lucky few, there were even washing machines.
Scrubbing clothes by hand had always been one of a housewife’s
most tedious chores. Now a mechanical device could eliminate
this drudgery. However, families were larger. Because of medical
advances, children were no longer dying as frequently as they had.
In this case, a cultural lag kept the birth rate higher than the death
rate. As a result, women often had eight or more offspring under
their care. At the same 115time, families were making increased
investments in their children. With economic success more than
ever contingent on expertise, the goal was to prepare the young for
good jobs. This was achieved by supporting education. Instead of
sending them out to apprenticeships or to work on factory floors,
young people were encouraged to go to high school. As a result,
they were less responsible for contributing to family finances and
could loiter with peers. In this, society witnessed the appearance of
the teenager.
Still, there were nagging problems. Industrialization had not
been an unmixed blessing.116 The cities, teeming as never before
with slums, blighted on the landscape. Hearst might be encouraging
of boosterism, but other reporters were investigating society’s dirty
underbelly. The muckrakers had arrived on the scene. One of them,
Upton Sinclair,117 wrote a novel, The Jungle, in which he exposed
the sanitary shortcomings of the meatpacking industry. This so
appalled the nation that, with the aid of a progressive president,
reform food and drug legislation quickly passed. Ida Tarbell118
added to the political ferment by exposing John D. Rockefeller’s
predatory business practices. This, too, created an uproar that led
to the enforcement of antitrust laws. Standard Oil was broken up
into smaller companies, none of which could threaten to monopolize
commerce. Meanwhile, Lincoln Steffens119 focused on local
government corruption in The Shame of the Cities. Together with
the goo-goos (i.e., the good government reformers), efforts were made
to prevent ballot stuffing and under-the-table payoffs. The result
was increased democratization. Control was redistributed between
the government and the private sector to diminish the likelihood of
a dangerous concentration of power.
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Progressivism,120 as this movement was called, was closely related
to populism. It added a concern for the welfare of the little man
to the public agenda. As prosperity became widespread, it seemed
unconscionable that the poor be left out. Jacob Riis’s121 pictorial
reportage revealed the squalor of slums. Union busting, in which
hired goons shot unarmed strikers, offended the sense of fairness
held by ordinary Americans. Likewise, a terrible fire at the Triangle
Shirtwaist Factory122, in which 146 young immigrant women workers
burned to death, underlined the dreadful conditions that prevailed in
sweatshops. Because many of these victims died as a result of locked
exits (in order to reduce pilferage), calls for enforce humane working
standards were sounded. For similar reasons, child labor became
a target of concern, ultimately to be prohibited. Even outside the
workplace, efforts to support the poor, e.g., by providing free milk to
mothers, were proliferating. Much of this campaign culminated in
the professed socialism of Eugene V. Debs.123 This onetime leader of
the American Railroad Union ran for President several times, at one
point attracting the support of nearly a million voters.
The art scene too was radicalized. The bohemians graduated
from Impressionism to Post-Impressionism and from Cubism to
the Fauve Movement. The Impressionism of Renoir, Degas, and
even, in retrospect, of Cezanne, was replaced by the eccentricities
of Picasso, Kandinsky, and Mondrian.124 Regarded as wild animals
by the establishment, they competed with one another to see how
impertinent they could be. Even in music atonality became a fad.
Arnold Schoenberg’s radical experiments may have confused many of
those who counted themselves as among the avant-garde, but “pretty”
music, art, and literature were nevertheless spurned as bourgeois
sentimentalism. A new breed of creators would not be bound by
the self-satisfaction of the more affluent. They would instead rub
people’s noses in the hypocrisies of the time.
The worst shock to the pride of the self-satisfied came with
the outbreak of World War I.125 Unchecked imperialism led to a
conflagration that consumed much of what had been built. The
multiplying jealousies between Germany126 and the Western powers
were to be resolved in battles made horrendous by the application
of industrialism. Machine guns, poison gas, effective artillery,
submarines, and airplanes inflated the death rolls. Trench warfare in
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which the combatants stood statically from whence they periodically
emerged to mow each other down took a terrible toll. Before the
slaughter ended, millions of corpses lay rotting in the mud.127 The
effect was to traumatize those involved. Before the outbreak of
hostilities, people thought they were in control. Afterwards, they
discovered they were not. The politicians, the generals, and the
ordinary doughboys were all proved wrong. This left lasting doubts
that were not assuaged by the inconclusive Treaty of Versailles.128
Reprise and Collapse
Once the Great War concluded, peace did not descend on an
exhausted world.129 The confusions, disappointments, and desires
for vengeance of the combatants were played out over the next
quarter century. Industrialization too underwent a period of turmoil.
Instead of marching forward with the determined progress of the
preceding decades, movement was hesitant, sideways. Perhaps an
evocative description of the interlude would be “manic-depressive.”
Within the space of a few years, Western society had experienced
enormous highs and devastating lows. At one point, individuals
assumed the millennium was at hand, but within short order they
were plunged into a despair that looked like hell itself. In the United
States, an incoming president campaigned on a platform of a return
to normalcy.130 For a while, it appeared that he would deliver on
this,131 but events went seriously awry. Since no one understood the
foundations of prosperity, once things did not go as predicted, no
one knew how to fix them.
Another successful candidate for the American presidency had
promised a chicken in every pot and two cars in every garage. In
light of the concurrent increases in productivity, it seemed that these
could happen. Certainly, automobiles had replaced from horsedrawn transportation.132 Even more symbolic of the economic
advances were changes in the media. Beginning with the World War,
movie making had come into its own. The blatantly racist The Birth
of a Nation was praised by Woodrow Wilson as “history written
with lightening.”133 Distorted though it was, this film demonstrated
the power of moving images to deliver emotional messages. By the
1920s, a habit of going to the cinema overtook the entire Western
World.134 Quite unexpectedly, public consciousness was being
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shaped by entertainments guided by uncultivated entrepreneurs.
The logo of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer claimed, “Art for art’s sake,” but
the motive power was satisfying the pubic taste for excitement and
titillation. The same was happening in radio. Before the war, it had
been an invention in search of an application. Afterwards, it was
broadcast music, news, and comedy to a multitude of nations and
millions of listeners. Because the technology was inexpensive, most
families could afford to gather beside their own sets to hear what
advertisers believed would capture their attention. The result was an
unanticipated cultural unity. Hearing the same songs, listening to the
same jokes, and being exposed to the same news stories homogenized
social perspectives beyond anything imaginable in the 19th century.
It soon enabled politicians to mold public opinion as well.
But before this could occur, the Roaring Twenties saw countless
social experiments.135 This was the Flapper Era. A joy at having
survived a brush with death in the World War unleashed a manic
exuberance. Dances, such as the Charleston, were wilder and more
sexual than the sedate foxtrot of an earlier day. Dresses were shorter
and more revealing than the floor-length models of their mothers’
generation. Moreover bathtub gin flowed freely in the speakeasies
to which Prohibition136 had driven partygoers. This was the period
during which the idea of the teenager came to prominence. Wearing
raccoon-skin coats and taking hip flasks to football games became
the epitome of a good time. Having fun became an international
obsession. In Germany, the Berlin nightlife became celebrated for its
decadence. In France, American expatriates such as Hemingway wrote
about bullfights and sexual peccadilloes. In the United States, huge
crowds screamed themselves hoarse as Babe Ruth pursued the home
run record. Free love was in the air and criminals were in the street.
Poets and philosophers were proclaiming that marital fidelity was a
form of bourgeois slavery, while Al Capone137 was exciting Chicago
with his latest audacious murder. This was the era of the Tommy
gun, with which gangsters sprayed bullets in multiple directions.
As might be expected, art too was indulging in excess. Modern art
meant abstract art and that meant in-your-face rebellion.
But then the U.S. stock market crashed, following sky-high
levels of speculation. Ordinary workers had purchased their pieces
of corporations on margin. Since the sky appeared to be the limit,
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there was no reason why they, too, should not leverage their resources
into substantial fortunes. When the prices began to fall, panic set
in. No one, including the professionals, knew how to stem the
tide. Attempts at imposing stability by raising interest rates had the
opposite effect. By removing liquidity from the market, deflation
was instituted, which had hideous consequences for business. So
dreadful was the impact that within the year the United States entered
the Great Depression.138 Millions of people lost their jobs. At one
point, over twenty percent of the workforce stood idle. Nothing
like this had ever been seen before. The business cycle was not new,
but its troughs had never been as deep nor lasted as long. It would
not be until the Second World War that there would be a definitive
turnaround. A full decade would transpire before the factories were
once again operating up to their potential.139
As bad as this was, it paled in comparison with the German
experience. In the wake of its defeat, the nation experimented with
democracy in the guise of the Weimar Republic. Yet this, despite
its noblest intent, was a miserable failure. The country had no
history of democracy upon which to draw; hence when things went
wrong both the elite and the populace longed for familiar trappings
of stability. And things did go terribly wrong. Inexperienced
politicians precipitated a roaring inflation that left the deutschmark
nearly worthless. It soon took wheelbarrows of cash just to purchase
a loaf of bread. In this environment, people desperately sought a
savior. And potential saviors were not in short supply. On the left,
the Communists touted the Bolshevik Revolution as the vanguard of
an international Communism.140 Nationalization of the country’s
industries, accompanied by local soviet-style governing councils,
would return money to the pockets of the people. Theoretically,
on the right but also collectivist in mentality, were the National
Socialists, i.e., the Nazis. They promised to undo what had lost
the war and to reintroduce social discipline. Rival gangs ran wild
in the street, but thanks to the backing of veterans groups, Adolf
Hitler141 and his cronies gained power. Eventually, they won enough
seats in the Reichstag to make Hitler Chancellor and, within a year,
Fuehrer. Totalitarianism had come to Germany,142 as it earlier had
to Russia and Italy, and soon would to Spain.143 In England and
France, democratic institutions held on, but socialists, who wished
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to nationalize industry, also dominated. Traumatized by memories
of the late war and labor unrest, politicians promised constancy at
any price.
Across the Atlantic, conditions were not so desperate. Franklin
Roosevelt144 was elected president and he promised his countrymen
a New Deal. Something had to be done to prevent banks from
collapsing and businesses from closing. People needed to be put to
work and their confidence restored. Roosevelt and his team did their
best.145 They introduced a blizzard of legislation and the president
himself went on the radio to give reassuring fireside chats. Part of
the plan called upon the government to provide jobs and another
to offer a financial safety net. Out of this welter of initiatives came
Social Security. Widows and orphans would receive checks directly
from the U.S. treasury, while older Americans would participate in
an insurance program to provide for retirement. Unemployment
benefits too were improved.146 Most important, people were given
hope. A nation that had always prided itself on its individualism made
a decisive turn toward governmental solutions. Many were convinced
that capitalism had run its course.147 and that the depression was the
fulfillment of Marxist prophesies.148 Since the system’s contradictions
had evidently caught up with it, it was doomed to destruction. A
communist utopia was inevitable; hence it made sense to support its
introduction. For many, this meant joining the communist party and
cheering for the Stalinist regime. For others, it meant becoming a
social democrat, following the Western European model.149 Yes, they
were socialists, but they wanted preserve democratic government.
Roosevelt, according to many academics, acted just in time. Had
he not touted his reforms, the pessimism of the average American
might have grown to critical proportions. In this case, a Germanstyle revolution might well have come to the nation’s shores.
The Depression, it must be added, also had a profound impact
on the family. All of a sudden, the levels of fertility dropped. Parents
who had expected to educate their children no longer possessed the
resources to do so. Committed to having smaller families, the average
number of offspring dropped to two, just enough for replacement
purposes. The age of marriage simultaneously increased, so that
child bearing was postponed until it could be afforded. During this
economic catastrophe, people scraped by. They settled for smaller
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living quarters and accepted almost any jobs that came along.
Contributing to the welfare of the group became a way of life. Since
there did not seem to be any hope in sight, most people lowered
expectations, purchased only what was needed, and soldiered on.
Even the movies reflected this mood. Some were saccharinely
sweet; others, intensely gloomy. In the former, battalions of singers
and dancers lauded the good times to come, whereas in the latter
regiments of gangsters shot each other dead. Banished from sight
was the sunny sexuality of the twenties. Even clothing became less
revealing, perhaps in an effort to hide that of which people had
become ashamed.
Then came World War II. As unwelcome as it was, this conflict
did not arrive as a shock. Pacifist strains had pressured for the first
war to be a genuine war to end all wars, but the appeasement policies
derived from this wishful thinking encouraged would-be aggressors.
Japan attacked China, and Italy invaded Abyssinia, and no one did
anything to stop them. Woodrow Wilson150 envisioned a League of
Nations as a guarantor of peace, but it degenerated into a debating
society. When Spain became the testing ground for Nazi and Soviet
weaponry, the League of Nations did nothing. By this time it was
apparent that unless the major powers had the will to act, there
would be no action. Hence, when Hitler marched in to Austria or
broke the promises he had made at Munich, the lack of an assertive
response was foreseeable. That, upon the invasion of Poland, the
allies finally issued a warning they were prepared to honor was a
surprise to many. This event ushered in the greatest conflagration in
the history of armed quarrels. By the time it concluded, over fifty
million people, most of them civilians, had been butchered. So great
was the slaughter than it instituted permanent changes. In many
ways, the First World War was the opening salvo of a struggle that
did not cease until after the bombing of Hiroshima. But when it did,
the participants were not the same. The crisis of industrialization at
its heart was resolved by an extraordinary bloodbath—and then the
world would move on.
World War II was a case of unequaled horror for several reasons.151
One was the technology of battle. Inventions which had been in
their infancy twenty-five years earlier, reached a dreadful maturity.
The tank, for instance, formerly a lumbering failure in smashing
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through defensive trenches, was transformed into the spearhead of
the blitzkrieg. It could swiftly move into the rear echelons of an
enemy, sowing panic as it went. Thanks to its brutal efficiency, the
battles of France and Poland were over within weeks. Much the
same can be said of the airplane. In the first war it was almost a toy.
Swashbuckling aces dueling each other in romantic dogfights thrilled
earthbound observers, but did little actual damage. In the second
war, fleets of bombers turned peaceful cities into flaming funeral
pyres. First London, then Dresden and Berlin, and finally Tokyo
and Nagasaki were flattened and their populations incinerated. Even
under the oceans, the techniques for inflicting death had become
more advanced. Modern submarines could wander farther, stay
under the surface longer, and launch more lethal torpedoes. The
loss in shipping was, in consequence, calamitous. Everywhere one
turned, massive death awaited, even without the reintroduction of
chemical weapons.
Worse still was the intentional butchery imposed by politicians.
Nazis, Soviets, and Japanese made terror an official policy. Able
to command the efficiency of modern weapons and modern
bureaucracies, they could order the execution of millions of innocents.
The Nazis, of course, were the instigators of the Holocaust. Hitler
made it his mission to exterminate Jews, Slavs, and Gypsies. Coming
to power on the premise that there had been a Jewish conspiracy, he
pledged to get even. Few imagined the lengths to which he would go,
which eventuated in the concentration camps. Millions were gassed
to death; many of them were reportedly flayed to turn their skins
into lampshades. So well organized was this killing machine that
Hitler also had millions of Poles and Russians shipped into its maws.
Not to be outdone, Stalin ordered thousands of his enemies shot
or imprisoned. Already an expert in mass murder, having starved
millions of Ukrainian kulaks and executed thousands of former
colleagues in show trials, he was prepared to visit his vengeance upon
German prisoners of war and his own troops who dared to surrender
to his enemies. Around the globe in Asia, the Japanese warlords had
taken on similar delusions of national grandeur. Heirs to a samurai
tradition, they scorned those who surrendered rather than perish in
battle. They, therefore, kept their POWs in subhuman conditions,
often starving them to death. Lesser mortals, such as the Chinese,
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were treated with unimaginable brutality. During the rape of
Nanking, hundreds of thousands of civilians were slain by the sword
and the bayonet. In order to give their troops practice with these
weapons, soldiers were ordered to toss babies into the air and skewer
them on the way down. And just as in Hitler’s camps, prisoners
were subjected to medical experiments that were more torture than
science.
Thus had industrialization reached its nadir. Visions of peace and
prosperity were being drowned in blood and gore. The technology that
erected skyscrapers and bridged broad rivers was turned to blasting
these to bits. Medicine, which had finally learned to save lives, was
reduced to preventing them from being taken. Superior forms of
organization that had delivered products to remote locations now
arranged to send battalions to distant battlefields fully equipped to
deal out mayhem. Worst of all, democracy was under siege. Ordinary
people had been making strides in governing themselves, but now
the dictators asserted a counterrevolution. Utilizing the very tools
that made representative governments feasible, they controlled vast
armies and intimidated huge populations. The same disciplines that
turned factories into the engines of prosperity were redirected into
engines of destruction. In the midst of this twisted pandemonium,
it was not clear that civilization would survive. Industrialization
seemed bent on self-immolation. The commercial revolution that
began millennia earlier in a few Greek harbors apparently contained
the seeds of its demise. The critics had said so, and for the moment
only the hardiest optimists dared to contradict them.
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Chapter 6

The Tipping Point
That which in England we call the middle class is in
America virtually the nation. (Matthew Arnold, A
Word About America (1882))
The best political community is formed by citizens of the
middle class. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics)
Wealth is not without its advantages, and the case to
the contrary, although it has often been made, has never
proved widely persuasive. (John Kenneth Galbraith,
The Affluent Society)
The Middle Class Ascendancy
The first atomic bomb sent a plume heavenward that was also an
exclamation point. Its mushroom shape bespoke a fantastic power.
The genie of the subatomic particle had been let out of the bottle
so violently that over a hundred thousand people lay dead or dying.
Suddenly mankind had the means of wiping itself out. A collective
shudder swept across the planet as billions of individuals wondered
what was in store for them. Would this illustration of triumphant
science usher in a renewed prosperity or did it forecast their personal
destruction? For the moment, the United States was this apparition’s
sole custodian, but how long would it exercise a monopoly?
Democratic politicians would likely be moderate in its employment,
but would others be as responsible? One good thing that could be
said of this was that it punctuated a temporary American hegemony.
This upstart nation had been the prime mover in the Axis defeat;
now its mastery of this astonishing weapon demonstrated that it had
become a superpower.
One of the consequences of the recent war was that the
continental United States had been left untouched by destruction.
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Most of the other belligerents, both in Europe and Asia, sustained
enormous damage to their infrastructures. Their cities and factories
had been bombed into rubble, and their people, turned into refugees.
Dislocations in their social fabric abounded, whereas in America
the joy of victory was undiluted. The nation had fought a just
war and won a resolute peace. Even its citizens were impressed by
their ability to fabricate and mobilize so potent an arsenal. Pleased
that fewer than half million of their own had perished, the man in
the street was horrified that so many others were exterminated in
Hitler’s concentration camps. Abraham Lincoln1 almost a century
beforehand had called their land the last best hope of mankind, and
more than ever, they believed his words prophetic. Their nation
had just delivered humanity from an extraordinary peril, and, as
when one saves another’s life, they felt responsible for maintaining
international security.
One worry, however, was the economy. After the last war
there had been a recession when the troops came home. Would
jobs be available for the conquering heroes this time once they were
decommissioned? The women who had manned the factories during
the conflict would have to return to being domestic engineers, but
would this be enough? Memories of the Great Depression lingered.2
People realized that full employment had not been restored until the
demands of battle compelled the government to resort to massive
deficit spending. Could a civilian economy take up the slack? No
one knew for sure because the situation was unprecedented.3 During
the war, a competition to outdo the other side resulted in a myriad
of technological innovations. Would these advances prove useful in
peacetime? Once again, no one knew for sure. Bigger planes had
proved they could drop tons of bombs on the enemy, but could they
be converted to carrying passengers across the continent? Only time
would tell.
In fact, there was a slight hiccup when the GIs returned home,
but fortunately it did not last long. An innovation not contemplated
after the previous war was to fill the gap. This was the GI Bill.4
The last time, the veterans had been promised pensions; this time
a grateful nation decided to provide a good education. Most of its
soldiers had come from blue-collar backgrounds; hence, they had
been to neither college nor technical school. Now, it was decided
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that improving their academic expertise would benefit both them and
their fellow citizens. They could get better jobs, and the economy
would become more robust. To the surprise of many, those eligible
for these benefits took up the offer in overwhelming numbers. Of
about twelve million servicemen, approximately eight million
signed on, and, of these, several million opted for college5. In one
fell swoop, the educational level of the nation surged upward. The
sector of the population crucial to further commercial development
would now be better equipped to handle these demands. Sobered
by their battle experiences, these men (and women) were prepared
to dedicate themselves to doing their best. A little hard work would
be nothing as compared to facing death. The result was a massive
infusion of professionalism6 into the work force.7 People who in
former times would have been satisfied being ordinary working stiffs
were given a leg up the ladder and, as a result, made a tentative entry
into the middle class. For most of them, this was a momentous step.
For society, too, it was an earth-shattering event. Few could see it
coming, but an historical landmark was about to be reached. The
threshold into a middle class world would soon be crossed. Though
the consequences could not be foreseen, a tipping point8 had arrived
and a long-building social revolution had entered upon a period
culmination.
What was in the process of evolving has been characterized as
a “service” economy or alternatively as a “post-industrial” one. The
social commentator Daniel Bell9 has pointed out that the kinds of
jobs about to be available would mutate as manufacturing processes
were automated. During the earlier part of the century something
similar had occurred. The body politic had then been traumatized
as multitudes of farmers were forced from the land. As a corollary
of agricultural mechanization, what had been seventy percent of the
population engaged in farming would be reduced to a scant two
percent. This transformation was so shocking that it was met with a
variety of policies intended to stem the tide. As is usual with social
change, a cultural conservatism dictated that people would demand
a restoration of the status quo ante. One means attempted for
achieving this was the imposition of price supports. Family farmers
would presumably be kept on the land by paying them not to grow
crops. Theoretically, by artificially lowering productivity, more labor
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would be required. Continued increases in productivity, however,
militated in fact against this solution, but an idealization of the
pioneer spirit prevented a widespread recognition that failure was
inevitable. The resultant government programs probably did ease
the transition for some individuals, but for many others they merely
held out a false hope. In the end, all that was accomplished was to
slow the transformation.
With regard to industry, something similar seemed to be
occurring in the postwar environment. Here, too, the number of
people required to run the operations declined as the machinery, and
the means of controlling it, became more sophisticated.10 Far more
goods could now be produced at a lower price with fewer people
at the controls. Would this entail an increase in unemployment?
Would it mean that millions of veterans would descend into poverty?
Despite battalions of Cassandras, this did not happen. The nation
did not slide into a renewed Depression as the manufacturing payrolls
declined. People merely transferred from one sort of employment to
another. On a personal level, this could be disconcerting. Individuals
forced to change jobs had to confront the insecurity of developing
new skills and the humiliation of losing seniority. They might even
be compelled to move from one part of the country to another. Yet
from the point of view of the whole, these developments prefigured a
huge step forward. None could know it at the time, but the next half
century would experience no commercial declines as severe as those
recently experienced. The business cycle would not be repealed, but
the post-industrial economy would be much less volatile. There were
to be periodic recessions, but none of these would be as deep or
tenacious. Instead a regular upward slope would transform the nation
into the undisputed economic colossus of the planet. By the end of
the century, the United States would be its only military superpower
and its sole enduring economic superpower. People would say that
when its marketplace caught a cold, the rest of the world’s financial
systems got pneumonia.
Nevertheless, to call this emerging economy service-based would
be misleading. The sorts of jobs Americans were assuming varied
enormously in scope. The division of labor was not merely to be
between blue- and white-collar workers but encompassed a veritable
rainbow of shades. The recipients of the GI Bill found themselves
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training for a wide variety of tasks. Not only this, but many of their
assignments were more intricate, with many of these required to be
self-directed. No longer did employees merely carry materials to and
from machines. Much of the time, they would not even be tending
machines. Rather, working with people and data was to become the
norm. Yet, to achieve this effectively required that the participants
attain internal discipline and a substantial expertise. To put the matter
succinctly, they would have to become middle class. Although their
own families had not prepared them for this eventuality, they would
have to find a way to muddle through. No matter how much they
might hunger for the simpler lifestyles of their romanticized youths,
their jobs would oblige them to make changes.
An Occupational Survey
Why this was so can only be appreciated by exploring the
complexity of the evolving division of labor.11 It was not only
enormously ramified, but it also included extremely complicated
activities. At the risk of becoming tedious, it is essential to review
its particulars. To begin with, the U.S. Department of Labor and
its Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)12 were mandated to keep track
of what was happening in the workplace. In order to fulfill this
obligation, their specialists found it necessary to categorize the tasks
being performed. This turned out to be a Herculean endeavor. They
discovered that no simple classification could be fully consistent
in how it represented the myriad of intertwining relationships. In
spite of this, an overview of the resultant schema is illustrative of
why self-direction became standard.13 At the top of their list of
occupations are those that pertain to management. These are the
ones that specialize in higher-level supervision. As corporations and
government agencies grew larger,14 the number of people needed to
coordinate their activities multiplied. These organizations required
not just owner/managers, but chief executives and middle managers,
legislators and legislative assistants.15 The sorts of activities that
begged for centralized direction varied from advertising to marketing,
from public relations to human resources, from purchasing to real
estate. Their divergent bosses, therefore, needed to know how to
work with people in order to get the most out of them and also the
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technical details of the assorted businesses of which they were to be
in charge.
Closely aligned to these employments are those in the second
category listed by the BLS. The heading for this group is Business
and Financial Operations Occupations. It includes business
agents, buyers, claims adjusters, insurances appraisers, recruiters,
benefits specialists, accountants, bankers, auditors, budget analysts,
underwriters, and tax examiners. In a market economy where
money matters, numerous specialists are required to keep track of
its flow. Banks, corporations, insurance companies, department
stores, and the Internal Revenue service employ them to oversee their
operations. Marx’s contingents of clerks were no longer sitting, a
la Charles Dickens,16 on spindly stools wielding quill pens on inkstained ledgers. They were now making important decisions about
what would be spent, how this would be recorded, and what was
likely to be profitable. Far from being ciphers, they were a semivisible army of puppeteers who often determined what others would
be able to do. Anyone who knows how the federal government
operates understands that the Office of the Budget is often where
the power lies. In deciding how the available pot of funds will be
divided, its denizens get to establish who will have the most clout.
Nowadays, experts in computer management have supplemented
these fiscal operatives. As computers assumed control over day-today transactions, programmers, database administrators, statisticians,
and systems analysts achieved prominence. Since it is often only
they who understand how things can be done, they are frequently
the ones put in charge.
Next down the line in the BLS compendium are architectural
and engineering occupations. The list of these is truly impressive.
Within the architectural area, they include architects, landscape
architects, cartographers, and surveyors. It is within the engineering
grouping that things get more interesting. These jobs include
aerospace engineers, agricultural engineers, biomedical engineers,
chemical engineers, civil engineers, computer-hardware engineers,
electrical engineers, electronic engineers, environmental engineers,
health-safety engineers, industrial engineers, marine and naval
engineers, materials engineers, mining and geological engineers,
nuclear engineers, and petroleum engineers. Responsible for
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translating science into practical operations, these professionals are
the experts in what is functional. Hardheaded realists, they are the
modern incarnation of traditional American know-how. Clearly,
what they do requires thought and accountability. Unless they are
personally dedicated to making good decisions, bridges fall down
and people perish. Nevertheless, they are not lone rangers. They
work in teams supported by architectural and civil drafters, electrical
and electronic drafters, mechanical drafters, aerospace technicians,
civil engineering technicians, electrical and electronic technicians,
environmental engineering technicians, industrial engineering
technicians, and mechanical engineering technicians. These latter,
too, though less responsible, must be skilled at what they do. One
small slip of the pen (or computer) can have as dire an impact on a
project as a faulty overall conception.
More directly people oriented are many of the life, physical,
social-science, and social-service occupations. As commercialization
has pushed the technological bubble forward, the sciences underlying
these developments have grown more critical. Research and
development has become crucial to modernization. Both with regard
to the products that make it to the marketplace and to the social
policies that are implemented to solve human problems, intentional
efforts at expanding the knowledge base tend to precede practical
applications. Scientists of all sorts are employed by commercial,
academic, and governmental organizations. Agricultural scientists,
biologists, biochemists, microbiologists, zoologists, epidemiologists,
astronomers, geographers, physicists, chemists, hydrologists,
economists, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and political
scientists all seek answers to questions that may, or may not, prove
useful down the road. The embodiment of self-direction, they
must first figure out what to ask before they even begin to look for
solutions.
More pragmatic in their orientation are those dedicated to social
service. Substance-abuse, vocational, marriage and family, mentalhealth, and rehabilitation counselors and social workers of various
stripes, including those oriented toward family, mental-health, and
school, deal directly with individuals in trouble. The answers they
provide must, therefore, be tailored to the dilemma of the moment.
In a sense, the engineers of the social sciences, they bear a similar
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burden of responsibility. Also listed in this grouping by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) are clergymen and religious directors.
They too have become specialists in the human condition and are
frequently summoned to intervene in personal and interpersonal
crises. Where ministers were once expert only in the scriptures, they
are now being called upon to provide valid answers about marriage,
business ethics, and personal growth.
De Tocqueville17 long ago suggested that stable commercialized
relationships are contingent upon a legitimate legal system.
Apparently the larger the marketplace the greater the need for
dependable means of settling disputes among strangers. Still, even he
would probably be surprised to learn that by the end of the twentieth
century the United States boasted almost a million persons working
in legal occupations and that, of these, more than half were lawyers.
Besides the attorneys, there are judges, hearings officers, arbitrators,
mediators, paralegals, court reporters, and law clerks. Not all of the
lawyers, of course, are trial lawyers, nor are most of these criminal
lawyers. A larger proportion is, in fact, engaged in corporate or civil
law. Moreover, despite the histrionics for which fictional lawyers are
famed, most remain under secure emotional control. Indeed, the
legal system specializes in emotional control. It is where people go
when their own disciplines break down. As such, it is another venue
characterized by self-direction. Lawyers must be able to figure out
what to say, and how to say it, without undue reliance on external
supervision. They have to be first-rate at thinking on their feet.
So, too, must educators. When they appear before a group of
students, they must know that which they wish to convey. If they
are unfamiliar with the subject matter, they may not know where to
begin. Teachers must likewise be expert in how to convey information.
Those who are knowledgeable, but inarticulate, are nearly useless. In
addition, when asked a question, they need to have a sufficient store
of knowledge to provide a relevant response. All this is done while
standing alone in front of what may be a hostile audience. Like
lawyers, or, for that matter, counselors, they are typically unable to
consult a colleague before they reply. They need, in short, to know
their stuff and to possess the confidence to deliver it. So voracious has
the quest for knowledge become that, as of 2001, the BLS estimated
that there were over seven and a half million teachers and those in
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related occupations in the United States. These individuals teach
business, computers science, mathematics, architecture, engineering,
agricultural sciences, forestry, meteorology, chemistry, environmental
sciences, physics, anthropology, philosophy, economics, social
science, nursing, criminal justice, law, social work, English, foreign
languages, and history at primary, middle, and secondary schools
and at colleges, universities, and proprietary schools. Joining them
in this endeavor are special-education, adult literacy and remedial,
and self-enrichment teachers, archivists and museum curators,
librarians, audiovisual specialists, and teacher assistants. Many of
these would be considered semiprofessionals by sociologists,18 but
with each passing year they become more professionalized. The
levels of knowledge and skill they bring to bear have far surpassed
what the core professions would have found acceptable a mere two
centuries ago.
Next on the list of jobs are the arts, design, entertainment,
sports, and media related occupations. Not long ago, these would
have been denied professional recognition. During the gay nineties,
actresses, for instance, were considered painted ladies and, therefore,
next to prostitutes. Nor would bohemian artists have merited
professional respect. Their work was admired, but their genius was
reckoned akin to madness. But, times have changed, and now artists
and entertainers receive extensive training in the refinements of
their undertakings. According to the BLS, fewer than ten thousand
individuals earn their living as fine artists, i.e., painters, sculptors,
and illustrators, but twice as many are employed as art directors and
three times as many work as multimedia artists and animators. Also
employed in substantial numbers are commercial and industrial artists
and fashion, floral, graphic, and interior designers and merchandise
displayers and set designers. Besides having talent, to be good at
what they do, these people must possess independent aesthetic
judgments. The same applies to actors, producers, directors, dancers,
choreographers, musicians, composers, and musical directors. Most
of them would be happy to consider themselves performing artists
and would, no doubt, insist on their internalized contributions to
their craft. Athletes, though nowadays regarded as entertainers and
labeled as professionals when they get paid for their sport, do not
possess the technical knowledge that is the hallmark of the traditional
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professions. They must nevertheless be dedicated to honing their
skills, or they would be consigned to short careers. Media people,
too, have come close to being entertainers, especially when they are
on-the-air personalities, but most have higher ambitions. Whether
they are reporters, correspondents, editors, writers, authors, or
photographers, they claim a journalistic status. Styling themselves
members of the “fourth estate,” they claim special privileges and
unique insights. Clearly most go to college to learn the subtleties of
soliciting, interpreting, and conveying the news.
Nowadays outstripping the educational occupations in
membership are the health related occupations. Even in the wake
of the Second World War, they were a presence to be reckoned with.
As society became more prosperous, people insisted on first-rate care.
Wonder drugs, most notably antibiotics such as penicillin, convinced
ordinary Americans that physicians both understood the causes of
illnesses and possessed the tools to defeat them. Everything from the
mumps to heart disease, from indigestion to polio, seemed capable
of a cure. Once medicine demonstrated a reliable competence,
laymen began trooping to doctors’ offices or the hospital. Actually,
before the 1950s, it was the physician who visited when people were
sick. With further progress, however, preventive medicine came to
the fore. Patients, especially those who possessed health insurance,
went to offices for routine checkups and prophylaxis. Chapter 3
has already presented a summary of the proliferation of medically
associated jobs. These range from the quintessential professionalism
of brain surgeons to the less exalted contributions by pharmacy
technicians and licensed practical nurses.19 Not included in that
compendium are the less prestigious positions of home-health-care
and nursing aides, hospital orderlies, occupational and physicaltherapy assistants, massage therapists, dental assistants, medical
transcriptionists, pharmacy aides, and veterinary assistants. What
is notable is that even these lower-status occupations have been
professionalizing. The levels of knowledge, training, and dedication
required of them have all escalated. No longer merely jobs, they have
become career orientations that demand special training.
As earlier remarked, this same phenomenon has asserted itself
within the protective service occupations. Police officers,20 detectives,
sheriffs, transit and railroad police, fire fighters, correctional officers,
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fish and game wardens, animal-control workers, private detectives,
and also security guards have been impelled to professionalize.21
They are expected to get better educations than their predecessors
did and to exercise self-control when on the job. Self-direction and
an allegiance to democratic standards are presently considered the
norm. Whereas skill with a nightstick was once admired, it has
become a potential indicator of abuse as a sign that an officer prefers
to act first and think later. Yet, thinking has become mandatory for
protective positions. Their occupants are not merely expected to
exercise control but to shelter people from harm. As such, they must
understand individual rights and personal vulnerabilities.
Even the sorts of white-collar workers that C. Wright Mills22
discussed have been professionalizing. There are now an immense
number of office and administrative support personal. The equivalent
of the nineteenth century clerks, by the end of the twentieth century
the BLS estimated that there were almost 23 million of these
adjunct staffers. Of these, a million and a half were supervisors of
administrative-support workers. These, of course, required the people
skills of supervisors. Among the first-line workers they oversaw were
switchboard and telephone operators; bill and account collectors;
billing, bookkeeping, and auditing, payroll, and procurement
clerks; bank tellers; brokerage, correspondence, and court clerks;
customer-service representatives; eligibility interviewers; file and
hotel and motel desk clerks; loan interviewers; library assistants; new
accounts and order clerks; human resource assistants; receptionists;
reservation and ticketing clerks; cargo and freight agents; couriers and
messengers; police, fire, and ambulance dispatchers; meter readers;
postal service clerks; postal carriers; postal sorters; production and
expediting, shipping and receiving, and stock clerks; weighers;
measurers and checkers; executive secretaries and administrative
assistants; legal and medical secretaries; computer operators; dataentry keyers; word processors and typists; insurance-claims, mail,
and general office clerks; office-machine operators; proofreaders; and
statistical assistants. This is quite a list and obviously quite varied.
Nevertheless, what should jump out from the page is how many
of these are responsible positions. Executive and legal secretaries,
billing clerks, and police dispatchers make decisions involving a great
deal of money and sometimes life and death. Moreover, some of
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these workers, notably those employed by the post office, would be
insulted were they not referred to as professionals. In any event, they
are expected to exercise some degree of self-direction and often quite
a bit of skill. Far from being mindless robots tremulously fulfilling
every request of their superiors, they must be able to engage in
independent problem solving. Mills would probably be discomfited
to learn that a large proportion of them have at least a two-year
college education. Like their more educated chiefs, they have been
upgrading their expertise in the expectation that this will lead to
greater responsibilities.
Mills might also be astonished by the skills exercised by those in
sales related occupations. With almost 15 million people occupying
them by century’s end, over a million more engage in supervisory
roles. In other words, many of those in supposedly subservient posts
are, in fact, expected to exhibit leadership. While on the job, they
are not under constant supervision but are mandated to exercise
discretion. Some of their subordinates, such as cashiers, perform
fairly simple tasks, but even these need to do so with care. Others,
such as sales representatives for wholesale, manufacturing, and
technical and scientific products, need a detailed understanding of
their merchandise, their customers, and the logistics of joining the
two. The same can be said of insurance, advertising-sales, travel,
and securities, commodities, and financial sales agents and realestate brokers. All require a sensitivity to customer needs that is
inconsistent with vacuous conformity. Here, too, Mills might be
surprised at how many have gone to college to obtain degrees in
marketing or psychology.
Although Daniel Bell23 characterized the emerging economy as
service oriented, the BLS estimates that less than three million people
are currently employed in personal care or service occupations. Those
who are include animal caretakers, gaming dealers, motion-picture
projectionists, ushers and ticket takers, amusement and recreation
attendants, funeral attendants, barbers, hairdressers, manicurists,
skin-care specialists, baggage porters and bellhops, concierges, tour
guides, flight attendants, child care workers, personal and home
care aids, fitness trainers and aerobics instructors, and recreational
workers. Of these, there are only some 12 thousand barbers, 330
thousand hairdressers, and 115 thousand flight attendants. The
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point is that there are fewer in classical service jobs than might be
supposed, and these are varied in their level of prestige, responsibility,
and remuneration. As the United States passed the middle-class
tipping point, the number of personal servants did not mount to
astronomic levels. Once upon a time, in preindustrial England,
maids and individual private servants were common occupations;
middle-class Americans, in contrast, are offended by sycophantic
attention. Themselves determined to be no one’s servant, they are
loath to impose this status on others. The closest they come to
accepting fawning attention is from those in the food preparation
and serving occupations. As members of the middle classes acquired
money, they began to eat out more frequently. This was reflected in
the century’s end tabulation of nearly ten million workers in these
employments. Chefs, cooks, bartenders, and waiters and waitresses
proliferated in taking on these roles, though, they did not deign to
become menials. Some chefs became television stars, and many
servers earn enough to support a plush suburban lifestyle. Bowing
and scraping to customers, as opposed to being polite, are deemed
déclassé. Often, it is the customers who are intimidated by the
insouciance and knowledgeability of their attendants.
So far, most of the jobs discussed are at least tangentially whitecollar. Yet to be mentioned, however, are the traditionally bluecollar occupations. These too have metastasized into thousands
of subspecialties. Moreover, they, too, have been infected by the
professionalization mania.24 Although these trades continue to be
largely manual in nature, their practitioners no longer work merely
with things. More and more, they, too, deal with data and people.
Even in their hands-on aspects, their work has become increasingly
complex. A strong back is no longer a sufficient qualification for most
of their occupations. The BLS enumerates only six categories that
may be considered traditionally blue-collar. These are building and
grounds cleaning and maintenance, farming, fishing, and forestry,
construction and extraction, installation, maintenance, and repair,
productions, and transportation and material-moving occupations.
Before examining these further, it should be noted that among the
cleaning and maintenance occupations fewer than a million are
reported to be maids or housekeepers. Another two million are
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janitors. This agrees well with the notion that personal service has
gone out of style.
The most central blue-collar occupations are those that entail
production. These are the manufacturing positions, the ones
historically associated with the Industrial Revolution. By century’s
end there are little over 12 million of them, including their supervisors
and foremen. What is astonishing, however, is the multitude of
distinctions among what these people do. The reader is warned
that the following inventory, while incomplete, is staggering in its
tedium.
The effect of reading this registry would be overwhelming. It
makes it clear that skill and conscientiousness are not confined
to the traditional professions. Many of the enumerated positions
would qualify their holders as artisans. A significant number of these
workers have spent years learning their crafts and take pride in being
able to perform operations that others cannot. Take machinists;
their ability to shape obdurate materials into complex forms entails
more than turning on a switch or pushing a few buttons. In order
to achieve tolerances often measured by micrometers, each must
possess a good eye, a superior mechanical aptitude, and a disciplined
attention span. This work obviously demands far more expertise
than did that of a medieval plowman. To some minds, production
workers are associated with an innate churlishness, that is, with a
peasant’s mentality. With the coming of the middle-class revolution,
this has ceased to be true. Classified by most sociologists as perched
somewhere within the lower middle class, they rightly consider
themselves as among the middling orders. They surely have a
jurisdiction over their own lives that a medieval serf would envy.
One more of the BLS categories should be sufficient to document
the growth in the division of labor and the professionalization that
has accompanied the middle class ascendancy. The transportation
and material moving occupations are also a hodgepodge of the
simple and the complicated, the conformist and the responsible.
They embrace airline pilots; air-traffic controllers; ambulance, bus,
long-distance truck, light delivery, and taxi drivers; locomotive
engineers; railroad conductors; sailors and marine oilers; parkinglot and service-station attendants; conveyor operators and tenders;
crane and tower, excavating and loading-machine, and industrial
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truck and tractor operators; hand laborers and freight and stock
movers; hand packers and packagers; and refuse collectors. Needless
to say, the distance between an airline pilot and a refuse collector
is considerable. Both in terms of social prestige and occupational
complexity, they are worlds apart. Yet, even long-haul truckers have
increased their levels of responsibility and remuneration. They are
accountable for the safe operation of vehicles that have intensified in
sophistication and ability to do harm if they are not faithfully, and
independently, managed.
Lastly, and without resort to cataloging occupational divisions
of labor, construction and repair occupations deserve mention.
Construction workers can no longer be stereotyped as ditch diggers
or as human mules to carry loads for others. Carpenters, masons,
electricians, and plumbers are almost semiprofessionals. The tools
they wield and the plans they follow are intricate and, therefore, a
mystery to the uninitiated. Road builders and heavy construction
workers also employ machinery that cannot be mastered by sitting
in a seat and turning a wheel. As for repair occupations, whether
these are in telecommunications, avionics, automobile repair, air
conditioning, or factories, the very nature of this work enables
their providers to control uncertainties. This becomes a source of
power. Workers are not mere plebeians. Because they can figure out
what others cannot, they can regulate the resumption of important
operations. Consider the plumber who comes to restore what caused
a flooded basement. The job must be done; hence the homeowner,
who probably knows little about plumbing, is at the mercy of a
technician in dirty overalls. In most cases, he/she must accept the
plumber’s diagnosis of the problem on faith and in the hope that,
when given the bill, he/she won’t be gouged.
One more indicator of the momentous change that has occurred
must be addressed. This is what happened to the labor movement.
From its inception in the nineteenth century with the Knights of
Labor, labor organizing had been envisioned as a shield to protect
the workingman from capitalist incursions. Labor unions decisively
replaced guilds when industrialization moved people into factories
where they could compare the multifarious indignities to which
they were subjected.25 As industrialization advanced, the impetus
to join together increased. While the particulars of this movement
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varied from country to country, within the United States it reached
its apotheosis during the Great Depression. The National Labor
Relations Act, more familiarly known as the Wagner Act, protected
the right of workers to become members of these organizations,
thereby expanding union rolls dramatically. C. Wright Mills,26 a
dedicated collectivist, was encouraged that this trend extended well
into the 1940s. He noted that, in 1900, only 2.5% of white-collar
workers and 8.2% of wageworkers belonged to unions. These figures
grew during the 1920s but at first dipped in the 1930s. By 1948,
however, 16.2% of white-collar workers and 44.1% of wageworkers
had joined the fold. At this point, it looked as if unionism would
dominate the foreseeable future. Mills hoped that white-collar
employees would choose solidarity with their greasier brethren, and
it appeared his wish might be fulfilled.
In the late 40s and earlier 50s unions seemed unstoppable.
John L. Lewis27 ran the coal miners union with an iron hand and
could bring the country to its knees by threatening a strike. So
potent did these threats appear that, Harry Truman, albeit a
Democrat, threatened to nationalize the steel industry in order to
forestall a labor action. Nevertheless, a reverse trend had already
begun. Though controversial, Republicans had pushed through
Congress the Taft-Hartley Act, which outlawed wildcat strikes and,
under specific circumstances, mandated collective bargaining. The
Landrum-Griffin Act, which further constrained union activities,
would eventually augment this. Union abuses were also under attack
in Congress, where Jimmy Hoffa was forced to answer the questions
of the McClellan Committee as it investigated racketeering among
the Teamsters Union. The most significant change, however, came
courtesy of the middle class tipping point. As the nature of jobs
changed, so did the composition of the unions. Coal miners, for
instance, lost their clout as automation came to the mines. With
far fewer miners and with those who remained more technically
proficient, power could be exercised by monopolizing skills rather
than by instituting shutdowns. Steel workers also lost leverage
through automation and competition from other materials. They
could not lock the nation in a chokehold once plastic was able to
substitute for steel.

The Tipping Point

225

In general, as industrial occupations declined, the number of
industrial unionists declined.28 By 1990, only 16% of all American
workers belonged to a union. What changed more emphatically was
who belonged to unions. In 2002, only 13% of miners and a scant
15% of manufacturing workers did. Those in financial and sales
occupations had even lower concentrations: 3% and 5%, respectively.
The largest gains had been among government workers. In this area,
42% were members, and many of these were professionals, or at least
semiprofessions. One of the most heavily unionized groups has been
the teachers. Unionism has decisively altered its complexion. Thanks
to the middle class revolution, burly laborers have been replaced on
picket lines. Standing where they once had stood, were females. They,
too, might walk off the job despite laws against this, but their most
potent tool is political influence. Backing the right candidates could
get favorable treatment at the bargaining table. After all, politicians
ran government, and government was their employer. Unionism,
therefore, came to reflect the professionalization of the workforce.
Many of its strongest adherents no longer thought of themselves as
blue collar but as members in good standing of the middle class. Far
be it for them to bring the system down.
The Eisenhower Consolidation
Dwight Eisenhower29 was a national father figure. A few short
years before he became president, he had led millions of troops in a
desperate crusade to save civilization from the Nazi challenge. He
was safe; he was solid; he could be trusted. Ike might sometimes
be boring, but he was never threatening. In retrospect, it is
conventional to assert that his presidency was a period during which
nothing happened. Thought of as placid and without turmoil, the
times are deemed as uninspiring as was the nation’s leader. The
truth is quite different. To begin with, there was massive conflict;
its dimensions were merely different from those of later years. The
50s was fundamentally a decade of consolidation. The middle-class
tipping point had just been reached, and it was now being knit into
the social fabric. In short, a social revolution was in the process of
being solidified. The Sturm und Drang might be muted, but this was
largely because legitimation required agreement, not discord. Too
many strident voices of dissent might indicate that the new social
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order had not been accepted. An apparent consensus signaled to
everyone that what had been achieved would not easily be reversed.
One of the things for which the period is remembered is the
moment when Charles E. Wilson, Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense
designate, allegedly said that what was good for General Motors
was good for the nation. The outgoing president of GM, he was
defending the profits his corporation made on defense contracts.
What is significant about this incident is that it symbolized the
legitimation of the corporation. Once a new-fangled innovation
that had inspired resistance, it now had growing dominance as an
organizational form made normal.30 Most people had come to
accept the fact that such business entities strode the economy like
colossi. They might be criticized, but very few expected, or even
intended, to dismantle them. To do so would kill the goose that lay
the golden eggs. On the contrary, the idea was to tame the giants.
People wanted to work for them, and to move up within them, not to
supersede them. They could perhaps stand to be regulated, but their
destruction was unnecessary. All that was required was legislation to
limit their powers.
Similar sentiments applied to those who worked for these
corporations. They were organization men; they wore gray flannels
suits; they were cut from the same cookie-cutter mold.31 Garbed in
copycat white shirts, uniform ties, and felt hats, they were proud of the
white-collar conformity Mills so roundly condemned. The economist
John Kenneth Galbraith32 described theirs as an affluent society and
they cheerfully accepted this portrayal. Viewing themselves on the
cutting-edge of prosperity, they were too busy pursuing success to
worry that materialism was unseemly. Seen from the inside, they
were innovators and go-getters. Job advertisements from the period
routinely sought individuals who were “self-starters.” The term “selfdirection” might not have been a prominent part of their vocabulary,
yet its reality was. The business uniforms so frequently ridiculed were
the external symbols of an internalized discipline directed toward
progress.33 The corporate types truly wanted to make things better.
Indicative of their attitude is another cliché from contemporary
advertisements. Virtually every product was extolled as “new and
improved.” Otherwise, it was not keeping up with the competition.
Nothing could be static. Those doing the pacesetting could always
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find superior ways to do things. This was the overriding orientation
of these supposedly mindless clones.
Nor should it be forgotten that this was the era of the Cold
War. The Soviet Union had become a strategic adversary.34 Also
a nuclear power, it presented itself as the wave of a very different
future. Trumpeting the inevitable destruction of capitalism, it
offered totalitarian communism as a more advanced alternative.
Many intellectuals of the period were convinced this was true.
They believed that centralized planning was more rational than
the confusions of the marketplace and that, therefore, it would
be economically, and militarily, more efficient. They also alleged
that socialism, and ultimately communism, were potentially more
democratic than representative institutions arguably controlled by
business interests. In the end, Marx would be vindicated and an
egalitarian prosperity would be triumphant. But neither American
politicians, nor members of the public, were convinced of this. They
feared that their hard-won freedoms might be overrun by dictatorial
aggressors. The result was an arms race and attempts at containment.
Vast sums of money were expended to prevent Europe and Korea
from slipping behind the Iron Curtain. Eventually the competition
concerned intercontinental ballistic missiles. The object was to see
who could build better rockets to carry nuclear warheads to the
other’s territory. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) became the
watchword of security, and it scared nearly everyone to death.
At home, this confrontation opened with a renewed red
scare.35 People began to worry that Russian spies had infiltrated the
government. At first the House Un-American Activities Committee
(HUAC), then Senator Joseph McCarthy,36 began to investigate
a bevy of suspects.37 Many, indeed, turned out to be Soviet
collaborators, notably Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs,38 but the seeds
for a culture war were being sown. Overreaction in the form of
blacklists was countered by furious denials of treason. In later years,
this episode gave the era a reputation for being ultraconservative.
Once more, the reality was subtler. The Eisenhower administration
did not turn back the clock. It did not attempt to undo most of
the New Deal’s social legislation. Social Security remained intact,
as did unemployment insurance. The social-welfare safety net had
become as much a part of the nation’s institutional fabric as had the
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corporations. Even McCarthyism lost its cache. Eisenhower himself
found it too extreme for his tastes.
On the domestic front, progress was also evident. 39One of the
mechanisms of consolidation was television. Invented in the 20s
and perfected in the 40s, it did not enter most living rooms until
the 50s. Radio had earlier fertilized a national culture, but moving
pictures that could be summoned at the turn of a dial signaled a
new dimension in entertainment. From coast to coast, ordinary
people saw the same situation comedies, the same variety shows, and
the same newscasters. Everyone loved Lucy;40 everyone found Ed
Sullivan a poker-faced presence on a family friendly program; and
everyone was impressed with Edward R. Murrow’s41 mellifluous tones
and ever-present cigarette. Another mechanism of consolidation
was the highway system. Eisenhower sponsored a plan for interstate
highways partly because his military experience demonstrated the
utility of being able to move men and equipment across the country,
but the major benefits were nonetheless civilian. Now, truckers could
move merchandise more efficiently than by rail. Steel tracks could
not be built into every small town, but asphalt roads could. Nor
were trains effective in delivering small loads; trucks were. This gave
commerce as much an infusion as had canals many years before.
This expanded highway network had an even more direct
influence on individuals. Ford had made automobiles affordable;
Eisenhower gave them a place to go.42 Before his concrete strips
crisscrossed the land in emulation of Hitler’s autobahns, intercity
transportation had been tortuous. Roads were narrow, winding,
and sometimes unpaved. They certainly did not tempt people to
take pleasure trips far from home. The interstates transformed
this.43 They made every corner of the country accessible to every
other corner. This prompted a slew of innovations to facilitate these
journeys. Motels sprouted like mushrooms. Holiday Inn was not
any longer just the title of a movie; it designated a chain of motor
hotels to which families could repair in the assurance that they
would be provided ample comfort. Likewise, a bevy of standardized
restaurants arose to feed these travelers. Kentucky Fried Chicken and
McDonald’s became household names.44 “Finger licking good” and
the “golden arches” signaled dependable, if not exhilarating, cuisine.
In the process, these changed the nation’s eating habits. Because they
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had to be uniform if they were to guarantee consistency and quick
if they were to be profitable, they became the progenitors of fast
food. Even at home, a TV dinner hastily removed from the freezer
and eventually popped into the microwave became the standard of
convenience. People on the move still expected nourishing food, but
they did not have the time to be fancy.
Their families too had become compressed. During the
Depression, families were postponed for financial reasons, but, after
the war ended, there was a burst of fertility characterized as The Baby
Boom. By the 50s, however, parents were voluntarily confining
themselves to two children. In essence, the nuclear family was
legitimated. Its flexibility was perfectly suited to the agility needed
to take advantage of a market economy. Middle-class families,
accordingly, no longer participated in extended families in order
to tend to their immediate needs.45 If anything, they relied more
on friends who had similar interests than on relatives. The lesson a
better educated, 46 and more affluent, generation has absorbed is that
childrearing is an intensive endeavor. If the young are to be prepared
for self-directed success, family resources must be directed their
way.47 Sending parental attention or financial reserves elsewhere,
including to extraneous siblings, might shortchange them. One
consequence has been the widespread practice of setting up college
trust funds. Savings are specifically designated for higher education
on the premise that it is inevitable and obligatory. Children are not
asked whether they want to go to college, but what they expect to
study once they get there. The new understanding is that, absent this
preparation, they will be unmitigated failures.
Yet college is not the start of this preparation. Parents have
to make certain that their children go to first-rate primary and
secondary schools. One way to ensure this is to move to the
suburbs.48 Inexpensive automobiles make it possible to live outside
the city limits,49 and the assembly-line style construction of houses
make these domiciles affordable. The Levittown phenomenon has
arrived.50 Those boxy residences, for which their inhabitants were so
roundly censured, are cozy affairs that enable people to practice the
watchword of the modern family, namely “togetherness.”51 Mother,
father, and their children are expected to comprise a mutually
supportive household. Those who play together, and perhaps pray
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together, will stay together. Their love will be an umbrella to shelter
them from the hazards of a world filled with unpredictable strangers.
The models for this friendly perfection are Ozzie and Harriet and
Father Knows Best. Their gentle conversations, during which family
members discuss their various dilemmas, are how it is supposed to
be. Sweet reason and mutual concern provide encouragement for
their younger members to stand on their own feet. Parents are there
to furnish guidance, not dictatorial orders, and children, who in
their immaturity might bridle at this assistance, would eventually
incorporate these lessons into their personal repertoires. Television,
the very essence of modernity, thereby became an academy for social
advancement.
Another of the changes that occurred within suburban abodes
was how discipline was exercised. During the 30s, John B. Watson52
had been the guru of childrearing.53 His central recommendation
was that children not be spoiled. They must be put on a strict
schedule, not unlike that found in the contemporary factory. By the
40s and into the 50s, Dr. Spock54 asserted a contrary expertise. He
recommended a gentler regime. Children were not to be exposed
to corporal punishment; they were to be patiently and carefully
instructed. When they misbehaved, they were to be sent to their
rooms so that they could reflect on their misdeeds. Although
this sometimes verged on permissiveness, the central intent was
explored by Melvin Kohn. 55 The underlying goal transmuted from
obedience to internalized discipline. Children needed to understand
why they should do what their parents required. These external
objectives had to become their own if they were to be pursued when
no external authority was available. The young were, in short, to
become middle class paragons, capable of emotional restraint and
competent decisions. Even in school, discipline was directed toward
internalized learning.56 Gone were the hickory stick and the “board
of education.” A trip to the vice principal for a good talking-to
replaced a rap across the knuckles. All of this was reinforced by
suburbanization wherein a group of like-minded parents migrated
to the same location to ensure that their offspring could attend good
schools. They would thenceforth insist that quality education meant
a progressive, nonpunitive, education.
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While this was happening, a newly middle-class public was
insisting that the rules of the game be universal. They wanted
equality of opportunity truly extended to all with equivalence before
the law. Consumed with a desire to participate in the upward
mobility57 they saw around them, they were adamant that no one
receive special favors. This applied on the job, in the schools, and in
the courts. Merit and justice were to govern how things turned out.
People were supposed to get what they earned. At work, expertise
was to be rewarded with promotions; at school superior scholarship
would be recompensed with good grades, and within the legal system
no one would to be railroaded because of lowly origins. Television
too reinforced these ideals. On its ubiquitous western and detective
programs, justice always prevails in the end. The good guy gets the
girl, and the bad one is arrested and locked up.
While the Eisenhower era has a reputation for conservative stasis,
it was actually the springboard for the reforms that flowered in the
next decade.58 One of these was the Civil Rights Movement.59 The
Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education ruling was published
in 1954.60 It launched the movement toward desegregation and then
integration. Eisenhower might reluctantly dispatch U.S. marshals to
Little Rock to enforce the Constitution, but he did dispatch them.
And at this time, Rosa Parks began the Montgomery bus boycott
when she refused to move to the back of a bus. The conventional
wisdom dismisses this period as a dark age, without noticing that
a sea change had occurred. A half century earlier, the Supreme
Court had ruled that separate could be equal and had acquiesced in
routine lynchings of assertive blacks. At the time of these outrages,
the public did not object. Keeping blacks as second-class citizens
seemed the normal order of things. By the time of the middle class
tipping point, this was no longer so. Middle-class values dictated
fairness for all, irrespective of skin color.61 If social mobility were
open to talent, then talent could not be denied whatever its shade.
Blacks, too, had to be allowed to take advantage of the rules, if these
rules were to mean anything. Northerners, who became middle class
before Southerners, were offended when they saw the law perverted
to enforce segregation. It was this attitude, one that also infected
the South as it extricated itself from its agricultural slumber, which
made the Civil Rights Movement possible. “Negroes” too were to be
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inducted into a social class system that could not function if it did
not reward merit wherever it was found.62
Similar considerations applied to the gathering feminist
movement. Nowadays, it is conventional to mock primitive television
commercials that presented housewives as glorying in their sparkling
bathrooms, but this was not all that changed. The togetherness of
the suburbs celebrated the roles of mother and housekeeper, yet
in this it was behind the times. The cleanliness that was so highly
regarded was handed down from earlier days, reinvigorated by a
flurry of technical developments. Electric refrigerators, washing
machines, dishwashers, and even sponge mops made sanitation more
easily accomplished.63 So did a host of detergents and grease-cutting
agents. Nevertheless, the myth of the housewife trapped in her lonely
suburban prison was never fully valid. Rosy the Riveter supposedly
pioneered the progress of women in the workplace, but her wartime
contributions were a blip on a much longer continuum. Women
had been gradually entering the labor force for over a century, and
the trend now accelerated. Wives and mothers were going to work
in greater numbers, not so much to supplement the family’s budget
as for personal fulfillment. With so many of their traditional tasks
superseded by technology, they needed an opportunity to perform
respected work. Better educated than their mothers, they craved
situations where they could demonstrate their abilities. Having
gone to coeducational schools and, often, colleges, they languished
when restricted to domestic ghettos. It was these women, and
their daughters, who were to provide the audience for a looming
feminism.64
Dissent, such as it was during these years, was marginalized.
Most famous from the time were the beatniks.65 They affected scruffy
beards, ill-fitting berets, and embarrassing poetry. Contemptuous of
the materialistic surrounding them, they were ostentatiously poor.
Styling themselves intellectuals, they sounded the tocsin of impending
dehumanization. Updated bohemians, they gathered in coffee-houses
to admire one another’s work and to curse organizational types.
Mothers cautioned their children not to become such wastrels, but
for the moment they need not have worried. The Beat Generation
might have been an object of curiosity, but it was also one of ridicule.
While the middle-class consolidation was at its peak, people were
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too focused on business to be attracted by its message. They would
have agreed with Calvin Coolidge that the business of America was
business.
The Hippie Eruption
The 60s began with John F. Kennedy.66 When he stood with
his head uncovered by the customary top hat to deliver his ringing
inaugural address, it was as if there really was a New Frontier. By
general consensus, he represented a fresh generation, one untainted
by war or Depression. In his campaign, he promised to get the
country moving again. Implying that nothing much had happened
under Ike, he pledged social as well as economic progress. What
seems to have been forgotten over the succeeding decades is that he
was elected on a platform dedicated to prosecuting the Cold War
more effectively. In his debates with Richard Nixon,67 he promised
he would close a “missile gap” with Russia and protect Quemoy
and Matsu from Communist Chinese expansion. Even the famous
peroration in which he said, “And so my fellow Americans, ask not
what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your
country,” has, as its goal, patriotism.
Before these oft-quoted words, Kennedy had also declared,
“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we
will pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any
friend, oppose any foe, to insure the survival and success of liberty.”
Protecting freedom, the quintessential middle-class value, was the
central aim of his presidency. But the packaging was new. Thus, he
began his address by asserting, “Let the word go forth from this time
and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a
new generation of Americans, born in this century, tempered in war,
disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage,
and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human
rights to which this nation has always been committed….” The
theme was clear: it was idealism in service to standards already set by
the American experiment. Kennedy’s signature program, the Peace
Corps, underlined this direction. It would spread middle class values
across the world. Youths committed to doing good would travel to
third-world countries, for little or no pay, where they would teach
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the lessons they had learned at home. In this, they would convert
their moral aspirations into action.
The actual accomplishments of JFK’s administration are very
much mixed. He had stared down Big Steel,68 flubbed the Bay of
Pigs landings, recouped during the Cuban Missile Crisis, pledged
to send men to the moon, instituted a tax cut, and begun inserting
advisors into Viet Nam.69 The war on poverty was not yet off the
drawing board, and it would not get started until after he was
assassinated. What must strike the neutral observer is the idealism
apparent in most of these programs. The youthful vigor of Camelot
reverberated around the land, especially among the young. They
wanted to save the world, not merely to aspire to suburban affluence.
This attitude was to erupt in full blossom in the hippie generation.
These children of the children of depression had been raised on tales
of frustrated idealism. Their parents wanted to change the world
but had been diverted into rescuing it from a barbarian invasion.
Now the young were chafing at the bit to fulfill their parent’s aborted
missions. They would not sell out just to attain personal comfort.
Since the millennium was visibly within reach, they would see things
through regardless of the obstacles blocking the way.
Some of these ambitious youths were red diaper babies.70 Their
parents had been Depression era revolutionaries from whence they
imbibed a Marxist legacy. Most, however, came from families with
a liberal bent, or, if from conservative ones, they were in rebellion
against a reactionary heritage. A majority of the activists were college
educated. Members of the first cohort of middle-class children
where a higher education was considered mandatory, they believed
themselves to be intellectually superior to their forebears. As such,
they were certain that their idealism was grounded in an enhanced
understanding of the human condition. Despite their youth and
inexperience, they were persuaded they knew best.71 Their book
learning and good intentions ensured that this was so. If their elders
would simply listen to their prescriptions with an open mind, they
too would realize that the problems of the past were amenable to
solution. All that was needed was the will to implement reforms.72
The hippie ideal was fairly simple.73 The Beatles74 were soon to
capture its essence in a hit song. “All you really need is love” went
their mantra. The key to universal happiness wasn’t a mystery; it
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was a matter of dedication. Another popular song advised: “If you
are going to San Francisco, you’re going to meet some gentle people
there. If you are going to San Francisco, be sure to wear a flower in
your hair.” The Haight-Ashbury district of San Francisco, along with
New York City’s East Village, became the capitals of a peace-oriented
movement. Along their urban streets wandered bona-fide converts
to the cause. Dressed in tie-dyed tee shirts and sporting granny
glasses, they preached a message of universal love to all comers.75
“Make love, not war!” and exercise “flower power” were among their
observations. If people would just be nice to one another, there
would be no need for a confrontation with the Soviets. If everyone
pursued beauty, as opposed to avarice, there would likewise be no
need for the rat race. People of every shade and description could
join hands and lift their voices in song. At long last recognizing their
inherent brotherhood, they would automatically seek to help, rather
than hurt, their neighbors.
Among the other slogans making the rounds were “Don’t trust
anyone over thirty”; “If it feels good, do it”; and “Do your own
thing.” The idea was that the children knew best. Uncorrupted
by the need to earn a living, or to prove how powerful they were,
they reincarnated Rousseau’s noble savages.76 Often financed by
their parents, they would nevertheless seek to achieve dignified
objectives. Art, for instance, was high on their list. But this was not
the art of their parents. It was more vibrant and more rebellious.
Some of it was psychedelic. Bright, otherworldly colors replaced
less adventurous shades. Some of it was pop art. Andy Warhol led
the way in appreciating the beauty of ordinary objects. The catch
here is that these objects are simultaneously being satirized. They are
kitsch, not true art. Although many hippies emulated the beards and
long hair associated with the bohemians of old, few were practicing
artists. They merely copied the poverty of these long-ago rebels. If
they lived in lofts, this was by choice, not necessity. The best they
could do by way of artistry was to engage in handicrafts. Personally
made objects, whether clothing, jewelry, or furniture, took on a
status significantly more elevated than that of manufactured goods.
The very imperfections indicated that they were more honest.
Most important was their rejection of the middle class discipline
of the older generation. These young people would not play the
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commercial game. Money did not matter. One of their mentors,
Abbie Hoffman,77 went so far as to entitle a book Steal This Book.
The objective was to undermine the market, not to participate in it.
They preferred to be like Neil Diamond, “forever in blue jeans.” If
they had anything to say about it, their privileged childhoods would
never end. Work would not be necessary because they would never
make the mistake of assuming its responsibilities. They knew that
spontaneous feelings are what really counted. Getting in touch with
one’s inner self, rather than obtaining a huge bank account, earned
the respect of one’s peers. This made it attractive to pursue shortcuts.
One of these was song. Folk music and, to a lesser extent, rock and
roll touched the soul. With a guitar in one’s hand, one could share an
expression of intense emotion with others. All could communicate
a joint appreciation of the poignant question: Where have all the
flowers gone? The answer was “the graveyard,” but this generation
would never personally join in the slaughter. Striving for universal
peace was the core of what it meant to be a loving individual. It’s
what flower power was about. As its partisans also said, one should
“make love not war,” for if everyone did, there obviously would be
no war.78
Another shortcut was drugs. It was a simple matter to zone
out with a joint in one’s hand. The Depression-era generation
sought discipline by avoiding narcotics, but this generation was too
sophisticated to be fooled by the propaganda that beguiled its parents.
The young people knew that pot was not the killer depicted in Reefer
Madness. Marijuana did not make a person crazy; it only made one
feel good. Passing roaches around at a party was an expression of
solidarity, love, and even creativity. More potent still was LSD. The
Harvard psychologist Timothy Leary79 was then touted it as the
perfect gateway to self-understanding. He described trips illuminated
by vivid colors and deep insights. “Tune in, turn on, drop out” was
his rallying cry. The world of inner beauty thereby released was far
more valid than crass materialism of the marketplace. It, and not
mere things, was what life was about. Heroin too was out there in
the streets, but most of the hippies knew that it was deadly. They
also passed along the word that “speed (i.e., amphetamines) kills.”
They would use drugs, but recreationally rather than addictively.
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A third shortcut was sex. It was love made tangible by the
act of coitus. Pippin, one of the era’s Broadway plays, promulgated
the message that sex was fun. It was no more harmful than pot
and had been denied these youngsters by their parents because they
were envious of youth. Like the actors in Hair, they would take
off their clothes and do what came naturally. Sex was not dirty; it
was a biological function. Unlike the Victorians, one should not
be prudish. One should be proud of one’s body, not ashamed of it
or the pleasure it gave. Nor was marriage a necessary prerequisite
for doing the deed. This too was a superstition inherited from less
enlightened times. Why did people need a piece of paper in order
to express their affection for one another? It was perfectly all right
to shack up. By the same token, it was okay to take advantage of
crash pads. Sleeping on the floor of a total stranger’s apartment,
where what happened happened, was a sign of generosity, rather
than of immorality. The apotheosis of this occurred at Woodstock.
This open-air celebration of music was characterized by several days
of mud and nudity. Reckoned to be a milestone of the up-to-theminute mindset, in later years people could prove they were hip
by recounting how they made the trek to this Catskill Mountain
extravaganza.
Nevertheless, the hippie generation was also typified by ennui.
Many young people were bored. Most of their days were spent just
hanging around and doing nothing. They literally did not know
what to do with their lives or where to look for clues about how to
find out. There was a genuine sense of being adrift. Deep down,
they hoped things would work out, but they were not sure things
would. Despite all the idealism, there was a nagging emptiness akin
to that experienced by the beatniks. Because so much of what was
valued was determined by what would offend parents, these young
people were not sure what they personally wanted. They were certain
they were morally superior and that it was their duty to inherit the
world; they were not definite about what to do with this bequest.
Not surprisingly, this fragile bubble burst when confronted by
harsh realities.80 Another of the era’s clichés proclaimed that those
who were not part of the solution were part of the problem. In spite
of this, unfocused loved turned out a poor mechanism for problem
solving. The first great shock was Kennedy’s assassination.81 He was
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so much an icon that most people did not believe that his murder was
possible. He was too vibrant to be snatched away at so appallingly
early an age. The result was a cottage industry in conspiracy theories.
Because it did not seem reasonable that a single misfit could change
history, the idea that Lee Harvey Oswald was a lone assassin was
rejected out of hand. Something more sinister had to be responsible.
Despite the fact that there was little evidence to this effect, many
concluded that members of the elite were to blame. Perhaps LBJ was
too eager to become president. Perhaps, the CIA, or was it the FBI,
did not want Kennedy to discontinue the Viet Nam project. Never
mind that he was the one who initiated it. Never mind also that the
proof of these nefarious plots kept changing. That Jack Ruby shot
Oswald and that some witnesses thought they heard shots from the
grassy knoll were too suspicious not to be expanded.
When within years Robert F. Kennedy, the deceased president’s
equally charismatic brother and Martin Luther King Jr.,82 the
compelling leader of the Civil Rights Movement, were also
assassinated, it was too much to bear. Naïve love had not been able to
stay the hand of evil. Sense could not be made by those who believed
that love would conquer all. Sadly, they could find no comforting
explanations. Several other of their fondest hopes were also running
into trouble. The Viet Nam War had turned into a quagmire,83 the
war on poverty was spinning its wheels,84 and riots had broken out
in urban streets. Flower power turned out to be an illusion. The
hippies of Haight-Ashbury were easy marks for muggers; the drug
scene mutated into a killing zone; and commercial interests ripped
off their art. Worst of all were the Tate-La Bianca murders. The
work of the infamous Manson family, these nailed the lid on hippie
coffins.85 Even the name of Charles Manson’s ill-assorted clan gave
the lie to hippie ideals. This group of unrelated individuals fancied
itself a family. Living, and having sex together, its members thought
of themselves as the embodiment of selfless love. Charmed by
Manson’s story-telling abilities and his personalized attentions, these
middle-class throwaways felt that they had found unconditional
positive regard. Charlie cared. Charlie would watch out for them.
All he asked in return was their loyalty. Going out to kill people to
start a race war was thus a reasonable request. They would do it in
the name of their love for Charlie and for the good of humanity.

The Tipping Point

239

This facile brutality was too much, save for the most hard-bitten
of the love children. The hippie kingdom succumbed to reality.
It dissolved as a product of its own unfulfilled promises. Most of
those who participated moved on to more conventional lives, but
its central aspirations would no more disappear than had those of
the Depression. They were incorporated within the liberalism that
became a standard middle class affectation. The former hippies did
not renounce their youthful indiscretions; they looked back upon
them with nostalgia. For many, these were the most exciting times
they would ever experience. Never again would they know the heady
feeling of saving the world. Never again would they be embryonic
geniuses for whom all things were possible. If their odysseys had not
ended as they had anticipated, at least they had tried.
The irony of the hippie interval is that it is a parody of middleclass ascendancy. The superannuated teenaged heirs to unprecedented
social mobility did not know what to do with this heritage. In fact,
most of their parents were first generation members of a higher social
status. Not quite sure of how to inhabit an unaccustomed lifestyle,
they were even less sure of how to transmit it to their offspring.86 As
a result, they requested that their young be successful; they provided
them with material well being; and they bundled them off to college.
What they could not manage was teaching them how to be selfdirected. Consumed with coming to grips with the difficult task of
becoming effectively middle-class, they asked their children to learn
the how and why of things without providing them the keys to doing
so. The upshot was that the 60s generation was left to experiment
without the guidance of clear directives. Confronted with a myriad
of uncertainties, they pounced on simple answers. Pampered when
they were young, they retrogressed to the uncomplicated remedies of
their halcyon days. With little personal experience of the ways of the
world, they substituted fantasy for practicality.
More specifically, the hippie cohort exhibited a caricature of
self-direction. Without putting effort into attaining emotional
maturity or acquiring certified expertise, they made decisions based
on whim or anxiety. Expected to perform better than their parents
but unconvinced of their ability to accomplish this, they renounced
hierarchy as a species of immoral exploitation. Theirs would be
a world of perfect cooperation and total equality. The only thing
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necessary to validate one’s worth would be one’s humanity. And
since nothing was more human than one’s emotions, these were
sufficient to make everyone equal to everyone else. To be honest to
one’s inner core, rather than to put on airs as did their parents, was
to demonstrate one’s superiority. Rather than seek empty symbols of
success, or kowtow mindlessly to insensitive bosses, they would seek
to be genuine and independent. The trouble was that everyone had
feelings. To be true to oneself, and no more, left one indistinguishable
from the common ruck. This might be fundamentally democratic,
but to be this undistinguished was essentially to be a failure.
One of the contradictions that the hippies could not resolve
was that between merit and equality. In asserting an allegiance to
art, they were aspiring to a particular form of excellence, whereas
in denouncing independent achievement, they were abrogating
efforts at being outstanding. The hippies believed in tolerance, but
as idealists, they took tolerance to an extreme. Everything was as
good as everything else; therefore nothing was better than anything
else. Daniel Patrick Moynihan87 in another context talked about
society’s “defining deviance down.” He suggested that outrageous
behavior had become more commonplace because people were no
longer offended by conduct once considered disgraceful. Hippie
tolerance was one of the starting places of this decline. In adopting
styles of dress and standards of action expressly designed to outrage
the older generation, this generation lowered the bar for those who
would follow them. In their rejection of discipline, these young also
rejected efforts to do well. Since doing good, or even being good, is
contingent upon meeting standards, to discard these out of hand is
to eschew both quality performances and social decency.
At least as serious was the mutiny against responsibility. If the
middle class specializes in making social decisions, to be worthy of
this designation, it must execute this assignment earnestly. It cannot
be frivolous or sloppy nor can it indiscriminately slough off blame.
Above all, its members must try to do a good job. To put momentary
pleasure above responsibility would be to condemn others to harm.
Yet in playing the victim, rather than acting as a locus of personal
control, the hippies failed to do what could be done. They did not
believe in their power to shape events. Instead, they cast the future to
the winds of chance. For them, planning for what was not yet present
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was anathema. Theirs was a here-and-now universe in which mental
images substituted for solid achievements. Determined not to hold
down nine-to-five jobs, they considered a drug-induced haze the
equivalent of productive activity. Almost constitutionally opposed
to following rules, they celebrated anarchistic impulsivity. They not
only rejected discipline in terms of the standards they honored but
also in terms of the efforts they exerted. With short attention spans
and a restricted event horizon, they could not mobilize themselves for
long-term projects. Nothing mattered enough to apply that much
energy. As a result, they did not accomplish a great deal. Looking
back, they left no substantial monuments except their romantic
attitudes. Not even in art did they produce timeless masterpieces.
The hippies, of course, preached cooperation. Loath to be
competitive, they mouthed platitudes about working together in
harmony. In fact, given their lack of discipline, they were poor allies.
Whatever their promises, they could not be relied upon to fulfill them.
The consequence was that they could not band together to assert
their power against straight society.88 Aggressively nonpolitical, they
treated exercises in seeking hierarchical advancement as sinful. To
be ambitious was to be selfish; to join with others in asserting social
control was oppressive. Nor would they descend to being pragmatic.
This would require them to contaminate their hands with mundane
occupations, and they were above this. Essentially immature egoists,
they gloried in their own isolation and uselessness. In their own
minds, they were pure and unsullied and, therefore, exceptional
human beings. The antithesis of what it meant to be middle class,
they were bent on disassembling the social class structure. The way
that this was expressed was to claim that the system was at fault.
Exactly in what the system consisted, they were unprepared to say.
Undisciplined even in their intellectual life, the details of history,
sociology, or political science left them cold. Nor could they explain
the future in concrete terms. As they never tired of reminding their
critics, love was all one needed.
This love, however, did not extend to marriage. Marriage and
children and a lifelong commitment were for the more conventional.
Worried primarily about the present, their plans did not encompass
the next generation. Primarily concerned with rebelling against
their parents, they suffered from a Peter Pan complex. In their own
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terms flower children, they took pride in a resistance to growing up.
Although many continued their lifestyle well into their twenties, they
refused to equate their sexual promiscuity with potential parenthood.
Farthest from their thoughts was any conception of how to prepare
the young to meet future middle-class responsibilities. Tireless in
their complaints about what their own parents had done wrong, they
were remarkably hazy about how such mistakes could be corrected.
Defiantly young in spirit, it seemed enough that they should get their
own way, without figuring out the implications of this direction.
Convinced of their moral worth, they were certain that their instincts
would be infallible. Not unexpectedly, utterly excluded from their
consciousness were thoughts of returning to the suburbs. For many,
this was the scene of their former incarceration. That a detached
home, surrounded by a manicured lawn, might prove a suitable
environment for raising their own children was inconceivable. This
would be the epitome of selling out. It would betray the sources of
their moral supremacy for the monotony of responsibility.
After Kennedy’s death, his promise of a New Frontier was followed
by the specter of Barry Goldwater.89 The Republican candidate who
opposed Lyndon Johnson, he promised the nation a choice, not an
echo. Uncompromisingly conservative, he unabashedly championed
a return to a market-oriented economy. For the hippies, despite
their lack of political passion, this was a joke. Capitalism had been
thoroughly discredited; hence a return to its middle-class standards
was unthinkable. Everyone knew that Goldwater was a madman
dedicated into nuking the Communists back to the Stone Age.
Ineffably dangerous, he was the personification of an extremist.
Thus, when he stood before the Republican convention to accept its
nomination and opined, “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no
vice. And…moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue,” they
were persuaded that their fears were vindicated. Four short years
earlier, Kennedy had vowed to “pay any price, bear any burden, [and]
meet any hardship” in defense of liberty, but that was then. The
revolt against the middle-class ascendancy was now at full cry, and
anyone who suggested that this might be an ill-advised adventure
was obviously a less than competent counterrevolutionary.
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Chapter 7

The Reaction
For every action there is always opposed an equal reaction.
(Isaac Newton, Principia Mathematica)
Attack is the reaction; I never think I have hit hard unless
it rebounds. (Samuel Johnson, from Boswell’s Life of
Johnson)
Every reform, however necessary, will by weak minds
be carried to an excess, that itself will need reforming.
(Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria)
The Reform Impulse
The middle class ascendancy threw up a series of challenges. As
the world changed, an unanticipated crop of conundrums arose to
puzzle society.1 This new stage of the Commercial Revolution was not
a walk across an untroubled upland meadow. The way was littered
with conflicts, abuses, and even stupidities.2 People had always
dreamt that progress would culminate in greater happiness and fewer
uncertainties, but its realization was fraught with anxieties and the
consciousness of human limitations.3 Rain clouds surrounded the
heads of the inexperienced. Unequivocal happiness was apparently
not to be the lot of mankind. The more people got, the more
they wanted and the greater their power, the more numerous their
frustrations. Or, so it seemed. Observers were transfixed with what
had gone wrong, rather than what was going right. It is a journalistic
cliché that good news is no news. The unexpected predicament,
not the ordinary accomplishment, is what captures public attention.
When a man bites a dog, especially when there is not supposed to
be any biting, bystanders take notice. This sort of event requires
concentration. If it is to be assimilated, it is imperative to figure out
what happened and why.
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Likewise, the more revolutionary the change, the more intense
the reaction to it.4 That which is exceedingly different from what
preceded it feels uncomfortable merely because it is different. When
people do not possess the routines with which to cope with a new
situation, they feel impelled to respond. This novel circumstance
is sensed as problematic and, therefore, as in need of a solution.
The stumbling block lies in finding an appropriate answer. Given
that the Middle Class Revolution was a seismic event, it called
forth a series of momentous, if not always appropriate, rejoinders5.
Although hardly remarked upon as it occurred, the transformation
traumatized the social structure. Commentators were aware of the
dislocations of the Industrial Revolution6 but were less cognizant of
the tribulations intrinsic to so great a success. Nevertheless, many
crucial relationships were not what they had once been. In point
of fact, the social hierarchy was shaken to its foundations. Those
who now got to the top of the greasy pole were not the same ones
who got there before. Nor were the strengths that once produced
success identical with those of the past. The professionalization of
society had changed the ground rules. Technological expertise, for
instance, counted for much more than it ever had previously. Nor
were the types of jobs people performed the same. The division of
labor fractured into so many anomalous pieces that it was difficult
to grasp how they fit together. Occupations were changed, their
associated statuses were altered; political techniques were revised;
educational demands were amended; and even family interactions
were under siege. Something had to be done, but no one could be
certain of what.
The hippies, in their own immature and inarticulate way, had
sought answers.7 Unfortunately, their remedies, though striking,
were soon found wanting.8 What was presently to emerge in their
place was a sequence of politicized solutions. The nation, and indeed
the world, would be rocked by a succession of political earthquakes in
what amounted to an outburst of reform mania. As people felt driven
to deal with the displacements in their lives, they got caught up in
an uncomfortable cycle of disguised cultural lag. Intending to keep
moving forward, their problem solving inclinations unexpectedly
betrayed them. In place of developing truly innovative answers, they
inadvertently recycled those of a bygone age. As might be expected,
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in a civilization increasingly populated by middle-class strivers, it
would not take long for the nouveau riche to apply their talents to
the conundrums elicited by their triumphs. They were, after all,
professional decision makers. Accustomed to utilizing their expertise
to organize productive activities, they assumed this approach would
be appropriate to their current predicament. On balance, the tactic
had surely worked well within the industrial arena—hadn’t it?
Techniques for scheduling the arrival of raw materials to cleverly
designed machines undoubtedly resulted in a cornucopia of goods
stocking suburban shopping malls. Why couldn’t this same stratagem
be applied to interpersonal dilemmas? If these too were addressed
in an orderly manner, they too should prove amenable to resolution.
Even as astute an observer as Max Weber9 depicted this method
as “rational.” It was simply what made sense. Not surprisingly,
those who extrapolated from this supposition presumed that, if the
government were assigned the task of correcting social injustices, it
could manage the mission. With greater resources available than
any combination of individuals and kept within reasonable bounds
via democratic oversights, it could, without question, be trusted to
do what was best for all concerned. The sticking point was that
government would have to perform this magic blindly. In a world
that had never before undergone a middle-class revolution, no one
could accurately predict what would be required.
The resultant line of attack is generally referred to as social
engineering.10 Patterned on tangible forms of manipulation, it
theoretically converts social knowledge into enlightened plans of
action. Deliberate, disciplined, and well motivated, how could it
not achieve desirable ends? As with other varieties of engineering,
this one is steeped in efforts at control. Grounded in rationality, it
is expected to take the mystery out of human misery and enable the
community to implement shared objectives. Yet, asserting control
does not, of itself, provide control. It is one thing to declare mastery
of a situation, quite another to master it. Sadly, social engineering
did not live up to its billing. Time and again, it has failed to produce
the promised results. What has really rankled is that problems meant
to be corrected have frequently been exacerbated. Instead of efforts
at improving a situation making things better, they often made them
worse.
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The reason is not hard to fathom. Social engineering takes for
granted three prerequisites.11 First, it assumes that the target problem
is understood. Clearly, people must know what is wrong before they
can fix it. Second, the solution to the difficulty is believed to be
readily at hand. It is imagined that the experts can always devise an
ingenious means of overcoming a problem. Third, when the solution
is known, it is presupposed that it can, and will, be implemented.
The authorities, and the people, will do what needs to be done, and
the issue will evaporate. The trouble with this scenario is that in most
cases, one, or more, of these preconditions is not met. People do not
understand the source of their discomfort and/or how this distress
can be relieved and/or how the appropriate resources can be brought
to bear. Activists speak glibly of root causes without evidence that
these are the actual sources of difficulty. Similarly, they routinely
proclaim insights into the ideal intervention. Swearing up and down
that a favorite policy will do the trick, they rarely produce facts to back
this up. Likewise problematic is mobilizing the appropriate actions.
Politicians engrossed in petty squabbles often find it impossible to
develop a well-timed consensus. Too little too late is a common
failing, but just as frequently the requisite resources cannot be
assembled, irrespective of good-faith efforts. To illustrate, if personal
therapy is deemed a sovereign cure for individual unhappiness, this
does not mean that there will be enough qualified therapists. Nor
does it mean that there are sufficient funds to pay them. Indeed, the
facts of social life are such that the players are usually ignorant of
what is transpiring. Worse yet, they are often congenitally incapable
of executing that to which they are consciously committed. Merely
to get from day to day, human beings have a knack of fooling
themselves about their fundamental circumstances.
The gap between action and intention is regularly filled
by idealism.12 People genuinely want to do good, but their
ideas regarding what is good are often based more on hope than
practicality. Ignorant of what is taking place, they substitute visions
of a romanticized future for a bleaker reality. Things will work out
for the best if only others will strive toward this perfect endpoint.
How, indeed, could they not? All the same, where this ideal came
from is, nine times out of ten, itself troublesome. Potential reformers
habitually refer to a future they are convinced is within their grasp,
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yet its outlines typically owe more to the past than to their prophetic
powers. Peering over the horizon is notoriously ticklish. No one
can literally foresee what is to come. More common is extrapolating
from what is known to what is unknown, from the familiar to the
unfamiliar. Generally what is recognizable is reworked to serve as a
model for what is desired. One reason why cultural lag is so prevalent
is that people unintentionally tighten their hold, on what used to be
in the very process of trying to cope with what is materializing. They
literally look toward what once succeeded for hints about what is to
come.
The reforms that were about to take center stage in response
to the middle-class ascendancy had their inception in idealizations
of this sort. Their backers were working from visions generalized
from past events. Promised cures were based, not on demonstrable
results but on purified ideals. Indeed, the nature of these ideals
depended on mentally cleaning messy realities. That which had been
was simplified and its rough edges smoothed out Eyeliner made the
outlines of the eyes more distinct and rouge produced cheekbones
that stood out. The ideal glowed with promise precisely because it
had been made extreme. More intense than real life, as with many
mental constructs, it did not suffer from mundane gaps or nagging
imperfections.
An ideal is by definition perfect.13 It is what people would want
if they could manipulate the world as they wished. As such, it is a
bright beacon that derives its allure from deeply buried fantasies. Yet
fantasies are inherently immoderate. They tend to go farther than
the facts allow because they are not impeded by facts. Nevertheless,
being fantasies, they may be impossible to achieve. However much
they are desired, often they cannot come true. People may approach
them and assume that, with a little more effort, they can be reached,
but this is apt to be an illusion. The worst part about uncritical
objectives is that they offer false hope. In convincing people that
improbable tactics can solve their troubles, they divert efforts from
what is possible. The perfect becomes the enemy of the good, and
people wind up with less than they might have had were they not so
credulous.
With regard to the middle-class reaction to its preeminence,
the sorts of ideals sought derived largely from factors perceived as
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contributing to this dominance. One of these was a veneration of
peace. As the wheels of commerce began to accelerate, the kind
of warfare in which medieval knights gloried became unproductive.
Hand to hand combat did not add to the output of factories or hasten
goods to market. Rather, it placed all this in jeopardy. To put the
matter crudely, violence was not good for business. The result was
that physical aggression declined. Highwaymen disappeared from
the arteries of commerce, and successful capitalists refused to wear
swords in emulation of a vanished aristocracy. Peace came to be seen
as a good in its own right. Thus Benjamin Franklin14 was widely
quoted as saying, “There never was a good war or a bad peace.”
Himself an architect of revolution, he nonetheless preferred the
comforts of home and hearth. Pacifism had come into vogue. “No
wars ever, for any reason,” became a guiding principle for would-be
social saviors. Certainly, this made sense. Since war is harmful to
living things, no sane person could possibly favor it.
Another idealized goal is equality.15 As the commercial
revolution rushed forward, so did social mobility. Those who had
been poor could reasonably expect to grow rich, whereas those who
had been rich, if they were careless, might slide into obscurity. In
any event, the ranks of those in the middle of the pack expanded
immeasurably. This meant that the distance between the top and
the bottom had been reduced. The direction of this change was
evident for all to see and, if it were projected into the future, might
eventuate in the space between the best and the worst closing into
nothingness. To many, it seemed clear that the endpoint would be
complete equality. Hierarchy would disappear and be replaced by
an egalitarian brotherhood. The result would indisputably be true
democracy. Not only would there be equality before the law and
equality of opportunity but also an equality of results. Material
resources would be distributed uniformly, as would social power. No
one would have any more than anyone else; hence all jealousies and
conflicts would abate.
A third ideal that arose in tandem with the middle classes was
rationality. Businesspeople needed to make careful calculations in
order to insure a profit, but this rationalism could be utilized for
other purposes. One of these was science.16 In this field, especially
within the physical sciences, mental discipline proved invaluable.
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Its projected application to the social sciences was, therefore, a nobrainer. The same could be said of social engineering. Employing the
computations of the sciences to solve irritating social predicaments
made sense. That this might not be automatic was regarded as trivial.
Surely, given sufficient diligence, every significant problem would one
day be amenable to systematic solution. On the other hand, those
who hated what they perceived as the cold, dead hand of science
idealized its opposite. Unprepared to allow passionless prognoses
to dominate social events, these romantics celebrated emotion.
Feelings, rather than precise measurements, were their standard of
value. It was these that made people human; these that had to be
intensified and allowed to determine communal dealings.
Part of what made the middle-class revolution unique was that
these ideals were not allowed to sit on the shelf. Previous generations
had had their own moral ambitions, which they attempted to bring
to fruition, but this time these efforts were to be more methodical.
The medieval knights, when they first set out to rescue Jerusalem
from the infidels, did so haphazardly. They took to the highways
with sketchy maps of their itinerary. Contemporary Westerners
launched their crusades in a more orderly fashion. Carefully crafted
social and political policies guided their steps. Purposefully they set
out to implement reforms scientifically. Or, so it was hoped. In the
event, this journey turned out to be more disorganized than expected.
Although even the most romantic of the reformers conceived of
themselves as intellectuals, they exercised less conscious control than
they had imagined. Disoriented by an inability to distinguish the
ideal from the real, their intentions were, time and again, frustrated
by an obdurate universe.
The Reforms
War is not good for business; as a consequence it is not good for
the middle- classes. It disrupts their orderly lives and throws their
plans for success into a cocked hat. Instead of children marching off
to college and then on to commercial triumphs, they are drafted into
a meat-grinder from whence they can not escape unharmed. The
difficulty is that pacifism is not good for business either. Antiwar
advocates complain that capitalists are warmongers because they
make a profit from the arms trade, whereas the actual merchants
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of death are a tiny sliver of that number. The real reason that war
can be of benefit to the bourgeoisie is precisely because they are
rich. Relative to others, they possess attractive resources. Were they
unprepared to defend these, by the sword if necessary, they would
soon find themselves stripped of all they have. The new middle
classes, like it or not, also developed a stake in this wealth. They
too have much to lose to the envious. If they lived in a world where
selflessness was the norm, they might not have to worry. Similarly,
were the less affluent content to stay in their places, the middle-class
need not dread coercive attempts to appropriate their goods. In fact,
the poor are not so inclined. Given the opportunity and the belief
that they would encounter no opposition, many of them would act
in what they perceived to be their best interests.
These opposing impulses, that is, in favor of peace but also
approving of self-defense, have resulted in ongoing squabbles within
the middle classes. What has exacerbated this conflict and made
pacifist reformers more insistent are the unprecedented dangers that
surfaced during the twentieth century. This was an era during which
warfare graduated to incalculably lethal dimensions. The First and
Second World Wars truly were world wars. Nations in every corner
of the planet were drawn into bloodbaths of unparalleled scope.
Advances in communication and transportation made it possible for
countries separated by thousands of miles to participate in different
theaters of the same hostilities. And when they did, advances in
technology and productive capacity made the carnage all the greater.
This peril was further escalated when science unleashed the power of
the atom. In short order, there was reason to fear that rockets tipped
with hydrogen bombs could within minutes traverse broad oceans
to deliver death on a massive scale. No one would be safe, no one
immune.
The peace movement was a response to this specter.17 In the
wake of the Great War it gathered momentum toward outlawing
aggressive militarism. Unfortunately this contributed to the
appeasement policies that provided Hitler his opportunity for
expansion. Nonetheless, after the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki,18 the need for general disarmament seemed imperative.
When Russia, too, developed the bomb, and the Cold War arose
between former allies, a desire to prevent a universal conflagration
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animated efforts to impose sanity. Reformers first asked both sides
to renounce their arsenals, but when this call went unheeded, they
turned to agitating for unilateral disarmament. Of course, the Soviet
Union was not a democracy, but the Western powers were. If only
their people put pressure on their governments to dismantle these
weapons, the Russians might feel less threatened and follow suit. This,
of course, did not happen. However, by the 60s the Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS)19 was a potent force on American college
campuses. The organization made pacifism seem both acceptable
and intellectual. Reasonable people could surely agree that it was the
duty of the most advanced industrial nation on earth to set a good
example. Marching and singing songs (in emulation of the hippies),
the young sought to educate their elders to the dangers—and the
opportunities.
When the Viet Nam War intervened to complicate this picture,
the peace activists knew where they stood.20 They were convinced
that politicians were disingenuously arguing that hostilities were an
attempt to prevent a domino effect, that if an aggressive communism
were allowed to succeed in one area, its appetite for hegemony would
be whetted. Conservatives mistakenly claimed that other nations
would soon be invaded and, in their increased anxiety, be less prepared
to defend their independence. In the long run, the United States and
Western Europe would be encircled and overthrown. The Korean
War had laid down a marker; now it was time to lay down another.
Communists must be sent a message this time, that aggression would
not be appeased. While the public seemed to buy this argument, the
students knew better. The United States was becoming an imperialist
power, and they would have none of it. The domino theory was a
myth, as was the idea of a monolithically aggressive Communism.
In order to get the word out, they organized teach-ins. The facts
would be put forward to counter the hysterical fictions emanating
from Washington. Eventually the ordinary voter must recognize that
Southeast Asia should be left to the Southeast Asians.
This antiwar initiative was to rise to national proportions when
the media joined the effort.21 Reporters who at first filed heroic stories
about the deeds of the Green Berets became increasingly skeptical. A
conflict that dragged on for years with ever-larger casualty lists began
to feel like a quagmire. As more of the combatants came home in
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body bags, journalists, both in the field and at home, became cynical.
The youth refused to believe in the accuracy of the body counts
issued by the military brass. With their own eyes they concluded
that the struggle was unwinnable. Images of death became routine
thanks to a television technology that allowed ordinary citizens to
view the battlefield from their living rooms. In time, the pacifist
demonstrators, at first regarded as kooks, were given sympathetic
coverage. The critical point was reached during the Tet Offensive.
Once the Communists committed themselves to overrunning
southern cities, the disturbing effects of combat were perceptible.
Prominent newscasters such as Walter Cronkite interpreted this
as a loss. Although the Viet Cong suffered a crushing defeat, the
American people were informed otherwise. This increased the
pressure exercised on politicians to refrain from incursions into
the enemy’s bases. North Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos became
off-limits; hence when they were bombed a hullabaloo arose in the
nation’s streets. Critics of the war burned their draft cards; peace
marchers converged on the capital; and members of Congress began
to demand a peaceful resolution. Some advised the president simply
to declare victory and pull out. Others cringed when the protestors
chanted, “Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids have you killed today,”
but then did nothing. Even when Jane Fonda flew to the North
Vietnamese capital to praise Ho Chi Minh and condemn America,
she escaped prosecution for treason upon her return home.
The accumulated effect of this was to persuade President Johnson22
not to stand for reelection. Likewise, responding to these strains, his
successor Richard Nixon,23 felt impelled to sue for peace. Eventually,
after a treaty was signed, the southern armies were left to fend for
themselves. The United States pledged to provide support should
the North violate its undertakings, but once these transgressions
occurred, Congress refused to honor the promised of aid. Soon the
South fell, and the images of refugees being helicoptered from Saigon
rooftops convinced millions of viewers that the war had been futile.
It had not accomplished anything, and, therefore, war should never
again be attempted. In the future, no American children should be
sacrificed to the arrogance of power. As far away as Western Europe,
the public reached the same conclusion. Anti-Americanism became
fashionable. The world’s greatest superpower was told it must learn
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to mind its manners. Power was inherently oppressive, and the only
way to keep it from doing harm was to keep its sword permanently
sheathed.
Another reform that emerged in America in tandem with
pacifism was the Civil Rights Movement. Achieving racial equality
became as imperative as achieving worldwide peace. The seeds of
this crusade were planted early in the twentieth century. Although
American slaves had been officially liberated by the events of the
Civil War, they did not acquire anything like parity with whites.
Almost universally regarded as of inferior ability, they were relegated
to second-class citizenship. Neither in the marketplace nor in
politics nor in the courts were they accorded equal weight. Agitation
to fulfill the Declaration of Independence’s objective of equality for
all had survived in the abolitionist cause, but just barely. Slowly,
however, African Americans were allowed to do more. Booker T.
Washington24 was invited to have dinner in the White House;25 the
resurgent Ku Klux Klan26 of the 1920s was driven into disgrace; and
the NAACP began to institute lawsuits to widen access to public
accommodations.27 Nevertheless, it was not until after World War
II, that is, after the middle-class revolution had reached its apogee
that civil rights became visible. It was an issue at the Democratic
nominating convention, when Harry Truman28 issued a presidential
order mandating the desegregation of the military and when the
Supreme Court decided Brown v. the Board of Education.29
The court’s decision that “separate is inherently unequal” signaled
an acceleration in the efforts to provide racial justice. Building upon
a change in attitudes that had already stimulated scientific research
into the ill effects of discrimination, the justices promptly ordered
that desegregation occur with “all deliberate speed.” The law was to
be obeyed, which meant that black students were to be allowed into
the same classrooms as whites. Subterfuges designed to postpone
the inevitable would not be tolerated. Soon thereafter, the nation,
outside of the South, cheered when Central High School in Little
Rock, Arkansas was integrated.30 Millions saw the hatred on the
faces of the parents opposed to this measure and were appalled. They
did not understand how children could be treated so barbarically.
This was not the American way. In middle-class America, everyone
is to be given the benefit of our society. In a democracy, whatever
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your origins, you deserve an opportunity to prove yourself. Several
years later, when Bull Connor, Commissioner of Public Safety in
Birmingham, Alabama, unloosed dogs on peaceful demonstrators,
the aversion was palpable.31 It reminded people of the Nazis, and
they would not tolerate it.
Initially this movement was very much about civil rights.32
The objective was to enforce the equal application of the law.
Everyone, regardless of race, was to be allowed to go to publicly
funded schools,33 to ride publicly subsidized buses, to use public
restrooms, to be served at public restaurants, and to vote in civic
elections. De jure segregation was to be dismantled, that is, the laws
were to be changed when they were unfair and were to be equally
applied when they were mandated to be equal. The culmination of
this was the civil rights legislation that passed following Kennedy’s
assassination. It was only subsequent to this that the call also went
up for an end to de facto segregation.34 If the proportion of the races
in different schools was different, not because legislation required
this, but because the neighborhoods in which the children lived were
segregated, this too was deemed to be unacceptable.35 As a result,
efforts at integration moved north. Students were to be redistributed
within school systems according to their percentages in the larger
community. If this could not be achieved by redistricting, forced
busing would impose it. Despite the resistance of parents eager to
preserve neighborhood schools, the government moved to compel
the desired outcome.36
The culmination of this policy was the advent of affirmative
action.37 Gradually, but with increasing momentum during the
Nixon administration, the government used race to manipulate
social phenomena. Rather than allow the marketplace, or individual
choice, to determine how individuals were distributed, various
agencies intervened to coerce an idea of fairness. Generally, this
meant that the final result would be in line with group representation
within the total population.38 Anything less was deemed racist and
subject to rectification by a quota system. Since quotas are anathema
in a democracy, these preferences usually went by another name, e.g.,
“diversity”39 or “multiculturalism.”40 On the job, in schools, and
in the dispersal of government contracts, one’s group membership
became the deciding factor, with lower standards typically applied
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to black, and later to Hispanics.41 The public at large believed these
techniques unjustified, but for the activists they were so crucial that
they made their influence felt at the ballot box.42
Another change occurred in the sorts of pressure employed to
achieve these goals. Initially, under the tutelage of Martin Luther
King, Jr.43, the Civil Rights Movement was dedicated to passive
resistance. Inspired by Mohandas Gandhi’s efforts in liberating India
from the British Raj,44 people pursued their objective through moral
suasion to convince Americans to liberate African Americans. Sit-ins,
boycotts, marches, and freedom rides were determinedly nonviolent.
The protesters held hands and sang about overcoming injustice
while they were beaten by batons or soaked by fire hoses. In fact,
this strategy worked as intended. When properly publicized, these
incidents had the expected effect. Ordinary middle-class Americans
were morally offended by the exercise of excessive force against
innocent protesters. So outraged were they that they demanded
reform. Nevertheless, as these developments gathered impetus,
they were deemed insufficient.45 Their very success whetted the
appetite of the activists for more and faster. Persuasion was replaced
by “nonnegotiable demands.” The authorities, or whoever was the
target, had to comply instantly and completely. There was no room
for equivocation or compromise. What the militants decided was
moral did not permit of adulteration.
All too quickly, this intransigence erupted into violence.46 Across
the country, inner cities erupted into riots. The phrase “long, hot
summer” became a commonplace as flames and bloodshed swept
over the North and West.47 Embittered firebrands now demanded
power rather than civil rights.48 They wanted to be in control. Even
though more African-American politicians were winning elections,
activists found the pace too slow. Soon gun-toting, beret-wearing
revolutionaries were out on the streets. Led by the Black Panthers,49
they insisted upon control of their neighborhoods. The police,
disparagingly referred to as “pigs,” were regarded as an occupying
army even as many more of them were black. Some suggested
that whites be cleared out of Mississippi so that it could become
an entirely black enclave. Gone now were calls for integration.
Separation became the order of the day, that is, so long as minorities
themselves engineered it. By the time the 90s arrived, some colleges
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were offering segregated dormitories on the premise that oppressed
groups were more comfortable living among their own kind.
Even some high schools, once the focus of efforts at integration,
unabashedly sponsored separate graduations for African Americans
and Hispanics.50
The victim mentality had become a national obsession.51 Whites
were expected to feel guilty for their continuing acts of oppression,
whereas blacks were excused from responsibility on the grounds that
they were innocents. Because Caucasians had imposed racism on
Negroes, it was assumed that prejudice and discrimination could
not flow the other way around. Hypocrisy became a way of life as
people refused to say publicly what they privately believed. Whites
refrained from criticizing blacks for fear of being branded racist,
while blacks concealed negative aspects of their communities on
the assumption that the truth would be used against them. The
only people that seemed happy with the situation were the liberals.52
Enduring frictions enabled them to pose as racial saviors and to reap
the rewards at the ballot box.
Piggybacking on the Civil Rights Movement was the Feminist
Movement. Its pedigree was as hoary as that of the racial activists, but
it had lain fairly dormant since the achievement of suffrage. Agitation
on behalf of women began with the dawn of the Industrial Age, but
its manifestations were at first isolated and sporadic.53 Not until
the middle of the 19th century did it become a force to be reckoned
with. Spurred by the entrance of women into factories and then into
classrooms and offices, aggrieved spokespersons began to demand
civic rights commensurate with their public occupations. Initially,
the focus was on the vote. Male resistance to sharing governmental
power was so stubborn that seeking it required a concentrated effort.
Women were also making their presence felt in fields such as social
work. Leaders in the temperance and antiprostitution movements,
they sought changes in the areas that affected them most. Desirous of
respect, they were able to obtain it in significant measure. Additionally
coeducation became available as industrialization progressed.
With the achievement of constitutional amendments regarding
Prohibition and the vote, many thought that feminist objectives
had been satisfied. There was an evanescent distaff upsurge during
the 1920s when so-called flappers flaunted their sexuality in short
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skirts and agitated dances, but this was to go underground during
the 30s. Depression-era virtue, as well as an enforced poverty, kept
female vivacity in check. During the Second World War, Rosie the
Riveter made her appearance, but she was the product of a national
crisis. While many women acquired a taste for the freedom that
accompanied earning paychecks, they were nevertheless prepared to
return to domestic chores during the 50s. It was not until the 60s
that a self-conscious feminism emerged to demand its share of the
social pie. Among many contributors to these developments, the
opening salvo might be attributed to Betty Friedan.54 Her book, The
Feminine Mystique,55 sounded a clarion call to battle. Women across
the nation responded to her thesis that selfish husbands imprisoned
wives in the suburbs. Placed on a pedestal and forced to endure
empty lives, women were subservient to a male jurisdiction over
important decisions.
As with blacks, the initial quest was for equal rights.56 Women
wanted to be able to sign contracts without obtaining their husbands’
permission or to take out loans in their own names rather than
under another person’s identity. In short, they wished to obtain
an independent legal status, with rights that belonged to them
personally. The activists saw an opening with the advent of civil
rights legislation. If the law was amended to read that both race and
gender were impermissible criteria for discrimination, women could
make effortless gains. This transpired when male legislators could see
no reason to deny women what they were prepared to give African
Americans. Women, with this one stroke, became an oppressed
minority with all the deference this implied. Not initially, but fairly
quickly, they too became eligible for affirmative action.57 Were they
for any reason to be denied jobs on account of gender or equal pay
for equal work, they too could seek relief in court. So tightly was
the concept of gender oppression bound to racial oppression that
sociology textbooks were rewritten to include race, gender, and social
class as equivalent phenomena.
Still, this was not enough for the reformers. They insisted
that absolute equality be written into the fundamental law of the
land.58 Thus were born the lobbying efforts to include an equal
rights amendment (ERA) in the Constitution. Women, by law, were
to be considered comparable to men in every respect. The critics
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fretted that such an edict would ultimately impose unisex bathrooms
and enlist female infantry soldiers,59 but its advocates denied these
intents. While the amendment was itself never fully approved by all
the requisite members of state legislatures, its aspirations gradually
began to permeate society. Bathrooms were never fully integrated,
but the military increasingly was. Women were mandated to be
given basic training alongside men on the grounds that they could do
anything their brothers could. The watchword among committed
feminists was that everything should be fifty-fifty. All jobs, including
the most powerful, were to follow this guideline. No longer would
there be a glass ceiling that prevented women from rising to the
executive suite.60 No longer would custom prevent women from
becoming construction workers or men from working in nursery
schools. There was, these partisans insisted, no biological difference
between male and female abilities; therefore, there should be none in
the marketplace or home.61 Housework too should be fifty-fifty, with
men becoming Mr. Moms. The endpoint was to be androgyny.62
Henceforward, gender would be irrelevant. For starters, traditional
gender roles were to be deconstructed so that all tasks were open to
everyone. Even dating patterns would be reorganized so that women
could ask men out. Moreover, just as with race, the final arbiter of
success would be an equality of results. Only when gender made no
difference,63 as certified by the equivalence of a color-blindness with
regard to sex, would this goal be achieved. Only then would women
be free to be whatever they wanted to be.
The ideal of androgyny, however, was impeded by traditional
social arrangements.64 First, as long as children were socialized
according to historical practices,65 they would be trained to perpetuate
artificial differences. With little boys given guns or trucks as toys and
little girls presented with dolls, boys would continue to aspire to
be soldiers and girls, mothers. What was needed was to give each
the other’s playthings—although on the grounds that they were too
violent, guns would be omitted. Eventually, a rationalized nurture
would overwhelm obsolete superstitions, and a new, more humane
division of labor would arrive. 66 Second, male aggression had to be
curbed.67 The reason that gender oppression lasted was that males had
grown accustomed to intimidating women into submission. Taking
advantage of their larger size, they had persisted in threatening rape
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should women assert their independence. This had to be stopped.68
Not merely persuasion, but strict punishment, had to be imposed
for violations of female rights. Men needed to be sent to jail if they
physically abused their wives. They also had to be chastised, e.g., by
being expelled from school, for engaging in any equivalent of rape.
Using sexualized language or staring lasciviously at a woman who did
not want to be admired qualified for this category. Such behaviors
created an impermissibly hostile working environment. Just as
physical rape prompted efforts to “take back the night,”69 it would be
necessary for enlightened women to protest pornography and male
boorishness. Third, in the catalogue of social changes, female values
had to replace their male counterparts. Because competition was
destructive, it needed to be supplanted by feminine cooperation.
Mutual supportiveness, rather than nasty rivalries, would reduce
communal violence and produce a better social environment for all.
In time, at least for a while, a tension equivalent to what had
developed among the races arose between men and women. Men no
longer knew whether they were expected to be chivalrous or asexual,
while women were unsure about whether to be gracious or assertive.
Were men supposed to cry in public? Were women to become
more bossy? No one knew for sure. There were even intimations
from some feminists that marriage, as historically defined, was
constitutionally permissive of rape. Perhaps, women did not require
male companionship at all. Gloria Steinem70 indicated as much
when she opined that women needed men as much as a fish needed
a bicycle. Nor was there a consensus about having children. In
many circles, caring for them was deemed oppressive; hence, many
thousands of professional women postponed motherhood in favor of
careers. All in all, the feminist revolution precipitated a great deal of
angst for men, for women, for couples, and for children. Expected
to open new vistas of female fulfillment, it inadvertently aroused
bewilderment for individuals and families alike.
The last watershed reform associated with middle-class
ascendancy was the War on Poverty. 71 Only a middle-class society
intoxicated with its own achievements could imagine that poverty
might be abolished. John Kenneth Galbraith72 celebrated America as
an affluent society, and people took this to heart. They were evidently
so rich that they had the resources to make certain no one would ever
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be poor again. Clearly, social mobility should be open to everyone.
So many individuals had climbed into comfortable positions that
it was unconscionable that anyone be left behind. This was unfair
and should not be tolerated by a moral community. According to
the middle class ethos, if the rules were applied equally to everyone,
then everyone should have a shot at doing well. Failing that,
provisions should be made to transfer payments to those who could
not compete on an equal basis. If a handicap or a social disability
impeded success, comfort should still be possible for those owed an
opportunity to share in the common good fortune.
For openers, welfare was declared a right and not a privilege.73
Government agents were instructed to inform those eligible that
they need not feel ashamed to apply for that to which they were
entitled. When welfare had been instituted during the Depression,
the fear was that free handouts would breed dependency. Franklin
D. Roosevelt74 himself was concerned lest people lose the incentive
to be responsible for their own well-being. This was to be forestalled
by imposing strict guidelines for eligibility. Now, these guidelines
were to be relaxed. In some cases, all a person had to do to enter the
relief rolls was to sign a form attesting to the lack of resources. Nor
would caseworkers act like detectives attempting to sniff out illicit
arrangements of men living with the women who were their clients.
Teenagers too, if they were in distress, could qualify as independent
recipients. This was the case if they were mothers. By the same token,
solvent relatives would no longer be compelled to support indigent
kin. In particular, children would not be required to contribute to
the upkeep of elderly parents. All were to be considered independent
of each other and, therefore, entitled to equal treatment.
Another front of the War on Poverty engaged social mobility.75
The intention here was to empower individuals who had been robbed
of their autonomy by an oppressive elite.76 Heretofore, reformers had
concentrated on redistributing physical resources; now, they would
attempt to redistribute social power. Democracy was reconceptualized
as entailing equivalent interpersonal influence. That some individuals
should exercise greater control over their destiny than others was
declared unjust. It was, therefore, necessary to train the weaker to
become stronger. First, they had to be told that it was their right to
be more powerful. Second, they had to delegate authority over their
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lives. Should they gain practice in making significant decisions, they
might be able to apply this to other situations. Third, they had to
be instructed in marketable skills. The illiterate would be taught to
read and write; high-school graduates would be encouraged to go
to college; blue collar workers would be steered toward vocational
training. Fourth, they also had to be taught to cooperate rather than
to compete. Community organizers would be sent forth to integrate
their activities. Only if the poor could pool their power could this
clout serve as a counterweight to that of the elites. In the end, it
would enable them to join the system and reap its benefits.
Begun with the sincerest of intentions, this crusade was to falter
before long. Some blamed this failure on the diversion of resources
to the Viet Nam War. They concluded that the nation could not
simultaneously finance guns and butter. Others thought that the
blame lay with a Republican administration that was not sufficiently
committed to the fundamental principles of the War on Poverty. In
any event, in little more than a decade, the campaign stumbled into
oblivion. Despite the floods of idealism tapped among the young
and social scientists, the momentum could not be sustained. By the
1980s, conventional wisdom was ascribing the program’s demise to
the rise of greed. The latest generation of Americans had evidently
stopped worrying about social justice and instead turned its attention
to individual enrichment. Early estimates that poverty might be
driven to extinction turned out to be premature. The poor were still
very much with us; indeed the ranks of those on welfare had grown.
Once more, promises of correcting the difficulties exposed by the
middle-class ascendancy proved empty. To the question What next?
few claimed to know the answer.
Before assessing the issue of these reforms, we should
acknowledge their Marxist roots. Obsessed with equality, the
reformers sought to impose a collectivist version of parity. Marx
envisioned that class conflicts would conclude with the triumph of
the proletarians. Once property was eliminated, competition would
disappear; hence, there would no way for some to assert superiority
over others. Everyone would voluntarily work for the whole and
then collect only what they needed from it. Much as on the starship
Enterprise, money would no longer be needed in a world where
exchange was unnecessary. Neo-Marxists were aghast that in the
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world as it is competing parties persisted in vying for dominance.
The leitmotif of their reforms was the need to resist the oppression
this principle generated. Elites, however conceived, were regarded
as the enemy. Only after they were overthrown could true equality
arise. A genuine egalitarianism, in which everyone was equal, could
not prevail so long as the bourgeoisie reigned. This contrasts sharply
with Jeffersonian impartiality. The Declaration of Independence
asserts that all people have an equal right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. An equality of results was never contemplated,
never mind to be coercively imposed.77 Indeed, Jefferson was candid
in advocating an aristocracy of merit. He hoped that in a free society,
the best would rise to the top. They might not be born to command
but would earn this distinction through their actions.
The Marxist and neo-Marxist epiphanies imagined a world
without hierarchy. Yet if hierarchy is built into human nature,
this was a fatuous expectation. To illustrate, most contemporary
sociologists recognize that poverty is a matter of relative deprivation.
They realize that America’s poor are not poor by historical standards.78
According to the American Census Bureau, as of 2002, 46% of
poor households owned their own homes; 76% of them had air
conditioning; nearly three-quarters owned a car; 97% had a color
television; and 73% possessed microwave ovens. Their poverty did
not consist in having to endure squalor or semistarvation. Compared
to others in their society, they were not doing well, but this measure
was only comparative. Yet, that is the point. What hurts about
poverty is not how little you have, but that you have less than the
next guy. Since hierarchies always have a bottom, those to be found
there feel disadvantaged compared with those above them. Given
the logic of this situation, absolute poverty can never be eliminated.
The best that can be achieved is to bring more people into the middle
by making social mobility available to all.
Power, too, is relative. It is also hierarchical and, therefore, can
never be parceled out with complete equivalence. The racial, feminist,
and poverty reformers all excoriated oppression in the expectation of
deliverance by a utopian equality of results. As romantic idealists, they
took an extremist view of equality, one that did not take account of
the human condition. The same was true of antiwar reformers. They
perceived an arrogance of power even in attempts at self-defense. As
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long as the United States is more powerful than other nations and,
therefore, superior, they would condemn its policies as unilateral.
But because its actions always betrayed this greater strength, it was
enjoined from exercising them. Only weakness, as imposed perhaps
by the collapse of the middle class, would satisfy this particular sense
of morality. The same applied to race, gender, and wealth. The only
definitive way to cease being oppressively racist, sexist, or financially
successful was to become poor and powerless, not an end likely to
recommend itself to those who were doing well—or who hoped to
do so.
The Great Disruption
The politicized reforms that followed hard on the heels of the
hippie eruption backfired. Despite preliminary optimism, these
reforms were not well calculated to improve the human condition.
Conceived in haste and in reaction to social changes that were difficult
to digest, they did not address the actual sources of discomfort. To
judge by what occurred subsequent to their imposition, we see that a
series of unanticipated complications followed. The timing of these
emergent problems, their temporal convergence, and their occurrence
in disparate societies suggest a disquieting causal relationship. This
was Francis Fukuyama’s79 conclusion. A political scientist by trade,
he dubbed what transpired “The Great Disruption.” Until this point
in its history, the Middle-Class Revolution had been making orderly
progress. The Eisenhower consolidation was relatively smooth, and
the hippie eruption had been more amusing than alarming. Once
the politicized reforms got going, however, small clouds on the
horizon swelled into thunderheads. Instead of people’s adjusting to
success and making it more general, society as a whole and a few of
its subdivisions in particular were subjected to significant harm.
Among the indicators of disruption to which Fukuyama alludes
is crime. First in the United States, then in Western Europe as it
caught up economically, crime rates soared.80 Starting slowly in the
1950s, but accelerating rapidly by the mid 60s, the violent crime rate
multiplied by many times. Assault, rape, and murder all became more
common, with, by the 90s, the murder rate almost ten times what
it had been at the turn of the century. Both the Wild West and the
gangster ridden 30s have worse reputations, but they were eclipsed

270

The Great Middle Class Revolution

by later events. Property crimes, such as theft and robbery, also
mushroomed. Ordinary people began to worry about being mugged
in their own neighborhoods. In New York City, they avoided places
like Central Park where they feared this might to take place.81 The
night became more frightening as potential victims contemplated
how much easier it was to be attacked after dark. In large cities, the
conventional wisdom now declared the streets ungovernable. Despite
hiring more police, there seemed no way to stem the torrent.
The family, too, appeared to be under assault.82 Once reckoned
the cornerstone of civilized society, it was falling apart. After the
elevated number of births in the Baby Boom, fertility rates declined
to fewer than the replacement rate of two per family. In Europe this
had long been so, but in the United States it was a novel experience for
times of prosperity. By century’s end, the population was still rising,
but this was due to high birth rates among fecund immigrants. More
troublesome was the increase in divorce.83 Its incidence, too, began
to spike in the mid 60s and reached an historically elevated plateau
in the 90s. By then, approximately half of all marriages ended in
court. This was better than it sounded, but only marginally so. In
fact, only a third of first marriages terminated in divorce; the rest of
the statistic was based one second, third, and fourth couplings. Most
people continued to get married—well over ninety percent—but
they did so at later ages,84 expecting their unions to last, through well
aware of the divorce rate. Once upon a time divorce was a deviant
act, but those days have receded into antique memory.
More disconcerting still was the growth in the rate of illegitimacy.
Divorce was already creating a generation of children raised by single
parents.85 As would be seen, this was stressful for the young, but
worse yet was growing up in a family that had never consisted of
two parents. Before 1950, fewer than five percent of all births were
out of wedlock. The pregnancies of unmarried women had once
been considered shameful. Often she would leave home to have her
child elsewhere, lest knowledge of her transgression ruin her chances
for married respectability. Giving the child up for adoption was
a forgone conclusion. When couples shared the prospect of such
a birth, they frequently married to provide legitimacy. After such
hastily arranged affairs, they explained to friends and relatives that the
child was premature. By the 90s, over thirty percent of children were
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being born to single mothers. In the African-American community,
more than two thirds of all youngsters suffered this fate. Nor was
it unusual for many to come of age in a family populated by several
half-siblings. It was also common to be raised by grandparents,
especially for children of teenaged mothers. Sadly unexceptional,
these children having children were unprepared for the responsibility
of parenthood. Many preferred to continue the party lifestyle that
put them in the family way in the first place. To compound this
misery, the largest share of illegitimacy occurred among the poor.
Those with the least adequate financial and social resources were the
ones most likely to bear the burden.
Fukuyama86 also emphasized the decline in interpersonal trust.
He had earlier documented that trust is imperative in gesellschaft
societies, and it was within these communities that the decline
was most precipitous. As the number of interdependent strangers
increased, their confidence in one another declined. People now
expected others to lie. They also expected cheating when someone
could get away with it. Sadly, surveys have shown, at least in school,
most did. Where once people left their front doors unlocked,
confident that no one would rob them, multiple lock, kept bolted,
became the norm, especially in large cities. Conventional wisdom
now stressed that placing temptation in front of others was almost as
serious an offense as the theft itself. Leaving one’s keys in an unlocked
car was condemned an invitation to teenaged joy riding. Ordinary
people were also encouraged to buy guns.87 These might be hidden
to keep children from having accidents, but not owning a firearm,
nor understanding how to use it, was thought to make families
vulnerable. It left them at the mercy of those who might attempt
a home invasion. In some towns, such as Kennesaw, Georgia, gun
ownership became mandatory. After this law went into effect, as was
intended, the volume of crime went down.
This lack of trust extended to particular segments of society. The
faith that Americans had in their government’s ability to help them
eroded badly. They were especially disillusioned with politicians.
Cynically convinced that most were liars, they considered their
promises with a grain of salt. Amazingly, when Bill Clinton88 was
caught red-handed, a common response was that everyone did what
he had done; that everyone lied to and cheated on their spouses.
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Although his denial of having sex with Monica Lewinsky was
patently false, it was not immoral because everyone told untruths
about sex. Sex was a private affair to be judged only by the wife.
What had once been considered depraved behavior had transmuted
into a justification of itself. 89
A similar cynicism extended to the media.90 The journalistic
purveyors of bad news became associated with their products,
particularly since they were assumed to slant the news to serve their
own purposes.91 Thanks to television, the volume of news to which
people was exposed had increased exponentially.92 Average viewers
could now see paparazzi pestering celebrities for photographs, pundits
of all sorts wildly spinning the facts to suit ideological preferences,
and vulgar sensationalism dressed up as the public’s right to know.93
If the public paid attention, it could also hear pious anchorpersons
justifying their latest biases. But many were not listening. They
had heard it all before. Even the police and courts were treated to
this suspicion.94 In previous years, before the Great Disruption, the
police had been the ordinary citizens’ friends and the legal system was
assumed to be the world’s best. Fairness and integrity were taken for
granted.95 Unfortunately, too many scandals followed. A drumbeat
of accusations about police brutality, political corruption, and sexual
peccadilloes convinced observers that where there was smoke, there
must be fire. They understood that much of what they saw was
exaggerated—that hyperbole was the standard means of generating
media interest—but they could not believe that none of it was true.
Though they knew that it was safer to trust little of what one saw and
less of what one heard, some of it registered.
Were this all that resulted from the turmoils following the Great
Middle-Class Revolution, it would be noteworthy. But there was
more. Not only were there more incidences of crime and distrust;
there was also greater disorder.96 Levels of civility declined along
with communal security.97 People were not as polite as they had
once been.98 Where vulgar language had previously been considered
a sign of poor breeding, four-letter words now sprinkled even erudite
conversations.99 Being too persnickety about obscene words came to
be interpreted as evidence of artificiality. It was stiff and uptight and
far too square for relaxed discourse. People said what was on their
minds, even when it was earthy. Real people apparently also wrote
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choice epithets on the sides of subway cars, abandoned buildings,
and unprotected billboards. Graffiti, formerly dismissed as a species
of vandalism, was reevaluated as street art. Among the cognoscenti,
graffiti came to be widely admired as a form of communication open
to those otherwise silenced by social conventions. This pattern of
rationalization became the norm in private discussions and public
forums; it also became standard fare in the entertainment industry.
Words never before heard coming from the silver screen or the
television set issued from the mouths of demure heroines. Worst of
all was what happened to music. During the 50s most popular songs
had been sweet and romantic. There were, to be sure, sexual allusions,
but they remained just that, allusions. The language of early rock and
roll was more explicit, but its words paled in comparison with those
in rap music, heavy metal, grunge, and hip-hop. Vocalists had no
difficulty in advocating that the police be murdered or that women
be treated as prostitutes. Accompanied by videos that left less and
less to the imagination, even young children were bombarded with
the next best thing to coitus. When criticized for these improprieties,
the entertainment executives and artists did not back down. This,
they explained, was real life, and real life needed no apologies.
Overall attitudes toward sexuality had undergone a
metamorphosis.100 In the pre-disruption 50s, television producers
were loath even to show married couples sleeping in the same bed.101
Usually they occupied twin beds and, if seen in an embrace, had
at least one foot on the floor. By the 90s, by common consent,
there had been a sexual revolution. Almost everyone now admitted
that sex was a natural function. People talked openly about it, and
television seemed obsessed with it. Scarcely a single episode of most
situation comedies could conclude without intimations of musical
beds. Consummating even the slighted physical attraction was
considered sophisticated. Everyone knew that being abstinent was a
religious affectation. Normal people had normal desires, which it was
healthy to fulfill. To do less was to be a prude. It indicated a neurotic
insecurity that was to be pitied rather than emulated. Virginity was
not a virtue; it was almost a psychological disorder. Ever since the
promulgation of the birth-control pill, there was no need to worry
about unwanted pregnancies. As long as people were careful, and
after the spread of AIDS102 this meant utilizing a condom, casual sex
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imposed no harm and was, therefore, no foul. Sex was fun, and what
was life for if not to extract its pleasures? Even the term “promiscuity”
went of fashion. Why not have multiple partners? During the 60s
and 70s, there was actually a period in which swinging was extolled.
Sharing partners, including in the midst of orgies, was praised for
improving relationships and removing guilt. It was just doing what
came naturally.
As time progressed, advertisements for casual sex appeared almost
everywhere. Besides the testimonials in the media, social dancing
became orgiastic. Bodies not only writhed in sexual ecstasy but
came to express in a pantomime of sexual collaboration. Clothing,
too, became more than suggestive. During the 60s, the miniskirt
made its appearance. Rising much higher than its 20’s forerunner, it
barely covered the crotch. This, however, was to seem modest when
compared with the thong. First introduced in bathing suits intended
to do bikinis one better, they became undergarment standards. With
the buttocks exposed and frequently highlighted by tattoos, the next
demand was that the breasts be liberated. Early feminists attempted
the feat by burning their bras, whereas later libertines reveled in wet
tee-shirt contests and in “girls gone wild” episodes of flashing chests.
Men, too, got into the act by discovering the Full Monte of male
strippers. The effect of this is to lower standards, albeit not to the
degree that it might appear. Yes, it is true that among girls the age of
first sexual encounter dropped to the high school years; with virgins
often ridiculed for their timidity. It also came to be expected that
couples would have sex before they were married. By the same token,
many decided to live together before marrying. At first promoted as
a sort of trial marriage intended to determine whether formal union
would succeed, when this turned out not to improve the chances of a
lasting relationship, it was simply accepted for what it was. Couples
became comfortable introducing their bed partners as roommates,
even to their parents. All the same, there was more private sexual
morality than was publicly advertised.
To begin with, the amount of sexual activity did not rise as
much as might have been predicted.103 People, especially women,
continued to be selective in their pairings. Frequently ashamed at
their own diffidence, they were unaware that others were privately
as reserved as they. Nor was cheating as extensive as the media
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depicted. More men strayed than did women, but the best evidence
indicated that this was about 25% for them versus 15% for women.
The misreading of what was happening had been encouraged by the
fact that the exhibitionists were more visible than more modest folks.
Nevertheless there was more experimentation with different sorts of
sex and with different sorts of partners. What made this dangerous
was that it was the young who were most vulnerable to being seduced
into compromising positions.
Also escalating during the Great Disruption was the rate of
substance abuse.104 Some of this increase was relatively modest.
Most people did not become confirmed addicts. Nevertheless, in
its early appearances marijuana was a gateway drug. Many who
experimented with it later turned to heroin and cocaine. There might
have been warnings, yet millions succumbed. And when hooked,
abusers became shadows of their former selves. Unable to hold down
solid jobs and addicted to expensive habits, they resorted to crime
and prostitution. This pattern became epidemic when crack cocaine
arrived on the scene. It could be smoked, rather than snorted or
injected; hence it was easier to use. Besides, it was cheaper. This made
it attractive to the poor; consequently they were most devastated by
its spread. Ironically, cocaine had begun as a high-status drug with
a reputation for being nonaddictive. When it became apparent
that addiction was possible, and after the government sponsored a
“just say no” campaign, usage among the middle classes declined.
Individuals who intended to be socially mobile understood that
success was incompatible with zoned-out substance dependence.
This left members of the lower classes to wallow in their wretchedness.
Already more vulnerable to alcoholism, addicted mothers gave birth
to crack babies, needle sharers were susceptible to AIDS, and all were
at the mercy of violent drug dealers. Added to this were the miseries
inherent in other substances. A plague descended upon many
neighborhoods, as amphetamines, quaaludes, ecstasy, angel dust,
and designer drugs flooded the market.105 Some of these recreational
narcotics established a foothold among middle-class teenagers, but,
in time, they easily made their way to ghettos and barrios.
Ironically, despite the fact that the middle classes flourished with
improvements in education, schools were among the most serious
casualties of the Great Disruption.106 Instead of learning becoming
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more highly developed, the reverse occurred.107 Education became
more widely spread in the sense that a greater number of children went
to school and more of them graduated with advanced credentials, but
the amount of information acquired declined. This decline was so
substantial that professional educators called it The Great Decline.108
Among its first indicators were the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)
scores. This gatekeeper test for college admissions was once
accounted a landmark of American education. Previous to its arrival,
acceptance to prestigious universities depended more upon family
connections than academic abilities. Consequently, universities like
Harvard and Yale were typified by the intellectual superiority of their
student.109 They became way stations that guided the nation’s best
and brightest into its most responsible and remunerative positions.
As a result, colleges of every description and students of every aptitude
scrambled to make use of the SAT. This diluted the talent pool, but
the deterioration in scores outstripped what was contained in this
explanation. In both reading and math, after the 60s, the college
bound did less well. So serious did this become that the Educational
Testing Service that owns the test changed its scoring procedures so
that the outcomes would be less embarrassing.
Below the college level, the devastation was as general.110 In
both primary and secondary schools, testing demonstrated that
students were less well prepared than earlier generations. Regularly
administered achievement tests made it plain that reading and math
competences were barely holding their own and that there was about
a four-year difference in the accomplishments between majority and
minority students. In areas such as science and history, the results
were especially discomforting. They revealed levels of knowledge
that were incredibly low and getting lower. When these figures were
compared with those of other countries, the American students
invariably came out toward the lower end of the spectrum. Even
students in third-world countries routinely did better in tests of
science and math. Much of this was disguised from parents because
their children’s grades remained high. In fact, they were probably
better than the parents’ own. This was not because they knew more
but because of grade inflation. Teachers were simply giving better
evaluations for inferior performances. They knew that to do well
their charges had to get into college and that bad averages might ruin
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their chances. Moreover, in passing nearly everyone rather than in
improving their teaching techniques, they more easily satisfied the
pressures coming from parents and administrators. Little Johnny
had to get good grades to keep these potential critics happy. Long
gone too was the technique of tracking students according to their
abilities. Because the final results were supposed to be equal, no
one was allowed to get special treatment to accelerate learning.
This would have been antidemocratic, but could be prevented by
the simple expedient of permitting everyone to remain comparably
ignorant.
Another of the educational declines was in discipline. In the
past, students were expected to heed their elders. When asked to
behave themselves, they generally complied—often fearful that if
they did not, their parents would inflict dire punishments. This too
changed. Middle-class parents became advocates for their offspring.
They lobbied teachers to make sure that Johnny was given a fair
shake. Lower-class parents were often as adamant. They would not
stand to have their children. If Junior complained of an injustice, his
parents were certain his obstreperous behavior had been justified. The
teacher needed to shapeup, not the student. As a consequence, many
inner-city classrooms were reduced to bedlam. The pupils would
not sit quietly in their seats for teachers who could not enforce social
order. Many youngsters even brought weapons to class. Teachers
and administrators became so concerned for their own safety that
they refrained from imposing discipline. Instead of teaching the
sort of self-control that is a prerequisite of middle class success, they
allowed chaos to reign, both externally and internally.
Already mentioned was the increase in the numbers on welfare
rolls.111 More people were getting more money from the federal
government than ever before, on the condition that they not make
efforts to support themselves. This not only promoted dependence,
it also encouraged cheating. Subsequent accountings would
demonstrate that double and triple dipping was common. With
loosened restraints appearing throughout society, taking advantage
of bureaucratic slackness appeared to be the rule. One could, for
instance, collect welfare from several venues, get unemployment
insurance while working under the table, obtain workman’s
compensation for fake disabilities, and receive training for a job
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only to quit it immediately to be trained for something else one also
did not intend to do. No one in charge seemed to care about such
cheating, so why should the cheaters?
Emblematic of these patterns is the Watergate scandal.112 Richard
Nixon stood before television cameras to declare that he was “not a
crook,” symbolizing the lowering of standards so characteristic of the
Great Disruption. If the president could manipulate the truth, why
shouldn’t everyone else? It was all a matter of what you could get
away with. Besides, the country was rich. It was so rich that none
of this mattered. The middle class cornucopia furnished a bounty so
enormous that it covered a multitude of sins. Why not scramble for
a bigger piece of the pie when there was so much pie to go around?
Why not cheat a little when no one would be seriously hurt by this
larceny? There was no need to come to honest terms with these
disruptions as long as almost everyone was sliding by.
The Culture Wars
The Great Disruption exacerbated what had already been a
division between liberals and conservatives. They were now at each
other’s throats over the most fundamental community values. So
ferocious did their conflicts become that they were dubbed a Culture
War.113 Each side was convinced that the other was ruining the
republic and, therefore, put up a stiff fight to preserve civilization
from destruction. According to the liberals, democracy hung in the
balance. Unless the appropriate reforms were put into effect, freedom
and equality were in jeopardy. According to the conservatives, these
reforms were the real source of jeopardy. They were said to undermine
the principles upon which freedom depended. To this charge liberals
responded by dismissing the conservatives as rigid troglodytes. They
were evidently so opposed to change that they refused to repair what
was unequivocally broken. The conservatives did acknowledge a
respect for tradition, but they insisted that their goal was to defend
crucial institutions.114 They too wanted things to be better; but they
did not want to throw the baby out with the bath water.
Both sides had a point, but they also missed a larger one. Though
each would vociferously deny the claim, what both were attempting
to do was intimately intertwined with what the other was seeking.
Each assumed that it was engaged in an independent activity, while
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it was, in fact, participating in a social give-and-take. Theirs was a
moral negotiation.115 Most people, including the parties to significant
disputes, assume that morality is a matter of eternal truths. They
believe it is a set of absolute and inviolable rules. What is good
is by definition good, and what is right is inherently right. There
can be no ands, ifs, or maybes about such matters. Nonetheless,
such dichotomous inflexibility is wrong-headed. Morality is not
a compendium of peculiarly obdurate facts. Nor is it something
discovered by inspecting the texture of the universe. Morality is a
social process. Its rules are socially constructed, socially modified,
and socially enforced. As a result, the standards people apply are
always of evolving. They never stand still. By their very nature,
dynamic, they perpetually trap humankind in a tug-o-war between
competing factions.
The nature of moral negotiations is distinctive.116 Because moral
rules are considered exceptionally important, conflicts over their
shape are typically animated. Among other things, the parties to
any enterprises tend to be polarized.117 They perceive themselves
as the good guys, with their own side always in the right. This
places a premium on distinguishing oneself and one’s allies from the
competing faction. But to be distinct, one has to be distinctive. Both
cliques want the differences separating the sides to be so striking that
potential converts will have no difficulty in choosing sides. This,
however, fosters extremism. Because the real world is pervaded by
shades of gray, to provide the desired clarity, divergences have to be
enhanced and the lines between them artificially straightened. In
other words, the differences have to be simplified and strengthened
if the players are to assemble the alliances necessary to promote their
positions. Moral goals, therefore, tend to be idealized, with each side
regarding its own as perfect and the other’s as the opposite. Both are
certain that were they to succeed, the world would become a better
place, whereas a victory for their enemy would be tantamount to an
excursion into hell.
Moral negotiations normally emerge when people are faced with
unusual circumstances. They engage in debate about the standards
best equipped to mange their discomfort because they are not sure of
what will work. Although stated in objective terms, their positions
are customarily predicated on individual situations and distinct
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socializations. In essence, what they conclude has helped them and
their allies to prosper is projected as potentially helpful to everyone.
Often intransigent in these assertions, the battle can seesaw back
and forth for centuries until a compromise is achieved. Because
this argument can escalate into warfare, people are often grievously
injured in their quests for justice. Nevertheless, this slipshod means
of developing a communal consensus ultimately subsumes more
information than might a purpose-designed settlement. Just as
with economic planning, a centralized version of moral planning
would be ill advised. Rather than displaying rationality, it would be
coercively unfair—favoring the interests of its designers over those
of the community. In morality and, therefore, in moral negotiations
no one has the final authority because no one is neutral or objective.
Since no individual can discern all that is involved, even the best
of intentions can go astray. The upshot is that mistakes are made,
sometimes corrected, and then replaced by new mistakes. This is
one of the reasons why history proceeds in waves. A push-andpull of discovery, often based on idealized miscalculations, results
in both progress and error. Improvements tend to accumulate, but
the missteps that occur along the way can send civilization reeling
backward.
A contemporary illustration of a moral negotiation is the debate
over abortion.118 Generally this squabble is framed in either/or
terms. The pro-choice faction demands that abortion be available
to all, including teenaged girls, upon request. The pro-life faction
counters that abortion is equivalent to murder and is, therefore,
never acceptable. These are extreme positions, but it is usually the
extremists who are most active in asserting the virtues of any side.
Eventually, a modified position tends to emerge. For abortion, this
looks as if it might eventuate in discouraging abortion, while making
it legal in most cases. It should also be noted that this quarrel first
arose only after modern medicine made it probable most children
would grow to adulthood. Before that, natural deaths swept away
many babies before anyone could contemplate abortion. Similar
considerations apply to euthanasia and alcoholism. Euthanasia
was not a moral problem requiring a social solution until medicine
made chronic illness more common by increasing life expectancy.
Likewise, alcoholism was not regarded as a social difficulty until
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industrialization demanded workplace discipline. Only then did
discussions of temperance and prohibition enter the public domain.
By the time of the middle-class tipping point, liberals had taken
the initiative in promoting moral reforms.119 Their efforts to reduce
incidences of racism, sexism, and poverty came to the fore as social
mobility became available to more and more people.120 It seemed
to these activists that a variety of impediments were interfering with
success based on merit. Those already on top, namely the elite, were
oppressively preventing others from supplanting them. One of the first
challenges to this form of intimidation developed out of anthropology.
These social scientists, in dealing with preliterate peoples, discovered
that their subjects too were fully human. Anthropologists also
found that, in order to understand these other lifestyles, they had to
view the world from that perspective. This practice was eventually
codified as “cultural relativism.” Soon thereafter, cultural relativism
mutated into ethical relativism.121 Figures such as Frans Boas122 were
appalled when Social Darwinism123 was utilized to justify eugenics.
At the turn of the century, Francis Galton’s argument that society
should improve its genetic heritage by preventing the poor and
disabled from reproducing had won many converts.124 It seemed
reasonable that society should not handicap itself by diverting its
surpluses into supporting individuals who could never contribute to
the commonweal.125 What Boas and his colleagues realized was that
this theory was being used to excuse the punishment of those on the
bottom. In the United States, welfare clients, who were often black,
were inaccurately accused of mental retardation and subsequently
sterilized. This was not only barbaric, it was also a depraved form of
discrimination.
Ethical relativism, however, went further; it argued that moral
rules were culturally specific. Each society constructed its own
standards, and, therefore, no group was entitled to criticize the
imperatives of another. Each was right unto itself. Thus, if Muslims
practiced polygamy, it was valid for them, whereas monogamy was
correct for Americans. In due course, this relativism was idealized
to promote non-judgmentalism. The intellectually sophisticated
were to refrain from judging how any others chose to live. This
was their own business, not those of the busybodies. By the 1940s,
Carl Rogers126 had imported this attitude into psychotherapy.
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His client-centered therapy taught that every individual deserved
“unconditional positive regard.” Parents and therapists distinguished
between the person and the deed so that the individual was always
accorded loving support. In psychotherapy, this had the advantage
of putting vulnerable clients at ease, but within society as a whole it
justified universal tolerance. No one was to be punished for misdeeds
but rather to be presented with an opportunity for rehabilitation.
This would enhance a miscreant’s self-esteem so that he/she would
never be motivated to repeat mischief. People who loved themselves,
because others loved them, would pass this attitude along to still
others. Ultimately, unqualified kindness would be the rule. Social
mobility would, in effect, become universal because cooperation
would replace competition.
By the end of the century, this philosophy had mutated again.
Now it was identified with multiculturalism and diversity.127 Not
only were women and minority groups to be accorded respect, their
differences were to be celebrated. Society as a whole would benefit
from cultivating their unique contributions. One of the means
through which this was expressed was “rights talk.”128 Sooner or later
most political conversations devolved into assertions of individual
or group rights. Formerly, civic-minded persons were concerned
with promoting duties. Now, the issues are what is due the claimant.
Activists never tired of presenting women and blacks as victims
entitled to protection from the more powerful. Only this could
insure that there would be no social losers. Only this protection
could guarantee that all would share in the advantages of freedom.
Far from imposing social or personal discipline, punishment and
violence were to be outlawed. Even symbolic violence, that is,
making people feel uncomfortable by treating them unwelcomely,
was to be banished.129 Merely to express a hatred or sexual attraction
toward protected groups was intolerable. Denying the right to feel
good personally was considered the equivalent of punishment.
Competition, too, was seen as punitive. Because competition
required some to win and others to lose, it imposed pain on the
weak. Instead of accepting the weak as they were, competition
consigned them to failure. In response to this abuse, efforts were
instituted to eliminate the circumstances productive of invidious
comparisons. Dodge-ball was banned from the schoolyard on the
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grounds that it was both violent and discriminatory. By the same
token, many Little League teams decided not to keep score. At the
end of the season, everyone would get a trophy regardless of efforts
or talent. Enlightened persons began to say—and mean—“it’s not
whether you win or lose, but how you play the game.” Actually,
it was not even how you played, but merely whether you showed
up—and sometimes not even that. Anything less was oppressively
unequal and, therefore, the opposite of genuine freedom.
It was this moral entrepreneurship that sparked a revival of
conservatism.130 Largely in retreat through the 50s and 60s, by the 70s,
referring to oneself as a “conservative” once more became respectable.
This appellation, however, had undergone a transformation. The
political turf was now crowded with fiscal conservatives, social
conservatives, neocons, religious fundamentalists, and libertarians.131
All claimed an allegiance to tradition in one form or another, but
what made them allies was a shared revulsion at what liberalism had
become.132 They looked at the reforms accelerating into extremism
and demanded a halt. Blacks might deserve a color-blind society,
but not quota-oriented affirmative action. Women were entitled
to equal pay for equal work, but not androgyny. The poor were
worthy of a chance to get ahead, but not to excessively generous
transfer payments that robbed them of their independence. Leading
the charge in this culture war were the religiously committed. More
deeply offended by the assault on family values than most, they had a
faith which gave them the courage to stand up and say so. When the
multiculturalists asserted that single parenthood was just as legitimate
as the traditional family, they bridled at the suggestion. This was not
what the Bible said, and they would not be persuaded otherwise.
Conservatives, in general, asserted an adherence to the primacy
of the nuclear family. What many did not realize was that this was
less traditional than they imagined. While household consisting
of a man, woman, and their children was of ancient lineage, the
companionate marriage is a recent innovation. Though the gospels
urged women to be subordinate to the husbands, this was not how
contemporary fundamentalists regarded the message. They, too,
emphasized mutual respect between spouses. There was to be a
division of labor between the two, but this was not the same as it had
been. Essentially, middle class standards were being grafted onto old
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texts. The fundamentalists, while quick to defend school prayer, had
no intention of instituting a Christian theocracy. As democratically
committed as their fellow citizens, they found nondenominational
messages perfectly acceptable. Indicative of their attitude were
attempts to place copies of the Ten Commandments in courtrooms.
These, they argued, were representative of no particular church, but
were part of the Judeo-Christian, and even the Muslim, tradition.
Among the values conservatives defended most vociferously were
“responsibility,” “merit,” and “discipline.”133 They believed in oldfashioned standards and wanted to see them respected. This mindset was exemplified in their approach to law and order. Exasperated
by the legalistic exploitation of excuses to relieve malefactors of
blame, they wanted hold them accountable for their misdeeds.134 If
this meant that murderers deserved capital punishment, so be it. As
to the major liberal reforms, conservatives were ambivalent. Most
believed passionately in fairness, but they were convinced that benefits
targeted for oppressed minorities were a mistake. Unimpressed with
claims that one had to tilt in order to restore balance, conservatives
insisted that the same rules be applied to all. Committed to a market
economy and interpersonal competition, they wanted people to
earn what they received. Nevertheless, in return for upholding this
version of fairness, conservatives were castigated as racists, sexists,
and classists. According to the liberals, they were merely protofascists
determined to turn back the clock.
The liberals, despite a professed dedication to being nonjudgmental,
held strong opinions about conservatives.135 Although prepared to
leap to the defense of fascists and Marxists, the fact that conservatives
might be able to impose their values made them too dangerous to
disregard. Tolerance was acceptable for embattled minorities, not
for potential majorities. These could not be accorded unconditional
positive regard but must be converted to the correct viewpoints. Nor
was this to be done gently. Conservatives offended liberals. Liberals
grew indignant at conservative attitudes and were unwilling to allow
those to prevail. In this, liberals were prepared to utilize political
coercion. After all, that which was immoral had to be suppressed.
Thus, laws needed to be instituted to make certain that hate crimes
were extinguished. Those who used drugs recreationally might find
their habits decriminalized, whereas those who murdered minority
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members would be treated more harshly than those who killed
members of the majority—with women, numbering more than
men, of course, defined as a minority. Likewise, men who battered
their wives would no longer be warned to desist but immediately
would be carted off to jail. Moreover, cultures that engaged in female
circumcision would be ostracized for their barbarity. To the extent
possible, in the name of female liberation, pressures would be exerted
to criminalize what had been a religious rite.
Remarkably, liberalism reverted from universalistic to
particularistic standards. During the Middle Ages, members of
the nobility were subject to different laws than others were. The ax
rather than the noose, for instance, was used to execute them. With
the dominance of commercialism and its resolve to level the playing
field, equality before the law became a central aim. Contemporary
liberalism reversed this trend. Some people would receive special
benefits because of their classification, whereas others were to receive
harsher punishments. Even the weight one’s testimony was accorded
in courts would vary with group membership. Women, to provide
a salient example, were allowed to judge whether they had been
sexually offended. The standard of what was permissible was their
reaction, rather than a more objective standard. Instead of a colorblind or gender-blind society, a socially engineered equality became
the goal.
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Chapter 8

Bobos in Limbo
The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing
of blessings; the inherent virtue of socialism is the equal
sharing of miseries. (Winston Churchill, Saying)
CONSERVATIVE. n. A statesman who is enamored
of existing evils, as distinguished from the Liberal, who
wishes to replace them with others. (Ambrose Bierce, The
Devil’s Dictionary)
What a chimera then is man! What a novelty! What a
monster, what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a
prodigy! Judge of all things, feeble earthworm, depository
of truth, a sink of uncertainty and error, the glory and the
shame of the universe. (Blaise Pascal, Pensees)
Bobos
David Brooks1 is owed a debt of gratitude for introducing the
term “bobo” into our lexicon. Related to the concept “yuppie,” the
appellation places a critical segment of the middle class in historical
context. The yuppies were young, upwardly mobile professionals.
They were go-getters on the rise, whereas the bobos are defined as
“bourgeois-bohemians.” This clever elision calls attention to the
artistic connections of many of the recently successful. Brooks
begins his ethnography of what is mistakenly labeled “the new upper
class” by exploring changes that occurred in the New York Times
society section. During the 1950s, the paper routinely identified
couples about to be married by the prominent families to which they
belonged. The WASP establishment was then very much intact. It
took pride in its heritage and the nation’s most prominent newspaper
was happy to collude in this. To quote Brooks, one such notice read:
“She [the bride] is descended from Richard Warren, who came to
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Brookhaven in 1664. Her husband, a descendent of Dr. Benjamin
Treadwell, who settled in old Westbury in 1767, is an alumnus of
Gunnery School and a senior at Colgate University.”2 The towns
in which the parties lived, and the fortunes to which they were heir,
clearly took precedence over personal achievements. And, as clearly,
the longer their pedigree, the better.
By the 60s, this had begun to change and by the 90s the style was
radically different. Not only had ethnics, such as Jews and Italians,
replaced the Episcopalian elite,3 but their claims to higher status
rested on other grounds. They were part of an emerging educated
class. Instead of families of recent immigrant origin taking pride
in their roots, the new wedding notices featured the couple’s own
accomplishments. The bride might be described as a graduate of Yale
University who was employed as a buyer by Bonwitt-Teller, whereas
the groom would be recognized as having received a degree from
Princeton and now working for a Wall Street law firm. Again to
cite Brooks, as of 1999 a reader of the wedding section “learned that
Stuart Anthony Kingsley…graduated magna cum from Dartmouth
and got an MBA from Harvard on the way to becoming a partner
at McKinsey & Company. His father was a trustee of the National
Trust for Historic Preservation, and his mother an overseer of the
Boston Symphony Orchestra…”4 Thus, even the WASP elite had
begun to justify their inclusion by personal or family achievements.
Their lineages might be long, but it was education, expertise, and
service that earned them notice.
The bobos, who edged their way to privileged status, were very
much a product of the middle class. Prominent, not because of their
fortunes, or those of their ancestors, they were instead eager to be
portrayed as “the best and the brightest.”5 Theirs was a dominance
predicated on the exercise of power, and this power was predicated
on what they knew. As a result, they were not given to ostentatious
display6. Long gone were the palatial estates of the Robber Barons.7
The bobos might have multi-million dollar apartments just off Park
Avenue and even more expensive ski lodges in Aspen, but they were
not fawned over by battalions of servants. Like President Jimmy
Carter,8 they were prepared to carry their own luggage. Flagrant
luxuries struck them as pretentious. They were just ordinary folks
whose jobs happened to provide a comfortable living. Painfully
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aware that they were not Vanderbilts,9 or Astors,10 most did not want
to be. They were content to be hard-working professionals whose
prestige derived from their social contributions.
If the bobos were not into luxuries, they were into lavish
necessities. Brooks presents what he calls the bobo “code of
financial correctness.” According to this list of conventions, it is
virtuous to spend $25, 000 on one’s bathroom, but not $15,000
on a sound system. Top of the line leather patent leather shoes are
a no, no, whereas pricey hiking boots are not. Kitchen equipment
is definitely okay, no matter the cost, but purchasing a Corvette,
rather than an SUV, is tasteless. It is also “perfectly acceptable to
spend lots of money on anything that is of ‘professional quality,’ even
if it has nothing to do with your profession.”11 Paying $300 for a
“multi-purpose industrial-strength toasting system,” therefore makes
more sense than paying $30 for an ordinary toaster. These pretend
journeymen often congregate together in “Latte Towns” such as
Boulder, Colorado and Burlington, Vermont, where they revel in
upscale coffee shops and arts and craftsy main streets. Dedicated to
the games of their youth, they flaunt a healthy physicality. Much
like over-grown college students, they enjoy demonstrating that
they can still play tennis or skipper a sailboat. Then too, they love
nature. They dote on climbing mountains to appreciate their beauty.
Dedicated environmentalists, they are committed to saving virgin
forests, rather than cutting them down. Besides, this naturalness is
good for one’s health. Jogging around the reservoir in the morning
and eating greens for lunch preserves one into a vigorous old age.
Evidently not only are the bobos smart in business; they are smart in
their personal lives.
Emblematic of the bobo mentality are Ben and Jerry of Ben
and Jerry’s Ice Cream. Vermont based refugees from New York,
they learned how to make their product from a library book. They
then proceeded to name their politically correct flavors for their
culture heroes, e.g. Cherry Garcia. More importantly, they have
been ostentatious in supporting liberal causes. The bobos may be
successful professionals, but they harbor an antibusiness mentality.
Comprehending themselves as erudite specialists, they resent the
managers they perceive as the real bosses. In their view, they are
hardworking employees, whereas these executives are the loutish
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heirs of the old bourgeoisie. Even when self-employed, the bobos
regard themselves as oppressed under-dogs. They, as opposed to more
business-oriented types, are creative in their approach. Definitely
not power-hungry parasites, they contribute their ingenuity for the
good of mankind. Self-expression, not insensitive control, is their
forte. Though they make innumerable business decisions, they
reject any association with a profit motive. Theirs is the world of the
intellectual and the artist, not of the avaricious capitalist.
Bobos, whether they understand it or not, are cultural specialists.
Because their power derives from their education, they identify
with pursuing knowledge and beauty for their own sake. The oldline bohemians12 clustered on the fringe of polite society, yet were
aggressively excluded from it. Prosperous capitalists might patronize
their productions, but these unconventional creators themselves lived
in scruffy poverty. The new bohemians, in contrast, find themselves
smack-dab amongst the bourgeoisie. Living upscale lifestyles, their
self-conceptions are nevertheless those of the impoverished outsider.
While not aesthetic innovators on anything like the scale of their
forebears, they aspire to this standing. Decidedly not organizational
conformists, most are nevertheless tied to corporate giants, either
as employees or contractual providers. Apt to depict themselves as
hierarchically feeble, regardless of their poormouthing, they set the
standards for these establishments. They dictate what is tasteful, what
is linguistically appropriate, and what is morally acceptable. As the
lawyers, the doctors, and the artistic directors of untold companies,
they determine what is within bounds and what is doable. In this,
they are guided by cultural principles derived from the bohemian
past. What they believe is proper often has more to do with what
these antecedents thought than with what works in the here and
now.
The chief innovation of the bobos is in how they manage selfdirection.13 Avowed enemies of bureaucratic institutions, they
loathe the technical rationality it theoretically embodies. Max
Weber dissected organizations he thought were tightly controlled
by scientifically validated procedures.14 In the quest for efficiency,
these institutions ostensibly sought to banish the human factor in
favor of impersonal rules. Such rigidity does not, however, appeal
to individuals invested in creative autonomy. Having majored in
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the arts, the humanities, and the social sciences, they are not about
to defer to the authority of MBAs or engineers.15 When they make
decisions, they wish these to be in flagrant disregard of systematic
rationality—or so it would seem. Bobo self-direction is grounded
more in aesthetics, emotion, and self-expression. They go with their
gut-feelings, not with cut-and-dried regulations. In fact, energetic
and competitive, they affect an easy-going cooperativeness. From
their mouths roll forth collectivist platitudes, yet their behaviors
speak a different language. The situation is exemplified in an episode
of the television program Law and Order, where a Hollywood
executive explains that she works with people who talk like hippies,
but who act like members of the Sicilian mob. Utterly cutthroat
in their tactics, as they twist in the knife, they justify what they are
doing in artistic and humanist terms.
Caught in a time warp, many bobos feel more controlled than
controlling. Excruciatingly aware of their personal limitations,
they appropriate an historical rationalization to vindicate their
shortcomings. Part of being a social leader is dealing with uncertainties,
which means making some choices that will not work out. Being able
to blame these on the wayward foolishness of uncouth managers can,
therefore, be psychologically comforting. Obviously the greed and
narrow-mindedness of these supreme leaders is at fault. The bobo,
however, is guided by an impeccable sense of what is appropriate.
Individual feelings and tastes cannot go wrong, especially when
these are imputed to moral sources. In this, the cultivated bobo is
in touch with the natural, and perhaps spiritual, springs of correct
behavior. Much as the old bohemians were certain of their muses,
their cultural descendents are as romantically inspired. This means
that they cannot be wrong; nor be blamed for what goes wrong. The
problem must be with the system, or those in charge of it—never
themselves. Though, in fact, responsible for many critical decisions,
they do not feel responsible.
Politically, the bobos have become the standard-bearers of
liberalism. Flamboyantly in sympathy with progress, this is conceived
of in antiestablishment terms. Because they do not pride themselves
on being pillars of the system, but rather as its victims, they feel
justified in agitating for its dismemberment. Indeed, the bobos and
modern liberalism were born in the same crucible. They both came
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to prominence as the hippie eruption subsided. When the blatant
bohemianism of the flower children proved a disappointment, its
aspirations were transferred to more politicized objectives. Members
of the middle class who were disillusioned with the oppressive
discipline of their jobs appropriated this reformist reaction for
their own purposes. Uncomfortable both with internalized rules
and restraints on their social mobility, they adopted a philosophy
opposed to both. They too would fight for a world in which social
stratification was abolished, but would do so using the tools of the
middle class. Well educated, and familiar with the means of social
organization, they would turn these skills to the task of achieving
complete equality. Though they would be appalled by the suggestion,
their liberalism was a variety of political romanticism. With their
goals largely determined by emotional reactions, they were even
given to theatrical politics. For them, dramatic promises replaced
careful evaluations in deciding public policy. It became enough for
office seekers to indicate that they “cared” about the welfare of their
constituents; they didn’t actually need to do anything to promote it.
Likewise, as long as they proclaimed their approval of cooperation,
they could be as competitive as they pleased.
Brooks describes the bobos as living in paradise.16 He notes
both their political ascendancy and the comfort in which they live.
He also suggests that they have achieved a stable adjustment to
contemporary conditions. According to him, “we are not living in
an age of transition. We are living just after an age of transition.
We are living just after the culture war that roiled American life
for a generation. Between the 1960s and the 1980s the forces of
bohemia and the force of the bourgeoisie launched their final
offensives…. But out of that climactic turmoil a new reconciliation
has been forged. A new order and a new establishment have settled
into place….”17 This new order is the bobo order. It supposedly
combines the bohemian and the bourgeois in a stable compromise
that satisfies both sides of the dispute—and the nation as well. The
new elite, namely this culturally dominant middle class, can, owing
to its ingenious rationalizations,18 exercise leadership responsibilities
without having to acknowledge them. It can apply its skills and
energies for the common good, without anyone admitting that the
old elite has been superceded.
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Nevertheless, there is reason to believe this is overly optimistic.
The culture wars are not yet over; they have not even taken a respite.
Today’s sulfurous politics do not include the riots of yesteryear,
but they hardly bespeak a renewed “era of good feelings.” The
antagonisms continue to run deep because a durable settlement has
not been achieved.19 Rather than the bobos being in paradise, they
are more accurately described as hovering in limbo. Caught between
a bohemian lifestyle they cannot truly emulate and leadership
responsibilities they have not fully embraced, they do not rest easy.
Theirs is a temporary stopping place. Because it sits on a foundation
of contradictions, the so-called “bobo reconciliation” promises to be
torn asunder. Since much of what is being attempted is impossible,
it cannot come to fruition. For similar reasons, camouflaged
resentments directed toward the old establishment portend
difficulties. Eventually these hatreds must be seen for what they are
and resented. The current resolution runs only along the surface,
with oppositionalist policies frequently breaking through. Many of
the players persist in doing things designed to injure their enemies
rather than to accomplish positive objectives. Thus they press for
regulations to hamper despised business interests or they promote
a sexual promiscuity that cannot be good for the next generation,
irrespective of the consequences. Sooner or later this must redound
against community interests and motivate fresh efforts to find a
workable solution. Despite Brooks’s assurances, the transitional
period has not ended. Still a work in progress, much remains to
be done. Where this middle class reaction will come to rest is not
certain, but that it is not yet reached this place is.
The Liberal Hegemony
Liberalism has a reputation for being the wave of the future,20
whereas it is actually an undertow from the past. While its champions
claim that is the herald of things to come, it reverberates with ideas
derived from times long gone. Although liberalism has not lived up
to its promises, it has nevertheless become the dominant force in
contemporary politics.21 In the United States and Western Europe
it is currently the default position. In both of these middle class
societies, criticisms of the market economy, and of those at its apex,
have become standard fare. This is a fact of life. The momentary
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state of the cultural wars may obscure this verity, but it needs to be
explained. Even though liberals present themselves as an embattled
minority, while conservatives assert that the liberal advantage is merely
temporary, this is because both are embroiled in a desperate battle.
Each side is seeking to define the situation in tactically advantageous
terms. Thus, liberals derogate their favorable position lest their allies
grow complacent, whereas conservatives boast of modest victories to
inflate their apparent strength.
Still and all, liberalism is the contemporary gold standard. It
declarations are widely considered pure and free from the taint of
avarice. Although what conservatives advocate was traditional
within the recent past, nowadays it is castigated as “extremist.”22
Amazingly, should the traditionalists come to the defense of the
market system, they are immediately suspected of greedily oppressing
the disenfranchised. Or if they argue on behalf of merit, they are
dismissed was favoring their associates. Meanwhile, liberal promises
of total equality are assumed to be realizable. The conditions they
endorse may never have existed among human beings, but these are
regarded as what would prevail if opposing forces did not intervene.
Moreover, liberals are assumed to favor “progress.” They want to
bring about changes for the better, whereas conservatives, in Ambrose
Bierce’s23 memorable words, “are enamored of existing evils.”
Apparently suffering from inborn anxieties, they are too apprehensive
to experiment with up-to-the-minute solutions. Unlike the liberals,
they do not possess the courage to peer into the future or to conceive
of substantial improvements.
Liberalism has become the international orthodoxy wherever
the industrial revolution has triumphed. In Western Europe
conservatives have occasionally prevailed at the polls, but they have
scarcely been able to undo the nationalizing impulses that convulsed
the continent immediately following the last World War. Deeply
steeped in welfare economics, their governments continue to tax their
citizens for “essential” services. More particularly, national medical
programs tend to be state run and vacations centrally mandated.
Likewise traumatized by Nazism and the Cold War, ordinary people
have opted for a civilized pacifism. They do not want to see their
homes or families devastated, hence when conservatives urge them
to take defensive measures, they reject these out of hand. Even when
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the United States, an ocean away, was shaken into an anti-terrorist
resolve and decided to invade Iraq, they were outraged. Perhaps an
embargo might do, but once this was demonstrated to be ineffective,
actual combat remained unthinkable. Much preferred was hand
wringing about the environment and global warming. The Green
parties, not the neo-fascists, created the stir in the streets.
In the United States, despite the successes of Richard Nixon
and Ronald Reagan,24 liberalism has continued to set the agenda.
Nixon,25 on account of his earlier anti-communist grandstanding,
was commonly reckoned to be a die-heart conservative, but that was
not how he governed. Not only did he preside over the opening
to Communist China,26 but he instituted significant extensions
to affirmative action and, when inflation arose, he imposed price
controls. Reagan was more conservative, but found that the only way
to control government spending was to create budget deficits. This
was necessary because congress continued to enact programs aimed at
solving a raft of imagined problems. The best he was able to achieve
was a political stalemate. With each new electoral cycle politicians
continued to promise legislation to satisfy the latest political itch.
Their proposals to end racism, sexism, poverty, or medical inequality
regularly crowded the legislative calendar. The public might hate
higher taxes, but it clung to its love affair with government-sponsored
benefits. Nonetheless, there arose a split between the urbanized
coasts and the less professionalized heartland. So-called “blue” states
like New York27 and California became reliably liberal in national
elections. The bobos that increasingly populated their voter lists
hailed government initiatives and tilted toward candidates who
supported them. They even contributed record amounts to their
campaigns. From their perspective, liberalism was enlightened selfinterest. Conservatives were, in comparison, consigned to a holding
operation. The best they could usually muster was to slow the liberal
impetus.
Another indicator of the supremacy of the liberal establishment
was the spread of political correctness (PC).28 Despite the ridicule such
super-sensitivities elicited among ordinary people, its prohibitions
became a national obsession. Formerly unexceptional words were no
longer allowed—on pain of ostracism. Women could not be called
girls or airline stewardesses “stewardesses.” They were now “flight
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attendants.”29 The greatest sensitivities dealt with race. Though a
host of four-letter words began to seep past the censors, this did
not include the “N-word.” It was strictly off limits. Talking about
“Negroes” or “colored people” is impolite, but alluding to “niggers”30
is vicious. So malicious was this considered that when detective
Mark Fuhrman was discovered to have employed it in private eight
years before the O.J. Simpson trial,31 this was taken as prima facie
evidence that he was a racist and, therefore, that his testimony could
not be trusted. Without any additional proof, jurors jumped to the
conclusion that he must have planted the incriminating glove. As a
result, they acquitted a person that the nation perceived to be a coldblooded killer.
Liberals tend to believe in the inevitability of their dominance.
Just as Marxists at one time boasted that they were on the side of
history, these semiMarxists sense that impending developments are
ineluctably trending as they prefer. Liberalism promises a bobo
millennium. Once the cold hand of capitalism is lifted from the
throats of workingpersons, everyone will be free to be his/her self.
The “system” will no longer repress self-expression; hence along with
complete equality will come complete freedom. What they fail to
add is that they will be in control32 of these events. As their sponsors,
they intend to preside over the implementation of the required
reforms. The bobos also claim that they will eliminate competition.
In their future, cooperation will win out because fair-mined people
will recognize its virtues. What is not mentioned is the parallel
between their situation and that of the early capitalists. Adam
Smith33 is famed for remarking that no one hated competition more
than business people. They realized that unbridled struggles over
market share could result in bankruptcy. In response, whenever they
got together, they colluded to fix prices. Best of all was monopolistic
control of the marketplace. This guaranteed profits without the
anxiety of trying to out-do one’s competitors. Bobos too despise
the uncertainties of scuffling for success. Their goals may be more
cultural, entailing the triumph of ideas or aesthetics, but these too
are open to defeat. Abolishing competition would, at least in their
imaginations, preserve them from this fate. In their future, there will
be no losers—especially among themselves.
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Paradoxically, liberalism is more reactionary than liberal. For
the better part of a century, liberalism has been identified with
social change. High school civics classes routinely define it as the
political doctrine that promotes prudent reforms. Thought to be
inherently forward-looking, it has been described as the opposite of
conservative. Nevertheless, liberalism would reinstall ancient social
structures if it could. The names may change, but the patterns are
of primordial vintage. Just because people proclaim an allegiance
to progress does not prevent them from looking backwards. Thus
Joseph Stalin34 described the collective farms he was imposing on the
rural Soviet Union as a prelude to communist democracy, whereas
they were like nothing so much as a reincarnation of the old-time
estates of the Russian boyars.35 In both cases, the peasants were ruled
from above. The only difference is that under Stalin, the effective
owners were the party apparatchiks. A similar allegation can be
lodged against Napoleon Bonaparte.36 Although he proclaimed
himself the embodiment of the French Revolution,37 he had himself
crowned Emperor. To the end of his days he portrayed himself as the
champion of liberty, whereas he had in reality attempted to reinstate
a draconian form of absolutist rule.
Liberals too are absolutists. In their love of government
programs, they continuously press for centralized rule. Remarkably
like the communists, they assume that they are smarter than other
people and, therefore, that they know what is good for them. Better
educated than their peers, they readily imagine themselves in the
role of “philosopher king.”38 Once triumphant, they would surely
work for the benefit of their fellow citizens. In this, they would
also be uncannily effective. As a natural “intelligentsia,” they would
accurately assess their constituents’ true interests. And because
contemporary technology permits improved communications, as the
central planners, they would implement these more efficaciously than
did a Louis XIV.39 Instantly transmitted orders would be quickly
monitored regarding their results and the information revolution
would make the ensuing decisions more relevant. Added to this, an
unparalleled command of the facts would enable them to determine
the most cost-effective ways to achieve communal goals. Given the
advantages of this sort of centralized command, it was their duty to
quash opposing forces. Where the Sun King was once preoccupied
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with drawing the fangs of the French nobility, their destiny was to
reduce the power of commercial interests. Forever on the alert to
corporate corruption, they needed to minimize the resources available
to bourgeois leaders. Among the tools for achieving this would
be crippling taxes and complex regulations. By imposing either
or both, they would prevent greedy plutocrats from doing further
mischief. Left out of these calculations, however, was the mischief of
an unopposed liberal dominion. That it too might become corrupt
was unimaginable.
Liberals are also romantic naturalists. They want to turn back
the clock to a time before human interference distorted Nature.
Rousseau’s40 noble savages never existed, but today’s college educated
observers are aware that there was a time when our ancestors were
hunter-gatherers. During this Golden Age, people presumably dealt
with each other as their biology decreed that they should. Men
and women were total equals; and no one was the paramount chief.
Humankind lived in large, extended families where they treated
each other like honored relatives—because they were. Inherently
loving, they had not yet been crippled by the competitive pressures
of commercialization. This is taken as an article of liberal faith;
one redeemable only by dismantling the machinery sustaining the
Industrial Revolution. How could it be doubted that if people get
back to nature, they would thereby get back to their true selves?
This was clearly what the Unabomber thought. Albeit a grotesque
offshoot of the liberal ideal, in his manifesto justifying random
killings he vilified industrialism as heartily as might any nature child.
Leaning upon his mathematical training, he was simply more explicit
in drawing out the implications of this thesis than most.
In many ways liberalism represents a fusion of Marxism and
bohemianism. Though the “liberal” designation has been around
for many years, in its current manifestation it is relatively recent.
At the dawn of the twentieth century, what was to become modern
liberalism was associated with progressivism41 and socialism.42 The
excesses of rampant industrialization had already become apparent,
as had the discomforts of urbanization. Progressives like Theodore
Roosevelt43 wished to fix these by tinkering with the system. They
sought legislation to curb the abuses of the monopolists and to insure
healthful products in the marketplace. The socialists, however,
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sought bolder solutions. They wanted the government to control all
property. This, they insisted, was the only way to enforce economic
justice. Nevertheless—although Eugene Debs did well in the voting
booth—most Americans were fearful of such dramatic change. They
preferred to be cautious, especially after the Russian Revolution sent
a shudder through elite circles. In fact, it was not until the 1916
presidential campaign that the editors of The New Republic, in an
effort to distinguish their position from the fading progressives,
popularized the “liberal” label.44 This term had international
cachet because of its prior use in Europe, but it now took on more
democratic overtones. Soon, however, the prosperity of the roaring
twenties was to make an enormous social upheaval, in any form,
seem superfluous.
The Great Depression45 changed all this, and incidentally made
liberalism more respectable. With capitalism falling apart, the donothing Republicanism of Coolidge seemed insufficient. Something
had to be done. Franklin Roosevelt46 did his best to administer
the appropriate medicine. Himself a scion of the upper class, he
did not intend to destroy his country’s heritage. Nonetheless his
administration was riddled with activists who did. As a consequence,
socialist, and to some extent communist, solutions found their way
into his policies. These did not, however, dominate. A sort of
compromise was reached. The New Deal blend of capitalism with
collectivism was to prove the underpinning of modern liberalism.47
The role of the government was significantly enhanced, but it did not
assume an ownership function. For ordinary people, there was the
safety net of social security, for workers support for unionization; for
business people regulation to prevent speculation and profiteering.
The government would be the final arbiter of what was fair and
under dire circumstances would provide the stimulus to restart the
economy.
This compromise was to outlast the return of normalcy under
Eisenhower.48 Although a Republican, he made few efforts to undo
the policies that underwrote confidence in the system. Yet liberalism
in its ascendant format was really to take shape during the 1960s.
First under Kennedy,49 but more decisively under Johnson,50 it
became political dogma. The movement from the hippie reaction to
political romanticism has already been outlined, but how this resulted
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in a fusion of Marxism and bohemianism has not. The bohemianism
of the hippies is patent, as was their idealistic inefficiency. Indeed,
it was this inefficiency that the emerging Marxist element sought to
rectify. If there were to be genuine reforms, i.e., if complete parity
was to come to fruition, the activists would need more than flower
power—they would require well-planned interventions. At the time,
conventional wisdom held that centralized planning was inherently
more effective than unsupervised market transactions. Communists
might be mean-spirited, but they were also supremely rational.
Thus, if the lingering socialism of the 30s were combined with the
warmheartedness of the hippies, it might be possible to correct the
defects of both. What the Europeans called “social democracy”
could then come into being, with ordinary people protected by a
government that genuinely cared about them. Racism, sexism, and
poverty51 would succumb to social engineering presided over by
an educated middle class that retained the idealism of the flower
children. Some might describe this as governmentally enforced
love, but reformers intoxicated by visions of universal ecstasy were
undeterred. They had seen the light at the end of the tunnel, and it
was a liberal light.
Liberalism52 glowed with such vivacity because it incorporated,
or seemed to incorporate, crucial middle class values. Peace, equality,
and rationality were the apparent bedrock of democratic prosperity.
To enhance and intensify these could only be good. Marxism, in
piggybacking on these, made its projections seem compassionate.
No war for any reasons, equality in all things, and rationality
administered by intellectuals would make a good thing better. These
themes did not include freedom because it seemed to Americans
raised on assurances of liberty that this was a foregone conclusion. It
did not occur to them that equality and freedom might sometimes
be at odds. Nor could they imagine that equality would be coercively
imposed. They were not that kind of people. They were Americans;
i.e., they were nice!
Universal niceness has indeed been one of the most enduring
themes of liberalism. Forged in hippie friendliness, it assumed
that if one is nice to others, they will reciprocate by being equally
nice. There is no need to be coercive because everyone wants to
be friendly if given the opportunity. The origins of this attitude
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can be found in children raised in middle class prosperity. Taught
to share their toys, they were also instructed that when they did,
their playmates would return the favor. It did not occur to middle
class types that a propensity to share was contingent upon possessing
surplus resources. They sincerely believed that even the meanest
person would desist from evil if confronted with a broad smile and
a welcoming handshake. This sort of niceness essentially combined
the goals of peace and equality. In refusing to threaten others and, in
treating them with respect, it sent the message that their aspirations
toward parity would not be challenged. No one was going to force
those on the bottom to settle for less; there was, consequently, no
need to resort to defensive force. Everyone could be friendly because
no one was going to exhibit any animosity. So compelling was
this logic that even criminals could be rehabilitated once they were
showered with ample doses of love and compassion.53
This was peace and equality as advanced by emotional means.
Primarily a hippie, rather than a Marxist contribution, the role of
warm feelings was raised to heroic proportions thanks to the Bohemian
legacy. It created what some have dubbed a “social Marxism,”54 i.e., a
Marxism based on Herbert Marcuse style love and sex.55 The pivotal
thesis was that if what was inside a person made him/her what he/
she was, then surely placing this in contact with others would alter
what they were. At a minimum, it would draw out emotional truths
hidden deep within. No longer would there be tests of strength
between individuals; only communication between kindred spirits.
Gone too would be an impulse toward competition; replaced by a
firmly entrenched commitment to be non-judgmental.56 Also firmly
installed would be a desire to be compassionate. People would want
to feel empathy for others and this would impel them to help those
in need of assistance. Furthermore, once their insides were exposed
to each other, they could not help but experience sympathy. And
once they were sympathetic, they would act benevolently.
One of the forms this compassion took was a defense of the
underdog.57 Those who did not have the power58 to safeguard
themselves could be equal only if others came to their rescue.
Niceness demanded efforts at such universal protection. Left out of
this assessment, however, was whether such interventions would be
just. It was assumed that evening out differences was automatically
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fair. Unfortunately, the reflexive emotionality of this attitude has
been visited upon the Israelis, with results they would not consider
appropriate.59 When the Jewish state was first established, most
western nations supported its independence. A couple of million
Jews pitted against many tens of millions of Arabs did not seem to
be a principled contest. Initially it appeared that these refugees from
the Holocaust might be pushed into the sea, but when they managed
to hold their own, they were roundly applauded for their courage.
For a while, they looked like an heroic David, who had felled an
aggressive Goliath. Then came the Six Days War and the Yom
Kippur War. During these, a well-equipped Israeli military soundly
defeated Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. This too seemed like the underdog
coming out on top and was at first welcomed. But as the years
passed, the odds were turned on their head. The longer the misery
of the Palestinian refugee camps appeared on television screens, the
more the losers began to seem like the real underdogs. The Jews had
been transmuted into an army of occupation and, in some eyes, into
racist oppressors. Despite the fact that Islamic fundamentalists still
threatened to throw them into the sea, and the small detail that both
sides were Semitic, they were scolded for taking repressive measures
against suicide bombers. Now depicted as terrorists for resisting
terror, their capacity to protect themselves deprived them of their
earlier sympathy, and converted many liberals into the allies of their
foes. The lesson was that niceness was accorded the weak rather than
the strong; irrespective of the moral implications.
A second enduring theme of liberalism has been its adherence
to centralization. Planned economies, and cradle-to-grave welfare
programs, appear rational to those who obtain their status from a
cultural expertise.60 Intent on exercising these skills, they are certain
the man on the street is too ill informed and too selfish61 to make
sound choices. Despite protestations of being social democrats, they
distrust democratic institutions; especially those of the marketplace.
One of the clichés of American politics is that having to meet a
payroll equips businesspeople with both a sense of responsibility and
the personal discipline to oversee governmental budgets. This surely
goes too far—as the success of any number of nonbusiness politicos
can testify. Nevertheless, those who learn their administrative skills
from ideological sources can be sadly deficient. Cultural leaders, who

Bobos in Limbo

311

develop their plans of action in bull sessions with their peers, easily
go astray if they never get to test these in practice. They may believe
that a perfectly balanced scheme for achieving a particular objective
cannot help but succeed, only to discover too late that it will not.
This has been one of the unwelcome lessons of social engineering.
Programs, such as Head Start,62 looked unstoppable on paper. How
could providing minority children with personalized instruction
before they entered grammar school not enable them to keep up
with better-prepared peers? The only problem was that experience
proved it did not. Though these youngsters made initial gains, these
did not last past the fourth grade. This, however, did not prevent
liberals from proposing a federal take-over of the nation’s medical
system. They were certain that they could manage one seventh of the
country’s economy more efficiently by placing it under the direction
of a bevy of public agencies. Not even the experience of Medicare
costs escalating wildly beyond the original predictions cautioned
them to be modest.
Centralization is good for many things. When coordination
and/or uniformity are called for, it is frequently the best approach.
Nevertheless centralization does not automatically confer insight or
wisdom. Because planners are subject to the hubris of power, they
tend to over-estimate what they understand or can control. There
is also a tendency to underestimate the appropriateness of socially
negotiated outcomes. Indeed, processes in which no one has a
preponderant voice strike them as anarchic. Combined with the
liberal certitude in their innate goodness, there is an unwillingness
to consider decentralized solutions. To the political romantics
allowing others to address their own problems seems to tantamount
to abdicating their duty to save their inferiors from themselves. It is
to do nothing in the face of a palpable obstacle, which is equivalent
to allowing problems to spiral out of control. That their proposed
interventions might be irrational makes no sense to those bred to be
proficient problem-solvers.63
A third enduring theme of liberalism is its ambivalence toward
social rules.64 On the one hand, rules are perceived as an essential tool
of centralization. Those who sit in the middle of the social web know
they must often implement decisions by promulgating laws and/or
administrative regulations. Unless others are ordered to take action
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on pain of a specified sanction, they may not respond. Moreover,
centralized rules, that is, approved forms of standardized behavior,
are supposedly superior because those best able to determine what
is for the common good have formulated them. Were individuals
to go off on personal tangents, they would make grievous errors.
They might, for instance, behave in a bigoted or unfair manner.
On the other hand, standardized rules impose personal constraints.
They prevent people from acting as individuals and convert them
into virtual automatons. Such obligations are definitely inimical to
creativity or self-expression. Nor do externally imposed controls allow
people to be guided by their feelings or aesthetic sense. Intrinsically
judgmental, uniform regulations provide no outlet for unconditional
positive regard. They are, to be blunt, the diametric opposite of
tolerance. In enforcing one-size-fits-all solutions, differences are
submerged and conformity is demanded. Which is definitely not
nice.
This, however, does not prevent liberals from endorsing
some rules; or from doing so enthusiastically. If they believe that
significant moral principles are at stake, they are eager to see them
enforced. This was the case with the Supreme Court’s decisions
regarding integration. Whether or not “separate is inherently
unequal” is literally true, they supported the use state power to act
as if it were. The same is the case with Roe v. Wade.65 When more
democratic institutions failed to pass legislation making abortion
legal, they turned to an un-elected court to do their bidding. After
a mere majority of appointed justices eventually found a previously
undiscovered constitutional right to privacy, they applauded its
discernment. In their view, this protected freedom and was, therefore,
an exception to their antipathy toward external directives. The same
applies to the constraints of political correctness. Whether these
standards are enshrined in university codes of permissible language,
or are less formally enforced via ridicule, they are deemed justified
omissions vis-à-vis the consecration of self-expression. Indeed,
because they are intended to protect people, they are not regarded as
rules, but as elementary common sense. This enables their advocates
to engage in mental gymnastics to vindicate whatever they want. To
illustrate, burning an American flag gets interpreted as a form of
protected speech, whereas calling someone the N-word is regarded
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as a hostile act worthy of being banned. The liberal antagonism
toward rules is thus managed by particularizing them. Instead of
the universalization dominant within market relationships, a tactic
more reminiscent of absolutism is preferred. The only way to predict
which rules liberals will approve is first to distinguish between their
friends and enemies. Despite unending protestations of an allegiance
to principle, this is trimmed to fit the political exigencies of specific
alliances. A Clarence Thomas66 could surely explain why he, but not
a Bill Clinton,67 was condemned as sexist. Apparently making an
off-color joke is more culpable than is engaging is sex with an intern,
that is, if one is also opposed to Roe v. Wade.
Sitting cheek by jowl with particularized rules is liberal
permissiveness. In the name of being nice, it is considered imperative
not to offend people by demanding that they do what they are not
inclined to do. This attitude has, first and foremost, been applied to
the family.68 Liberal parents frequently decide that it is better to be
a child’s friend than an authority figure.69 Children who are allowed
to get their way are placates their offspring when they protest against
being punished. This way, their brood will love, rather than fear them.
Spouses too are allowed free reign.70 The object is to demonstrate
that they are not pierces of property, but free to pursue pleasures
in their own fashion. In perhaps the most bizarre manifestation of
this phenomenon, partner swapping71 has been advocated as the
ultimate expression of interpersonal trust. The same approach also
extends beyond the home, e.g., to the school.72 No longer is it to be
regimented, but it must become a place dedicated to cultivating free
expression and creativity. Children are not to be forced to sit silently
in their seats, but are encouraged to decide what they want to learn
and how they want to learn it. Old style discipline is rejected as
tantamount to imprisonment.73 Even dress codes are discarded as
too restrictive. In essence, the liberal solution to an ambivalence
regarding rules is that they are okay for others, but not for themselves
or their friends. They (and their allies) are loving people who do not
require external constraints to keep them in line.
Contradictions of Liberalism
Among liberals, it is an article of faith that capitalism is riven with
contradictions.74 A system based on decentralized commercialism
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and representative democracy is regarded as inherently unstable.75
This analysis goes back at least as far as Marx.76 He assumed that the
same mechanisms that made the industrial order distasteful would
eventually force its demise. One of the reasons the market-based
system generated unprecedented prosperity was that its entrepreneurs
were driven by greed. It was because they were seeking to accumulate
as much as they could that they implemented profitable efficiencies.
At the same time, in their unrelenting pursuit of riches, the fruits
of their achievements were concentrated in ever fewer hands. This
would ultimately alienate the workers who made this possible.
Once they understood that they were being exploited, they would
overthrow their masters. Out-numbered, and grown effete from
luxury, the bourgeois hegemony would disappear as unconditionally
as had the dominion of the dissolute Romans.
Undiscouraged by the failure of this prediction, the neo-Marxist
element in liberalism still expects capitalism to crumble. Marx had
not anticipated the rise of the middle class, nor its dominance within
representative democracies, but this has not deterred his acolytes
from uncovering fresh reasons for its imminent downfall. Daniel
Bell,77 who describes himself as a socialist in economic matters,
is among these. He perceives an intrinsic conflict between the
avariciousness of modern materialism and the asceticism necessary
to finance economic growth. In the old days, when the Protestant
Ethic78 was operative, entrepreneurs willingly postponed gratification
in order to invest in their enterprises. Fully expecting their reward
in heaven, they could control their desires in the here and now in
favor of was needed by their businesses. With affluence, however,
came decadence. Those grown unimaginably rich could not refrain
from indulging their private dreams. As some of their number began
to say, “when you’ve got it, flaunt it.”79 Why not fly the Concorde
to Europe to save a few hours? Why not purchase a sports car that
can go one hundred and fifty miles an hour? What else is money
for? This attitude effectively diverted them from commerce. It made
the governing classes lazy and sidetracked their resources from more
productive purposes.
In this, however, Bell is wrong. First, as to their laziness, this
has no more occurred than did the impoverishment of the working
classes. The middling orders, including the bobos, are, for the most
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part, very hard workers. They put in long hours and do so in a
disciplined manner. Religious asceticism is evidently not necessary
for commercial effort. People can be motivated by professionalism as
well as by a desire to please God. Second, other ways to finance capital
formation than through personal savings have been developed.80
Contemporary capitalism invented numerous such mechanisms. To
state but a few, stocks, bonds, and government programs all proved
effective in concentrating the necessary funds. Corroboration of this
is found in a constantly growing economy. Thus when computers
were invented, they were not consigned to a back shelf because
companies were strapped for cash. Nor did self-satisfied executives
refuse to learn how to use them.
Bell81 also suggests that there is a conflict between
bureaucratization and a desire for self-expression. He characterizes
the modern corporation as hide-bound by a devotion to detailed
procedures and picky records keeping. This, he laments, contrasts
sharply with the predilections of an educated workforce preoccupied
with its emotional well-being. There is, to be sure, this sort of
tension, but it is not true that the market has found no ways to
cope with it. Just as Marx over-looked the emergence of the middle
class, Bell discounts the emergence of a professionalized middle class.
The specialization inherent in postindustrialization called forth an
individuation that is indeed inconsistent with idealized forms of
bureaucracy. Nevertheless professional workers are capable of a
decentralized organization in which they control much of their own
efforts. They, thereby, escape the close supervision that characterized
early industrialization. Since their expertise and internal motivation
permit more creativity and emotional independence than Bell
imagined, they get to call the shots.
This said, adjusting to the on-going evolution of the Commercial
Revolution entails more than an appeal to tradition. Because
the past cannot be an infallible guide to the future, the ideals
appropriate to primitive capitalism are insufficient to its more recent
professionalized form. The nature of interpersonal honesty, social
responsibility, and family relationships cannot be identical in a mass
society. A certain level of social experimentation has, therefore, been
inevitable. So has a conflict between increasingly divergent moral
perspectives. Indeed, this is essential as a means of testing revised
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solutions. Liberalism itself has put forward an assortment of such
social innovations, while traditionalists have challenged the validity
of these proposals in an effort to find something better. Each side
of this culture war is convinced of its correctness, but the eventual
resolution is likely to differ from what either would find ideal. That
which works under emergent conditions is invariably beyond the
ability of the participants to foresee.
What is clear is that the liberal solutions have proved no more
satisfactory than would have an unalloyed traditionalism. To
judge from the nascent disorders of the Great Disruption,82 they
too failed to resolve the dilemmas thrown up by the Middle Class
Revolution. Questions about how to handle prosperity, a revised
division of labor, and self-direction among professionals have not
yielded to their idealism. Specifically, they have not reconciled the
conflict between emotional spontaneity and rational calculation.
If anything, the contradictions of liberalism are more serious than
those of traditional capitalism. Ideologues who attempt to execute
their visions verbatim are in for grievous disappointments. Because
their dreams always include inconsistencies, they can never deliver
precisely as promised. As an example, more often than not, the
centralized and naturalistic mechanisms said to promote peace,
equality, and rationality are incapable of doing so. They certainly
cannot promote these simultaneously. To illustrate, liberalism
implies that it can supply both equality and freedom. But this is a
vain assurance. The situation is rather like that to which Winston
Churchill83 alluded after Neville Chamberlain came back from
Munich promising “peace in our times.” Churchill observed that the
prime minister had chosen peace over honor, but would eventually
have neither. Liberals likewise tend to choose equality over freedom
and are destined to achieve neither.
Liberalism, in shunning market-oriented values such as
responsibility, merit, and discipline, does not help professionals adjust
to their newfound powers.84 Instead of assisting them in applying
their expertise and motivation, it offers comfort via a fictitious,
never-never land of pipe dreams. Far from being compassionate,
or even moral, it undermines its aspirations through its grandiosity.
Taking idealism too far ensures the opposite of what is desired. A
platitude most children learn is that the road to hell is paved with
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good intentions. This is as true of the liberals as it was of the hippies.
Despite their hopes, a resort to Marxist embellishments did not provide
rationalism so much as an additional layer of fantasy. Paradoxically,
liberals go on to denounce conservatives as mean-spirited and coldhearted. Their adversaries are assumed either to be callous computing
machines or greedy monsters. Alleged to suffer from a condition
analogous to that of the Conquistadors when Cortez told the Aztecs
that his Spaniards had a disease that could only be cured by gold, they
too are labeled terminally avaricious. Nevertheless, in believing this,
liberals demonstrate their own emotional immaturity. In refusing to
see people, including their enemies, as complex human beings, they
confirm an idealistic short-sightedness.
To begin with, liberals specialize in “invidious goodness.”85 They
condemn their moral competitors as “bad,” that is, in comparison
with themselves.86 Instead of modestly performing good works,
they ostentatiously proclaim a dedication to these in order to put
others down. As they tell it, they are the ones that care about the
poor and downtrodden; whereas the traditionalists do not. They
compassionately feel other’s pain, whereas conservatives are selfinvolved egoists. In essence, their opponents are censured for not
living up to liberal standards. But in making this claim, they engage
in the very behavior of which they theoretically disapprove. Ironically,
they are the ones being “mean” when they insist on rubbing in their
goodness. Were they truly moral, they would let their deeds speak
for themselves.
Nor is liberal relativism inherently moral.87 Those who tolerate
everything, including the intolerable, have no standards. When they
accept whatever is as right, because they are not prepared to judge
anything as wrong, they perforce accept conditions others would
recognize as morally abhorrent. Thus, were some people to find
slavery, human sacrifice, or genocide to their taste, on what grounds
could these be criticized? The consistent relativist must desist from
outlawing cannibalism or ethnic cleansing should those who commit
these deeds believe them valid. If unconditional positive regard
cannot be withheld for any reason, the true relativist is barred from
expressing disagreement. Deep down most liberals know this. In fact,
they do disagree with many practices—often vehemently. Rather
than stand quietly aside while others engage in racism or sexism,
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they protest. Nor are they troubled by Emerson’s88 criticizing the
“foolish consistencies” as “hobgoblins of little minds.” Inconsistent
though they may be, they are addicted to particularizing. Regularly
making ad hoc judgments about their opponent’s shortcomings,
they exempt conservatives from their strictures of tolerance. As
the bad guys of their moral universe, those on the right side of the
aisle are admonished for their purported callousness. Meanwhile,
their friends, e.g., the feminists, are not allowed to languish without
assistance. Like other human beings, liberals delight in hurling verbal
barbs at their foes, while regaling their allies with praise. Theirs is
thus a selective compassion. They may feel for the agony of the street
junky, but they gloat when a Rush Limbaugh reveals he is addicted
to painkillers. For them, the anguish of the “little guy” is far more
repugnant than that of an articulate opponent.
Worse still is the immorality of the short horizon. Liberals tend
to make extravagant promises without fretting about their long-term
consequences. It matters less to them whether their programs work
than whether they promise to work. If increasing the minimum wage
is intended to put money in the pockets of the poor, but, in fact,
results in their becoming unemployed, they will continue to advocate
for it. If bi-lingual education89 is sold as facilitating the assimilation
of immigrant children, but produces a generation incompetent in
English, at least they tried. The difficulty with this approach is
that ignoring predictable consequences is equivalent to not caring
about what happens to people. It is to live in a fantasy world where
actual pain counts for less than imagined pleasures. After all, in the
Antebellum South, slaveholders justified their peculiar institution
by insisting that they were intent on civilizing their property. They
did not consider themselves immoral because they overlooked
the many injuries thereby inflicted. In contemporary America,
something analogous occurs with regard to school discipline. It is
anathematized as inflicting force on the powerless without regard
to the implications of abolishing social control. Samuel Bowles
castigates classroom order as a means of channeling poor children
into work as factory laborers. Yet were he to peer further into the
future, he would perceive that these external disciplines instigate the
internal disciplines vital for social mobility. Merely letting children
do whatever they please implicitly consents to their ignorance and
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subsequent failure. Similarly, advocating multicultural families on
the grounds that this permits individual freedom is to doom the poor
to single parent households that cannot prepare them for economic
advancement. It is to promote short-term expediency over the longterm happiness of millions of innocents.
Nor is liberalism particularly nice.90 Coercion is alleged to be
the domain of traditionalists who believe in such things as spanking
small children. Yet there is more than one way to be coercive. One
can also inflict force indirectly. One can, for instance, impose it
without overt acknowledgement. Liberals proclaim that they are
always kind, but because they want to win, they frequently play
rough. Human experience is such that everyone learns that excessive
niceness is an invitation to exploitation. People who never stand
up for themselves are habitually relegated to the leftovers. The
result is that most individuals discover how to be assertive. Some
disguise their aggressiveness by accusing others of being nasty, but
upon closer inspection themselves inflict pain. Thus throwing
conservatives out of academic positions on the grounds that they are
not being collegial surely qualifies as unkind. So does destroying the
newspapers of campus Republicans when they publish unwelcome
editorials. Name-calling, which has become a liberal staple, is
likewise not very nice. Sticks and stones break bones, but names
break spirits. Even so, deadly violence is not excluded from the liberal
arsenal. The lengths to which they can go—and this is admittedly
an atypical case—was demonstrated by the Weather Underground.91
An offshoot of the Students for a Democratic Society,92 this faction
of urban terrorists came to the conclusion that peace would never
arrive through persuasion alone. When politicians failed to heed
their warnings, they decided to bomb them into compliance. Sadly,
peaceful demonstrations also have a way of escalating into violent
confrontations. When frustrated, idealists have a way of mutating
into Molotov cocktail-throwing thugs.
Contrary to expectations, a less direct means of liberal coercive
is tolerance itself. One of the contradictions of naïve niceness is that
it is impotent against the truly nasty. When everything is treated
as equal and, therefore, as deserving of the same protection, the
intolerant are given a helping hand in becoming dominant. This
is an unintended implication of multiculturalism. Contemporary
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democracy did not come into being full-blown.93 It evolved through
an accretion of norms, values, and attitudes. A tolerance of political
differences, for instance, emerged from innumerable street clashes
and many contested elections. To be more specific, the Irish, when
they arrived on American shores were initially regarded as heretical
bog-hoppers. They later earned respect, in part, when urban riots
made them a force to be reckoned with. On the other hand, they
were only gradually recruited into democratic practices.94 It took time
for them to resort to the ballot box, and even longer to desist from
stuffing it. Yet nowadays the progeny of these once squalid outsiders
are as horrified by electoral fraud as any native Protestant. They
too reckon electoral honesty intrinsic of the structure of democracy;
that, were it not widespread, would dictate elections counting for
naught.
Yet multiculturalists show little reverence for this normative
infrastructure.
In advocating tolerance and equality, they
simultaneously advocate the rights of minorities who are opposed
to democratic traditions. As good relativists, they are apologists for
groups like the Black Panthers when they aim to impose their will
at gunpoint. While they oppose the KKK95 and skinhead militias,
they readily find excuses for draft card burners. The Palestinians,
in particular, are given a free pass for their suicide bombers and
Islamists, in general, are excused for promoting Jihad.96 What seems
not to be appreciated is that were these minorities to get their way,
democratic traditions would erode and with them the protections
they offer. Idealists who loathe coercion, therefore, pave the way
for coercion imposed by those currently too weak to impose it.
On behalf of equality, they empower precisely the sort of people
who do not accept the equality of others.97 Paradoxically, in their
unsophisticated niceness, they assume that egalitarian pluralism
is possible in a world where not everybody is benevolent; in one
where hierarchy is a biological imperative and not a momentary
aberration.98
By the same token, to be against internal discipline is implicitly
to favor random violence. As per Rousseau,99 human beings may
be born with kindly impulses, but they also come equipped with
angry and vengeful ones. As any mother knows, frustrated infants
are capable of temper tantrums. Were these to go unsocialized, in
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the hands of adults, they could prove fatal. Like Ivan the Terrible,100
who in a towering rage stuck down his own son, ordinary parents
might kill their youngsters over trivial disagreements. Ivan, as Czar
of all the Russias, grew up believing that he could do whatever he
wished. Most ordinary people learn otherwise. They are taught to
feel guilt when their anger passes certain bounds. As a result, they
become their own keepers. Though they may have violent thoughts,
they develop the means of keeping these under wraps. Advocates
of unrestrained niceness inadvertently open the cage containing the
monsters from the id. Despite their pipe dreams, because everyone
is both nice and nasty, everyone must learn to encourage one and
restrain the other.
When liberals heap scorn upon the traditional family because they
perceive it as an impediment to self-expression, they inadvertently
encourage impulsive violence.101 Likewise, when they describe the
nuclear family as a prison that should be breached by sponsoring
other formats, they interfere with inculcating personal discipline.
Every society has some form of family because every society has
found it essential to socializing its young. Unless children acquire
basic rules, including emotional rules, they become the enemies of
social order.102 In the contemporary middle class universe, neither
an orderly marketplace nor peaceful democracy would be possible
without them. The virtue of the family is that it provides the emotional
supports and the close instruction crucial to instilling what is needed.
Self-discipline is a significant accomplishment that is facilitated
by loving relationships and expert counsel. The insecure and the
uninstructed are unguided missiles. They become indiscriminately
coercive because they are incapable of better. This makes the family,
as it were, the workshop of civilization. To suppose that it might be
supplanted by public education or government transfer payments is
wishful thinking. For moral rules to mean anything, they must be
enforced, and to be externally enforced, they must first be internally
enforced.
Liberalism for all its vaunted moralism undermines its own
aspirations. It is not rational if rationality implies utilizing facts
and logic to achieve stated aims.103 By disguising what it is doing,
and failing to acknowledge the implications of its policies, it
encourages the opposite of what is sought. Instead of eliminating
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social conflicts, it incites them. Despite protestations of universal
love, it stimulates antagonisms. Yet in its stubborn refusal to engage
in honest negotiations with its foes, it ensures that these hostilities
will continue. As incongruously, by insisting on total equality, it
prevents those at the bottom rung from rising as quickly as they
might. Attempts at social engineering that ignore the realities of tests
of strength or alliance formation deprive the poor of the skills and
emotional strengths needed to get ahead. Because equality cannot
come by way of social fiat, to deny the realities of social mobility is to
impede it. Finally, in opposing merit and responsibility, it undercuts
the sources of social prosperity and representative democracy, i.e., in
demanding a utopian whole loaf, it attacks the conditions that make
ordinary decorum possible.
Marx thought that communism could come about because
industrialization would produce the surpluses needed to provide
everyone with comfort.104 He did not understand that the machinery
of a commercial system would not run itself and that once market
institutions were dismantled this excess of wealth would vanish.
Present-day liberals make a similar mistake. They assume that values
such as merit and responsibility produce destructive competition
without recognizing that they also generate efficiency and
interpersonal restraint. Were these standards no longer to be passed
to the next generation, the post-modern edifice would collapse. The
products liberals expect to redistribute would cease coming from the
factories and the power they hope to equalize would evaporate in an
explosion of anarchism. To sum up, liberalism promises peace, but
serves up conflict; it promises equality, but keeps the poor powerless;
it promises rationality, but is mired in childish emotionalism and a
myriad of contradictions.
Foremost among these contradictions is the conflict between
liberalism’s absolutist and egalitarian impulses. The draconian
coercion of one and the sentimental warn-heartedness of the other
are not compatible. While they are easy to reconcile on a conceptual
level, they cannot coexist in practice. Karl Marx and 60’s style hippies
make uncomfortable bedfellows. As long as they are in agreement,
they can share a love-fest. Yet should they have a falling out, there
will be hell to pay. Unconditional love and centralized planning must
clash when economic quotas are unfulfilled. Furthermore, the only
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way to believe that the victims of centralized penalties are equal is to
pretend they are not in distress. Like it or not, freedom and equality
are incompatible so long as freedom leads to inequalities. But in
the real world it does. Unequal inputs create unequal results; hence
the only way to prevent this is through coercion. In a world where
the lottery of birth favors some over others, this demands that the
winners be cut down to size. Plato105 thought stealing babies from
their mothers and raising them by nurses could achieve this. Liberals
think they can do it through universal education and democratic
regulations. They are both wrong. Because their goals cannot be
accomplished without opposition, this opposition must be stilled by
means of force.
Sources of Power
Liberalism denies the implications of social power.106 In
their niceness, its advocates pretend they neither have, nor seek
hegemony. They are merely individuals in quest of universal justice.
Peaceful and non-hierarchical, they would instantly return to their
creative endeavors if the political situation allowed it. Like George
Washington,107 or Cincinnatus before him, they are generals who
would happily go back to plowing their fields once the battle against
the reactionaries is won. It is only the exigencies of the moment that
rouse them to fight as energetically as they do. Yet liberalism, like
any other political movement thrives on power. Those who would
foist their ideas on others could not achieve this without the ability
to be persuasive, or failing this, to be coercive. Leadership, including
ideological leadership, is a species of authority.108 Liberals may
renounce any intention to obtain superiority, but, in their eagerness
to be influential, they give the lie to this assertion.
One more paradox of liberalism is that the sort of power it exercises
is retrogressive. Instead of grounding itself in a commercially oriented
professionalism, it turns to absolutist and religious sources. As the
Middle Class Revolution gathered momentum, internalized controls
transferred power to individuals.109 People made more decentralized
decisions as increasingly complex institutions demanded that
expertise and motivation be concentrated in their hands. Liberalism
reverses this trend by attempting to re-centralize control. As per the
absolutists,110 it employs government coercion to impose its dictates.
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Whatever the perceived problem, the solution is a state administered
program. Nor is liberalism averse to using coercion on a personal
level. Those who oppose its plans find their reputations besmirched
and their careers interrupted. In essence, liberalism finds much of its
support in personal relationships.111 In particularizing the sting of
its sanctions, or the benefits of its support, it acts as might a military
brotherhood. Within the community of its own interest, love is all
that matters; whereas outside this family, the politics of personal
destruction are allowed free reign.
Nevertheless the most important source of liberal power derives
from quasi-religious sources.112 Despite being adamantly secular,
the movement is also profoundly ideological. Time and again,
unsubstantiated beliefs trump facts. Strange to say, one of the reasons
for the antipathy between liberals and fundamentalists113 is that they
are remarkably similar. Both exhibit a certitude based on moral
commitments. Though they would be aghast at the suggestion,
many of their central allegiances are nearly identical. Liberals believe
in universal niceness, whereas Christian fundamentalists believe in
universal love. Liberals believe that niceness breeds niceness, whereas
fundamentalists are urged to turn the other cheek. Both likewise
have collectivist tendencies. They believe in cooperation, rather
than competition, and would like to implement something akin to
primitive communism. Moreover, each is grounded in a community
of the faithful. Within their own confines they impose an intense
loyalty and a strict orthodoxy. Durkheim114 argued that the power
of the sacred derives from the united devotion of the true believers
and one sees this operating in both locals. Theirs is each a solidarity
validated by holding fast to those within the fold, while execrating the
heretics. Then too, both sets of communicants share a grandiosity of
spirit. The fundamentalists promise their followers entrance to heaven
for reliable devotion; the liberals counter with a utopian heaven on
earth. Convinced of their respective righteousness, they both have
no doubt they will reap tangible rewards. The difference between
them is, of course, that one believes in a deity and the other does not;
one is avowedly spiritual and the other obstinately secular. But this is
sufficient to guarantee mutual revulsion.115 Precisely because they are
so similar, they assert their uniqueness by reviling the other. What
might seem minor discrepancies are elevated to heroic proportions,
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with one side anathematized as Godless humanists and the other as
mindless dogmatists.
In fact, both are faiths.116 Many have asserted this as a metaphor,
but it is much more than that. Freud117 speculated that monotheism
of the Judeo-Christian variety depended upon the projection of a
strong and protective father figure upon the heavens. The faithful
imaginatively, if unconsciously, created their deity as an answer
to their hopes and fears. Utopians of the neo-Marxist variety rely
instead upon the projection of a kind and protective family upon
the future.118 They mentally conjure up an imminent society based
on good will and total equality that will one day redeem them
from the tribulations of social conflict. In each case the intellectual
consensus upon which they rest depends not on evidence, but an
implacable allegiance to shared beliefs. Furthermore, these beliefs
are not subject to disconfirmation. No matter what facts come to
light, they cannot shake true believers of their central commitments.
Karl Popper119 argued that an ability to disconfirm its hypotheses was
the distinctive element of science. Scientists examined the world,
proposed an explanation of what was going on, made predictions
based on this thesis, then modified their theories in light of what
turned out to be true or false. Religious beliefs, in contrast, cannot
be falsified. If they seem to be erroneous, it is only because people
have misinterpreted them. For the faithful, that which has been
promulgated by an eternal authority, be it natural or super-natural,
cannot be abrogated by human perception.
Some years ago Festinger, Riecken, and Schacter120 did a study of
a cult that had predicted the end of the world. In When Prophesy Fails,
their account of what happened when this forecast was apparently
disconfirmed, these investigators initially registered surprise when this
did not result in the sect’s demise. On the contrary, after a period of
disappointment, the event was interpreted as reinforcing the group’s
articles of faith. According to its affiliate’s revised view, the world
continued because of some miscalculations had been made. What
was needed to insure the millennium was to recalculate the date and
reinvigorate their commitment. This tendency to excuse failure by
converting it into proof of an accepted revelation has a long pedigree.
The ancient Hebrews routinely indulged in it.121 When something
terrible happened, that is, when their God failed to protect them,
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a prophet arose to explain that this was because they were guilty of
some religious infraction. Jehovah was punishing them because they
had been derelict in their duties. They must, therefore, rededicate
themselves to his service in order to receive a renewed blessing.
The same tendency is found in liberalism. It too makes
predictions, which when they fail to come to pass are reworked to
demonstrate the fundamental correctness of the central assertions.
The unity of liberalism is rooted in this inability to disconfirm its
premises. It is, therefore, a faith. The list of events that might have
been taken as disproving its contentions is long. That these have not
had this result, suggests the absence of a scientific point of reference.
A partial inventory follows:
• A generous welfare system was supposed to foster social
mobility; it did not.
•

Tighter restrictions on welfare would surely to produce
more misery; they did not.

•

Unionization was to be the wave of the future; it was not.

•

Poverty levels were said to be been increasing; they have
not.

•

The minimum wage was alleged to reduce poverty; it does
not.

•

Healthcare is described as in crisis; but life expectancy
keeps rising.

•

The poor are said not to receive health care; they do, albeit
not through employer paid insurance.

•

Race relations were to be improved by affirmative action;
they have not been.

•

Affirmative action was to produce social mobility; it did
not.
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•

Easy divorce was to produce solid marriages; the reverse is
closer to the truth.

•

Casual sex was to be a liberating experience; it was not.

•

Stay-at-home moms have been called traitors to their
gender; they are not.

•

Multicultural families were supposedly more supportive of
children; they are less so.

•

Rape was assumed be epidemic; it is not.

•

Men, in general, have been condemned as innate rapists;
they are not.

•

The suburbs are depicted as a living hell; they are a middle
class utopia.

•

Most members of the middle class are portrayed as
insensitive louts; they are not.

•

Instilling unearned self-esteem in children would make
them more successful; it did not.

•

Bi-lingual education would stimulate minority
assimilation; it does not.

•

Stereotypes caused racism; they do not.

•

Acid rain would destroy the forests; it did not.

•

DDT would contaminate the environment; thanks to
its discontinuation millions of children have died from
malaria.

•

Arsenic in the water supply was an imminent threat; it is
not.

328

The Great Middle Class Revolution

•

Criminals could be reformed via rehabilitation; they were
not.

•

Police brutality is on the rise; it is declining.

•

Profiling is ineffective and racist; it is not.

•

FDR’s reforms shortened the Great Depression; they
lengthened it.

•

Rent control would guarantee affordable housing; it did
not.

•

Price controls would prevent inflation; they never do.

•

Alger Hiss was not a communist spy; he was.

•

The Rosenbergs did not steal secrets for the Russians; they
did.

•

Increasing the defense budget could not defeat
Communism; it pushed the Soviet economy into
bankruptcy.

•

The United States’s arrogance brought terrorism on itself; it
did not.

•

America is an imperialist power; it is not.

•

International trade bankrupts rich countries and exploits
poor ones; it provides wealth for nearly all.

•

Star-wars was a fiasco; it brought the Soviet Union to its
knees.

•

Training programs would end poverty; they have not.

•

Kneeling buses would provide independence for the
disabled; they did not.
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•

Socialist planning produces prosperity; it does not.

•

Mental illness could be controlled by deinstitutionalization;
it increased homelessness.

•

Protecting homosexuals from public ridicule was more
socially beneficial than aggressively testing for AIDS; it was
not.

•

Women would be happier becoming superwomen; most
did not.

•

Women should be more aggressive daters; they find this
awkward.

•

Military intelligence was an oxymoron; it is not.

•

Progressive education would improve reading scores; it did
not.

•

Government housing could eliminate homelessness; it
could not.

•

Guaranteeing jobs through strict employment laws would
reduce insecurity; it breeds conflicts.

•

Lauding it as street art would control graffiti; it did not.

•

Aggressive policing does not reduce crime: it does.

•

Political correctness instills interpersonal respect; it
promotes social dishonesty.

•

Community policing would lessen crime; it did not.

•

North Korea could be trusted to dismantle its nuclear
program; it could not.
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•

Castro would renounce Communism if treated
respectfully; he did not.

•

Civilization is intrinsically anti-human; it is not.

•

Everyone lies and cheats (except liberals); they do not.

These are more than a handful of anomalies.122 The presence of
this many represents a pattern; a pattern some might equate with
the extreme spasms of a moment in its death throes. Whatever the
reason, liberalism plainly exhibits an inclination to disregard the
truth. So egregious has this tendency been that political spinmiesters
do not hesitate to stand before the television cameras to proclaim
the demonstrably ridiculous. In one amusing case, a Democratic
spokesman explained that Arnold Schwartzenegger’s victory in
California’s recall election was actually a defeat for the Republicans.
Because the loser, Gray Davis, was an incumbent, this was surely bad
news for incumbents such as George W. Bush. By the same logic, if
liberal programs have not been successful, all this proves is that they
haven’t been given a chance. Not enough money was invested; too
little skill was applied to administering them; insufficient confidence
was placed in them. What is necessary is to go back and do things the
right way. Triple the budgets, make the regulations more inclusive,
employ harsher punishments, and all will go well. In any event,
the liberal paladins fought the good fight, for which they deserve
credit. They did their best to improve the world and conditions
would surely have been worse had they not.
Die-hard liberals claim the reason they have not prevailed is
attributable to a determined, and powerfully immoral, opposition.
When the Bolsheviks were attempting to communize Russia,
they blamed their difficulties on “counter-revolutionaries.”123 If a
production quota was not met or famine hobbled the grain belt, the
cause was sabotage. Those who wished to restore the Czars patently
conspired to make the system look bad. Since these villains were
beyond redemption, the only way to terminate their interference was
to extirpate them root and branch. They had to be removed from
their jobs, sent to the Gulag, and most likely killed. So must their
relatives, lest they pass on a lethal infection. Only after millions
of such souls were eliminated would good communists be able to
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implant genuine socialism. For parallel reasons, the traditionally
religious, ascribe their failures to the devil. Were it not for him,
mankind would never have been seduced away from following God’s
will. A supernatural rebel, he diligently continues to proselytize for
his empire of darkness.
For liberals, conservatives and traditionalists are the devil. Their
intransigence prevents a collectivist utopia from actualizing; their
seductions divert good people from supporting necessary reforms.
Were they physically removed progress would certainly accelerate.
This is why they must be resisted. This is why they have to be
barred from positions of power. Were they allowed a bully pulpit
of any sort, they would utilize it to corrupt the defenseless. Given
this menace, liberals have nothing for which to apologize; nothing
to retract. If they have mistakenly asserted something that is not
true, even acknowledging this might present evil with a weapon with
which to bludgeon the good. All that is necessary is to move on
without comment. Or if a lie promotes the good, e.g. by inflating the
number of homeless124 and, therefore, the resources devoted to them,
it may still be promulgated because it represents a deeper truth. This
strategy places them in exactly the same situation as the Popes when
they forbade the teaching of a heliocentric universe that might elicit
doubts about the Bible.
The faith-saturated moralism of liberals is further confirmed
by the manner in which they engage in moral negotiations. Their
vociferousness betrays an almost spiritual confidence in their
rectitude. When the religious fundamentalists were riding high,
they were as strident. God-besotted ministers would hurl fire and
brimstone thunderbolts from the pulpit. Those who dared question
their orthodoxy were promised an eternity in hell. Indeed, during
the Middle Ages, the insufficiently conformist might be accused of
witchcraft and purged of their corrupted souls by way of searing
flames. Contemporary liberals are not so vulgar. They too attack
their adversaries, but not with threats of immolation. Name-calling
is generally deemed adequate.125 Those who disagree are accused of
being ignorant fascists. Instead of having their arguments examined,
they are dismissed by means of ad hominem assaults. Judge Kenneth
Starr126 is transmuted into a priggish extremist, George W. Bush is seen
as a stupid party-boy (or is that a diplomatic cowboy), and Clarence
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Thomas is converted into an ungrateful mediocrity who owes his
elevation to affirmative action. Not merely maligned as inept or
evil, they are ridiculed for a plethora of putative absurdities. George
Bush’s malapropisms are proof of dimwittedness, Dan Quayle’s
difficulties with spelling “potato” demonstrate mental limitations,
and Gerald Ford’s stumbles derive from years of playing football
without a helmet. Liberals, it must be understood, are exempt from
such mockery. When Edward Kennedy misidentified Sammy Sosa
after he set a home run record, his lack of knowledge was passed over
in silence.
This attack dog spirit is supplemented by a penchant for
supporting liberal initiatives by way of sob stories. The problems
their reforms are intended to rectify are invariably elaborated upon
in heartrending illustrations. If drug costs are said to be too high,
Aunt Minnie from Oshkosh is trotted out explain that she was
reduced to eating cat food because her social security did not cover
her medical expenses. Or if racism is alleged to be virulent, the
tragic dragging of a black man to his death is asserted to be the norm
in race relations. The objective is not to investigate the extent of
a difficulty, but to arouse an emotional response. People need to
be motivated to do good; not merely to understand its nature. In
traditional religions, evil was painted in as evocative terms.127 Were
this not so, people might sit on their hands as opposed to joining the
war against immorality. Action, not disinterested thought, is what
wins moral contests.
After raising the specter of evil, the old-line religions explained
what the forces of light needed to do in order to triumph. Among
the recommended actions were prayer, good works, regular church
attendance, and belief in the catechism. The liberals, as confirmed
secularists, put forth a different agenda. Their salvation is not aimed
at a heavenly reward, but a more mundane one. Drawing on their
Marxist core, they invariably propose governmental solutions.
Whatever is wrong, a state organized program can fix it. A new
bureaucracy and/or more money are the sovereign remedies for any
difficulty. The details of these programs are never fully elaborated;
nevertheless their intended purposes are sufficient to overcome
all barriers. Nor are the results honestly evaluated. Because their
sponsors and administrators have vested interests in success, whatever
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the actual outcome, it is celebrated as surpassing expectations. Head
Start may not have improved the academic performance of minority
students, but look at the many millions it served. At least they were
not labeled retarded.
Whatever the outcome of these programs, the time comes to
move on. Liberal moralizing is contingent on promises, not results.
Sooner or later the subject is changed and a new sob story is put
forward for the edification of the voters. When the traditionalists
question this account, they are attacked for their insensitivity and
the game is once again afoot. Even successes may be bypassed on the
way to a freshly embellished future. Sad to say, old triumphs, such
as social security, are boring. They may be cited as in need of defense
from reactionaries, or as evidence of liberal compassion, but on their
own are not sufficient to elicit support. Faith-based impulses are not
satisfied by what is, but only by what might be. Whether via heaven,
or an earthly utopia, hope is what animates communal solidarity.
Either that, or terror of a vividly limned devil.
Nowadays the bobo faith has nearly transmuted into nature
worship. A desire to protect the environment has become the
signature cause of the cultural middle class. According to the
standard cliché the ecology is “fragile” and must defended lest it go
out of balance.128 If one small part is disrupted, the whole will lose its
equilibrium. Humankind itself is threatened by such unenlightened
tampering. In their greed, people will destroy the very factors that
make survival possible. They must, therefore, be educated to become
environmentalists and conservationists. Instead of wasting the
precious resources upon which they depend, they must limit their
consumption. Rather than infringe on nature’s eternal wisdom, they
must work in conjunction with it.
This is a gentle, lyrical philosophy, one befitting the college
educated, but it is based on a tautology. Every eco-system is fragile
because every one represents a particular equilibrium. If something
is altered, the old balance is gone, but this does not mean that
doom is imminent. What happens is that a new equilibrium comes
into being. A priori, this development is neither better nor worse
than the one that preceded it. Since the world is always changing,
a succession of equilibria is a fact of nature. Once upon a time
the North American skies were blackened by flights of passenger
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pigeons. For over a century now these birds have been gone; hunted
into premature extinction. This is sad, but it did not result in the
desolation of the continent. Non-native birds such as sparrows and
starlings took over some of their environmental niches, but then
so have European immigrants vis-à-vis Amerindians. Treating that
which is as intrinsically sacred is not a scientific necessity, but a moral
imperative. Despite the reputation of liberals for being progressive,
they make a fetish of stability.
An illustration of the mindset of this naturalistic faith is the fight
over drilling for oil on the North Slope of Alaska.129 A Republican
administration, in order to lessen dependence on imported oil,
proposed opening the area to exploration and utilization. An
uproar immediately ensued among the environmentalists. This,
they groaned, was one of the few untouched regions in the nation.
Moreover, it was particularly fragile. Bringing in heavy equipment
would irreparably damage the permafrost and put endangered
species, such as the caribou, in jeopardy. This objection sent oil
industry experts scurrying to their drawing boards. They came up
with several solutions. One was to use a single platform to house
multiple directional wells. This would mean that only a few acres
would be necessary for production purposes. Another was to bring
in equipment over ice roads in the dead of winter. By summer these
thoroughfares would melt without any impact on the underlying
soil. As was also pointed out, even more intrusive techniques had
proven caribou friendly. The trans-Alaska pipeline, in particular, had
not decreased their numbers. They had actually increased.
All of this made no impression on the environmentalists. It was
the purity of the North Slope they were defending, not its physical
integrity. Any intrusion was too much for their liking. No matter
how their concerns were addressed, the rhetoric remained the same.
Arctic Alaska was a pristine wilderness that must not be desecrated
for commercial purposes. What they did not emphasize is that even
tourism would have impacted the land. Feet on the ground, housed
in heated facilities, and brought in by modern transport might
profoundly injure the ecosystem. This too would be intolerable.
Therefore, in order to maintain Nature unspoiled, it could neither
be drilled nor viewed. It would just have to lie there off-limits to any
human involvement. This, it must be noted, is the perfect definition
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of what it is to be sacred. It demonstrates that the environmentalists
were no so much seeking to protect against catastrophe, as to
safeguard an emotional ideal.
Environmental excesses have proliferated in many directions.
No matter what the cost, streams and rivers must be cleaned up,
toxic dumpsites returned to absolute purity, miniscule the traces
arsenic removed from water supply, and carbon dioxide and sulfur
oxide scrubbed from the air. Global warming and environmental
poisoning need to be prevented despite the fact that these remain
theoretical possibilities. The worst possible computer models,
as opposed to hard data, are publicized to alert the population to
speculative hazards. Even if this creates an economic decline, the
health benefits must come first. Left out of these calculations is that
a prosperous economy might produce the resources and technology
to address other problems. Also not considered is the misery of
poverty.130 The reason for these oversights is that the environmental
religion is fundamentally antibusiness. Time and again, the changes
demanded are in how commerce is conducted. The villain is
industrial production and the salvation lies in relieving industrialists
of their profits so that these can be sunk into restorative programs.
Herein one sees the bobo revenge. They are using the appearance
of science to get even with their hated superiors. Conceiving of
themselves as powerless workers exploited by callous managers,
they seek to turn the rationality of industrialism against itself. As
cultural experts, they use their facility with language to coordinate an
alliance of the disaffected. The way they tell it, catastrophe lies just
over the horizon—the numbers prove it—and we must all hasten
to stave it off. Yet this is being done with mirrors. Mysteries are
created out of symbolic distortions in order to recruit allies to equally
mysterious solutions. Some bobos apparently believe that if they are
not running the show, they can at least leverage the insecurities of
others to enhance their influence.
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Chapter 9

Temples of Liberalism
By education most have been misled;
So they believe, because they so were bred
The priest continues what the nurse began,
And thus the child imposes on the man.
(John Dryden, The Hind and the Panther)
Journalists say a thing that they know isn’t true in the hope
that if they keep saying it long enough, it will be true.
(Arnold Bennett, The Title)
Men never do evil so completely and so cheerfully as when
they do so from religious conviction. (Blaise Pascal,
Pensees)
Cultural Institutions
As if the middle-class revolution has not been difficult enough,
adjusting to it has been made more difficult thanks to the resistance
provided by the institutionalization of reactionary liberalism.
Institutions, whether theocratic or ideological, are the bane of
self-direction. They are also the enemy of unbiased expertise.
Institutions specialize in providing and enforcing standard answers.
In this respect, the institutionalization of liberalism is no different.
It focuses on facilitating anti-middle class power plays grounded in a
self-righteous moral consensus. It insists upon collectivist orthodoxies
and furnishes reliable anti-middle class coalitions to impose these
orthodoxies; coalitions for which, not incidentally, C. Wright Mills’
characterization of middle class foibles remain valid. As such, it has
attempted to derail the middle class ascendancy.
To begin with, religions are institutionalized.1 This enables
societies to develop the cultural and structural means of perpetuating
themselves. Consisting of stabilized belief systems and formalized
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social relationships, these much respected spiritual establishments
are able to carry recognizable ideological systems forward; often
for millennia. Through their agency, communities hold on to their
core ideas with a tenacity, and a uniformity, that prevents their
disintegration. The Jewish faith has managed this feat for almost
three thousand years,2 the Christian for two thousand,3 and Islam
for well over a thousand.4 We call these institutions “churches” and
they posses a solidity that can make them seem like facts of nature.
They are, in essence, a method for conserving shared norms, values,
and viewpoints.
Among the assets institutionalized religions typically possess are
communal belief systems. Included within these are cosmologies that
explain how the world was created and moral codes that specify how
communicants should live. These concepts are normally promulgated
within an accepted format; e.g., a set of scriptures. As some point, it
is officially decided which beliefs count as orthodox and these are set
forth in an authorized configuration. For Christians, the Council of
Nicaea was instrumental in certifying that God was to be considered
a Trinity. For Jews, their Rabbis decided that some books belonged
in the Bible,5 whereas others were apocryphal, decisions made by
Christian authorities are often vested in particular persons. These
individuals constitute a designated leadership; hence their opinions
are accorded extra weight. Sometimes these “holy” ones are arranged
in a hierarchy. The Roman Catholic chain of command is a case
in point. Other religions are less formal, with status established by
individual merit. Both Judaism and Islam come closer to this model.
There are also designated times and places where worship occurs.
Whether in cathedrals, synagogues, or mosques, the faithful gather at
predictable moments to celebrate what they jointly regard as sacred.
In this, they reinforce their connection to a powerful communion,
thereby enhancing their individual feelings of control.
Quasireligions, such as liberalism, are also institutionalized, yet
their cultures and structures are not as formal. As cultural ideologies,
they too require a stabilized consensus in order to perpetuate
themselves. Nonetheless this need not be as strict as that exhibited
by their spiritual counterparts. Secular communicants require an
emotional bond to observably similar beliefs,6 but not necessarily one
stabilized by a scriptural format. Most get by with a conventional
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wisdom that is sustained by a common literature and regularized
communications. It is enough that people read the same things,
praise interchangeable opinions, and condemn familiar heresies. Nor
do they need an official leadership. Here it is sufficient that there be
recognized opinion leaders. Individuals noted for their intelligence,
energy, and/or communication skills articulate positions that are
later dispersed by unofficial means. Communicants read what they
write, listen to what they say, and then repeat this within their own
social circles at their own initiative. These off the record contacts
are essential; hence they are facilitated by occurring at predictable
locations. Liberals, for instance, are not uniformly distributed
throughout society.7 There are particular places where they constitute
a majority and thus where they feel free to exchange their beliefs.
Nowadays, the universities are one of these sites. They provide a
comfort zone for jocular self-congratulation and joint derision of
outsiders. Moreover, these gathering places provide the resources
necessary for their continuation. True believers can, therefore, be
assured that these locations will be available tomorrow and ten years
from tomorrow. This provides them the confidence to make the
moral, emotional, and intellectual commitments that sustain their
faith.
Some quasireligions are more institutionalized than others.
Until recently the Communists boasted an official party hierarchy
upon which they could rely for leadership and a sense of security.8
A central command dictated an official party line adhered to by
card-carrying members. There were also authorized texts written
by Marx,9 Lenin,10 and Mao11 that could be consulted to determine
eternal truths. Needless to say, the party possessed a bureaucratic
configuration, not unlike that of the Vatican, in which apparatchiks
sought to establish a rewarding career. This provided a shared
discipline, a common agenda, and a party headquarters. In places
like the Soviet Union, countless splendid buildings were essentially
party property.
Meanwhile, in the United States, political organizations, such
at the Democratic Party, did not approach this level of structure.
Back in the 1920s, Will Rogers12 could joke that he did not belong
to an organized party—that he was a Democrat. He knew that his
party had squishy political positions, a constantly shifting panoply
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of local and national alliances, and a headquarters that floated upon
the political tide. There might be temporary platforms, daily talking
points, and successful candidates for office, but no single individual,
or idea, could claim exclusivity. While Democrats could distinguish
themselves from Republicans, the boundaries between them were
porous.13 People joined or left their ranks via private declarations
of intention. The same could be said about the convictions they
represented. Although Democrats prided themselves on being the
party of the little people, how these were to be represented varied with
the electoral cycle. Entrepreneurial candidates routinely modified
their policies and rhetoric to conform to public opinion. Democrats
could not even boast that their primary constituency consisted of
working people. Contrary to a widely held perception, by the end
of the twentieth century almost half of the nation’s wealthiest voters
were casting ballots for them.
When one considers liberals, the state of their institutionalization
is still more tenuous. Although associated with the Democratic Party,
not all Democrats are liberals14 and not all liberals are Democrats.
More a diffuse cultural orientation than a concretely identifiable
faction, liberalism is dominated by the bobos. They provide the
outlook’s most articulate spokespersons and its more powerful
defenders. Indeed, it is their institutional connections that give the
perspective its backbone and its megaphone; i.e., they who provide its
stabilized points of transmission. To add to the confusion, the central
tenets of liberalism are not codified in an identifiable sourcebook,
nor sanctioned by an official convocation. Its wellsprings are instead
found in a loose consensus of culture-based professionals. People,
whose jobs entail manipulating ideas, coordinate their beliefs over
the water fountain or the dinner table. They also do so while playing
tennis, during intermission at the symphony, or when standing
before paintings at the art gallery. Because they are plugged into
the same scuttlebutt at work, consistent sermons at church, and
congruent psychological theories, they tend to see things the same
way. Likewise, having gone to the same schools, watched the same
news programs, and read identical books, they can predict what
their peers will find persuasive. Theirs is not a conspiracy, but what
Bernard Goldberg15 characterizes as a “bubble” of opinion.
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Eventually there arises a “canon” to which most remain loyal.16
Once upon a time the literature sophisticated people perused and the
music to which they listened were determined by upper class tastes.
In the English-speaking world, to be unfamiliar with Shakespeare
was to be a cultural clod; to never have attended a chamber music
concert was to be déclassé. With the initial arrival of the middle
classes, allusions to popular novels became the currency of cultivated
conversation, while sentimental songs could be found on most
lips. The bobo ascendancy dramatically changed this. A liberal
oppositionalism rejected anything associated with the traditional
bastions of power. That which was produced by dead white males
became anathema. Now works created by former outsiders set the
tone. A Rigoberta Menchu,17 not a John Milton, received their kudos.
Often it was enough that an author was a member of a minority or
a musician was uncommonly vulgar to obtain public acclaim. The
liberal establishment consistently certified that that which offended
conservative sensibilities was intrinsically valuable.
Liberals do not, however, possess a formal hierarchy. No single
person directs their opinions. Nevertheless they know whom they
are expected to admire. Some sources of information are considered
reliable, whereas others are not; some persons trustworthy, and others
not. Individually in quest of reputations for credibility, many prize
the status of a “guru.” Little surpasses the honor of being regarded as
an expert by one’s peers or as creative force by future generations. As
representational specialists, they cherish being persuasive over being
intimidating. Liberals may thus be thought of as secular preachers.
In their own minds, custodians of “the truth,” they compete to garner
acclaim for their lay sermons. This makes liberalism a venue for
almost non-stop moralizing.18 Indeed, the crux of the movement’s
institutionalization is located in an atmosphere of shared, and
vigorously projected, testimonials.
Where these homilies occur is not a trivial matter. Liberalism
has appropriated many of society’s junction boxes to broadcast
its messages. Virtually monopolizing centers of communication
and education, its devotees control “mainstream” viewpoints.19
Primary and secondary schools, higher education, the media, and
entertainment outlets have all become their strongholds.20 So have
philanthropical foundations, agencies providing research grants, and
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professional societies. While no underlying plot directs what is taught
in colleges or transmitted over the evening news, a community of
views holds sway as if one did. Professors and students, editors and
reporters, participate in feedback loops that rein them in as tightly
as any party line. Most know that the punishment for apostasy is
severe; that to deviate too far from the established consensus risks
ostracism. Friends and acquaintances will look at a renegade askance
and are suddenly unavailable for lunch. This sort of isolation may
sound trivial, but it is the lifeblood of human sociality. Most people
want to “belong” and will do almost anything to maintain their
social contacts. Over and above this are the more substantial matters
of careers and their concomitant material rewards. Those who do
not conform to the approved attitudes find themselves out of a job
or no longer in line for promotion.21 In many cases, they never
receive the initial appointment. The gatekeepers who do the hiring,
or determine what gets published, do not overtly condemn their
deviations; they merely find others more qualified. Members of the
faith, not defectors, get the big houses, the fancy cars, and the corner
offices. They are the ones who obtain prizes for their books, face
time before the camera, and elective office in professional societies.
Progressive Education
Education was once the province of the church, the nobility,
and prosperous merchants, but with the arrival of the middle classes
formal learning was democratized. Schools grew in number and
the period of instruction in length. Ultimately education was to be
universal.22 Even the children of the lower classes were tutored in the
rudiments of what every citizen should know. This would provide
the foundation for a representative democracy and a technologically
based commerce. The questions then arose as to what should to be
taught and how would this to be realized. The old liberal education
of the Middle Ages was designed for the clergy and a smattering of
professionals, but advances in the sciences and scholarly achievements
made this obsolete. Moreover, it was essential that these newly
valuable subjects no longer be taught by rote. If students were to be
flexible thinkers, they had to cultivate more than a good memory.
They would have to become proficient in something other than the
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once pervasive Greek and Latin—as taught to the tune of the hickory
stick.
Ideas for liberating pupils from the tyranny of aristocratic
conformity go back hundreds of years. Jean-Jacques Rousseau23
was one of the more influential exponents of what came to be
called “progressive education.” He asserted that young children
must be allowed to follow their instincts. Tutors might arrange
their environments so that these would lead them to important
discoveries, but their insights had to come from the youngsters
themselves. That which failed to excite their interests or enlist
voluntary experimentation was an epiphenomenon that would be
lost once the teacher’s discipline was removed. What was needed
instead was something more practical; something related to the world
in which the child would one day operate. Rousseau was himself of
the old school. Emile, his major excursion into educational theory,
revolved around a single tutor mentoring a single child. Its model
was the aristocratic household and the purpose hired scholar. Once
education became more democratized, these did not apply. The
sort of close supervision possible in a one-on-one relationship was
impossible is a schoolroom where one teacher confronted dozens of
students.
By the dawn of the twentieth century, the appropriate alterations
in perspective had been made. At this point, the leading theorist of
progressive education was John Dewey.24 A pragmatic philosopher
by background, in time his focus shifted to preparing children for
modernity. One of his primary concepts was that of “experience.”
Instead of being artificially intellectual, he wanted the young to
interact with the world. It was by doing, and not simply absorbing
verbal lessons, that they would acquire a genuine understanding of
their environment. This perspective was institutionalized in the
“project method.” Either individually, or in groups, students would
engage in pieces of independent research, art, or social intervention.
They would choose their own goals, and their own means, and
implement these with the assistance, not the oppressive direction,
of the teacher.25 In this, not only would they develop the initiative
needed to control their own lives; they would also learn how to be
creative. In essence, they would discover the secrets of being selfdirected. Given this head start on personal growth, they would be

352

The Great Middle Class Revolution

prepared continually to expand their horizons once they entered the
professionalized world of their future.26
This, at least, was the theory. The practice was very different.27
An example of what happened was the “open classroom.”28 In
order to introduce freedom to the grammar school curriculum,
the traditional classroom was torn down. Gone were fixed seating
arrangements and solid walls separating classes. Taking their place
were movable seats and impermanent partitions. This way, children
could move around from one project to another and one work group
to a second. The teacher would no longer stand before the collected
group to deliver a boring one-size-fits-all lecture. Instead, she would
move between individuals providing personalized instruction as she
went. All would, therefore, move at their own pace and come out
ahead of where they would have with an enforced conformity. This
sounded heaven-sent and a perfect fit for a middle class dominated
society.
The problem was that not everyone was from the middling
orders. Most of the children who went to public schools did not
come from upper middle class backgrounds.29 Those who did had
already been taught to be considerate of others, to be interested in
how and why things happened, and to exercise self-control. They
had also been trained to think things through and to take personal
initiative. Thus, when presented with an opportunity to choose an
individual learning project and then to follow it up, they possessed
the internalized disciplines to succeed. Lower class children, however,
came from homes where their parents placed more emphasis on
good manners, being neat and clean, and obeying those in authority.
Primed to conform, they had no practice in how to exercise
independent judgment. When asked to take control over their own
activities, they were more apt to seek an easy way out. Having already
encountered oppressive power, their primary concern was to evade
it. Few took advantage of the opportunity to learn how to be selfdirected. In the end, this form of progressive education ratified the
pre-existing social class structure. Platitudes about sponsoring social
mobility were contradicted by the reality making families responsible
for inculcating both internal discipline and the value of knowledge.
Instead of freeing lower class children from oppression, it insured
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that they would one day be subject to the external discipline of the
workplace.
The same considerations applied to other educational reforms.30
One of these was the “whole word” means of learning to read. Gone
were the phonics of yesteryear. Ascertaining the pronunciation of
individual letters and sounding them out in words was supposedly
too monotonous to sustain student attention. Simply jumping
in and recognizing combinations of words as embedded in stories
would be more enticing. In fact, it was more confusing; particularly
for lower class children. Less likely to have been introduced to books
at home, this facsimile of being thrown into the deep end of the pool
was decidedly not reassuring. Nor was it helpful when they were
told that spelling didn’t matter and that grammar was old-fashioned.
Starting with less preparation in reading, and with parents whose
linguistic skills were wanting, this was a formula for remaining
permanently handicapped. Because they were also instructed, when
asked to write stories, that whatever came naturally was acceptable,
they never developed the vocabulary or the disciplined approach to
linear organization necessary to handle professional communications.
Then too, “modern math” was equally debilitating.31 Where once
children were drilled in their times tables, it became fashionable to
introduce them to conceptual themes. Instead of calculating twelve
times twelve in their heads, an approximate answer was deemed
good enough. Teachers believed that understanding the rudiments
of symbolic logic was more important. The difficulty here was
that students who relied upon calculating machines, rather than
internalized mental operations, never became comfortable with
numbers. As a result, they never pursued the higher mathematics for
which a familiarity with set theory was ostensibly to prepare them.
Once more, it was the offspring of the higher classes whose parents
had instilled these skills who surged ahead. It was they, because they
were less intimidated, who took the advanced classes in these topics.
As sadly, students who were forced to serve their own teachers
could not turn for assistance to adult pedagogues who knew
much of anything.32 Those delegated to supervise their education
might be skilled in motivating, but not in instructing them. The
educators of potential educators believed it imperative that soonto-be teachers care more about the welfare of their students, rather
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than acquire something to share with them. Liberalism had come
to the classroom.33 What mattered were good intentions, emotional
rapport, and creative aspirations. Schools of education were no longer
places dedicated to promoting knowledge. They sought instead to
imbue politically correct attitudes. Teaching was presented as more
akin to social work than to an academic enterprise.34 Children were
to be furnished with self-esteem,35 rather than intellectual tools.
Presumably, if they learned to feel good about themselves, they
would automatically be able to achieve what was later expected of
them. For similar reasons, they were to learn to be cooperative rather
than competitive. Modern society was represented as a place where
love would predominate over conflict, that is, if everyone learned to
be nonviolent. In this vein, students were to celebrate the differences
that existed in a multicultural society. They must be indoctrinated to
believe that everyone was as good as everyone else. Only this would
expunge sexism, racism, and classism.36 By this logic, if children
studied history, it must be as a cautionary tale against oppression.37
They needed to learn about the horrors perpetrated by their ancestors
so as never to repeat them. Likewise, if they read literature, it was to
be as an object lesson in tolerance and universal love. Only stories
that showed women, gays, and minorities as active winners would be
allowed on the reading list. Rather incongruously, this watered down
curriculum sat well with novice teachers. Most of them had never
been very good students; hence they appreciated a program that was
not intellectually demanding. Far from intending to pass along a
love of learning, they were satisfied to be well-meaning babysitters.
Given these objectives, contemporary schools of education
focus on teaching methods, not content. They insist on fostering
an absolute equality of results,38 rather than academic excellence.
Neo-Marxist as it was possible to be without proclaiming oneself
a Marxist and as bohemian without retiring to a Montmartre loft,
they promote egalitarian techniques ad nauseum. Rita Kramer,39
while taking a national tour of Ed schools, overheard numerous
exhortations of the prevailing philosophy. Coast to coast, she was
privy to sentiments inimical to “meritocracy.” Thus, working hard
at on one’s lessons was frequently dismissed as totalitarian, for as one
student opined, “if it doesn’t work, if you don’t succeed, you think,
What’s wrong with me? [And] because it doesn’t always work” this
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is terrible for the losers. This suggests that a failure is the student’s
fault, blaming the victim, which is equivalent to a death sentence.40
It also fosters hierarchical thinking, and that too would be wrong.
Clearly, suggesting that one child might be better than another
harmed both.41 As one professor insisted in explaining the rationale
of multicultural education, “The central and overriding [objective] is
to promote equity in student achievement.” Everyone must come out
the same. But Kramer, herself, had doubts. She comments that, “the
real losers in this situation are the ones they profess to be concerned
with helping. In their determination to avoid the charge of ‘elitism’
by providing the same education in the same classroom for everyone,
they ignore not only the needs of those youngsters with an academic
bent but those with more practical interests as well.” Paradoxically,
in this rush for equality, no one gets much of anything.
What tends to happen with extreme egalitarianism is that the
lessons get “dumbed down.”42 Since the only way for everyone
to do equally well is for the best to do less well than they can, the
emphasis is on fun rather than on effort. Courses are geared to the
lowest common denominator and are expected to be more enjoyable
than enlightening. Under these circumstances, arts and crafts and
visual aids drive out the more challenging currency of lectures and
homework dwindles to the vanishing point. And because no one is
allowed to fail, grade inflation becomes the rule. Every student is
expected to get an A or a B, whether or not this is earned. Even a B
is considered an insult to students who expect to receive a collegebound average just for showing up. Nor are textbooks allowed to
be challenging. The slightest hint of controversy might insult, and,
therefore, damage the scholarship of sensitive students. Although this
generates boredom, the teacher is delegated to find a way to sustain
interest. There is also an antitest bias. Since time immemorial,
students have been reluctant to take examinations. These produce
enormous anxiety because it is possible to fail them. Try as one
might, one can still come out worse than others. This has produced
a cottage industry in derogating tests. First, they are alleged not
to reveal what matters. As artificial assessments, they are said to
leave out what the student really knows. Second, other means of
evaluation are declared superior. Personal journals and portfolios are
thought to be better at disclosing creativity. The problem is that there
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are no standardized means of evaluating these alternative indicators.
There is the additional difficulty that the traditional methods have
a documented ability to predict academic success, whereas their
replacements do not.
Many liberal educators have come to the conclusion that what
matters most are credentials. Since it is degrees that allow students
to obtain employment, these must be equally available to all. Much
as the Wizard of Oz’s scarecrow had his ability to think confirmed by
a diploma, all students are to be allowed their “piece of parchment.”
This has at least two consequences. One is an escalation in the degrees
sought. If everyone is a graduate, then the only way to distinguish
one’s competence is to obtain a yet higher degree. There is also the
phenomenon of mainstreaming. Every student, irrespective of ability
or motivation, is said to deserve to be in the same classroom. To
isolate anyone because of low intelligence or obstreperous behavior
is to stigmatize him or her. This “labeling”43 will surely convince the
victim that he/she is unable to keep up. Such practices as tracking are,
therefore, tantamount to oppression in that they sponsor some for
success and others for the opposite. Particularly reviled is providing
extra help for gifted students. Since they already have an advantage,
giving them further assistance is unfair. If this leaves them bored,
and society deprived of their abilities, this is a small price to pay for
promoting democracy.
Exceptionally large sums have been devoted to helping mentally
retarded students. Both in terms of funds and time, attentions have
been lavished on them that might have been more productively
invested elsewhere. The concept of “normalization”44 holds that if
intellectually disabled children are placed in ordinary classrooms and
treated as normal, they will function close to normal levels. This,
in fact, is massive denial in service to an egalitarianism fantasy.
Retarded children are biologically handicapped and can never keep
up with their undamaged peers. That middle class parents agitate
for them to achieve comparable results is understandable in terms of
the middle class need for success. Less understandable is diverting
social energies that would have a greater payback if directed toward
those with superior abilities. The results have, in fact, been meager.
Educational budgets have swollen and class sizes have decreased,
but this has had little impact on overall achievement. As foolishly,
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because ordinary teachers are not experts in special education, those
students who do require expert attention are deprived of it.
Romantic egalitarianism has also been unproductive with
respect to racial differences and classroom discipline. Instead of
comparable demands being made of all students, African-American
and Hispanics have been allowed to languish.45 The continued
existence of discrimination has been invoked as an excuse for
lowering the standards they are expected to realize. This has resulted
in large disparities in achievement tests, with the importance of these
instruments written off as an artifact of segregation, lesser funding,
or cultural bias. No matter how often these causes are disproved,
minority students (excepting, of course, Asians) are permitted to slack
off. Although the advocates of special attention for blacks contend
that they are promoting equality, they do not seem to believe black
abilities are equivalent to those of whites. Somehow, sitting beside a
white is supposed to substitute for reading books or doing homework.46
With respect to maintaining classroom order, it is similarly argued
that imposing discipline is indistinguishable from racial repression.
Those from different cultures are said to require approaches unique
to them. If they are made to sit still, this theoretically deprives them
of the advantages of a more dynamic heritage. To suggest that all
students, irrespective of their backgrounds, require peace and quiet
to absorb their lessons is dismissed as ethnocentric. Somehow “street
smarts” are thought a viable alternative to what must be read and
tranquilly assimilated.
Teachers unions have promoted much of this agenda.47 Their
leaders have become the de facto bishops of liberal, multi-cultural
education. Incessantly agitating for the progressive program, they
contend that additional money and more personalized instruction
are the answers to all questions. Asserting a professional expertise
that trumps the demands of disappointed parents, their hierarchies
remain unfazed by evidence of failure. Whenever testing indicates
that gains have not been made, it is alleged that classes are too large
or that private schools are creaming the best students. Particularly
anathema to an oligarchy that derives its power from the shear
numbers of public school teachers are proposals for voucher
systems.48 Giving parents monies directly might enable them to
utilize the power of the purse to discipline unsuccessful schools and
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this is unacceptable to those who wish to retain control. In essence,
a pseudo-professionalism is employed to resist efforts toward a more
genuine professionalization of education.
Higher Education
One of the consequences of the Middle Class Revolution is the
belief that every child deserves a college education.49 With so many
good jobs contingent upon the expertise and motivation inculcated
in higher education, everyone is expected to have the opportunity
to acquire these. Whether or not an individual demonstrates an
academic bent, he/she is urged to go beyond high school; often at
public expense. Even functional illiteracy is not a disqualification.
As most colleges and universities have learned, they are now expected
to compensate for lessons not previously learned; thus almost all
have remedial programs designed to provide the foundation for more
traditional courses. Even so, the results have been disappointing. A
large proportion of students admitted to college never complete a
degree. Despite the aid of grade inflation,50 they drop out.
As unhappily, higher education has been subject to the pressures
from progressive forces.51 Equality of results is supposed to apply
in this instance too. Once again, however, the only way to achieve
absolute parity is to demand less from all. Knowledge that was
previously considered the inevitable outcome of university training is
never broached, never mind attained. Moreover, as with their lower
status peers, many college professors and administrators have come
to believe that their primary task is social reform. Dedicated liberals,
they dismiss an accumulation of facts as of secondary importance.
Far more significant is becoming a tolerant, peace-loving person. Far
from encouraging merit, their aim is a non-judgmental altruism that
fosters egalitarianism; albeit one with a creative tinge. Cooperation,
not competition, is their aspiration, with emotional spontaneity,
not intellectual incandescence, the sign of accomplishment. Just
as in the lower grades, the traditional canon is dismissed as sterile,
whereas political correctness has become de rigueur. This means that
grade inflation,52 non-traditional assessment formats, and affirmative
action have become the norm.53 Anything that might discourage
tender souls is off limits, especially in the arts, humanities, and social
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sciences. All must be allowed into the tent and all graduate with the
same degree, irrespective of their shortcomings.
Much of this is a consequence of the faculty’s gatekeeping
tendencies.54 During the 60s, and especially at the height of the
Viet Nam War, colleges became a sanctuary from the real world.55
As long as one was a student, one did not need to get a real job
or submit to military discipline. The university campus was also
the perfect nexus for a social consciousness. Much better to prepare
oneself for enlistment in the War on Poverty than for the paddy fields
of Southeast Asia. The effect was to produce a generation of liberal
Ph.D.s. So great was their dominance that by 2002 a survey by
the American Enterprise Institute revealed an overwhelming liberal
hegemony.56 In elite universities such as Harvard and Brown literally
95% of the faculty were registered to vote as affiliates of “parties
of the left.” In general, across the academic spectrum the ratio of
Democrats to Republicans tended to be roughly 10 to 1.
Evidently convinced that their pacifism and selflessness were
intellectually justified, these enthusiasts had devoted themselves
to remaking their disciplines in the image of their political
commitments. Gone was the academic rigor of previous cohorts; in
its place arose a self-congratulatory moralism. Emblematic of this
transformation was the ascendancy of post-modernism.57 Even more
modern than modernity, it preached that there was no such thing
as truth. No one could be more correct than anyone else, because
there are no absolute standards of correctness. Nevertheless, these
same post-modernists felt justified in indoctrinating students in their
own moral viewpoints.58 More genuine and principled than their
predecessors, in tearing down the remnants of the old order, they
were paving the way for a kinder, more democratic, future.
This neo-Marxist,59 bobo inspired, liberalism became the
conventional wisdom in fields such as history,60 English literature,61
and sociology.62 Each of these cultural-based disciplines sought
to contribute to an emerging canon. But first they needed to
“deconstruct” the existing intellectual edifice.63 As per Marx, they
had to demonstrate that people believed what they did because a “false
consciousness” propagated by the capitalists obscured their vision.
Old-fashioned ideas such as truth, merit, and responsibility were
evidently rationalizations for concentrating power in the hands of the
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rich. If one looked past what was said to what was done, it became
obvious that the intention was to handicap the poor. Historians
contributed to this interpretation by emphasizing how pervasive
sexism and racism had been.64 Instead of delving into the activities
of politicians and industrialists, they shifted their gaze toward their
innocent victims, i.e., the women and minorities. Where once the
Civil War was understood in terms of what Abraham Lincoln had
done, Sojourner Truth emerged as a major player. Almost invisible
now were the contributions of Thomas Edison, exchanged for the
depredations of Joseph McCarthy.65 What mattered was to show
how ordinary people lived. Also essential was demonstrating how
vicious the oppression had been. George Washington was to become
more renowned for being a slaveowner than as the Father of His
Country. That contrary to the wishes of his relatives, he, on his
deathbed, freed his bondsmen was not as well publicized, for this
might contradict the image being purveyed.
In literature, the transformations were more dramatic.66 The
authority figures decided that Standard English was too confining.67
Ruled the arbitrary creation of a predatory elite, students needed to be
taught that other forms of expression were equally valid. They were
now allowed to sprinkle their writings with what would once have
been thought vulgar. They could likewise collaborate in committees
to produce original works of art. Thanks to the computer, groups of
individuals were encouraged to contribute to common ventures. If
asked to analyze literature, this was intended either to deconstruct
the biases of the past or to explore the authenticity of once marginal
figures. Charles Dickens was still acceptable as a spokesperson for
the downtrodden, but Mark Twain was uncomfortably addicted
to the n-word.68 Jane Austin was a wonderful example of female
genius, whereas Samuel Johnson was a misogynist buffoon. William
Shakespeare was definitely out of date, while obscure authors from
Africa and Latin America enjoyed a vogue. Students might themselves
read Ayn Rand, whereas in class they poured over John Steinbeck’s69
The Grapes of Wrath in order to determine how the reserve army
of the unemployed had been used to keep workers impotent. In
1989 The Wall Street Journal70 described the curriculum of Stanford
University’s course in Western Civilization thus: “Dante’s ‘Inferno’ is
out…but ‘I…Rigoberta Menchu’ is in…Aquinas and Thomas More
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are out, but ‘Their Eyes Were Watching God” by feminist Zora Neale
Hurston is in…Locke and Mill go down the memory hole, replaced
by the U.N Declaration of Human Rights and Rastafarian poetry…
[while] Virgil, Cicero, and Tacitus give way to Frantz Fanon….”
In sociology, as in most of the social sciences, the emphasis
shifted to exposing oppression to the antiseptic effects of intellectual
sunlight.71 Students needed to become familiar with the continuing
universality of exploitation. Understanding how societies were put
together thus took a backseat to revealing the means whereby they
perpetuated immorality.72 Once upon a time functionalists sought
to determine the prerequisites of community survival, but by the
70s conflict theorists had defiantly supplanted them. Neo-Marxists
in all but name, they were preoccupied by issues of inequality. On
the grounds that race, class, and gender were all about disparities in
power, these were taught in the same courses. It did not matter that
social class had more to do with hierarchical relationships and gender
relations with heterosexual intimacy. Furthermore, much of what
was covered was treated as problematic. Marriage was revealed to be
an institution dedicated to suppressing women and children,73 and
schools a mechanism for instilling industrial uniformity.74 Time and
again, the answer to human misery was seen as liberating people from
the despotic grip of greedy capitalists. According to authoritative
professors, when business people spoke of responsibility, they
meant an allegiance to themselves. When they praised merit, this
was a code word for that in which they excelled. Since many who
gravitated to sociology had been involved in social reforms, they were
also fascinated with social movements.75 Essentially “movement”
people, they were not so much interested in studying how morality
operated as in determining the means of making their interventions
successful. This might not be social science as originally conceived,
but it was in line with their liberal dispositions.
This moral certitude produced classrooms of stifling
conventionality.76 The correct answers might not be representative
of the larger society, but they were the ones students were expected
to proselytize once they exited the halls of academe.77 In former
times, professors had been committed to exposing students to all
sides of important issues in a relatively dispassionate manner. The
students were to be introduced to the facts and to canons of logic,
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and then make up their own minds. This was now history. Despite
protestations of promoting “critical thinking,”78 the only critiques
allowed were of the old order. A deconstruction of the particulars
of the liberal establishment was strictly off limits. Its faith was to
be the guiding faith, not the target of a disinterested investigation.
So virulent was this new orthodoxy that ridicule was deemed an
appropriate means of enforcing its tenets. Professors literally failed
students who expressed the wrong views about race or gender.
Moreover, they did so unabashedly. With upwards of ninety percent
of faculty members in the humanities and social sciences of elite
institutions avowedly liberal (or left of liberal), there was little dissent
when they taught or graded ideologically. In sociology, for instance,
it was routinely assumed that the science dictated liberal conclusions.
This meant that only liberal texts were assigned and only liberal
speakers invited to speak on campus. “Only” may be too strong a
term, but one study indicated that, when it came to commencement
speakers, if a political orientation was demonstrable, it was liberal by
a ratio of sixteen to one.
Something more sinister occurred to the nature of science.
Dispassionate science, one of the hallmarks of industrialization,
made its mark by utilizing disciplined observations to push out the
boundaries of knowledge. In areas such as physics, chemistry, and
biology this continued to be the situation. In the social sciences,
however, political correctness became the standard of truth. The
moral agendas of investigators determined what would be studied
and how this would be interpreted. Because committed ideologues
dominated subjects like sociology, they did not even pretend to go
beyond this. Theirs became advocacy research. The goal was to
disseminate what was already believed, but to do so with the authority
of science. Unconscious biases had always been the bane of social
science, but keeping them unconscious was no longer a priority.
The post-modernists79 argued that since everyone had a bias, Max
Weber’s notion of value neutrality was naïve. The only question was
how persuasive one could be in propagating one’s views. Given that
the liberals were on the side of justice,80 it was incumbent upon them
to be as convincing as possible. Not the truth of their observations,
but their righteousness was what counted.
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“Scientism,” as opposed to science, exploited the trappings of
rational investigation.81 Though it employed the language of science,
and often such valid techniques as statistical analysis, it did this
without a genuine commitment to discovering important truths.
The prestige of science, not its motivating spirit, was appropriated to
serve moral interests. This enabled the advocacy researchers to distort
their activities with a clear conscience. They could, for example,
exaggerate the positive impact of affirmative action82 or detract from
negative effects of divorce without qualms. Some pieces of research
could be totally ignored if they contained unwelcome implications.
This was the fate of James Coleman’s83 massive study on education.
When he found that parental values mattered more for student
success than did school resources, his conclusions were hushed
up. Sometimes the measuring rods were manipulated to produce
the desired inferences. This is what occurred with respect to sexual
abuse. Because conventional liberal opinion demanded that males
be guilty of overwhelming abuse of women, what was regarded as
“abuse” was expanded beyond its ordinary meaning. Merely casting
an admiring glance at a female could be viewed as the equivalent
of rape, that is, if its object found it objectionable. Sometimes
interpretations were massaged after the fact. One set of investigators
reported that teachers were paying more attention to boys than girls
and that this was injuring the self-esteem of the girls.84 What they
failed to divulge was that most of this attention was negative. The
boys were being told to shut up because they were more disruptive
than the girls. How this was supposed to enhance their self-images
was a mystery. Also left unsaid was that the girls were doing better
in school. Despite questioning their abilities, they got better grades
and entered college in larger numbers.
Much of this distortion of science took the form of statistical
manipulations.85 Both in college classes, and on the political
hustings, impressive figures were manufactured because they proved
persuasive. This made it advantageous both to inflate the numbers
and to misinterpret their implications. To wit, although the census
bureau could only find three hundred thousand homeless persons,
homeless advocates, including academic sociologists, cited three
million as the actual count. This was no more than a seat-of-the-pants
estimate, yet it was treated as an absolute fact. For a while it was also
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taken on faith that strangers annually kidnapped over two million
children, although the true number was under a few hundred. Even
when the figures were correct they could be given a deceptive spin.
Percentages, for instance, might be ignored in favor of raw numbers.
To illustrate, it was said that crime and welfare were not concentrated
among African-Americans because there were in fact more Caucasians
in jail or on the dole than blacks. This was true, but to get the
appropriate incarceration figures they had to combine the white and
Hispanic census. More importantly, they had to disregard the minor
detail that blacks were only thirteen percent of the population.
What mattered were proportions, not absolute numbers, but stating
this would have produced the wrong impression. People might have
realized that per capita blacks were committing more than seven
times as many murders as whites. They might also have recognized
that per capita many more members of minorities are on welfare.
This perpetuates a debilitating dependence, but to acknowledge it
might induce the public to come to racist conclusions. The same
statistical smoke and mirrors applied to marriage. Academics who
found the institution outdated produced articles that suggested that
less than ten percent of families consisted of the traditional husband,
wife, and their two children. What they neglected to add was that
most of these households were either still childless, or past the child
rearing period, or composed of single individuals. Despite divorce
and out-of-wedlock births, most children continued to be raised by
married couples.
Higher education had become infested with these “just so”
stories.86 As with more traditional religious institutions, what was
disseminated was chosen for its moral effect, not its truth-value.
Faculty members and administrators had come to think of themselves
as trustees of the next generation. Intent on making sure that the
young were protected from corrupting influences, they censored that
to which they were exposed. Some of this as overt, but much of it
was accomplished via a community of opinion. Just as what was
considered beautiful has been determined by a cultural zeitgeist, so
was that which was deemed intellectually valid.
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Journalists
Journalism and democratic politics shared the same cradle.87
Both came into being dependent upon the other. If free citizens
were to elect suitable representatives, they needed to know who these
persons were and for what they stood. As importantly, they had to
keep track of their activities once in office. In fact, the most important
function of the first newspapers, and more recently the electronic
media, has been electioneering. From the beginning candidates
were not content to leave their fate to chance.88 If they could, they
would stage-manage pubic attitudes to their advantage. What made
it into the journals, and how this information was construed, was
critical to their interests. Sometimes these manipulations were quite
sophisticated, as when the Federalist Papers89 were used to agitate
for ratification of the American Constitution. Sometimes they were
evocative, as with Thomas Paine’s90 proindependence pamphlet
Common Sense. At other times, they were merely scurrilous, as
when Thomas Jefferson91 was lambasted for having an affair with
Sally Hemmings. In retrospect, the origins of the United States may
seem sedate, and even dignified, but as they were unfolding they
were so raucous that John Adams92 attempted to muzzle the press
with a sedition act that made it illegal to write offensive pieces about
public figures.
The partisan nature of the press is, therefore, of ancient lineage.
What has changed with the advent of liberal dominance is that this
influence became monolithic. The biases of reporters and their
editors grew to be so one-sided as to produce an apparent unanimity
of opinion. Henry Luce,93 the founder of Time Magazine, though
an outspoken conservative, observed that he was forced to rely on a
liberal staff because they were better writers.94 Unquestionably they
were a larger proportion of those from whom he was obliged to draw.
Although it has become compulsory to deny that journalists are
largely left wing, this has long been the case. Surveys of their voting
patterns routinely demonstrate that upwards of ninety percent vote
Democratic, yet most reporters insist that as professionals they can
separate their private beliefs from their occupational judgments.
Even a Dan Rather, whom his colleague Andy Rooney described as
transparently liberal, could continue to describe himself as politically
neutral after vociferously defending forged documents intended to be
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detrimental to a Republican president.95 The truth seems to be that
journalism attracts a certain sort of person. Many are idealists, who if
they weren’t writing about the world, would be attempting to reform
it. Indeed, many seem to be attempting both; the quintessential
social workers with pens.
Added to this is the reality that journalists are cultural experts.
They may seem to know everything, but what they know best is
the prevailing conventional wisdom.96 While many affect an air
of detached omniscience, they come closer to being observers with
attitudes than disinterested authorities. As a matter of fact, most of the
people who turn out to be reporters or editors study communication,
rather than technical skills. Some have backgrounds in political
science or economics, but many more majored in journalism,
English, or the law. Their competence thus lies in how to disseminate
a message, not in making certain that it is accurate. Under these
circumstances being theatrical is often of more consequence than
being honest. Though many in the press portray themselves as
pundits, this is a self-proclaimed designation. The platform they
have achieved, rather than the insights they possess, lend them
their air of legitimacy. Often a stentorian voice or an elegant
way with the printed word is their sole claim to public attention.
Also of inestimable value in validating their pronouncements is
the uniformity of opinion with which they are surrounded. The
repetition of bald-faced absurdities, if sufficiently homogeneous,
can make almost anything sound plausible. Ordinary consumers,
if they do not have access to contrary viewpoints, may have no way
of distinguishing truth from falsehood. The liberal dominance has,
therefore, converted the press into a Temple of sacrosanct ideas. As
soon as technological advances limited the number of newspapers
and media outlets, only their propaganda reached the public ear.
Standardized reportage accordingly came close to being spiritual
indoctrination once contrary voices were muted.
One of the indicators of this development was the metamorphosis
of the front page of newspapers into an extension of their editorial
pages. Where previously this was considered unprofessional,
journalists began to insert personal viewpoints into their stories and
headlines. The tipping points for this progression seem to have been
the Viet Nam War and the Watergate affair. After Walter Cronkite,97
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by unanimous consent “the most trusted man in America,” indicated
that the Tet offensive was a terrible defeat, many of his viewers lost
their faith in the war.98 In time, the government was forced to extricate
the nation from its commitment. This achievement convinced
journalists of their ability to influence events. Shortly thereafter,
Richard Nixon’s disgrace confirmed this assessment. Reportage by
the Washington Post was largely credited with exposing the illegal
cover-up of a third rate burglary, thereby driving a president from
office.99 This, in turn, was construed as saving the nation from
totalitarian ruin. In this manner, having saved both the peace and
democracy, journalism, and particularly investigative journalism,
was tinged with romantic potency. Talented journalism students
could now project themselves as heirs to the mantle of Woodward
and Bernstein. Someday they too would uncover a scandal so great
that their names would be imbued with legendary status.
Under these circumstances ordinary newspersons began to think
of themselves as adversaries of the political elite. Their job, as the
shadow government, was “to tell truth to power,” which meant that
their goal was to reveal as many lies as possible.100 News conferences,
which had once been sedate venues for obtaining information,
became opportunities to embarrass public officials. Even liberal
office-holders were subjected to “gotcha” exercises in tripping them
up over small matters. During FDR’s administration, those who
covered him felt obligated to hide his paralysis from the public on
the grounds that this was in the national interest. Now national
purposes were to be damned when they conflicted with “the public’s
right to know.” When the politician was a conservative, the glee in
exposing his feet of clay was palpable. Given that journalists believed
that their profession endowed them with both moral authority and
technical proficiency, they routinely explained what the news really
meant. They not only told their audiences what happened, but why
it had happened and what the long-term effect would be. Strange
to say, this was habitually consistent with liberal platitudes. In
this way, Monday morning quarterbacking was transformed into a
seven-day-a-week distraction. Whatever occurred, reporters could
elucidate how it could have been done better. During the Nixon
administration101 Spiro Agnew, the soon to be discredited Vice
President, drew disdain for labeling these pundits “nattering nabobs
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of negativity.” Yet this criticism stopped no one. Both its message
and its alliteration struck those at whom it was aimed as over the top.
Themselves emancipated of responsibility for achieving results, they
systematically found those who were accountable wanting. Well
aware that their own prescriptions were unlikely to be tested, they
could paint their consequences in the rosiest of hues without fear
of contradiction. Despite the revolving door between the press and
office-holding,102 when journalists were on the outside looking in
their disparagement was so strident as to be malicious. An aura of
smug self-satisfaction clung to romantic analyses that were never to
be tested against the disinterested verdict of reality.
In many ways contemporary journalists have become emotional
demagogues. They utilize sentiments to manipulate the perception
of policies for which they are not answerable. Theirs is power without
consequence. Theirs is the muscle to set the parameters of debate
without having to consider the outcomes. The New York Times
has demonstrated the degree to which moralistic kibitzing can color
events.103 Widely considered America’s most influential newspaper,
in the past it prided itself on being the nation’s journal of record.
In presenting all the news “fit to print,” its staff considered itself
engaged in presenting the first draft of history. As such, accuracy
and even-handed objectivity were the goal. Those days, however,
are long gone. With the advent of the liberal hegemony, the Times
was transformed into the cathedral of left wing political thought.
Though an integral part of the nation’s political establishment, it
became obsessed with crusading for change. Much as might a small
town newspaper seeking to unseat a corrupt mayor, it flooded its
pages with stories intended to promote a compassionate collectivism.
Thus one of its chief objectives was to promote peace. Writers, as
pacifistic as any tied-dyed hippy, rarely found a kind word to say
about military adventures. This included efforts to confront terrorism
after the devastation of 9/11. In particular, they resolutely sought to
undermine the Bush Administration’s Iraq undertaking.104
Throughout its coverage, the Times depicted the Iraqi situation
as analogous to Viet Nam. Within days of launching the ground
action, one of its most prestigious columnists used the front page to
moan about an impending “quagmire.” Wont to quote any public
figure remotely critical of Bush’s policy, its editors had the temerity
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to misquote Henry Kissinger about its legitimacy and then to drag
their feet before giving a grudging retraction. So far as the Times
was concerned, it would be impossible to defeat Saddam Hussein
because there was no viable “plan” for doing so. One might have
imagined that entering Baghdad within a mere three weeks would
have quieted these editorial qualms, but it did not. As Bob Kohn105
documents, before, during, and after major combat the Times ran a
preponderance of negative stories. It began by fearing a “protracted
war’ and a new “jihad,” then it worried that the British “mistrusted”
how the U.S. was waging the battle, and it highlighted a “chorus
of criticism” that speculated “images of victory overshadow doses of
realism.” As the climax drew near, it perceived new dangers in the
“final push” and described American troops as “weary” from their
exertions. Meanwhile the paper stressed that images of the war were
“faltering in the Arab world,” found disagreement pervading the
U.S. Congress, depicted a “trail of death” in the Iraqi capital, and
reported the enemy as claiming the U.S push had been “thwarted.”
Soon it was proclaiming that the “urban war begins: it was real scary,”
while speculating that the “evidence contradicts rumors of torture.”
Moreover, “anti-Americanism” was growing in Greece, and an African
leader was saying the “Iraq war sets bad precedent.” When weapons
of mass destruction were not immediately found this prompted loud
skepticism about whether they ever existed. Eventually it would be
implied that George W. Bush lied about their presence in order to get
revenge for his father’s earlier fiasco.106
One of the more revealing episodes disclosed the lengths to which
the Times would go to portray the government as incompetent.
After Baghdad fell, looting broke out in the streets. This was quickly
blamed on the administration’s failure to anticipate disorder or to react
expeditiously. Particularly shocking was that the national museum
had been robbed of hundreds of thousands of irreplaceable treasures.
Obviously this legacy of Mesopotamian civilization should have
been protected by the conquering troops. The American military
simply stood by while unalloyed greed destroyed a part of everyone’s
heritage. From the beginning the Times’ reporters knew that things
were not what they seemed, nevertheless their editors could not resist
printing archeological testimony about how horrendous this event
was. Within days other outlets were suggesting that the missing
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artifacts might have been removed by the museum’s own staff, but
this did not stop the Times’ from continuing the assault. Eventually
it was found that no more than a couple of dozen items were lost;
that most had merely been transferred elsewhere for safekeeping.
But the damage had been done. The impression was created that
the American military was composed of vulgar philistines led by
uncivilized warmongers.
On the home front similar distortions ruled the day. In matters
small and large, a tendentious flavor of liberalism and a nagging
disdain for its enemies prevailed. One of the longstanding disputes
between liberals and traditionalists concerned crime.107 Those with
a conservative bent insisted that law and order must be maintained,
whereas “progressives” claimed that rehabilitation and respect for
diversity would eliminate the root causes of criminality. For many
years, it seemed that there would be no resolution to this controversy.
Then Rudy Giuliani appeared on the scene.108 Once he was elected
mayor of New York City, he determined to end the disorder on
its streets. The local Democratic establishment, which included
the Times, had taken to describing the city as ungovernable. It
contended that the crime rates traced an unbroken gradient due to
the community’s large population and freewheeling spirit; that, and,
of course, the bigotry on the mean-spirited Right. Giuliani, however,
decided to give the Broken Window Theory a try. He would instruct
his underlings to pursue small, as well as large, violations of the law.
And this is what happened. Within a couple of years the effects were
dramatic. The crime rate tumbled, with the number of murders
falling to almost one fourth of what they had been. The streets, and
the subways, were measurably safer. People began to talk about the
community having been taken back from the criminals. Even the
graffiti had been scrubbed off of public property. The environment
was literally cleaner than it had been in decades.
One might have thought the Times would celebrate these
events.109 Presumably its editors too preferred safer neighborhoods.
From their perspective, however, the price was intolerable. A
Republican mayor had achieved what his liberal predecessors only
promised. His solution, not theirs, had been demonstrated to be
effective. Were this allowed to stand, it might cast doubts on the
entire liberal enterprise. Some fly had to be found in the ointment
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and people convinced that this was serious enough to renew their
confidence in the old prescriptions. Providence was soon to provide
what seemed the perfect vehicle. A young African street vendor,
Amadou Diallo, was gunned down outside his home in the Bronx.
Not just this, but the police had riddled his body with over forty
shots. This over-kill was unambiguous evidence of brutality. Yes,
crime had gone down, but only because a totalitarian regime was
allowed to dominate the streets.
The Times quickly went on the offensive.110 A paper that
had historically spurned crime reporting in favor of national and
international coverage became obsessed with pursuing justice. Day
after day, week after week, often several times a day, it ran stories
about the incident. When there was no news, it recruited Al
Sharpton to lead protest rallies designed to highlight the incipient
racism. Sharpton was a well-known demagogue, but he was also
an articulate spokesperson. His antics were sure to draw attention.
Through all this, the Times was aware that police brutality had been
on the decline. Under Giuliani there were fewer such acts than their
had been under an earlier African-American mayor. There were
also fewer such incidents than in most large cities. This did not
matter. What did was that a graphic episode could make it appear
that conservatives were insensitive brutes. Nor were officials at
the Times concerned that an investigation showed the killing had
been accidental or that the police officers involved were later found
innocent in a court of law. This was about appearances, and as the
gatekeepers of public perceptions, they could manipulate these to
send the appropriate political message. Even when they became
aware that their crusade provoked the police to reduce their presence
in minority neighborhoods and that this reduction was followed
by an increase in crime, they were not apologetic. They could no
more admit a mistake than a Pope could express doubts about the
resurrection of Christ.
Though they persistently deny it, journalists habitually implement
their ideological commitments in their editorial choices.111 They
regularly decide what they will write about and how they will describe
it. This both the substance and tone of the media are at their discretion.
While these are not always conscious decisions, they are momentous.
This is why political correctness continues to flourish.112 In general,
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members of the establishment share core beliefs that influence what
is considered newsworthy. Almost entirely sympathetic to abortion,
its proponents receive a supportive hearing, whereas its foes are
portrayed as kooks.113 Likewise strongly approving of feminism, it
is represented as defending the rights of women, whereas traditional
views are depicted as oppressive.114 Also in favor of gun control,
they brook no amount of contrary evidence convinces them that gun
ownership does not increase murder rates.115 Similarly, the efficacy
of affirmative action is never seriously reviewed.116 To be against it
is assumed to be racist and, therefore, its achievements are exempt
from neutral evaluation.117 Even prayer in schools gets short shrift.
Routinely identified with fundamentalism, advocates of school
prayer are seen as advancing a religious orientation. The result is
that a molehill is presented as a barbaric onslaught against religious
freedom.
As arbiters of good and evil, the priesthood of institutionalized
journalism exercises the prerogatives of an image-maker.118 Whose
words are quoted, how these are edited, the details chosen to convey
their ambiance, what adjectives applied, and the critics selected for
provide a rebuttal determine how what is reported will be perceived.
If he did not already understand this, Arnold Schwarzenegger
discovered it when he ran for California governor. Having previously
been considered an open-minded friend of Jewish interests, the Los
Angeles Times suggested that he had years earlier made pro-Hitler
comments. These were ostensibly cited in full, but subsequent
investigations revealed that they had been revised to leave out his
anti-Hitler assertions. Corresponding to this libel have been those
addressed toward virtually every Republican president. Democrats are
praised for their intelligence and compassion, whereas conservatives
are ridiculed for stupidity and avarice. George W. Bush was already
being dismissed as an intellectual lightweight when a reporter sprung
a surprise quiz about obscure world leaders. When Bush missed most
of these, this was taken as confirmation of his mental limitations.
Needless to say, no Democratic candidate faced similar opprobrium.
It cannot be an accident that Ronald Reagan119 was regarded as a
genial dunce, Dwight Eisenhower120 a dim-witted grandfather, and
Gerald Ford121 a clumsy oaf, while John Kennedy122 was a brilliant
young leader, Adlai Stevenson an intellectual statesman, Al Gore a
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wooden, but insightful intellect, Jimmy Carter123 a detailed scientific
mind, and Bill Clinton124 one of the smartest men to inhabit the
Whiter House. Even conservatives too bright to be labeled dumb
did not escape. Richard Nixon125 became a villainous crook, Barry
Goldwater126 a troglodyte cold warrior, and George Bush the elder
an out of touch elitist who did not understand how supermarket
scanner worked.
Needless to say, liberals are presented as paragons of the
mainstream, whereas their opponents are dismissed as extremists.127
Those on the left are likewise victims of McCarthyite slurs, while
those on the right perpetrate these. It does not matter that it has
been decades since liberals were accused of being communists, the
implication of a lack of patriotism remains. Nor does it matter that
conservatives are hounded for being racist, sexist, homophobes;
they undoubtedly deserve it. Progressives are the “real” democrats,
in sharp contrast to these traditionalists, who are closet Nazis. No
epithet, not liar, mass-murderer, or warmonger is too severe. The spin
is never-ending. Nowadays the accusations have reached a crescendo
with the arrival of competing news outlets. Both the Fox network
and talk radio have aroused suspicions that the liberal monopoly may
not endure. As a result, the rhetoric has heated up with accusations
that it is the conservatives who are actually in charge.
It must be noted in passing that liberals also dominate the
publishing business. Most of the big houses have a penchant for
printing and publicizing works congruent with these preferred
beliefs. With most of the larger companies headquartered in New
York City, their editors are influenced by the prejudices of the
Manhattan intellectuals who are their friends. The neo-Marxism
of these thinkers appears mainstream to decision-makers who are
exposed to little else when they make their social rounds.
Entertainment
If America’s image-makers are concentrated in New York City,
its myth-makers are clustered in Hollywood, California.128 Just as a
society’s beliefs are shaped by the facts its institutions transmit, so they
are molded by the stories they tell. Human beings learn about their
world as much from fictional accounts of it as from direct observation.
These narratives have the advantage of possessing uncluttered plots
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and emotional clarity. For the most part, straightforward depictions
of who is good or evil, they are the contemporary version of biblical
parables. As a result, audiences receive transparent instructions on
whom to root for or against. Once, the Christian Church utilized
passion plays to tutor the laity on the rudiments of faith. Today, in
our more secular times, the entertainment industry has acquired this
function. In movies, television dramas,129 and music it broadcasts its
favorite lessons in the form of easy to swallow amusements. People
pay attention because they are emotionally enlisted into performances
that appeal to their instinctual dispositions. Though they know this
is make-believe, they nevertheless care about who wins and loses
because they are biologically programmed to care about such things.
As it happens, liberals have attained a virtual monopoly within the
entertainment industry. In control of the machinery of storytelling,
they produce materials uniformly favorable to their point of view.
The cultural dominance of liberalism is revealed by pieces
of evidence such as how U.S. presidents are portrayed. In almost
every instance, positive renderings are reserved for liberal politicians.
From the movie’s American President to television’s West Wing,
conservatives are rendered as heartless villains intent of destroying
sympathetic left-leaning heroes. Indeed, it is far more likely that
a president will be depicted as a bloodthirsty murderer than as a
conscientious traditionalist trying to reduce the size of government
in order to preserve freedom. Much more visible are Dr. Strangelove
characters who are plotting an anti-democratic conflagration. The
attitude is also exposed in depictions of tradition. Pleasantville was
one such concoction. This film magically transported teenagers
back into a black and white television portrayal of the 1950s. Not
only was color gone from this world, so were art, love, and sex. The
morals of a half-century ago were thereby pilloried as crimped and
antihumanistic. They clearly needed to be loosened up by a large
dose of abstract painting and lyrically represented lust. They needed,
in short, to be rescued by an injection of liberal values.
One of fiction’s specialties is presenting the unreal as true. There
may never have been dragons, but novelists and filmmakers routinely
construct images that make them appear factual. The same can be
said of idealized models of the future. A world in which hierarchy
fades away may not be possible, but is on the silver screen. So is one
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in which indiscriminate sex has no unfavorable consequences.130 The
Pleasantville teens did not fret about becoming pregnant, that is, as
long as the producers kept this out of the story line. In the same way,
history can be reworked to serve contemporary purposes. Nixon and
JFK could identify the scoundrels as whoever their director desired.
Yet that which was shown to have happened never really unfolded in
that way. Even in a genre as simple as westerns, the staples have been
revised to convey liberal shibboleths. Once upon a time the good
guys wore white hats and the bad ones black. Once upon a time the
Indians attacked the wagon train and the cavalry drove them off. In
recent years, this has been reversed. In Dances with Wolves there is
no question that the underdogs are morally superior. Their defects
are passed over in poetic silence.
A casual glance at the academy awards131 demonstrates who is
in and who out. From Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1947, to The
Apartment in 1960, to Midnight Cowboy in 1969, to Rocky in
1976, to Platoon in 1986, to the Unforgiven in 1992, the underdogs
received compassionate treatment. About the only conservative
hero to win an award was Patton in 1970. More recently Bowling
for Columbine was honored with the Oscar for best documentary.
Blatantly anti-establishment, and riddled with misrepresentations,
its awkward filmmaking nevertheless impressed voters in agreement
with its central thesis. Less egregious is what happened to made-fortelevision movies. Though many of these traded in sensationalism
for its own sake, another batch were dedicated to illustrating the
“problem of the week.” Just as liberal politicians specialize in sob
stories about whatever grievance they promise to solve, so media
moguls feature social conditions that cry out for reform. That they
are not able to offer a viable solution takes a back seat to mobilizing
social concern for a legislative intervention.
Hollywood has also produced a bumper crop of liberal celebrities.
Artists whose only claim to fame is that their occupation provides
a larger-than-life image leap to the defense of causes they barely
understand. Imbued with the romance of being among the beautiful
people,132 viewers often confuse them with the roles they play. While
actors and actresses have as much right to be politically active as
any citizen, many nevertheless disingenuously conceal their modest
intellectual credentials. For many, a liberal-oriented appearance
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of compassion is a good career move. It is certainly valuable to
politicians who can raise huge donations by associating themselves
with well-loved entertainers.
One of the worst effects of the entertainment industry has been
on sexual mores. In an effort to attract viewers, conventionalized
lasciviousness has become the order of the day. Full frontal nudity,
plus simulated sexual intercourse, have migrated from the x-rated
movie theater to the television screen. No longer is much off-limits.
Worse yet, promiscuity is represented as exciting and sophisticated.
To judge from what appears in the cinema or on situation comedies,
the beautiful people routinely swap bed partners. They have learned
that sex is natural, beautiful, and inconsequential, and like Madonna
are trying to liberate others by sharing their insights. When it is
objected that this sends the wrong ideas to young people, the response
is to lament censorship. Government regulations are denounced
as totalitarian impositions that must be resisted lest democracy be
imperiled. Even private criticisms of casual sexuality are deplored as
smacking of fascism. They are said to portray a narrow-mindedness
inimical to art and creativity. The paradox in this is that those who
defend a complete freedom of sexual expression also favor broader
representation for minority performers. In this case, they argue
that the downtrodden need positive role models if they are to move
forward. Yet if race relations can be improved by providing such
models, why shouldn’t sexuality receive analogous treatment? Why
isn’t casual promiscuity an image that needs to be shunned as much
as are Sambo representations of African-Americans?
In fact, a ready access to cavalier sexuality seems to have had
grievous consequences. The very individuals liberals claim to be
defending are the ones most adversely affected. Youngsters impressed
by the glamour of publicly exposed skin conclude that going naked
is not so terrible. Less likely to come from families that instill strict
standards, they are easily drawn into prostitution and/or relationships
based on physical attributes. Instead of being encouraged to seek the
professional skills needed to move up the social class ladder, they are
seduced into besmirching their reputations. It is as if they have been
lured into one-night stands by unscrupulous media Lotharios who
promise they will still love the victims in the morning. The same can
be said of hip-hop music133 that substitutes friction between body
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organs for enduring love. “Shake your booty” and “give it to me
baby” and you will be liberated from oppression shout a bevy of halfnaked millionaires. And the very young listen. They submit to the
importations of their lustful boyfriends and flash their breasts for the
television camera. It is all in good fun and in a world were everyone
is destined to be equal can have no unfortunate by-products.
Lawyers and Social Workers
A few words must also be said about lawyers and social workers.
They too have become pillars of the liberal establishment. In their
different ways dedicated to supporting centralized government, they
have likewise contributed to the institutionalization of niceness. Both,
for example, theoretically fight for the rights of the disempowered.
Both also have a vested interest in promoting victimization and
collectivist solutions. Although respectively professionals and semiprofessionals, they are occupationally committed to discouraging
others from becoming professionalized. Neither group would accept
this characterization—quite the contrary, they consider themselves
compassionate facilitators of social justice—yet they exhibit a bobo
mentality that undermines their official intentions.
Lawyering has become a growth industry.134 Ironically, the more
commercialized our society has become, the more de Tocqueville’s
social peacemakers have taken to tearing at its foundations.135 Many
attorneys dedicate their careers to settling contractual disputes, but
many more use the law as a bludgeon to beat the powerful into
submission.136 Casting themselves in the role of a David sworn to fell
the capitalist Goliath, they perceive themselves as making democracy
work for the little guy. In their own eyes, legal ombudsmen who apply
the law to correct grievances for those who have no other recourse,
they do so with so a blunt instrument that they are in danger of
weakening the social infrastructure undergirding the law.137 The very
market system that produced the values and self-discipline to make
universalistic regulations viable is attacked with singular enthusiasm.
Instead of genuinely fostering an even playing field, victory at any
cost is all that matters.138
The primary tool of legal liberals is tort law.139 Torts are civil
wrongs such as negligence. Private citizens suing each other in court
to have their differences decided by a judge or jury enforce these
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statutes. Out of this frequently comes a monetary award intended to
correct the adjudicated imbalance. Someone who has been injured
by slipping on ice might, therefore, have his medical costs paid by the
party held responsible for having cleared that ice. But the tort law
goes farther than this. It allows the injured party to collect “punitive
damages.” This is intended to discourage others from committing
the same wrong. Trial lawyers who specialize in negligence suits, as
a consequence, regard themselves as a bulwark against iniquity. In
their own view, they make sure that doctors avoid malpractice, that
manufacturers do not sell defective products, that employers guard
against sexual harassment, that motorists exercise due caution, and
that schools do not smuggle in Christian prayer under the guise of a
moment of silence.
All of this sounds reasonable, yet in the hands of unscrupulous
practitioners has been overdone. Once upon a time, the damage
awards were relatively modest. Nowadays they have escalated into
the billions of dollars. The objective is not merely to send a message,
but to drive the villains into bankruptcy. Thus when liberals were
unable to pass legislation outlawing tobacco, they did an end run
around democracy by seeking to drive the tobacco companies out
of business. This has not yet been achieved, but they did destroy
the asbestos business. What makes this tactic egregious is that
virtually any court can impose these awards. Attorneys are free to
do venue shopping.140 They can bring their suits before jurisdictions
sympathetic to their clients. This has the effect of holding the accused
hostage to the least common denominator. As a result, the potential
quarry is hesitant to engage in actions some unelected vigilantes
might find objectionable. Corporations, in general, fearing that
they might be detested for their commercial success often avoid risky
enterprises in the expectation that these might draw unwanted fire.
The outcome is to play it safe and retard progress.
Another result of this is a spate of frivolous suits brought for
profit rather than to redress injustices. In legal circles it is well
understood that some actions are brought only because the defendant
has “deep pockets.” Another reason for these cases is that they can
be brought at no cost to the accuser. Because victory can be so
profitable, lawyers are prepared to work for contingency fees, that
is, they agree to work for a proportion of what they can later extract
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from the target. This technique has become so prevalent that it has
driven up medical costs to unconscionable levels. In order to engage
in practice, physicians must carry malpractice insurance that costs
them hundreds of thousands of dollars. They must also engage in
defensive medicine, ordering unnecessary, but expensive tests, lest
they afterward be accused of failing to do so. All of this provides trial
lawyers with a financial incentive to make sure there exist regulations
others can be sued for violating. In favor of big government because
it is good for their business, they are generous contributors to the
party of Big Government, i.e., the Democratic Party (which even
nominated a trial lawyer for vice-president).
Another devotee of big government is the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU).141 Dedicated to constitutional cases
ostensibly in defense of personal freedoms,142 somehow the freedoms
protected are never those of conservatives. More apt to be on the
organization’s agenda are measures shielding affirmative action than
those challenging reverse discrimination. Remarkably, the ACLU’s
idea of free speech is either liberal or crackpot speech. It never seems
to get involved when a college president refuses to protect a student
newspaper from being vandalized, that is, if the paper’s editorial
policy is right of center. Here too the institutionalized “niceness” is
highly particularized.
Still more associated with niceness is social work.143 It too has
been a growth industry in a society that considers itself affluent enough
to rescue everyone from any conceivable disability. Much of the
social engineering that liberals have sponsored is understood in social
work terms. As was mentioned above, many educators today regard
themselves as social reformers. They believe in neo-Marxist changes
and expect that in instituting an equality of academic results they
are laying the foundation for broader social equalities. Professional
social workers have similar aims. Given an enormous boost both by
the war of poverty and the advent of psychotherapy, they have long
since surpassed their origins in assimilating immigrant populations.
Professionally nice, they believe that compassion dictates a quest for
complete equity.
The primary recipients of social work attention have always
been the poor. This has naturally engendered a commiseration with
their condition. Social workers get an up-close and personal view of
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the devastation poverty can impose. Were they able to they would
wave a magic wand to raise everyone’s social status. Given the facts
of social hierarchy, however, this is not possible. Improvements
can be made, but these are always limited and, therefore, to some
degree frustrating. For many, solace is found in liberal idealism. Its
extravagant promises are supported in the belief that they can be
redeemed. That they are impractical contradictions, which cannot
come to fruition, is suppressed. As true believers, social workers are
among the most persuasive advocates of programmatic solutions.
Psychotherapy too has provided a wedge to produce change.144
The Freudian discovery that analyzing emotional impediments could
facilitate personal growth had by the 1940s created a therapeutic
craze among the well heeled. Financially, the only way the poor could
participate in this treatment was to avail themselves of therapists less
expensive than the physicians who introduced the procedure. Social
workers fit this bill. For the most part, less intensively trained, they
were prepared to work for less. The irony is that they performed
this so well that the demand for their services outgrew the ability of
insurance companies to afford long-term interventions. The result
was that instead of well-motivated clients receiving services that
could in fact promote social mobility, they were shunted into brief
therapies that more or less maintained the status quo. Liberalism
having over-promised, it delivered almost the opposite of what it
promised. In the hands of social work, it became a rationalization
that legitimized the reverse of what its supporters hoped.
The Working Class Counterattack
The Middle Class Revolution has produced many winners, but
not everyone can be counted among their numbers. Those who
remain on a lower rung have benefited materially, yet they understand
that many others outrank them. As disturbingly, they recognize
that they are subject to direction from above. Trapped in relatively
conformist occupations, they may be more self-directed than their
ancestors, but are less so than their bosses. This can be so irritating
that it impels them toward rebellion. They become oppositionalists
who decide what to do on the basis of what will exasperate those with
greater power. Feeling relatively weak, they go out of their way to
embrace purported symbols of strength.
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How this strategy operates can be seen in the wrestling ring.145 In
almost every corner of the country, gigantic blue-collar bruisers can
be found standing before huge crowds shouting their defiance toward
the world. With muscles pumped up to grotesque proportions, they
threaten to wreck violence on anyone who gets it their way. To this,
their audiences respond with vicarious delirium. They too shout
their insubordination toward anonymous others; thereby engaging
in a symbolic mutiny they could never sustain on the job. Among
their other forms of disobedience are the self-mutilations of tattoos
and body piercing. As visible evidence that they are willing to endure
physical pain, these disfigurements are boasts of being stronger than
effete corporate executives. So too are song lyrics that promise to
shoot law officers and rape uppity women. Those who sing them
out at rock concerts know full well that they offend law-abiding
sensibilities. And this is the point—to get away with being vulgarly
offensive.
Throughout most of history, the trendsetters have come from
the higher social classes. The ways that they have dressed and spoken
have usually established the models for those below them. Not
surprisingly, in their desire to improve their situation, the poor have
emulated what they could. Yet with the ascendancy of the middle
class, there has been a partial role reversal. Today many styles have
bubbled up from below. Music, fashions, and even tattoos and
piercings started among the lower orders have become chic among
middle class adolescents. This is partly due to the rebelliousness of
teenagers, but it also to the dynamics of social class politics. Amazingly
bobos have been instrumental in spreading styles that are inimical to
their interests, or, at least, to the interests of their children. They too
have enthusiastically ratified lower class over upper class practices.
As cultural specialists, liberals control most of the companies
that market communal fashions. Were they, in fact, opposed to
vulgar sexuality or defiant rebelliousness, these would not show up
in the magazines, television programs, or college classrooms they
command. Yet they do provide them a social imprimatur. Instead of
condemning graffiti as vandalism, it is encouraged as “street art.”146
Instead of rejecting pornography as exploitive, it is promoted as free
speech. The reason for this counter-intuitive behavior is as old as the
belief that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” In seeking allies
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against the traditional middle class, bobos have courted those below
them in the pecking order. Because, like the bourgeois politicians
who sponsored Adolf Hitler,147 they are convinced they can manage
the antics of their inferiors, they advance activities detrimental to
social mobility. But since most of their own children only dabble in
this sort of raucous rebellion, they are not seriously hurt, whereas the
children of the poor take these adventures seriously. They believe that
becoming tattoo billboards identifies them as sophisticates. Much to
their surprise they will one day discover that they have been excluded
from positions of authority. The victims of another group’s assault
on the bastions of conventional middle class supremacy, they are apt
to be the last to recognize it. The bobos, the ones who support
the institutionalization of this folly, may be the only winners—if
only temporarily. They gain the profits and the political capital, but
perhaps at the expense of their own long-term security.
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Chapter 10

The Family
MARRIAGE, n. The state or condition of a community
consisting of a master, a mistress and two slaves, making in
all, two. (Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary)
Accidents will occur in the best-regulated families.
(Charles Dickens, Dombey and Son)
As powerful as government is, it can only do so much by
itself. Government can never take the place of parents in
raising children. Government can never take the place of
families and churches and synagogues in teaching values.
(Zell Miller, A National Party No More)
A Bridge to the Future
When he was running for re-election as President, Bill Clinton
promised to build a bridge to the 21st century.1 He would introduce
the reforms necessary to deal with the emerging challenges of
postmodernity and lay the foundation for a nearly utopian future.
These improvements would, to be sure, be liberal in nature. Those
championed by his wife were particularly so. Hillary Clinton2 had
earlier acquired notice for, among other things, arguing that it takes
a village to raise a child. Paraphrasing an old African adage, she
contended that it was now up to the government to protect the
interests of the very young. Only government-sponsored programs
could provide the education and security children deserved. In this,
neither of the Clintons believed that they were doing damage to the
family. Both took it for granted that domesticity in its customary
format was outdated. As good bobos,3 they were certain that federal
regulations were inherently more moral than potentially abusive
nuclear families.
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For some time now, those who proclaim themselves to be the
wave of the future have placed their confidence in the quasireligious
institutions of liberalism. They have concluded that schools, media,
entertainment industry, social-work establishments, and lawenforcement agencies can be trusted to do a better job of raising
children than the men and women who brought them into the world.
Because the members of these civil bodies are open to rationalization
in a way that emotionally biased parents are not,4 they can be perfected
to a degree impossible for nuclear families. It is certainly true that
liberals are more alarmed by private, as opposed to, public abuses.
They can barely envisage the family as crucial in helping individuals
adjust to the Great Middle-Class Revolution. Committed to niceness
and centralization, they find it inconceivable that unfettered parents
might do better jobs than the enlightened autocracy they propose.
Nevertheless, the familial changes presently underway point in the
direction of an improved management of the professionalism and
affluence so characteristic of the modern world. Contrary to the
faith of its devotees, liberalism is riven with so many contradictions,
that it cannot overcome the challenges of a complex marketplace or
individual self-direction. Families, in contrast, possess an elasticity
that enables them to adjust to varying demands.5 Though imperfect,
they can provide more than governments ever will.
Liberals, in their discomfort with the dislocations of the middleclass ascendancy, have insisted upon absolute solutions.6 In quest
of intellectual and aesthetic control, they confuse a yearning for
emotionally infused rationality with insights into how to achieve this.
Authentically desirous of a better world, they mistake their shared
fantasies for what is feasible. That which is actually possible is, in fact,
in the process of evolving. Contrary to what they imagine, no single
person or group of persons, however, has total control over these
emerging realities because no individual or collection of individuals
is that formidable. Discoveries are constantly being made as billions
of mortals stumble along attempting to deal with their private issues,
all the while influencing others engaged in similar attempts. This
interlocking web of social negotiations is hammering out the shape
of future families. Mistakes have been made and will continue
to be made, but a combination of instinctive longings, combined
with external pressures, is pushing us toward better answers. These
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responses become more rational as people learn more, but they are
never as pure as are quasireligious visions. Nevertheless, they are
bona fide solutions, which are, in addition, emotionally authentic.
Derived from experience, they are lived rather than speculative.
To begin with, it must be recognized that liberalism has
inherited a hostility toward the family. From both its Marxist7 and
hippie antecedents, it acquires a suspicion of the emotional crucible
in which organic relationships materialize. Though both of these
ideological precursors romanticize a loving family of all humankind,
they have difficulty with the genuine article. Like many reformers,
they tend to be more comfortable with people in the abstract than
with particular human beings. For their part, the Marxists equate the
family with capitalist exploitation. The bourgeois male is depicted
as a greedy tyrant who dominates his household for his personal
glory. His wife and children are said to be extensions of himself
who either display his fortune or are groomed to enlarge it. Since
both are essentially conceived of as his property, they are his to do
with as he pleased. This converts women into sexual objects whose
central tasks are childrearing and conspicuous consumption.8 His
children, though loved, are potential heirs whose primary purpose
is to mirror his personal achievements after he is gone. Unless they
liberate themselves from this suffocating hegemony, they are doomed
never to have independent lives. The best they can hope is to become
pampered slaves lashed to the service of his needs.
The Marxists, when they came to power in the Soviet Union, were
passionate advocates of free love.9 Eager to see the bourgeois family
consigned to the dustbin of history, they urged women to rebel against
commodification by participating in sexual relationships solely from
personal desire. Children too were soon redefined as the property
of the state. Its preservation was where their first loyalty belonged.
In this, their fidelity would be to all mankind rather than to private
privilege. As time passed, this orientation became enshrined in
schoolrooms where cooperation as opposed to competition is taught.
Among today’s unacknowledged neo-Marxists, radical feminists
remain equally distrustful of heterosexual intimacy and filial piety.10
They, as Engels11 taught, perceive women as having been enslaved by
men in the wake of the Agricultural Revolution. Marriage, which
was designed to hold them in bondage through threats of rape, is
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regarded as a means of enforcing this tyranny.12 It provides the legal
chains that enable men to implement their diabolical threats. Only
when women recognize this as maltreatment and take charge of
their lives will they ever be truly free.13 Only by choosing to live
independently will they become the coequals of men.
Nor should women be shackled to childrearing. Anatomy
must not be allowed to be destiny.14 Just because men want women
barefoot, pregnant, and in the kitchen does not mean they have
to comply. Much more honorable is breaking out to become the
CEO of a corporation.15 As for children, they, too, will benefit from
having liberated mothers. This will provide a model for their own
manumission and bestow permission to seek independent success.16
In the feminist universe, loyalty to the family becomes secondary to
loyalty to oneself.17 This same outlook infused hippie sensibilities.
Perceiving themselves as eternal children, their primary objective was
to engage in recreation for its own sake. They would never settle
down to become sellouts like the over-thirty crowd. They would
certainly never voluntarily assume the responsibility of starting their
own families. Having been tutored in the arts of consumption within
households now interpreted as having purloined their souls, they
exulted in an autonomous egotism. Not for them commitments
to spouses. Such choices were often mistakes that were later
transformed into penal relationships. Nor for them the humdrum
jobs of those bound to servitude by a need to support children. The
hippies18 preferred the pseudofamily of the crash pad. It allowed
them to come and go as they pleased, with the illusion that anyone
in momentary proximity could and would provide as much love as
might be needed.
Contrasted with this was the misery of the traditional family.19
Its apotheosis during the Victorian20 era ushered in a sexual repression
that mirrored the more extensive repression of industrialization.
Cooped up in isolated households, its victims perforce lived
cramped, parochial lives.21 Contemporary religious people who
recommended a return to committed domesticity were thereby
championing the imposition of a narrow-minded bondage. Worse
still, these pious hypocrites wanted to impose families grounded in
antediluvian platitudes.22 They literally sought to go back to the
Bible for inspiration about how men and women should treat one
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another. Although this text was written thousands of years ago, they
intended to utilize it as a model for contemporary relationships.
This was absurd. Modern Westerners were no longer shepherds. It
made no sense for women to walk a step behind their husbands or
to fawn over them as if they were reincarnations of ancient despots.
Liberated women neither could nor should be subservient to men
who were neither smarter nor more moral than they.
What the critics of traditional family values faile to appreciate
is that the fundamentalists23 are not advocating a literal return to
the past. The words might be derived from ancient sources, but the
sentiments have been adapted to modern conditions. When these
religious defenders of the family speak about preserving the institution,
they are concerned about issues such as personal commitment. They
want husbands and wives to be faithful to one another and their
children. Although there might be disputes among family members,
they urge them to work things through without resort to physical
or emotional desertion. The parties are to respect one another and
their mutual pledges.24 Thus, when wives are asked to honor their
husbands, they are not being asked to become doormats. They are
merely expected to treat their spouses with the respect that intimacy
requires. Nor was this to be a respect; they, too, are entitled to
have their needs valued. The traditionalists further insist that men
and women are different25 and that, therefore, their responsibilities
within the family differ, and in this they come closer to reality than
did those feminists who argue that there are no biological differences
between the genders—at least, none that matter. Furthermore, in
encouraging women to concentrate on being good mothers and
men on being competent providers, they come nearer to the realities
of contemporary domestic relations, even taking into account the
sexual and Middle Class Revolutions.
A bridge to the future is, therefore, unlikely to be structurally
sound if it does not pay attention to family values.26 Though these
standards are not liable to be what they once were, neither are they apt
to be totally different. The Marxist-inspired and bohemian augmented
immaturity that captures the bobo imagination, because it totally
disregards both human nature and social imperatives, cannot provide
viable answers. The idea of totally independent human beings who
can meet their needs for love and their children’s requirements for
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social support, without stable attachments, is a chimera.27 So is the
notion that government bureaucrats or impersonal transfer payments
can substitute for long-term interpersonal commitments. These are
ideological fantasies utterly detached from human experience. Even
liberals, it is safe to say, have begun to realize these fairy tales are
inadequate.
Tradition, however, is not unconditional.28 What existed in the
past was never perfect, nor can it be the final word for all eternity.
Modifications have been made right along and will continue to be
made. The importance of tradition is as a starting point. The rules
people once lived by, in their time, undoubtedly served significant
purposes, even if their functions have been misunderstood. Jettisoning
them without qualms would, therefore, be unwise. More prudent
is experimenting with reasonable modifications. Small changes
that are re-evaluated as people push ahead can avoid catastrophic
readjustments. The trouble, of course, is that no one possesses a
consistent objectivity. Human beings are always confused by the
small slice of reality they personally glimpse. Imagining that each
slice is the whole, they generally project it past its the breaking point.
They are also hampered by intellectual and emotional boundaries
they cannot overcome. No one is as smart as he or she supposes.
This produces an inevitable irrationality that is compounded by
the turbulence introduced via other people’s irrationalities. Being
churned in a world of competing demands is inherently disorienting.
Often, the best that can be done is to look back upon past social
negotiations in order to discern how they evolved. With luck, it
may be possible to recognize what people have been dealing with
and why.
The Post-Liberal Way of Life
In chapter 3 much was made of the middle class way of life. People
are said to be coping with a commercial world in which the division
of labor has subdivided to a perplexing degree. Required by technical
and social circumstances to adapt to unprecedented complexities,
they create a decentralized and professionalized lifestyle contingent
upon self-direction and internalized disciplines. They thereby learn
to make independent decisions in a fluid environment fraught with
uncertainties. This is no mean task, one ultimately betrayed by the
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normal human tendency toward cultural lag.29 People who grow up
with the customs and social relationships of one way of life find it
difficult to convert to another. Frequently, they do not even recognize
the pressures they are sustaining. As a consequence, when attempting
to adapt to what they think is happening, they revert to reactionary
solutions. This is the irony of liberalism. Touted as a progressive
development, it is actually retrogressive. Bound to an absolutism and
a naïve familism, it depends upon quasireligious alliances to enforce
its dictates. When it comes to the family, although it propounds an
extended domesticity of all humanity, in practice it seeks to dismantle
nuclear families in favor of a government-sponsored hegemony.30
This, almost certainly, cannot be the shape of things to come.
Interlaced with contradictions and institutionalized falsehoods too
unstable to provide a sound foundation, it must collapse. What seems
more likely is the establishment of a post-liberal way of life centered
on professionalism. Liberalism does offer hope for improvements,
and this hope cannot be abandoned, but neither can it be allowed
to explode due to romantic idealism. An optimistic, yet realistic,
alternative must be found. Fortunately, this transformation is in the
process of materializing. Families are being revamped as this is being
written. As important, these modifications are not apt to result in
its termination. The nuclear family is decidedly not dead.31 Despite
the ravages of divorce and extramarital affairs, an overwhelming
majority of people choose. They still dream of finding soul mates
and of raising a passel of tow-headed children. What they participate
in differs from what their parents knew, but its dimensions would
nevertheless be recognizable to earlier generations.
The family emerging from the Middle Class Revolution is one
that has been amended to fit the needs of developing circumstances.32
To begin with, this remains a hierarchical world. It has not become
suffused with a quixotic egalitarianism. Social class continues to be
a crucial organizing principle, with some individuals winning and
others losing. Successful families are, therefore, those capable of
promoting social mobility. This means the marital partners must
receive the interpersonal support they need in order to win tests of
strength.33 Though the criteria required to come out on top have
changed, some couples continue to achieve greater power than
others. The family must, as a consequence, keep up with these
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advances. It has to furnish the resources to meet emerging standards
of success. Husbands and wives have to encourage their respective
professionalization and, as parents, must collaborate in preparing
their children to achieve self-directed futures.34 All must acquire the
skills and emotional reserves to enter and sustain productive alliances
in a world full of strangers.35
Liberalism fosters a quasireligious orientation toward the family.
Its simple faith is in disembodied love and centralized altruism.36
Yet, upon a closer inspection, it reflects a flaccid immaturity. Parents
are asked to be indulgent, friends to their children, and spouses
are asked to be open-minded regarding the partner’s infidelities.
Even single parenthood is celebrated as evidence of multicultural
tolerance. None of this, however, has been well thought through.
Advocates have not considered the implications of their proposals.
What, for instance, would happen to youngsters who did not have
parents capable of consistent discipline or marital partners who
were continually betrayed by irresponsible mates? Love and good
intentions may be alleged to conquer all, but among normal human
beings they never do. In fact, the liberal family is about denying the
validity of the traditional family, rather than offering a blueprint for
a viable alternative. It is an act of defiance, not a prudent effort at
innovation.
Not too surprisingly, the professionalizing family is apt to have
more in common with professionalized occupations than with
colliding billiard balls.
and lawyers and their ilk are trusted to
make important decisions because they have demonstrated the
expertise and motivation to do so effectively. The same must apply
to the family. It has to provide its members with the expertise and
motivation to live successful lives. This means its core cannot be
bound together by flower power or mindless tolerance. Nor can it be
about total independence. Although its members are self-directed and
self-disciplined, they must also be committed to a common mission.
Individually, they need to know a great deal and to be a great deal.
They, likewise, have to possess significant people skills, technical
skills, and emotional maturity. Beyond this, they benefit from being
committed to middle class values and virtues. The job of the family,
as a group, is to inculcate and perpetuate these factors.37 Both for
the marital partners and their children, the family must facilitate
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the sorts of strength necessary for its members to make independent
decisions in an indeterminate world of shifting alliances. An ability
to be successfully assertive under these circumstances derives, in part,
from biology. Some people are born smarter and more energetic
than others. Nevertheless, much of the family comes from the social
structure and culture in which a person is embedded. The family
is at the center of this infrastructure. It is the framework that gives
people their start, in life and that keeps them going in moments of
stress.
For a husband and a wife, the family has been described as a
haven in a heartless world.38 It is a place to which they can retreat
to lick their wounds and receive aid and comfort from individuals
who care about them. Those who do not have such succor face the
daunting challenges of fending off the pressures of social competition
in isolation. Without someone to love, the individual must find the
courage to persist somewhere deep inside. For children, the family
can also be a safe home base.39 It is a place where they, too, can
receive acceptance and encouragement. But, it is also their primary
source of socialization. It is where lessons are taught in how to cope
with what is eventually to come. It is also the starting point for social
networking. The child who does not have a supportive family is, as
a result, deprived of a ticket into the middle classes. The child will
have to scramble to learn how and with whom upward mobility can
be accomplished.
The family is critical for instilling and reinforcing people skills,
emotional maturity,40 and middle-class values and virtues.41 Less
focal in teaching technical skills, it may nevertheless be significant
in directing children toward the schools and jobs where these can
be acquired. Social propaganda to the contrary, formal education
is inept at teaching personal competence. If someone wants to
study the mathematics of civil engineering, there is no better place
than an accredited university. If one wants to discover how to be
a responsive role-taker, however, it is virtually useless. One of the
reasons liberalism cannot fulfill its promises is that public institutions
are dismal at dealing with emotional tasks.42 As is well known,
massive bureaucracies and formal regulations are notorious for
impersonality.43 They may advertise themselves as caring about the
little person, but they, in fact, incorporate few individuals assigned
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to do the caring. Genuine emotional concern occurs among people
who know one another and who, typically, have previously bonded.
Massive organizations specialize in an interchangeability of
personnel that is inimical to intimate emotional support. No sooner
do those who belong get to know one another than they are whisked
away to other assignments. They, thus, find themselves subject to
rules enforced by individuals who do not know or care about them.
This is true even in elementary-school classrooms. Many teachers44
assume that they will be able to compensate for the love their charges
are not getting at home, but this is a vain hope. They can never
know most of their students well enough to achieve this, but, what is
worse, they can never commit to them for the long haul. However
well things go during this school year, their charges will be passed
along to someone else next term. And the children know this. They
understand that they cannot depend on the long-term availability of
the best-intentioned teacher. Their parents, in contrast, will be there
next year and the year after that. Parents are the ones children have
to worry about and the ones upon whom their fate depends. For
better or worse, they are the persons with whom emotional bonding
is possible.
With respect to people skills, the intimate intensity of the
nuclear family is decisive.45 A father, a mother, and their children
interact regularly and familiarly. They have access to one another
when they are at their most vulnerable and most open to influence.
Take the issue of communication. Family members converse with
one another both verbally and non-verbally. For the young, these
dialogues are the place where they learn language and where they
discover how to be persuasive. If their parents are inarticulate, it
is not likely they will be much different. Members of the middle
class, it must be remembered, are cultural specialists.46 Their jobs
typically entail the manipulation of symbols. They are, therefore,
well equipped to demonstrate how this is done. This may not be
fair, but it is the way it is. If one’s parents are not orally expressive
or do not value expressivity, they are unlikely to encourage it in
their offspring. Middle class mothers and fathers, to the contrary,
encourage communication by filling their houses with high-quality
books and sophisticated cultural artifacts. The poor generally do
not.
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Similar considerations apply to role-taking and responsiveness.47
Parents who are self-involved make it difficult to learn how to see
things through the eyes of others. Not only are they inadequate
models, but their selfishness tends to elicit defensive counter-measures.
This, in turn, makes it difficult to develop subtle negotiation skills.
Individuals who do not recognize the needs and goals of their role
partners fail to recognize solutions that might meet their concerns.48
Instead of engaging in problem-solving efforts where both parties
emerge as winners, they arouse suspicion and resistance. Should
this sort of conflict arise, the chances of building effective alliances
are reduced. Since the family is the place where a person’s first
interpersonal negotiations occur, it is where basic training in deal
making occurs. As should be evident, middle-class parents, because
they are apt to be better practiced at this skill, make better tutors.
Although deal-making routinely occurs among school-yard peers, it
is remarkable how closely this follows patterns instituted earlier.
There are also the closely related competencies of self-knowledge
and other-knowledge. Because learning to see what is taking place
inside dissimilar individuals begins with being able to look inside
oneself, children of self-aware parents get a head start over those
never exposed to parental introspection. Knowing oneself takes
courage. All human beings are more fragile than they would prefer;
hence, they can be discouraged from making unwelcome discoveries.
If these discoveries are also turned into weapons against a child by
insecure parents, the message is obvious. The youngster is thereby
instructed on the virtue of becoming an opaque fortress, opaque even
to himself. If, on the other hand, parents are sympathetic toward
their own and their offspring’s mistakes, they can point toward
methods for overcoming these. They can instill an honest acceptance
of normal human frailties
Once more, middle-class children have an advantage. Because
their parents will probably have developed personal insights in their
quests for social mobility, they are better able to teach these.49 They
will also have learned more about what makes others tick. People- and
data-oriented occupations demand a cosmopolitan sophistication.
They force individuals to discover that blindness to cultural and
situational differences produces an ignorance that is not conducive
to sensitive leadership or valid decision-making. Self-absorbed social
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organizers virtually beg to be challenged by subordinates who may be
required perform what they are not equipped to perform. Such bosses
inadvertently violate Chester Barnard’s50 injunction that a manager
should only lead where others are already headed, or, at least, where
they are willing to head. Parents who deliver this understanding must
perforce possess an accurate comprehension of social arrangements.
As a consequence, their children will be less naïve than their more
sheltered rivals and, therefore, less apt to inspire insurrections by
being authoritarian.
People skills can also be reinforced within the marital union.
A husband and wife who are both middle class can supplement
each other’s abilities. Since both are apt to possess independent
competences, they can pool their resources such that both are better
off than either would be, alone.51 A woman may, for example, share
her superior ability to read emotions by interpreting subtle social
cues for her husband, whereas a man may share his more aggressive
problem-solving style. As important, in getting to know each
other, they can acquire a better understanding of themselves and
of outsiders. The mutual responsiveness and role-taking52 required
of them hones their dexterity in dealing with others. Similarly,
engaging in the negotiations inherent in an intimate relationship can
improve bargaining skills. People who learn to accommodate one
another, in the intensity of private liaisons, can productively transfer
this forbearance to other circumstances. In learning to get along
with one another, they obtain an advantage in getting along with
strangers.
Many family-nurtured people skills are closely bound to the
emotional maturity that is a product of certain kinds of intimacy.
Emotional maturity,53 that is, an ability to control and utilize strong
emotions, is of enormous import. To be emotionally immature is to
be a social weakling easily intimidated by others.54 Those who are
overwhelmed by their own feelings are prone to having these used
against them. Yet, emotional strengths do not come automatically.
All human beings enter the world equipped with roughly the same
affective toolbox. Some may perhaps be more passionate than others,
but all are imbued with a capacity for anger,55 fear, love, etc. How
to employ these interpersonally must, however, be learned. The
primitive emotions of children—the crying, the lashing out, etc.—
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come naturally, whereas control and appropriate communication
do not.56 These must be socialized, that is, they must be taught
and practiced. Once more, the family, as the locus of interpersonal
intimacy,57 is where this best occurs. It is the place adults who have
learned to manage their own feelings can instruct the young on how
to manage theirs.
The school, the work site, and the welfare office cannot substitute
for the family.58 They provide neither the continuity nor the intensity
to do the task. What goes on behind a family’s closed doors is usually
supposed to stay there because much of it would be embarrassing in
front of outsiders. Most people want to appear more mature and
in better control than they are. They, therefore, lack candor with
strangers. It is only in the let-it-all-hang-out environment of the
private household that they are truly themselves. As a consequence,
only some tasks are possible. Learning to deal with strong emotions is
impracticable in places where they rarely go wild. Unless passions are
sometimes too powerful to be contained, there can be no rehearsal in
containing them. Childhood tantrums, to cite one familiar case, must
be managed in situ. The toddler rolling around the floor in despair
discovers during his agony that this condition is not fatal. If parents
who are not unhinged by the display immediately confront the child
with its vapidity, the child may also learn that this demonstration
is ineffective. This should prompt seeking more advanced means
of making a point. Were emotions only talked about or indirectly
referred to in socially acceptable charades, they could never be
successfully resolved. Public pretense is occasionally required, but it
does not allow for experiential learning. Family crises, for all their
sturm und drang, are, therefore, essential.
Among the emotions with which families deal are anger, fear, and
love. Individuals who never learn to deal with rage never find the
means to overcome their frustrations. Those for whom terror is more
than they can handle never learn to cope with social intimidation.
And those for whom intense love is an ineluctable mystery may be
swept away by a desire to be cared for by the perfect other. Yet, all
of these feelings occur in every family. Some individuals suppress
them in an attempt to deny their presence, but no normal child ever
escapes their clutches. All that hiding from them achieves is sending
the message that they are beyond control. This strategy, for that

404

The Great Middle Class Revolution

reason, perpetuates immaturity instead of confronting it. To resort
to what has become a familiar mantra, middle-class status can once
more make the difference. Because most people- and data-oriented
jobs cannot be navigated without emotional maturity, middle-class
parents are less likely to feel overmatched by a child’s emotionality.
Their own work-forged courage comes into play at home and enables
them to convey the dependable love that converts passion from an
enemy into a friend.
Marital partners may correspondingly find that marriage increases
their emotional maturity. Small children often require an adult to
mediate their disputes. On their own, the violence of their anger can
escalate to insupportable levels. A husband and wife cannot afford to
permit this to happen when they disagree. They must independently
find the means to restrain their passions. They must learn that,
although they will fight,59 they are capable of resolving these quarrels
without inflicting emotional injuries.60 What is more, if they love
each other, they can become allies in increasing each other’s internal
reserves. Instead of engaging in emotional assaults, they can provide
the loving tolerance within which an overexcited partner is allowed to
regain control. Couples who establish a reliable domestic anchorage
within which both can find safety, thereby, furnish the conditions
for further emotional growth. This sort of learning is not something
confined to childhood. Fresh dangers, frustrations, and yearnings
must continually be confronted and mastered by adults. An intimate
friend, i.e., a spouse, who cares and who is present during moments
of stress can be crucial in providing the collaboration that makes the
difference.
The family is also the place where values and virtues are inculcated
into children.61 Parents instruct their young on which goals are
important. As significant, they provide both models of propriety
and of negotiating partners for deciding what is acceptable. Because
morality is socially constructed, it must be passed along from one
generation to the next. One of the ways children learn to be decent
human beings is by observing paradigms of moral behavior. Parents
who live out these patterns provide the best lessons on virtue. Honest
parents are thus unsurpassed at demonstrating that honesty is both
valuable and possible. They also offer examples of how truth can be
employed. By the same token, they may function as sounding boards
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against which the young can test variations on moral standards. Since
each generation confronts different challenges, its members will need
to modify their patrimony. Some sorts of falsehoods, for instance,
become less morally acceptable under emerging circumstances.
But, which ones in particular need to be altered is determined in
negotiations with authority figures. This process occurs within
families when parents and children differ on what is appropriate, as
they regularly do about such matters as staying out late on dates or
experimenting with psychoactive substances.
Among the most important moral traditions transmitted are
those entailing personal responsibility,62 individual merit, and selfdiscipline. Children, who are rewarded for exercising initiative and
for accepting blame, are more likely to take chances and to learn
from these experiences. Likewise, when they are praised for their
successes and honored for their individuality, they are more apt to
value personal achievement. Perhaps as important, children who are
loved for themselves are likely to grow into loving adults.63 Having
been raised in a trustworthy emotional environment, they develop
into trustworthy role partners, partners who can be relied upon by
intimate strangers. Nor need they be naïve in placing their confidence
in others. Those who experience trust early on learn to distinguish
between genuine reliability and the counterfeit variety.
Finally, marital intimacy can promote moral behavior in a
husband and wife.64 Sociology has taught us that partners who
share crucial values have successful heterosexual relationships. If one
believes in honesty and the other does not, their interchanges are likely
to be fraught with conflict. On the other hand, if both are honest,
they reinforce this disposition. Although external forces will batter
them with contradictory messages, they can validate their shared
commitments and hold fast despite periodic disappointments. They
can also discuss their reactions to evolving circumstances. Since they,
like their children, continue to negotiate their moral obligations, they
can, as well-disposed allies, do so with greater confidence. Because
they stand with each other, they are more likely to stand up to those
who disagree and, in the process, contribute to social bargains in
accord with their own needs.
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Feminist (etc.) Lessons
Because the middle-class way of life could not have been foreseen,
the way the family developed has been misunderstood. Wouldbe prophets regularly denounced the institution as antiquated and
confining.65 Later, feminists pinned most of the blame for their
personal disillusionments on men.66 They lambasted males as gender
bullies who intentionally imprisoned women in gilded suburban
cages. Neither of these perspectives was accurate.67 Marriage has
demonstrated a continuing utility for men, women, and children,68
whereas most men have been unfairly castigated as protorapists.
Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned from the Marxist and
feminist missteps. In their efforts to persuade people of their utopian
fantasies, they convinced many of the unwary to pursue their visions.
These did not succeed, but their failures revealed what was left out.
In this, they also highlighted what the professionalized family of the
future must include.
One of the more painful lessons has been provided by divorce.69
Traditionally, marriages were considered everlasting. After a couple
said its “I do’s,” they expected to live happily ever after, or at least
until one of them died. With the advent of widespread prosperity,
all this changed. Because the availability of market-oriented jobs
enabled both men70 and women to live independently,71 many came
to the conclusion that it made no sense to remain bound in a loveless
union. Divorce became common and even normal, once the laws
were changed to facilitate marital dissolution. In the midst of this
instability, opinions about divorce underwent a sea change. What
was previously regarded as sinful was reevaluated to be beneficial.
Dissolving a bad relationship was said to give each partner an
opportunity to find a better match and their children a chance to
grow up within a loving family. Rather than suffer from emotional
or physical abuse, all would be resilient enough to embrace the
transformation.
This turned out to be wishful thinking.72 Most divorces do not
produce the expected gains.73 Ideological promises of a bright future
are not redeemed because they are not based on a sound understanding
of human-attachment behavior. Those who propounded them
believed that people could rationally move from one relationship to
another without undue upset. What they failed to reckon with was
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the emotional aspects of personal bonds. When people get married,
they do not merely sign a piece of paper; they also undergo a courtship
process that rearranges their internal motivations. Falling in love
rewires their brains so that they cannot move on with impunity.
Once a relationship has been forged, it can only be torn asunder
with difficulty. Almost everyone wants love to be perpetual; hence,
when it is not, individuals experience disappointment. They become
furiously angry at the partners who, they feel, betrayed them and
eventually fall into deep depressions. Divorce is an unhappy event
even when the ex-spouse is a miserable human being. The agony
of detaching from a former lover takes several years, at minimum.
But even then, the acceptance of this catastrophe does not prepare
either party for something better. An individuals who has chosen a
partner poorly often utilizes the newfound freedom to make another
appalling choice. Nor may that person have learned much about
how to make intimacy work.74 There is no guarantee that the person
will not make the same mistakes in a new marriage.
One of the discoveries that emerged from the explosion in the
rate of divorce is that marriages must be worked at. Love does not
automatically exclude conflict. No matter how well suited two
individuals may be, they are never a perfect match. They must,
therefore, learn how to negotiate their differences. This means they
must be committed to hammering their disagreements out. If they
are not, if they look for quick exits once they hit a rough patch, they
will never salvage a strong bond. During the hippie interregnum,
trial marriages, often without benefit of clergy, came into vogue.
Couples lived together in sexual cohabitation without agreements
to formalize their relationships. This was rationalized as providing
information upon which a solid association could arise. If individuals
saw firsthand what their partners were like, they could presumably
unite their fortunes once they had confirmed their worth. As a result,
they would be less likely to divorce. But this is not how it turned out.
Partners who lived together for extended periods before marriage
are more apt to divorce. This might appear nonsensical, but what
researchers found was that those who shacked up before tying the
knot tended to be less committed to the institution of marriage. As
a result, when things went wrong they invested less effort in working
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them out. More traditional couples who viewed marriage as sacred
stayed together long enough to find solutions.
This said, the greatest victims of precipitous divorce turn out to
be the children.75 These innocents are the most affected by ruptures
over which they have almost no say. Before the divorce craze,
conventional wisdom urged unhappy spouses to stay together for
the sake of the children. Afterwards, it was equally well understood
that children were resilient enough to bounce back from the worst
breakup. Indeed, they would benefit by being freed from an
atmosphere saturated by parental conflict. For a while, the experts
agreed with this claim. Unfortunately, they did not have the benefit
of longitudinal studies. It took years for the children of divorce to
reach maturity and for the hidden injuries of their conditions to come
to light. Eventually, social scientists recognized that in almost every
measurable category these children are at a disadvantage. Persons
whose parents had separated are themselves more likely to divorce.
They are also less apt to be well educated or to achieve economic
success. Even their health suffers relative to that of their peers.
Divorce, it seems, leaves children emotionally isolated and financially
at risk. Parents distracted by the pain of their own troubles have less
time to recognize or alleviate those of their youngsters. Instead, these
children have to suppress their pain lest they further distress their
parents. Frequently blaming themselves for what has gone wrong,
they have to wait until adulthood to work through losses incurred
when they were small. In the meantime, they endure relative
impoverishment and a father who is at best an infrequent visitor.
Moreover, because so many men remarried, they were also unlikely
to provide assistance in funding college educations.
Perhaps worst off are the children of unmarried parents.76 As
divorce becomes more frequent, many conclude that marriage is
an unnecessary frill. As a result, illegitimacy rates have exploded.
Feminists argue that a woman alone, unencumbered by masculine
oppression, can provide better parenting by herself.77 Not diverted
by a need to ward off abuse, she can offer maternal love in its
purest form. In their view, a heterosexual commitment is not only
superfluous, it was positively harmful. Yet, the research on the
children of illegitimacy is even more discouraging than that for those
of divorce.78 They, too, suffer personal and professional disabilities
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from which they find it difficult to extricate themselves. Far from
being the happy recipients of freedom, they tend to be insecure and
unsuccessful. Frequently afflicted by mental disorders and inclined
to indulge in deviant behaviors, the absence of two loving parents
handicaps them by denying them the emotional, financial, and
socialization supports that might prepare them to hold their own in
a dynamic commercial society.
Marriage has been misconstrued.79 Visions of unencumbered
lust as a practical alternative are always a false ideal. Simply having
sex for the mere pleasure of the experience has unanticipated
consequences, consequences that leave its practitioners bereft of the
expected payoffs. In contrast, marriage, though it ties people down,
provides compensation for this restriction. The Great MiddleClass Revolution has not reduced the relevance of the family. To
the contrary, it has enhanced it. Both men and women profit
from the companionship of stable marriages; both derive comforts
from the material rewards of their partnerships; and both can draw
pleasure from raising children who will one day grow to be happy,
self-sufficient individuals. Far from being the seedbed of despotism,
the successful middle-class family provides refuges within which all
can pursue their private dreams. While the institution is not an
unruffled sanctuary, it is superior to the alternatives.
Nor has feminist male-bashing been productive. Men have never
been the despots they have been portrayed to be. Most are certainly
not rapists.80 Indeed, isolating and demonizing them has had
disconcerting effects. Ironically, though males have been maligned,
those most seriously damaged are not the intended targets. Relieving
men of their marital and parental duties does not bankrupt them,
nor reduce their power, nor even deprive them of sexual outlets.
What it does is to force women into uncomfortable roles and to
deprive children of their fathers.81 Furthermore, because marriages
are adversely affected, men, women, and children are denied the
benefits of the emotional and financial supports these can provide.
For the moment, let us focus on the damage done the father
role. The feminist indictment of men includes their alleged abuse
of their children. Said to be inherently violent, the blows they
direct at their offspring supposedly harm them more than would
living without them. This is demonstrably wrong. Children need
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their fathers.82 The limits they set, the goals they encourage, and
the models they provide are of inestimable value. Fathers are critical
in inculcating the strengths needed to succeed in a competitive
society. Even the roughhousing in which they specialize has the
effect of making competition fun. If this sometimes frightens the
young, it is more than compensated for by the protective buffer they
furnish. Should this be doubted, sociologists have established that
the children of strong, available fathers do better than those without
them. They tend to feel better about themselves and hence are more
confident when they strike out on their own. They also have a better
understanding of what it is to be a man, both within a family and
out in the marketplace. This is better for boys who will become men,
and also for girls who may one day want to interact with one.
Feminists, in stark contrast, mistakenly contend that there
are virtually no differences between men and women.83 They find
men unnecessary because in their androgynous universe women
can perform any service that males can.84 Women are told that
they can have it all. They can simultaneously be lovers, mothers,
corporate presidents, and, if necessary, surrogate fathers. All that has
to happen is for men to relinquish their hegemony so that women
can demonstrate their worth. This transformation is supposed to
be utterly democratic and pacifically cooperative. Men are urged
to oblige because after they denounce their macho posturing, they
too will find solace in the liberation of their own feminine qualities.
Equality, in the final analysis, is said to be the ultimate form of
freedom. Yet, this prediction has not been fulfilled. Men and women
have not become carbon copies of one another. Feminists typically
blamed this on male obstructionism, but most people, including
women, realize that there are fundamental differences between the
genders. Females may want equal pay for equal work,85 but they
do not want to be men.86 Nor did they want to be superwomen
once they realize that this entails the expenditure of more energy
than anyone has to spare. If they have to choose where to apply
themselves, many decide that being a mother counts for more than
running a corporation.
The most fundamental error of feminists, one that has amply
been confirmed by modern science, is their assertion that the only
differences between the genders are in their sexual plumbing.87 Some
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sociology texts88 persist in making this claim, but psychologists and
biologists have demonstrated numerous behavioral and biological
discrepancies in this thinking. Whatever the radicals say, men do
tend to be more aggressive than women. From infancy, they are
predisposed to be more assertive. This is not a matter of learning but
of genetic heritage. Similarly, women are more nurturing toward
young children. Strongly drawn toward babies and toddlers and
gentler in manner, women find this reciprocated by their being
preferred as sources of emotional comfort. These differences are not
absolute. Were they graphed, they would show up as overlapping
normal curves. Just as it is accurate to say the men are taller than
women because on average there is a more than five-inch difference,
so men are on average more aggressive than women. In particular
cases, it might be the woman who is taller or more aggressive, but
this does not alter the overall distribution.
Other differences have been revealed in terms of brain structure.89
Women are verbally more able than men. They have more neurons
in the part of the brain that organizes speech. They also have a larger
corpus callosum. This means that the communication between their
right and left hemispheres is better than in male brains. Magnetic
resonance imaging discloses that, when given identical problems to
solve, women utilize more areas in different parts of the brain. On a
macro level, this is expressed in the intuitive and multitasking abilities
in which women have long excelled.90 Men, on the other hand, tend
to be more precise in their orientation, a style that has generally been
depicted as logical. For many decades, sociologists, and more recently
linguists, 91 have noted that men tend to be instrumental in style,
whereas women are expressive.92 What this means is that men are
more intent on getting tasks accomplished, whereas women are more
concerned with maintaining tranquil relationships. Closely related
to this is the fact that men are more occupied with competition and
women with cooperation. Though the genders belong to the same
species and, hence, are both enormously competitive and cooperative,
the energies they devote to desired ends are not the identical.
Few serious observers today dispute these disparities. To do so,
as many feminists continue to do, is to encourage men and women
to seek jobs they are unlikely to find satisfying.93 The feminist ideal,
namely androgyny, would have eliminated the gender division of
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labor.94 All jobs would be divided 50/50, with women working in
equal numbers as machinists and men as primary school teachers. It
would not matter that men are better at spatial relationships or that
women are superior with young children. To the gender reformers,
democracy means not freedom of choice, but absolute equality, even
if artificially enforced. Unwilling to allow the chips to fall where they
may, they even insist on reorganizing the military to put women on
the front lines. Though this requires that the standards of physical
training be lowered to accommodate women whose upper body
strength does not match that of men, they forge ahead, irrespective
of the consequences for national security.
The question naturally arises as to why feminists have made so
palpable an error. Paradoxically, the reason seems to be connected
with of the Middle-Class Revolution. Once the Industrial
Revolution95 moved into high gear, men transferred their work from
behind the plow onto the factory floor. Women stayed behind to
take care of the house and children, yet, as technology advanced,
much of their work was taken over by labor-saving machinery. For
middle-class women, this eventually reduced their status to that
of an indolent symbol of family prosperity. This, however, was
boring and unappreciated. By the 1950s, suburban housewives
began to feel more useless than is good for anyone’s ego.96 From
their perspective, men were monopolizing the fun and glory. Into
this void marched the feminists with their hyperegalitarian solution.
Since the male jobs were more rewarding, feminists would rectify
the imbalance by opening them to women. The women, in short,
would do everything their husbands did—and vice versa. What did
not occur to these social engineers was that the traditional differences
might be transferred to the workplace. Transfixed by an egalitarian
Marxist ideology,97 they could not conceive of a world in which
males continued their competitive/instrumental ways, whereas
females dominated the expressive roles. Yet, this seems to be what
has happened. Women continue to preside over elementary-school
education,98 while men rule the construction trades. This, however,
is a matter of choice and divergent skills, not of male hegemony.
Men intent on cheating women out of their just heritage have not
imposed it on them.
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A failure to recognize the differences between the genders has also
had untoward outcomes with respect to heterosexual relationships.
In as simple an issue as dating,99 a refusal to admit that male and
female sexualities are different has confused how people make contact.
When Freud100 suggested that anatomy is destiny, the feminists
scoffed.101 As far as they were concerned, there did not need to be a
double standard. If men could play around, why couldn’t they? If
their brothers could call women to ask them out, why should they
have to wait passively by the phone? Nevertheless, when women did
not react as aggressively as was hoped, the reformers did not revise
their understanding of the causes. Ideologically prevented from
acknowledging the truth, they could not confess that women had
more of an investment in pregnancy than men and that, therefore,
they needed to be more careful about whom they admitted into their
bedrooms. Nor could they recognize that men are more interested
in physical beauty because this is a biological sign of female fertility,
whereas women are more concerned with male finances because this
represents evidence of an ability to protect them and their children.
Instead they condemned men for admiring female pulchritude.
Against all history, an appreciative glance became evidence of sexual
harassment and could get a culpable male fired from his job. Though
many women enjoyed being visually prized, those who did not were
allowed to define what was unlawful.
All of this amounts to a radical reversal of Victorian standards.102
Then, it was women who were by common consent seductive hussies.
In their lust, they distracted men from their duties. For the feminists,
the opposite has been true. It is men who in their lust have terrified
women into submission. Threats of rape, rather than feminine wiles,
poisoned gender relations.103 Both of these theories are, of course,
absurd caricatures. Men and women are simultaneously different
and similar. Though one or the other may specialize in a particular
quality, both share enough to understand where the other is coming
from. They are also both complex compounds of good and bad.
Neither has a monopoly on virtue or vice. Nevertheless, for a while
the gender warfare was out of hand, with accusations of perfidy rising
to comedic heights. Thankfully, sanity seems to be returning. More
people have come to realize that individual men and women need
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to be appreciated for what they are and not for how they fit into an
artificial morality game.
This has happened none too soon because successful families
depend on men and women who both understand and approve of
their respective uniquenesses. Raising children well begins with
parents who not only like, but love, one another. This, however,
is difficult in an atmosphere where the partners are encouraged to
be suspicious. The gender libels they propagated are probably the
worst contribution of the feminists. These have made it difficult for
men and women to achieve an accurate assessment of each other.
An accomplishment that is inherently difficult is made more so by
suggestions that men are devils and women, innocent victims. This
encourages, not honest and egalitarian communications, but genderbased posturing. It makes each side feel that it has been wronged and
that this injustice might be irreversible.
Voluntary Intimacy
These are serious errors. Heated gender misunderstandings make
it seem as if the family is beyond redemption. Nevertheless, under
this smokescreen of contempt, a new sort of family has been arising
on the foundations of the traditional model. This is a family that is
more isolated than its predecessors but, for that very reason, more
flexible. The new middle-class family has to be nimble on its feet. A
highly commercialized and technologically integrated society is one
in which change has become endemic. From moment to moment,
the skills demanded have mutated at a dizzying tempo. So have the
locations where these are required. Those who cannot keep up, those
whose professionalization is stuck in an obsolescent mode, pay the
price by falling behind. Families, therefore, have to be supportive of
adaptability. They need to help their members stay abreast of changing
jobs, postgraduate education, and transcontinental relocations. As a
result, they have to be small and self-sufficient.
In former years, extended families were the archetype.104 If aunts
and uncles did not reside under the same roof, they usually lived
within walking distance. Nowadays, economic fragmentation has
become so routine that families have tendrils in remote locations.
Formerly, relatives could drop by one another’s homes, but now they
rely on long-distance telephone conversations to remain in contact.
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This has made the nuclear family the primary focus of allegiance.
A man, a woman, and their children have become the center of
their own universe. In a decentralized market society, they are the
molecules that must be rearranged to make for an efficient whole. As
a consequence, there is more stress on the pair bond of the marital
couple. Where once their respective families and friends pressured
them to dwell together, the responsibility for doing so now falls on
their shoulders. Despite the ease of divorce, if they are to remain
together, it is because they voluntarily choose to do so.
In this, the family has itself become professionalized. It members,
and more particularly the spouses, must possess the expertise and
motivation to make their relationships work.105 Because they reside
in a self-sufficient home, making their own decisions about how
to live, it is up to them if this is to be done satisfactorily. While
they may receive advice from those close to them, their economic
and social independence provides the room to act as they desire.
Nevertheless, the intimacy and interdependence of this arrangement
holds dangers.106 Unregulated intimacy is fraught with hazards.
Adult human beings (whether hetero- or homosexual) who dwell
under the same roof, and often sleep in the same bed, hold each
other’s fate in their hands. Behind closed doors, unsupervised by
outside authorities, they can inflict injuries of unparalleled ferocity.
Because they are physically close, they have the opportunity to
do material harm. They can, if they desire, murder one another.
Though this does not occur often, propinquity provides a setting for
emotional violence. People who dwell together for extended periods
get to know one another’s deepest secrets. They observe where their
buttons are, and because they are regularly in each other’s presence,
find the occasion to push them. Those who love one another can
utilize intimacy to be mutually supportive, but when they get angry
may take advantage of it to gain revenge. If they are emotionally
immature, uncontrolled rage can cause inestimable hurt.
If a man and a woman are to collaborate for their own and their
children’s advantages, they must guard against these hazards. If they
are to adjust to shifting circumstances, they must be individually
and jointly flexible. To begin with, they need to trust one another.
This trust is so important that it is a central feature of the courtship
processes that bring them together. Love is not like a faucet that
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can be turned off and on. It takes time to cultivate and time to
be torn asunder. During its development, when a couple is getting
acquainted, a crucial duty is assessing their respective trustworthiness.
They need to fathom who this previous stranger is and how he or
she might react under adverse circumstances. When upset, might
this other’s fury become destructive? Individuals who are not honest
in their appraisals are in for some nasty surprises. If their own
immaturity prevents them from obtaining an accurate reading; i.e.,
if their neurotic needs attract them to dangerous partners, trouble is
likely to ensue.
One of the reasons why feminism has been so destructive is that
it tarred everyone with the same brush. All men were condemned
as vicious rapists and all women exalted as innocent victims.107
Acceptance of this fantasy made it more difficult to recognize
individual differences. In real-life intimacy, two people must open
their souls to one another. They must be able to see each other, warts
and all, and accept what they see. This, however, is not easy. It takes
skill and effort. As the modern family evolves, it becomes essential
to pierce the romantic myths of bygone eras. For starters, the
parties must understand that men and women are different. If their
expectations are out of line with what is possible or if they imagine
that they can reconstruct their partners in their own images, they are
in for disappointment. Once the feminist or Victorian mythologies
are out of the way, it becomes possible to evaluate the other as an
individual. This is where knowledge of the self and of other human
beings comes in handy. Those who understand themselves and what
it is to be human have head starts on determining whether they are
apt to mesh with particular partners. They can determine whether
their respective goals and values are compatible and what sorts of
adjustment might be necessary to make them so.108
This perceptiveness does not come automatically, but it comes
most naturally to those who are personally mature. Individuals
whose socialization has prepared them to control their emotions and
to recognize their distinct limitations are not only better equipped to
perceive the emotions and limitations of others, they are also better
equipped to deal with them. One of life’s greater ironies is that persons
who grow up within loving families are more able to give and receive
love. Less in need of affection, they are better prepared to participate
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in it. In other words, those who are raised within stable middle-class
families are better situated to create their own stable middle-class
families. They are more competent in making allowances for other’s
failures and in reacting to these resiliently. They are also more likely
to be constant in their commitments. People who grow up feeling
good about themselves have less of a need to pursue emotional
balm outside committed relationships. During the height of the
hippie efflorescence, sexual fidelity was regarded as old-fashioned.
Physical love was deemed fungible. Yet, this was never true. The
traditions that lauded sexual commitment have proven remarkably
durable. Especially under conditions of voluntary intimacy, marital
partners need to trust each other on multiple levels. One of these
is the sexual.109 After they pledge each other their troth, should this
not be taken seriously, that is, should they stray, they are engaging
in emotional betrayal. They are breaking promises and dishonoring
bonds. In direct opposition to the sophisticated philandering of
open-minded liberals, the middle-class marriage seeks to maintain
its integrity in many dimensions. In this, if not in their naïve sexual
fairy tales,110 the Victorians got it right.
Also fundamental to middle-class intimacy is a secure division
of labor.111 The feminist fable extols gender interchangeability.
Total equality is supposed to bleach out all task differences. This
has proven inaccurate vis-à-vis the marketplace but also within the
family. Contemporary couples rarely divide their domestic duties
as did their grandparents, but neither have they established an
amorphous egalitarianism. No longer may the woman be the sole
cook nor the male the exclusive repairman, but together they decide
who will specialize in what. Not all reach the same settlement, but
almost all have some settlement. The reason is simple. Intimacy
is about cooperation, not competition. If a man and a woman are
pursuing exactly the same goals, one is apt to do better in something
than the other, and this is bound to elicit envy. If, however, they are
pursuing separate but compatible objectives, when one wins, so does
the other. This enables them to root for each other. They can be
allies, both with respect to the jobs they hold outside the household
and the tasks performed within it. In dividing their responsibilities,
each obtains authority within a personal sphere of influence, thereby
reducing the issues over which they come into conflict.

418

The Great Middle Class Revolution

This, however, leaves open the question of how to arrive at an
agreement about what each will do. Voluntary intimacy, if it is to
work, requires a mechanism for resolving differences. Because no
two individuals are ever in complete accord, there must be a giveand-take that results in concurrence. To put the matter plainly, we
can say that they must be good negotiators. Lasting bonds depend
in equal measure on shared commitments and shared bargaining
skills. Indeed, these aptitudes depend on each other. Individuals
who do not work at staying together will not work at resolving their
differences, whereas those who do not resolve their differences will
have their steadfastness severely tested. Nevertheless, negotiating is
a skill. The parties need to be motivated to engage in it, and they
need to know how to do it. When they enter into their various
wrangles, they must possess a dual-concern attitude; that is, they
must be committed to meeting the needs of both parties. If either or
both are excessively selfish, the resultant bargain will be too skewed
to be durable. The loser will leave, nursing a grievance that is bound
to upset the agreement later on.
Beyond this, the negotiators must be competent problem
solvers.112 Their personal professionalism must encompass an ability
to be creative in pursuing their aims. The word usually used to
express how spouses can come to an agreement is “compromise,”
but this is inadequate to many circumstances. Obviously, the
baby cannot be divided in half. Intimate partners, if they are of
good will, collaborate in coming up with ideas that neither would
have entertained alone. Instead of agreeing to take their vacation
halfway between the mountains and the seashore, they discover a
Caribbean island that has a mountain at its center. This ability to
envision solutions that allow both to win becomes exceptionally
valuable when children enter the scene. With more than two parties
to be satisfied, all concerned need the patience of Job to consider
unforeseen answers. Life is full of surprises; hence, those with the
courage to embrace the unexpected tend to come out ahead.
One of the preeminent qualities of the emergent middle-class
family is the complementarity at its heart.113 The companionate
marriage is a relatively new invention. Husbands and wives talking
to one another as friendly partners in the same enterprise is a recent
innovation. Spouses, to be sure, have always communicated, but
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the degree of voluntary integration has not always been as great. In
the past, the domestic division of labor was laid down along precise
cultural lines. Both parties knew what was expected even before
they crossed a common threshold. Now, in our commercialized
technological world, many of these inherited patterns are obsolete.
The invention of the cell phone, for instance, revolutionized how
family members keep track of their whereabouts. Who is expected
to call whom could not follow previous guidelines because there were
none.
Contrary to the feminists or the free-love mavens, the differences
between men and women do not need to be a handicap or a
source of perpetual discord. Heterosexual intimacy can generate
forms of expertise that neither party could manage apart. Gender
complementarity is not an empty boast. The father who roughhouses
with his children is not necessarily opposed to the mother who worries
about an eye being poked out.114 Their children benefit from both of
these attitudes. Their youngsters are simultaneously tutored in risk
taking and in prudence, each of which is desirable for a successful
life. Men do not need to become more like women, nor women
more like men, for them to act in concert. Despite their periodic
frictions, the expertise and motivations built into their respective
frames can contribute to a whole that is more than the sum of its
parts. Furthermore, the full benefits of voluntary intimacy accrue
only if innate differences are understood, respected, and exploited.
To this end, mythologies that blame one or the other are of less value
than clear-eyed acknowledgements of complex truths.
The Children
If the emerging middle-class family esteems and is dependent
upon gender differences, it must also acknowledge the nature of
children and childhood.115 Responsible for socializing the young so
that they can succeed in a competitive and uncertain environment, it
must take advantage of who they are and how they develop to shape
them into self-directed adults.116 Kohn suggests that middle-class
parents want their children to be considerate of others, to be interested
in how and why things happen, and to exercise self-control.117 He
also indicates that they are less concerned over whether they have
good manners, are neat and clean, and obey their parents. In this,
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they seek to prepare them to strike out on their own. Aware that the
most substantial legacy they can provide is not financial but personal,
they intend to make them strong and self-reliant. The aim, in short,
is to groom the next generation for a professional lifestyle. Both on
the job and at home, they attempt to instill the skills and motives
to organize complex tasks—both independently and in partnership
with reliable allies.
The self-direction and self-discipline to which Kohn refers are
not implanted via the obedience that working-class parents prefer,
but by more subtle means.118 Were middle-class parents to assert
absolute control over their young, they would prevent them from
internalizing controls.119 Mothers and fathers can inspire, can guide,
and can direct their children, but they cannot dictate to them. To
do so would arouse oppositionalism, not a desire to acquire personal
strengths. Parents who want these to emerge seek to establish the
conditions in which they can. They know that they surface only
through a child’s own efforts. Adult supervision establishes limits,
i.e., boundaries beyond which the young are not allowed to go, but
not initiatives that, by definition, come from inside. Children can
be required to respect the rights of others or to avoid extravagant
risks but not to be creative. Because there are dangers adults can
anticipate, but children cannot, it is imperative for the former to set
terminal points. Yet because of the inevitable novelties, everything
can never be completely foreseen.
Middle-class parents explain things to their children and
encourage them to think, but they also allow them to internalize
their own conclusions. The paradigm for this is found in childhood
discipline. In former times, parents were expected to beat the devil
out of their offspring.120 Spare the rod and spoil the child was not
an empty phrase; it was a prescription for action. Children were
considered inherently sinful and, therefore, in dire need of having
their willfulness expunged. Paradoxically, a controlled willfulness is
at the core of self-direction. Those who are spanked on the grounds
that independent thinking is selfish are thereby instructed not
to make autonomous decisions. As a result, spankings, and, ever
stronger whippings, have gone out of style. Contemporary discipline
is more apt to consist of a stern discussion of what is appropriate or,
in extremes, of a time out. Children are sent to their rooms, told
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to think about what they did, and asked not to emerge until they
understand what is right. The objective is not behavior elicited from
fear of punishment but internal commitments that operate without
parental intervention.
This sort of regime permits children to make mistakes.121 In
the traditional working-class family, a mistake was tantamount to
disobedience. Children were expected to get things right the first
time and, if they did not, were subjected to corporal punishment.
This, not surprisingly, discouraged experimentation. If they knew
what was good for them, the young either kept to the straight and
narrow or threw over the traces. In contrast, middle-class parents
understand that complex lessons entail missteps. The error is not
in making a mistake but in failing to learn from it. They, therefore,
allow their children to be less self-critical, that is, as long as they
keep forging ahead. Because they understand how and why things
are complicated, they realize these lessons cannot be instantaneously
absorbed. Their own experience having demonstrated that the
acquisition of knowledge is a lifelong affair, they not only allow but
encourage their children to take their time. They are also pleased
when the young exhibit curiosity.122 Getting into things and creating
a mess may be bothersome, but it is better than a lack of interest.
Who knows what discoveries a toddler will make. Lower-class
parents, in contrast, find unregulated behavior less tolerable. Theirs
is a tendency either to allow their children to proceed unattended or
to demand conformity to strict standards.
Back in the 1920s and ‘30s, the behaviorist psychologist John B.
Watson123 counseled Americans that the worst thing they could do was
to spoil their children. The son of an alcoholic father who deserted
his family, he believed absolute emotional control was urgent.124 To
this end, he advised parents to allow their children to cry themselves
to sleep. His belief was that, if babies were picked up and comforted,
they would grow into selfish adults. This philosophy fit well in a
working-class world where external discipline was the norm. It does
not, however, suit middle-class requirements. The sort of responsive
love Watson abhorred is precisely what their families must provide.
Contrary to the behaviorist model, reacting to a child’s discomfort
by being warmly solicitous does not create egotism. It makes a child
feel important, and also secure. This imparts the confidence to
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make independent decisions, despite concurrent uncertainties. As
an adult, the individual’s determinations will arise from a personal
psyche, but need not on that account be selfish. The apparent
contradiction Watson did not appreciate is that persons who learn
to love themselves are also capable of leading others. Having had
their own needs attended to, they can better assess and meet external
needs.
The evolving middle-class family seems to be discovering that
a collaborative interaction between parents and children is essential
for the development of the young.125 It was once said that children
should be seen and not heard, but this interferes with the dialogues
that build social skills. Because the middle-class way of life entails
synergistic alliances, discovering how to negotiate with others is
crucial. Practice in this occurs first within the nuclear family. Parents
and children of necessity encounter conflicts that must be resolved.
Dictatorial controls might prevent these from escalating, but they do
not provide training in coming to reasonable bargains. The young,
of course, are less powerful than their parents. As a consequence,
adults who desire to impose their will can, but does not allow the
children to learn how to assert themselves. What is necessary for twosided negotiations is adult restraint. A parent must be patient with
the often maddening immaturity of the biologically undeveloped.
This means that neither empty-headed permissiveness nor obdurate
authoritarianism is best. An adult who is thinking about a child’s
future will seek a moving equilibrium. The goal is to be as firm
as is needed to match the child’s developing ability to be assertive.
To overpower the child would crush a fragile spirit, whereas to be a
doormat instills a false estimate of the child’s worth. More useful
are the energy and coherence needed to ensure an honest exchange
of ideas, an exchange grounded in a dual-concern model of their
respective needs and in flexible problem-solving techniques.
These sorts of negotiations do not simply happen; they too are
an achievement. In previous centuries, they were not considered
necessary because they were not a normal part of day-to-day
functioning. Peasants did not need to work out the intricate bargains
characteristic of a commercial environment. Nor did a preindustrial
society require the mental dexterity of a technological one. Today’s
complex decentralized division of labor has, in essence, forced
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families to conform to its needs. Parents who have themselves been
struggling to attain a self-directed, emotional maturity have assumed
the supplementary burden of discovering how to pass this along to
another generation. After it reached its tipping point, the Middle-Class
Revolution demanded personal growth from newly professionalized
individuals, as well as modifications in their parenting skills. As we
have seen, there was a cultural lag with regard to the former and
perhaps a lengthier one with respect to the latter. Those who were
actively engaged in the process of ascertaining how to direct their
vocational lives might be expected to need additional time to apply
these lessons to their families, especially to their children.
The liberal excursions into no-fault divorce and androgynous
feminism were time-consuming dead-ends. Sadly, they diverted
attention away from exploring better solutions. First, they interfered
with developing voluntary intimacy. In rejecting the past root and
branch, they made it difficult to build upon evolving family values.
This, in turn, made it difficult to provide the direction and support
their children required. Parents barely able to negotiate fairly with
one another could scarcely be expected do this with their young. To
be committed and yet to allow emotional independence entails an
apparent inconsistency that was not easy to surmount. Authoritarian
models derived from the centuries past certainly did not do the trick.
Something else was needed, but those entangled in these events did
not understand what. They literally could not perceive the utility
of being flexible. Worse still, they had not attained the internal
strengths to live by this standard. Voluntary intimacy and responsive
childrearing necessitate insights and emotional controls that are
themselves achievements. Irrespective of their conscious intentions,
individuals who had not mastered their inner environments found it
difficult to engage in evenhanded negotiations. Unable to control who
they were or what they felt, they had to await internal developmental
processes they could not deliberately engineer.
The professionalized middle-class family may ultimately change
this. As people gain experience on the job, in their marriages, and
with their children, they can be expected to move forward from
their mistakes. In time, the conventional wisdom will surpass the
reactionary fantasies that seemed to promise salvation. People will
nevertheless need to work at what they accomplish, including in
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their personal lives. The liberal model has suggested that neutral
government institutions could protect people from their selfish
impulses. It held out the prospect of a nonhierarchical society in
which the most important decisions would be codified in centralized
regulations. This has proven to be a chimera. There are a variety
of tasks that no impersonal bureaucracy, however brilliantly
conceived, can manage. No corporate entity can substitute for
intimate love or fair-minded interpersonal negotiations. Drained
as they are of emotional responsiveness and localized knowledge,
these organizations cannot deliver the motivation or expertise to
do what is best. The very factors that enabled them to provide the
broad social controls that were useful for early industrialization
continue to prevent them from exercising personal concern. Yet,
without this concern, no society can supply the emotional supports
adults require or the guidance the next generation demands. In its
rationalistic simplicity, a Big-Brother government can furnish neither
the happiness nor the self-directed individuals it needs for its own
perpetuation. Here, then, is the central irony of initial attempts to
cope with the dislocations of the Great Middle-Class Revolution.
The family, which seems so contrary to the large-scale objectification
of postindustrialized commercialism, may be the linchpin essential
for its survival. Only it provides what human beings need in order
to become decentralized decision makers.

The Family

425

Endnotes
1

Graham, T. 1996. Patterns of Deception: The Media’s Role in the Clinton
Presidency. Alexandria, VA: Media Research Center.
2
Sheehy, G. 1999. Hillary’s Choice. New York: Random House.
3
Maraniss, D. 1995. First in His Class: The Biography of Bill Clinton. New York:
Simon & Schuster.
4
Stone, L.J., Smith, H.T. and Murphy, L.B. (Eds.) 1973. The Competent Infant:
Research and Commentary. New York: Basic Books.
5
Nye, F.I. 1976. Role Structure and the Analysis of the Family. Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications.; Nye, F.I. (Ed.) 1982. Family Relationships: Rewards and
Costs. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.; Handel, G. [Ed.] 1967. The
Psychosocial Interior of the Family: A Sourcebook for the Study of Whole
Families. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
6
Rossi, A.S. (Ed.) 1973. The Feminist Papers: From Adams to de Beauvoir. New
York: Bantam Books.
7
Engels, F. 1972. The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. New
York: International Publishers.
8
Veblen, T. 1967. (1899) The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: Viking
Penguin.
9
Fischer, L. 1964. The Life of Lenin. New York: Harper & Row.; Russell, B.
1929. Marriage and Morals. New York: H. Liveright.
10
Fein, M. 1999. The Limits of Idealism: When Good Intentions Go Bad. New
York: Kluwer/Plenum.
11
Engels, F. 1972. The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. New
York: International Publishers.
12
Brownmiller, S. 1975. Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape. New York:
Bantam.; MacKinnon, C.A. 1987. Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on
Life and Law. Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press.; Wilson, J.Q.
2002. The Marriage Problem: How Culture Has Weakened Families. New
York: HarperCollins Publishers.
13
de Riencourt, A. 1974. Sex and Power in History. New York: Delta Books.
14
Freud, S. 1953-1974. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud. (Edited by J. Strachey. London: Hogarth Press and
Institute for Psychoanalysis.
15
Lorber, J. 1994. Paradoxes of Gender. New Haven: Yale University Press.
16
French, M. 1992. The War Against Women. New York: Summit Books.
17
Horowitz. D. 1997. Radical Son: A Generational Odyssey. New York: The Free
Press.
18
Partridge, W.L. 1973. The Hippie Ghetto: The Natural History of a Subculture.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
19
Aries, P. 1962. Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life. New
York: Vintage Books.

426
20

The Great Middle Class Revolution

Himmelfarb, G. 1995. The De-Moralization of Society: From Victorian Virtues to
Modern Values. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
21
Friedan, B. 1963. The Feminine Mystique. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
22
Jones, J.H. 1997. Alfred C. Kinsey: A Life. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
23
Sandeen, E.R. 1970. The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American
Millinarianism 1800-1930. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
24
Lindsey, B.B. and Evans, W. 1927. Companionate Marriage. New York: Boni
and Liveright.
25
Moir, A. and Jessel, D. 1989. Brain Sex: The Real Difference Between Men and
Women. New York: Delta.
26
Bennett, W.J. (Ed.) 1993. The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral
Stories. New York: Simon & Schuster.; Hunter, J.D. 2000. The Death of
Character: Moral Education in an Age Without Good and Evil. New York:
Basic Books.; Wilson, J. Q. 1997. Moral Judgment. New York: The Free
Press.; Wuthnow, R. 1987. Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in
Cultural Analysis. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.; Fein, M.
1997. Hardball Without an Umpire: The Sociology of Morality. Westport,
CT: Praeger.
27
Popenoe, D. 1996. Life Without Father: Compelling New Evidence that
Fatherhood and Marriage Are Indispensable for the Good of Children and
Society. New York: The Free Press.
28
Kirk, R. 1997. Edmund Burke: A Genius Reconsidered. Wilmington, Del:
Intercollegiate Studies Institute.
29
Ogburn, W. 1922. (1966) Social Change with Respect to Culture and
Original Nature. New York: Heubsch.; Fein, M. 1990. Role Change: A
Resocialization Perspective. New York: Praeger.
30
Russell, B. 1929. Marriage and Morals. New York: H. Liveright.; Coontz, S.
1992. The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap.
New York: Basic Books.
31
Waite, C.J. and Gallagher, M. 2000. The Case for Marriage: Why Married People
are Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially. New York: Doubleday.;
Cherlin, A.J. 1992. Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
32
Seward, K. 1978. The American Family: A Demographic History. Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications.
33
Fein, M. 1999. The Limits of Idealism: When Good Intentions Go Bad. New
York: Kluwer/Plenum.
34
Garbarino, J., Schellenbach, C.J. and Sebes, J. 1986. Troubled Youth, Troubled
Families. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
35
Lindzey, G. and Aronson, E. (Eds.) 1985. Handbook of Social Psychology; Third
Edition. New York: Random House.; Lofland, L.H. 1973. A World of
Strangers. New York: Basic Books.
36
Russell, op cit.

The Family
37

427

Wentworth, W. 1980. Context and Understanding: An Inquiry into Socialization
Theory. New York: Elsevier.
38
Lasch, C. 1979. The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of
Diminishing Expectations. New York: Warner Books.
39
Bowlby, J. 1969. Attachment. New York: Basic Books.; Bowlby, J. 1973.
Separation: Anxiety and Anger. New York: Basic Books.; Bowlby, J. 1980.
Loss: Sadness and Depression. New York: Basic Books.
40
Schaffer, H. 1971. The Growth of Sociability. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
41
Bellah, R.N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W.M., Swindler, A., and Tipton, S.M.
1985. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American
Life. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
42
Scheff, T. 1990. Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion, and Social Structure.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
43
Weber, M. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York:
Free Press.
44
Lortie, D.C. 1975. Schoolteacher: A Sociological Study. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
45
Handel, G. [Ed.] 1967. The Psychosocial Interior of the Family: A Sourcebook for
the Study of Whole Families. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
46
Kohn, M.L. and Schooler, C. 1983. Work and Personality: An Inquiry Into the
Impact of Social Stratification. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing.
47
Sarbin, T. and Allen, V. 1968. Role Theory. In: Lindzey, G. and Aronson, E.
(Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology. Mass.: Addison, Wesley.
48
Fein, M. 1990. Role Change: A Resocialization Perspective. New York: Praeger.;
Pruitt, D.G. 1981. Negotiation Behavior. New York: Academic.
49
Herrnstein, R.J. & Murray, C. 1994. The Bell Curve: The Reshaping of American
Life by Differences in Intelligence. New York: Basic Books.
50
Barnard, C. 1938. The Function of the Executive. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
51
Waite, C.J. and Gallagher, M. 2000. The Case for Marriage: Why Married People
are Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially. New York: Doubleday.
52
Mead, G.H. 1934. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
53
Goleman, D. 1995. Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ.
New York: Bantam Books.
54
Hollingshead, A. and Redlich, F. 1958. Social Class and Mental Health. New
York: John Wiley.
55
Lorenz, K. 1966. On Aggression. London: Metheun.
56
Fein, M. 1993. I.A.M.: A Common Sense Guide to Coping with Anger.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
57
Zeldin, T. 1994. An Intimate History of Humanity. New York: HarperCollins
Publishers.

428
58

The Great Middle Class Revolution

Eberstadt, M. 2004. Home-Alone America: The Hidden Toll of Day Care,
Behavioral Drugs, and Other Parent Substitutes. New York: Sentinel,
59
Bach, G.R. and Wyden, P. 1968. The Intimate Enemy. New York: Avon.
60
Gelles, R.J. 1997. Intimate Violence in Families (3rd Edition) Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications.; Gelles, R.J and Straus, M.A. 1989. Intimate Violence:
The Causes and Consequences of Abuse in the American Family. New York:
Touchstone Books.
61
Glendon, M.A. and Blankenhorn, D. (Eds.) 1995. Seedbeds of Virtue: Sources
of Competence, Character, and Citizenship in American Society. Lanham,
MD: Madison Books.
62
Morris, H. (Ed.) 1961. Freedom and Responsibility. Stanford, CA: Sanford
University Press.
63
Cooley, C.H. 1956. Human Nature and the Social Order. Glencoe, Ill.: The
Free Press.
64
Fein, M. 1997. Hardball Without an Umpire: The Sociology of Morality.
Westport, CT: Praeger.
65
Horowitz, D. 1998. Betty Friedan and the Making of the Feminine Mystique.
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
66
MacKinnon, C.A. 1987. Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law.
Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press. Sommers, C.H. 1994. Who
Stole Feminism: How Women Have Betrayed Women. New York: Simon
& Schuster.; French, M. 1992. The War Against Women. New York:
Summit Books.; Whittier, N. 1995. Feminist Generations: The Persistence
of the Radical Women’s Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.;
Brownmiller, S. 1975. Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape. New
York: Bantam.; Faludi, S. 1991. Backlash: The Undeclared War Against
American Women. New York: Crown Publishers.; Rossi, A.S. (Ed.) 1973.
The Feminist Papers: From Adams to de Beauvoir. New York: Bantam
Books.
67
Whittier, N. 1995. Feminist Generations: The Persistence of the Radical Women’s
Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
68
Waite, C.J. and Gallagher, M. 2000. The Case for Marriage: Why Married People
are Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially. New York: Doubleday.
69
Whitehead, B.D. 1998. The Divorce Culture: Rethinking Our Commitments to
Marriage and the Family. New York: Random House.; Wallenstein, J.S.,
Lewis, J.M. and Blakesee, S. 2000. The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A
25 Year Landmark Study. New York: Hyperion.
70
Weiss, R.S. 1990. Staying the Course: The Emotional and Social Lives of Men
Who Do Well at Work. New York: Free Press.
71
Epstein, C.F. 1970. Woman’s Place: Options and Limits in Professional Careers.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
72
Weiss, R.S. 1975. Marital Separation: Coping with the End of Marriage. New
York: Basic Books.

The Family
73

429

Whitehead, B.D. 1998. The Divorce Culture: Rethinking Our Commitments to
Marriage and the Family. New York: Random House.
74
Fisher, H.E. 1992. Anatomy of Love: The Natural History of Monogamy, Adultery
and Divorce. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
75
Wallenstein, J.S., Lewis, J.M. and Blakesee, S. 2000. The Unexpected Legacy of
Divorce: A 25 Year Landmark Study. New York: Hyperion.
76
Moynihan, D.P. 1965. The Negro Family: The Case for National Action.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt.; Franklin, D. L. 1997. Ensuring
Inequality: The Structural Transformation of the African-American Family.
New York: Oxford University Press.; Landry, B. 1987. The New Black
Middle Class. Berkeley: University of California Press.
77
Faludi, S. 1991. Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women. New
York: Crown Publishers.
78
Blankenhorn, D. 1995. Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent Social
Problem. New York: Basic Books.; Wallenstein, J.S., Lewis, J.M. and
Blakesee, S. 2000. The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A 25 Year Landmark
Study. New York: Hyperion.; Popenoe, D. 1996. Life Without Father:
Compelling New Evidence that Fatherhood and Marriage Are Indispensable
for the Good of Children and Society. New York: The Free Press.
79
Waite, C.J. and Gallagher, M. 2000. The Case for Marriage: Why Married People
are Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially. New York: Doubleday.
80
Roiphe, K. 1993. The Morning After: Sex, Fear, and Feminism On Campus.
Boston: Little, Brown, & Co.
81
Graglia, F.C. 1998. Domestic Tranquility: A Brief Against Feminism. Dallas,
TX: Spence Publishing Co.; Fox-Genovese, E. 1996. Feminism is Not
the Story of My Life: How Today’s Feminist Elite Has Lost Touch with the
Real Concerns of Women. New York: Doubleday.; Lynn, D.B. 1974. The
Father: His Role in Child Development. Monterey Ca.: Brooks/Cole.
82
Blankenhorn, D. 1995. Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent Social
Problem. New York: Basic Books.; Coltrane, S. 1996. Family Man:
Fatherhood, Housework, and Gender Equity. New York: Oxford University
Press.
83
Moir, A. and Jessel, D. 1989. Brain Sex: The Real Difference Between Men
and Women. New York: Delta.; Baron-Cohen, S. 2003. The Essential
Difference: The Truth about the Male and Female Brain. New York: Basic
Books.; Tiger, L. 1970. Men in Groups. New York: Vintage Books.;
Tiger, L. and Fowler, H.T. (Eds.) 1978. Female Hierarchies. Chicago;
Beresford Book Service.
84
Lorber, J. 1994. Paradoxes of Gender. New Haven: Yale University Press.;
Jagger, A.M. 1988. Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Totowa, NJ:
Rowman & Littlefield.
85
Epstein, C.F. 1970. Woman’s Place: Options and Limits in Professional Careers.
Berkeley: University of California Press.

430
86

The Great Middle Class Revolution

Tittle, C.K. 1981. Careers and Family: Sex Roles and Adolescent Life Plans.
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
87
Lopreato, J. and Crippen, T. 1999. Crisis in Sociology: The Need For Darwin.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
88
Glenn, N. 1997. Closed Hearts, Closed Minds: The Textbook Story of Marriage.
New York: Institute for American Values.
89
Moir, A. and Jessel, D. 1989. Brain Sex: The Real Difference Between Men
and Women. New York: Delta.; Baron-Cohen, S. 2003. The Essential
Difference: The Truth about the Male and Female Brain. New York: Basic
Books.
90
Gilligan, C. 1982. In a Different Voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
91
Tannen, D. 1990. You Just Don’t Understand: Women and Men in Conversation.
New York: William Morrow and Co.
92
Parsons, T. and Bales, R.F. 1955. Family, Socialization and Interaction Process.
New York: Free Press.
93
Epstein, C.F. 1970. Woman’s Place: Options and Limits in Professional Careers.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
94
Fein, M. 1999. The Limits of Idealism: When Good Intentions Go Bad. New
York: Kluwer/Plenum.
95
Ashton, T.S. 1965. The Industrial Revolution 1760-1830. New York: Oxford
University Press.
96
Friedan, B. 1963. The Feminine Mystique. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.; De
Beauvoir, S. 1978. The Second Sex. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
97
Mannheim, K. 1936. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and
World, Inc.
98
Lortie, D.C. 1975. Schoolteacher: A Sociological Study. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
99
Fisher, H.E. 1992. Anatomy of Love: The Natural History of Monogamy, Adultery
and Divorce. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
100
Freud, S. 1953-1974. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud. (Edited by J. Strachey. London: Hogarth Press and
Institute for Psychoanalysis.
101
Consider too the Darwinian implications. Darwin, C. 1974. The Descent of
Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. Detroit: Gale Research.
102
Himmelfarb, G. 1995. The De-Moralization of Society: From Victorian Virtues
to Modern Values. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
103
MacKinnon, C.A. 1987. Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law.
Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press.
104
Zeldin, T. 1994. An Intimate History of Humanity. New York: HarperCollins
Publishers.

The Family
105

431

Rebach, H.M. and Bruhn, J.G. (Eds.) 1991. Handbook of Clinical Sociology.
New York: Plenum Press.
106
Scarf, M. 1987. Intimate Partners: Patterns in Love and Marriage. New York:
Random House.
107
Brownmiller, S. 1975. Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape. New York:
Bantam.
108
Wilson, J. Q. 1993. The Moral Sense. New York: The Free Press.; Wilson, J.
Q. 1997. Moral Judgment. New York: The Free Press.
109
Fisher, H. 1982. The Sex Contract: The Evolution of Human Behavior. New
York: William Morrow and Co.
110
Jones, J.H. 1997. Alfred C. Kinsey: A Life. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
111
Coltrane, S. 1996. Family Man: Fatherhood, Housework, and Gender Equity.
New York: Oxford University Press.
112
Pruitt, D.G. 1981. Negotiation Behavior. New York: Academic.
113
Cherlin, A.J. 1992. Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
114
Bettleheim, B. 1977. The Uses of Enchantment. New York: Vintage Books.
115
Whiting, J. and Child, I. 1953. Child Training and Personality. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
116
For case studies of the difficulties see: Wead, D. 2003. All The Presidents’
Children: Triumph and Tragedy in the Lives of America’s First Families. New
York: Atria Books.
117
Kohn, M.L. 1969. Class and Conformity: A Study in Values. Homewood, Ill.:
The Dorsey Press.
118
Clausen, J. (Ed.) 1968. Socialization and Society. Boston: Little Brown.
119
Bettleheim, B. 1987. A Good Enough Parent; A Book on Child-Rearing.. New
York: A. Knopf.
120
Foucault, M. 1979. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York:
Random House.
121
Stone, L.J., Smith, H.T. and Murphy, L.B. (Eds.) 1973. The Competent Infant:
Research and Commentary. New York: Basic Books.
122
Bergen, D. 1988. Play as a Medium of Learning and Development: A Handbook
of Theory and Practice. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
123
Watson, J.B. 1928. Psychological Care of Infant and Child. New York: Norton.
124
Buckley, K.W. 1989. Mechanical Man: John Broadus Watson and the Beginnings
of Behaviorism. New York: The Guilford Press.
125
Spock, B. 1957. The Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care. New York:
Duell, Sloan and Pearce.

Chapter 11

Toward a Professionalized Society
Now Art, used collectively for painting, sculpture,
architecture, and music, is the mediatress between, and
reconciler of, nature and man. It is, therefore, the power
of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and
passions of man into everything which is the object of his
contemplation. (Samuel Taylor Coleridge, On Posey or
Art)
Science frees us in many ways…from the bodily terror
which the savage feels. But she replaces that, in the minds
of many, by a moral terror which is far more overwhelming.
(Charles Kingsley, Sermon, The Meteor Shower)
Freedom although it has brought [modern man]
independence and rationality, has made him isolated and,
thereby, anxious and powerless. (Erich Fromm, Escape
from Freedom)
A Professionalized Humanism
Society is not in the process of becoming one huge family.
Nor is it about to become an extended village encompassing of
all humankind, not even in a some fanciful electronic version of
democracy. Nor is it likely to revert to a modernized theocracy of
born-again souls. Not even a technocratic utopia seems to be in
the cards, not to mention a nanny state guided by super-educated
philosopher kings. As the Middle-Class Revolution continues
to unfold, it promises to move in directions undreamt of by most
reformers. Contrary to the proclamations of the culture wars,
neither traditional conservatives nor enlightened liberals are apt to
emerge victorious. Something else, something neither romantic
nor trouble-free, seems to be brewing. In short, we appear to be
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developing an unprecedented civilization, i.e., a professionalized
society.1 With expertise and internalized motivation more critical
than ever before, these, and the conditions that sustain them, are
becoming more prominent. Larger numbers of individuals, and the
institutions upon which they rely, are transforming into something
genuinely middle class. Almost despite themselves, and their
ubiquitous misinterpretations of their circumstances, billions of
moderns are lurching into a brave new world, not of totalitarianism,
but of personal growth and responsibility.
The Great Middle-Class Revolution has been more terrifying
than the harbingers of progress could have imagined. Who among
them would have thought that growing rich and free might impel
battalions of the best and brightest to rush headlong into what F.
A. Hayek characterized as a renewal of serfdom?2 Hayek, and his
contemporary Erich Fromm,3 lived through the horrors of Nazism,
fascism, and international communism. They learned firsthand
that individuals could choose to submerge themselves in an
authoritarian collectivism rather than face the insecurities of coping
with a triumphant commercialism. This scared them, as well it
should have. Victorian commentators earlier on speculated that art
or science would provide the keys to surmounting the challenges
of modernization. But few of them predicted that a near universal
prosperity would itself be construed as problematic.4 They would
surely have been surprised to learn that unequivocal affluence could
prove more fearsome than poverty or political tyranny. Had they
lived to see it, they would have been baffled by calls to dismantle
the very institutions that delivered unparalleled gains. Yet, this is
precisely what bobo liberalism has proposed. It may do so in muted
tones, insisting that relief will come by way of the ballot box rather
than the barricade; nevertheless, were it to get its wish, the world
would undergo a transformation more radical than any previously
conceived.
Clearly, the adjustments needed to cope with being middle class
have proven more wrenching than might have been predicted. To the
astonishment of many, a burgeoning ability to control our individual
circumstances inaugurated uncertainties that, from a distance, might
seem trivial but which up close appeared insurmountable. So
profound did these seem that many would-be saviors recommended
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a complete social overhaul. They sought to do away with both the
marketplace and social hierarchies. In their utopian cosmos, equality
and universal love were to become the norm. As members of the
same congenial family, everyone would be equivalent. Although
their personal experiences were of gesellschaft commercialism and
social stratification, in their minds’ eyes these crusaders perceived
perfection. Thus, without evidence of feasibility, they counseled
the elimination of personal property and the imposition of radical
egalitarianism. Terrified by the lack of organization inherent in
a decentralized society, they rushed to introduce a comforting
predictability by forcing everyone to operate on the same plane.
Sadly, this anticipated equivalence existed only in their imaginations.
Its alleged fairness derived from their psyches, not from reality.
The liberal ideal is a fantasy.5 It is a chimera summoned up by
the emotional insecurities of those unsure about how to manage their
independence. Were it to be implemented, its universal love would
prove as ephemeral as a morning mist. So, too, would the prosperity
and egalitarianism it is said to augment. Paradoxically, those frightened
by the advent of a middle-class society do not allow themselves to
recognize that both the wealth and liberties they take for granted
derive from institutions they despise. They do not understand that
the efficiencies of the marketplace are the source of their prosperity
or that decentralized decision-making is the foundation of political
democracy. Whatever their glorious conjectures, it is indisputable
that neither command economies nor anarchistic autonomy have
been able to make good on their claims. To the contrary, experience
has demonstrated their tendencies to devolve into totalitarian scarcity
or murderous discord. Hobbes6, long ago, was right about the human
potential for a war of all against all. Without the boundaries set by
the marketplace, people either fail to coordinate their activities or
do so via brutal repression. Liberalism, for all its elevated rhetoric,
because its pedigree derives from a combination of quasireligious
absolutism and romantic familism, would kill the golden goose in
order to preserve comforting delusions. Despite the promises of its
advocates, their new Zion would halt progress in its tracks. To quote
John Hospers,7 its legacy would be “splendidly equalized destitution”
or a sanguine tyranny.
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Contrary to what the prophets of egalitarian collectivism say
what is needed is more freedom, not less. Instead of mandating an
equality of results, people have to be released to pursue individual
success. Despite the skeptics, this is not to recommend a Social
Darwinism,8 which authorizes losers to perish in isolated misery. As
social creatures, humans must be free to create interpersonal alliances
even as they seek private benefits. What the old-style eugenists did
not realize is that, just as people can pursue individual aims, they can
collaborate on joint ventures. The central point is that, if the MiddleClass Revolution is to expand in scope, its evolving institutions must
facilitate a social mobility based on merit. This means that an ever
larger a proportion of the population must contribute its talents to
furthering the concerns of the majority. A sort of neo-utilitarianism,9
based not on conscious calculations, but semiconscious social
negotiations,10 has to determine, then implement, the greatest
good for the greatest number. Both individually and as members
of competing alliances, the participants must reshuffle their social
statuses so that superior worth can have the greatest impact. Put
another way, we can say that the tests of strength in which people
engage should be domesticated rather than outlawed. These contests
need to be both fair and flexible if they are to result in what is socially
optimal. The upshot is that conflict cannot be eliminated. There will
still be winners, and therefore losers, but the overall consequences
can be collectively advantageous. As significant, most individuals,
by dint of their effort and expertise, will have a greater opportunity
to improve their personal lots.
Indeed, complete equality is a procrustean bed. It slices off the
legs of those who are exceptional while concurrently stretching those
who do not measure up. People are different in both their motives
and capacities. They are also hierarchical by nature. Once these
facts are put together, efforts to make them otherwise are revealed to
be inevitably coercive. Only compulsion can produce a facsimile of
uniformity when so many of necessity resist homogenization. More
suitable is encouraging people to be their best, which entails promoting
professionalization in all its aspects. The more expert and dedicated
people are as they play their individual roles,11 the more they can do
for themselves, their loved ones, and humanity in general. Naturally,
this would not eliminate conflicts, disappointments, or mistakes.
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It would merely militate toward improvements in an inescapably
imperfect human condition. Aiming toward this would demonstrate
that a greater occupational professionalization allows for more
control over one’s work,12 while a greater personal professionalization
facilitates greater fulfillments in the private domain. In permitting
decentralization, these, in tandem, maximize the application of local
knowledge and personal energies to human aspirations.
But to become more professional, people need to become as
strong as they can get. They need to maximize their separate abilities.
This, of course, is not a unique insight. The modern military long
ago learned that the best army is composed of the best-trained
soldiers. Bitter experience demonstrated that throwing warm bodies
into machine-gun fire was a prescription for slaughter, not victory.
The same can be said of civilian pursuits. Those who do not know
what they are doing are not apt to do it well. Untrained minds and
bodies crumple under pressure. But even this is not enough. To
do well, people need to capitalize on their humanity, not just on an
abstract rationalism.13 They have to get in touch with their inner
selves and to reinforce what they find.
A model regarding what is possible can be drawn from the
past. Thus, during the Renaissance newly discovered documents
arriving from Muslim realms hinted at a world beyond medieval
scholasticism.14 Greek and Roman manuscripts written in ignorance
of the Bible argued for a way to understand nature other than that
expounded by the Doctors of the Church. To be more precise,
Greek playwrights revealed a psychological sophistication that
set literary minds racing. Their heroes and heroines exhibited
scandalous impulses outside the purely religious. Fictional though
the characters might be, these ancient forms were more completely
human than their biblical counterparts. This provided the impetus
for humanism.15 Suddenly the best and brightest concluded that
there was more to life than a preparation for heaven. The here-andnow realities of flesh and blood also deserved attention.
This Renaissance humanism inadvertently accelerated a search
for secular knowledge that proved of inestimable value to a revived
commercialism. Those prepared to examine mankind firsthand
now opened a window on unsuspected truths. Not only could
asrtists paint figures that looked like their neighbors, scientists could
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engage in autopsies to determine human anatomy. Eventually, this
expanded enlightenment led academic explorers into virgin territory
and launched the West on an adventure that has yet to reach a
conclusion. Indeed, we are at the threshold of a new humanism16
or, more precisely, a social humanism. As social creatures, we are in
the process of locating ourselves in a social context. With time and
experience, it becomes patent that each of us possesses inescapable
connections to others. What these are and how they are established
must therefore be appreciated in multifaceted detail. The time to
wallow in mythological storytelling is long gone. A genuine social
humanism has to include a social anatomy at least as faithful to the
ligaments of interpersonal associations as were the renderings of the
Renaissance anatomists.
What is more, in our convoluted technocommercial world, it
is essential not to deny unpleasant realities. The breath of human
experience has to be accepted for what it is, warts and all. Nor
should people aspire to perfection. Because our natures encompass
disagreeable elements, the best that can be hoped for are improvements.
Our aggregate and individual prospects can be enhanced, but not to
the point where everyone wins. Like it or not, pain and loss are
integral to the human condition. These may be unwelcome, but
they are fundamental to the mechanisms that make people people.
Paradoxically, they are also crucial to what has made our species
successful. This being so, we cannot be rescued by romanticized
aesthetics. While art can furnish insights into the human situation,
particularly on an emotional level, by itself, it is insufficient. More
regretful, its idealized simplifications tend to produce false hope. This
is especially true of quasireligious idealizations. Mysticism banishes
too many facts to be a reliable guide. Nor can an enlightenmentstyle physical science provide all the answers. People are more than
assemblages of atoms, molecules, and cells. Physics, chemistry,
and biology have demonstrated their worth yet, by themselves, are
incapable of explicating the social aspects of human existence.17
A new professionalism,18 a humanistic professionalism must,
therefore, emerge from the demands of a budding middle-class
society. The need to coordinate the complex activities of selfdirected individuals, if permitted, will elicit the tools necessary to
decipher what is occurring. Just as the need for sailing ships to pilot
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themselves on trackless oceans once brought forth the chronometer,
so a gesellschaft social order can summon the reflexivity needed to
determine the combined location of its members. Since the social
is human and vice versa, this process can be aided by a social science
that provides honest, nonideological accounts of its subject. By
candidly examining the mechanisms through which interpersonal
associations are created, maintained, and modified, it can strengthen
the base of knowledge available for those planning their private and
social activities. In illuminating limitations as well as opportunities,
ordinary men and women may thereby direct their energies where they
can have the greatest effect. As such, the socially well informed can
become professional with respect to their personal circumstances.
The enemy in this is an immature romanticism. Good intentions
cloaked in a breathless, emotional utopianism venture into the
world unclothed. Winston Churchill19 said that some truths are
so important that they deserve to be guarded by a cordon of lies.
This was certainly true for allied military secrets. But it is not the
case for social realities. Self-deception here is the height of folly.
Yet, people habitually fool themselves about their social situations
in order to protect against the pain of failure.20 They would rather
bask in the glory of phony triumphs than recognize that they are
not sitting atop the hierarchical heap. On an individual level some
such balm may be indispensable, but collectively it is a disaster in
waiting. A single person walking off a cliff is one thing; an entire
society doing so is quite another. This being the case, reorganizing
gender roles to conform to feminist mythologies would have been
more than a private tragedy. Taken literally, it might have resulted
in the sort of communal suicide that overtook the Shakers. These
religious zealots thought celibacy provided a route to heaven; and
separately it may have, but for an organized community it ushered
in their extinction.
Nor was Hobbes, despite his central insight, right about the
solution to a war of all against all. He believed a Leviathan who
could compel obedience was necessary to curb private ambitions. A
man of his times, he conceived this as a monarch with the centralized
power to command submission. Yet, such a consolidated authority
cannot work in a middle-class society.21 Notwithstanding the fact
that human beings are no more altruistic today than they were during
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his era, given the upsurge in social complexities, many more of them
must partake in controlling their destinies. To do so, however, they
must become stronger and more knowledgeable than their ancestors.
Instead of relying exclusively on associations based on hierarchical
organizers, they must become expert in making role-based decisions.
Rather than reflexively defer to one-size-fits-all ideological principles,
they must participate in shaping the rules that guide their personal
actions. To be succinct, they must become skilled interpersonal role
players. This said, an evolving commercialized division of labor
must not be rejected from fear of its ambiguities. Indeed, it must
be embraced as an honored part of the human condition, then
implemented with intelligence and dexterity. This, however, requires
that the skills needed to execute it be internalized.
Unfortunately, the data and the internal controls necessary to
craft workable role relations are not instinctive. People must today
prepare themselves to assume the responsibilities to which they have
become heir. They cannot afford to react impulsively in a landscape
littered with hidden snares. Effort is, therefore, needed to allocate
their respective positions with intelligence, as well as to obtain practice
in performing these satisfactorily. The answer to complexity is not
an all-powerful genius at the helm; it is informed competence at the
periphery. An apt analogy would be a network of billions of personal
computers. The introduction of a multitude of interlinked desktops,
in place of a single super-mainframe, surprised the experts with its
dispersed intellect. A professionalized distribution of specialized
roles should do no less. Profoundly human in its architecture, if
appropriately expert and flexible, it possesses the potential to handle
matters no unified authority ever could.
The Division of Labor Revisited
The power of integrated social roles has been profoundly
underestimated. As surprising as it may sound, history seems to be
pointing us toward this conclusion. Nevertheless, the hubris of the
Marxists in assuming they understood the arrow of history provides a
useful caution.22 Despite what we have learned, the future is not ours
to master. Still, an overview of what has already happened suggests
where things might be headed. The progression of society from the
Symbolic Revolution23 that set our hunter-gatherer ancestors on a
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global trek, through the Agricultural Revolution that sent populations
soaring, to the Commercial Revolution that drastically improved
efficiencies and led to the intricacies of the Industrial and Middle
Class Revolutions points to an evolution in organizing principles and
sources of interpersonal power. Where once personal relations and
face-to-face hierarchies dominated the scene, they have receded in
influence. And while religiously inspired structures previously rose
to prominence because they could assimilate the swelling numbers
in protocivilizations,24 more empirical principles have taken over.
Commercialization has also dictated that social-role configurations
become more focal. A complex, yet decentralized, division of labor
proved necessary to keep pace with complications too byzantine to
be dealt with any other way. What did not occur, however, was
the wholesale replacement of one form of organization by another.
That which came later built upon what came before, albeit with
appropriate modifications to account for altered circumstances. Old
traditions and old mechanisms were not abandoned so much as
adjusted to meet unanticipated needs.
To reiterate, personal relations and hierarchical command
structures did not disappear with the advent of commercial/
technological societies. They merely assumed new forms. Where
huntergatherers depended almost exclusively on family relations,
members of the contemporary middle class rely more on friends and
colleagues. Common activities, rather than biological ties, cement
their alliances as they navigate novel occupational and avocational
crosscurrents. This is not to say that family ties have evaporated.
As was explained in the previous chapter, the nuclear family has
increased in salience, especially for the middle classes. Though more
voluntary than its predecessors, its assigned tasks are no less crucial.
As a haven in a heartless world and as the incubator of future selfdirected generations, it remains unsurpassed. Even the fingerprints
of more extended family relations remain detectable. These are more
attenuated than those of former times but are still called upon to
solemnize rites of passage and to provide succor in times of crisis.
The relatives may gather only for family holidays such as Christmas
and Thanksgiving or for weddings, funerals, and graduations, but
their incipient presence continues to be a source of security.
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A parallel transformation has overtaken social hierarchies.25
When foraging bands represented the norm, determining which
individual was dominant occurred in tests of strength among persons
who knew one another. The victory of one and the defeat of the other
resulted in inarguable reputations with observable consequences.
After societies became too large for these contests to be universal, less
personal means for determining precedence developed. Ultimately,
social class structures evolved. These relied more upon commercial
success but also upon the symbols of this success. Winners and losers
remained a part of the scene even though the means of deciding who
was who had drastically altered. Today, the distinction between the
dominant and the submissive remains significant. Commercialization
may have increased social mobility, but it has not eliminated the
perquisites of power. Nor will it.
A hierarchical species must continue to generate hierarchical
differentiations. It is the shape and the mechanisms of these rankings
that have been modified. Clearly social classes and, more particularly,
the middle classes have swelled in bulk and prestige. Similarly,
what counts as a form of strength has been adjusted, e.g., economic
expertise now carries more clout than does physical prowess. So, too,
have the abilities to assemble alliances in mass communities torn by
a myriad of divisions. Most significantly in their quest of power, the
roles individuals occupy and the connections these engender with
other players are more critical than in simpler times. Nowadays,
the nature of someone’s expertise and how it intersects with that of
role partners can determine how individually powerful the person is
and/or how effective in organizing the activities of others. Moreover,
it is not merely the nature of these roles but how nimbly they can be
revised that often proves decisive.
Meanwhile, this obligation to manage mounting complexities
has also affected religious configurations. Once societies became
too large for everyone to be familiar with everyone else, the
emerging impersonality of shared systems of faith allowed strangers
to coordinate their pursuits. A commitment to common gods
and communal myths permitted united fronts when confronting
external challenges.26 Members of the same normative group
could rely on the steadfast beliefs of others to enforce a joint set of
standards. Indeed, when this normative consensus was grounded in
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supernatural phenomena, it could achieve a resilience that enabled
it to withstand considerable stress. This was an enormous advantage
during periods of strife. Thus at the height of the Middle Ages,
marauding bands of Vikings might come and go and ambitious
aristocrats might scour the countryside for wealth, but the Church
and its teachings remained intact. The problem with this form of
social integration, however, was that it could also be rigid. Religious
beliefs and later political ideologies have undergone more change
than most of their adherents imagine; nevertheless their viewpoints
are jealously guarded against heresy. The result can be an inability
to meet unsuspected difficulties. A Church may, for instance,
decree that charging interest is usury and therefore a sin at the very
moment when commercial transactions require impersonal forms of
financing. By the same token, an ideological social movement can
insist that gender differences are a myth, just when isolated nuclear
families demand a greater tolerance of gender disparities.
One of the worst consequences of normative rigidity, of course,
has been caste systems. When religions declare that particular forms
of stratification are sacred, these become virtually impossible to
modify. The strengths and abilities of individuals count for little
when the weight of the entire community is recruited to prevent
organizational innovation. This, as we have seen, runs directly
contrary to the requirements of social class systems. These are
dependent upon frameworks that stimulate social mobility. Once
a religion unbendingly prohibits economic fluctuation, this sort of
flexibility cannot exist. The same applies to legal frameworks that
attempt to institutionalize fairness too precisely. Mechanisms such as
rent-and-price controls typically have side effects that their sponsors
do not anticipate. Nevertheless, rigidity can be beneficial in some
moral contexts. Murder is an activity that must be unwaveringly
prohibited. Religious bans, therefore, make sense in demanding
that it be proscribed. Less functional are political ideologies.
Refusing even to consider welfare reforms because one insists that
transfer payments are rights can bind a commercialized community
to counterproductive policies and condemn many of its citizens to
blighted dependencies.
What is indispensable within a middle-class society is adaptable
moral negotiations.27 Romantic relativism28 goes too far in
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sanctioning normative fluidity, yet a critical relativism that allows
rules to be adjusted to novel conditions is also conceivable. In the
latter, individuals realistically assess the impact of specific regulations,
then work out their differences with others to promote diverse
interests or perspectives. In this way, values and virtues are modified
to provide support for evolving patterns of interaction. As a result,
middle-class societies have been characterized by dizzying debates
about values. Politically and socially rent by disputes about what
is right or wrong, everyone seems to have a unique opinion about
what to do. Eager to vent these in public, they are often hawked as
a form of media entertainment. It may sometimes seem that these
controversies proceed without purpose, but, viewed longitudinally
they are akin to a problem-solving mechanism. Thanks to them,
modern societies need not be constrained by behavioral tenets more
suitable to their preindustrial precursors. Nor need they renounce
the communal standards essential to interpersonal trust. They can
have both stability and flexibility owing to bargaining processes that
fluctuate between agreement and discord.
Still, of central import to the advent of modernism has been the
proliferation of social roles and the evolution of their complexity.29
More than ever, people occupy highly personalized sets of tasks
within an extended, impersonal infrastructure. Despite the apparent
contradictions of pursuing individualized activities within a system
that treats the players interchangeably, this is what seems to be
occurring.30 The dramatis personae are becoming highly skilled at
occupations with which they personally identify even though most of
those who rely on their contributions do not recognize their humanity.
To compound this irony, the power of these persons and of the
societies to which they belong are augmented by this circumstance.
As members of cohesive communities, these individuals benefit from
the effectiveness inherent in an extremely specialized but nonetheless
responsive division of labor. For one thing, their separate needs
are more efficiently met by role partners who possess the ramified
competences to do so. For another, the community itself becomes
more powerful thanks to the integration of roles. Because the various
parts mesh to facilitate amazingly intricate activities, the whole is
able to achieve complex goals, goals that allow it to prevail vis-à-vis
competing societies.
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Perhaps unexpectedly, the participants in these complex role
structures31 also gain hierarchical power from being personally crucial
to the attainment of specific ends. Though they are theoretically
regarded as expendable, once ensconced in particular positions, they
may not easily be replaced. This permits them to exercise control
over critical uncertainties and therefore over others dependent on
having these performed. As the linchpins of particular activities,
they can demand personal deference by threatening to withhold
their services. In making crucial decisions, they thus require others
to alter their behaviors. This is so even though these others may not
be consciously aware that their conduct has been manipulated. The
secret of how this sort of power is allocated lies in the dynamics of
role negotiations32 and in the conservative nature of role scripts. In
essence, the means whereby a social division of labor is created and
maintained provide the key to how authority is exercised and why
some role players become more powerful than others.
Social roles33 may not completely replace either social hierarchies
or normative standards, but they frequently trump both. In rearranging
how these other mechanisms are organized, they permit personalized
controls that would not otherwise be available. More particularly,
the existence of detailed roles in which some individuals develop
an expertise, but others do not, dramatically modifies how ranking
systems operate. One of the ways in which hierarchies and divisions
of labor intersect is in methods the latter utilize to define power. A
simple way to understand what is involved is through bureaucratic
offices.34 A person appointed to a position within a bureaucracy35 is
not only delegated a precise task but also the authority with which
to accomplish it.36 Along with the role assignment to fabricate a
circumscribed item comes the right—nay the requirement—to direct
specific others in creating it. One is hired not merely as an engineer
but as the boss of a particular task group. Others, who also possess
assigned roles, roles that Weber37 called defined offices, become one’s
designated subordinates. They are, thereby, directed to defer to orders
emanating from their superior. The boss, as part of her role, makes
identifiable decisions and then oversees their performance. Indeed,
the might of the entire organization will come to her aid should an
underling defy this arrangement.
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What differs between hierarchical power that grows out of faceto-face tests of strength and power mediated by roles is that the latter
is more restricted. Roles, which include leadership imperatives, also
specify limitations on this authority. They define the perquisites of
the boss more clearly than does an unfocused ability to intimidate
others. An organizational role might, for instance, demand that a
superior set the schedule for his subordinates, but it will be equally
definite in precluding his meddling in their home life. Rationallegal power, such as that discussed by Weber, prevents what would
today be considered abuses by endorsing some orders, but not others.
By the same token, subordinates facilitate role-based authority by
recognizing the legitimacy of some commands but not others. The
former are accepted as part of the leader’s task assignment, whereas
the latter are not.
These role arrangements also facilitate power by defining networks
of relationships. Oftentimes the allies a would-be decision-maker can
call upon are motivated to help because of the roles they occupy. As
direct or indirect role partners, they engage in activities which tend
to be dependent upon his. Just as parents support one another in
disciplining their young because they know that, if they do not, they
will soon be open to challenge, so may one bureaucratic boss support
the claims of another. This assistance is typically built into the role
and is not a matter of conscious choice. Police officers, to cite an
important instance, do not ask for the identity of the victim when
their radio blares a call to assist an officer in distress—they simply
come to his aid as expeditiously as they can. From this point of view,
this is what one does if one is a police officer. Less dramatical, one
student will disapprove of another who arbitrarily refuses to take a
scheduled examination. This is part of what it means to be a student.
This predisposition may not be intended to strengthen the teacher’s
hand, but it has this effect. Indeed, it is so predictable that few
students consider challenging this phalanx of intersecting roles.
These phenomena have the consequence of making the exercise
of power less arbitrary. In a world populated by millions of strangers,
such clarity is essential.38 Were individuals with few personal
relationships unrestrained by internal role structures, an impatience
to achieve dominance might lead to the escalation of tests of strength
to fatal endpoints. Absent the inhibitions of personal sympathy,
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some might callously torture those they do not individually know.
This is no mere academic possibility. It is the stock-in-trade of
tyrants and has been for millennia. Thus, well-defined roles not
only permit extensive alliances among strangers, they also temper
potential extremism. Indeed, democratic institutions are contingent
upon such highly ramified roles structures. They do this, in part, by
investing some decisions in their less powerful members by way of
the ballot box. Universal suffrage,39 by endowing ordinary citizens
with the right to vote upon their leaders, provides a brake on the
more powerful. Elected officials get to make decisions ordinary
people do not, but they must make these with an eye to future polls.
The same is true within corporations where capricious bosses find
that their reputations and, therefore, their promotions, suffer if their
subordinates bridle at being manipulated into working outside their
job descriptions.
There is also a consequential intersection between norms and
social roles. Just as roles help to shape hierarchies, so norms help
mold roles. Both personal and interpersonal rules contribute to
determining the sorts of tasks particular individuals perform. On
a society-wide level, moral standards define how social roles will be
negotiated.40 The sorts of demands that role partners make of one
another and how these are pursued are regulated by broadly held
commitments. Parents, for instance, are not allowed to impose
violent strictures on their children. It may be their responsibility to
shape their young into law-abiding citizens, but they are not allowed
to do this by beating them with bullwhips. Nor do contemporary
communities countenance parents forcing offspring into unwanted
marriages. What were once acceptable forms of influence have
categorically gone out of style. That which is now permissible has
slowly evolved to meet the needs of a socially mobile and frequently
self-directed society. Almost second nature, these rules are today
considered coterminous with civilization.
Other rules are found within role scripts.41 These are a part of
the machinery that guides role performances. Unlike moral rules,
however, these norms and values can be highly specific. More precise,
that which is considered moral derives much of its force from a social
consensus. Indeed, it would not be considered moral were it not
enforced by a significant proportion of the community. Individual
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roles, in contrast, vary too dramatically for the same parameters to
be applicable. To cite one example, the conventions that make for an
ethical dogcatcher are not the same as those that make for an ethical
politician. Few, except other dogcatchers, would be familiar with
the standards appropriate to a humane animal capture. Likewise,
few, except other politicians, understand the constraints under which
elected officials must operate. This lack of inter-role visibility is
on display in recent social disputes over police brutality. Outside
observers, who have never had to subdue lawbreakers, are frequently
scandalized by the physical restraints professional law officers
understand as essential. Never having been personally attacked nor
ever having been tutored in what constitutes going too far, countless
laypeople find even defensive force too brutal. Fortunately, within
a particular role, there may exist internalized directives that keep
power within bounds. Law officers really do commit to standards of
restraint that are known within their role set, although not beyond
it. Matched to local conditions, these imperatives make for greater
flexibility than would universal imperatives. At once responsive to
restricted circumstances and bounded by suitable constraints, they
are derived from generations of street experience. In other words, the
rules that apply to particular roles allow for decentralized variation
without succumbing to anarchistic license. They are the equivalent of
the physician’s Hippocratic oath, albeit with less historical fanfare.
When all of this is synthesized, it becomes apparent that
the evolution of a social-class society is intimately linked to the
evolution of highly diversified yet closely integrated social roles. It
is these, grafted onto earlier hierarchical and normative structures,
that make middle-class lifestyles possible. They permit people to
be both mobile and self-directed within the larger communities
upon which they have become dependent. Had they not arrived
on the scene, neither the specialized competences necessary within
a technocommercial society nor their intelligent combination would
have been feasible. Their validity, however, is contingent upon a
growing professionalization.42 These roles would be useless without
a concurrent evolution in the expertise and motivation necessary for
those performing them. Individuals who have not internalized the
skills and commitments to make them work would be placeholders
in a pathetic charade. To invoke a familiar Texan cliché, they would
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be all sizzle and no steak. What is more, the society to which they
belonged, to further mix metaphors, would be a house of cards. It
is, therefore, vital to understand how proficient roles are created and
maintained. Comprehending this is a first step toward facilitating
their continued proliferation. Since role negotiations and roles
scripts are key, they must be our next area of focus.
Role Negotiations and Role Scripts
Emile Durkheim43 in confronting the conundrum of why mass
societies have remained stable postulated what he called “organic
solidarity.” People cooperated with one another not because they
were relatives or were imperatively compelled to do so or feared
eternal damnation but because it was in their interest. Conversely,
members of foraging bands were mutually sympathetic as a result of
an intimate familiarity with each other’s situations. The latter could be
reciprocally compassionate because they were able to put themselves
in one another’s shoes. Members of contemporary nation-states, in
contrast, work harmoniously because they recognize their mutual
interdependence. Since each receives essential services that only
others can provide, they are sensitive to the utility of these exchanges.
Moreover, since their own services require consumers, they are alert
to the reactions of their patrons, however remote these may be. Their
partners in such transactions might be strangers; they might even be
unsympathetic personalities; yet it is to their own advantage to be
civil and accommodating. Since all benefit from partaking in this
division of labor, all profit from maintaining its integrity. They are,
in Durkheim’s powerful analogy, like the organs of a single body that
cannot survive without their joint contributions.
In the century since Durkheim presented this thesis, the division
of labor has proceeded apace. The proliferation of specialized roles
has become so extensive that direct observation rarely confirms the
efficacy of interpersonal collaboration. People know their own jobs
and those of their immediate role partners, but the contributions of
most others are a blur. They make regular trips to supermarkets to
purchase provisions, yet they do not make the mental connection
between prepackaged chicken breasts and bib-overalled chicken
farmers. How then are they to feel gratitude toward these others?
How can they care about their welfare? Worse still, the efficiency
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of modern institutions has exacerbated an impersonality already
evident at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.44 This suggests
that individuals who never participate in face-to-face exchanges may
not literally recognize the value of their interdependence. It may
be virtually impossible for them to feel indebted to specific others
for services not identified as such. From this, it follows that few are
likely to feel solidarity with strangers out of a rational appreciation
of their mutual reliance.
Nevertheless, people continue to cooperate. They do so almost as
if this were a conditioned reflex. Society has managed to maintain its
integration, partly because it continues to incorporate personal and
hierarchical relations, partly because it carries forward a normative
order, but also because it has evolved a network of detailed and
highly personalized role structures. Since these roles could not exist
without being reciprocal, they must be mutually obliging. But this is
not from a conscious awareness that this is collectively functional. It
is the very nature of how social roles are created and maintained that
provides their stability. Durkheim did not pay sufficient attention
to the mechanisms through which this occurs, but they are of crucial
import. They dictate what is possible and what is not. Likewise,
they determine how societies can be integrated and who will hold
which positions within them.
Just as it is impossible to understand how families function
without recognizing the sorts of negotiations that occur between
spouses, so it is impossible to appreciate the connections joining
less intimate individuals without recognizing the negotiations,
some of which are indirect, that occur between them. In the same
way that tests of strength were fundamental to understanding how
hierarchies are constructed, it is essential to recognize that social
roles typically come in pairs. A division of labor implies that tasks
will be divided among different individuals and also that these will
be linked together in larger social operations. If, as Adam Smith
said,45 in manufacturing pins, one person draws out lengths of wire,
another cuts these into pin-sized pieces, and a third sharpens the
points, they must all coordinate their actions to make the desired
end product. The ultimate goal of each player would be incomplete
without the contributions of the others—and indeed of many others
besides these. The same is true of husbands who require wives and
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vice versa and of teachers who require students and vice versa. More
than this, these role partners are involved in chains of interlinking
partnerships. Spouses have children, children have teachers, teachers
have administrators, and so on and so forth. Every person has many
role partners, who themselves have multiple partners. Sometimes,
these individuals interact with only one at a time, but, at other times,
they are simultaneously torn among completing claims. In any event,
to be a role player is to be subject to the demands of multiple players
who have vested interests in how one acts one’s parts.
Furthermore, it is these intersecting demands between multiple
partners that constitute the core of role negotiations.46 For the sake
of simplicity, consider the situation of two partners—let us say a
pair of spouses. Each has desires about how the other should fulfill
assigned tasks. In the traditional household, a husband may have
ideas about what he wants his wife to fix for dinner, and she about
the domestic repairs on her honey-do list. These will influence what
gets done and, more specifically, how the husband decides to be a
husband or the wife a wife. But this is a negotiation; hence, each
will have ideas about role performances—some of which may have
derived from previous role partners and some from personal desires.
It is from this complicated give-and-take that relatively well-settled
behavior patterns evolve. Despite numerous altercations, eventually
a series of compromises is reached. Each party then makes an
internalized commitment that more or less stabilizes the partnership.
Because each player knows what is expected and is in more or less
agreement with this expectation, it can be performed with reasonable
regularity.
These internalized compromises become institutionalized as
role scripts.47 When people decide that they will voluntarily execute
certain tasks, they do not need constant reminders from their partners.
Their interior attitudes are transformed so that they are disposed to
act in accord with the designated behavioral patterns. During role
negotiations, each party is exposed to demands to think, feel, and act
in particular ways. Each will be directed to understand the world in
specified dimensions, to react to it with appropriate emotions, and to
conduct oneself in accord with identifiable norms and values. These
are, respectively, the cognitive, emotional, and volitional aspects of
their individual roles. In time, these elements are adopted as personal
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commitments. They, then, become role scripts in the sense that how
the person now thinks, feels, and believes guides future activities
without direct consultation with role partners. The person need
only consult these inner guidelines before deciding how to behave.
Although role partners may continue to provide input, this is not
always as decisive as are the internal traces of prior demands.
Much of how people are prepared to behave typically derives
from interactions with previous role partners.48 Those who helped
inculcate an earlier repertoire of predispositions retain an influence
that expresses itself in subsequent interactions. This is because role
scripts tend to be conservative. The ways that people have learned
to think, feel, and behave become part of their identities and cannot
be altered by the mere expedient of deciding to do so. Central to
this conformity are emotions. When these are intense, they can
perpetuate themselves for a lifetime. Antique fears, outdated angers,
and historic loves frequently continue almost unabated over decades.
And since the clashes that occur during role negotiations can be
quite passionate, they are ideal for instilling these role-preserving
attitudes. Furthermore, since primitive emotions tend to be at their
zenith when a person is young, role patterns established in childhood
can set the template for adult relationships.
Role conservation via role scripts is thus a two-edged sword.
On the one hand, its ability to maintain a division of labor
without constant reminders provides for social stability. People can
confidently predict that others will uphold their ends of the division
of labor because of who they have become. This enables them to
plan their activities with confidence. On the other hand, roles can
be so constrained that they fail to adjust to altered circumstances.49
People inflexibly perform actions that are no longer appropriate to
their own or their partners’ situations. Given the fluidity of modern
market societies, this can be a serious drawback. Instead of becoming
expert in their specialties, the players continue in their loyalties to
ineffective tactics. They can, in a sense, be hobbled by personalized
cultural lags.
As commercialization has produced a society that is at once more
complex and mobile, the requisite professionalization of roles can
be obviated by a reactionary allegiance to obsolete practices. Both
individually and institutionally, people can persist in attempting to
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do things the way they learned they were supposed to long after this
is counterproductive. They can literally seek to retain organizational
arrangements that hark back to former times. Although they find
themselves in a gesellschaft world, they long for intimate communal
ties that cannot be revived. Romanticism50 takes over, and they
dream either of a universal extended family or an absolutistic father
figure. More particularly, though a dynamic market economy
means that businesses grow and contract and that jobs come and go,
they fantasize about the security of lifelong employment within a
doting familial corporation. On a personal level, they may likewise
remain dedicated to archaic skills. Instead of professionalizing,
they learn just enough to get by. Rather than dedicate themselves
to expanded expertises, they reject challenging innovations. Worst
of all, in preference to pursuing emotional maturity, they idealize
childish spontaneity. The goal is to be forever young based on the
rationalization that this means being forever happy.
What these rigid souls fail to realize is that these practices
condemn them to comparative impotence. In a middle-class society,
power is usually tied to occupying a middle-class niche.51 But in a
modern market economy, the best decision-making slots are normally
allocated to those with the expertise to perform them. Who will get
to fill authoritative positions is supposed to depend on who possesses
the motivation and abilities to execute them. Not unexpectedly,
because some roles are more rewarding than others, disputes arise
as to who is appointed to what. Just as with hierarchical priority,
people butt heads to determine who will prevail. This means that, as
with raw power, role conflicts can be decided by assembling potent
alliances. Given that there is no rule obliging role negotiations to be
one on one, powerful supporters can give one person’s demands more
weight than another’s. But a major reason why those who exercise
clout choose one side over another is that they believe their choice
is potentially more competent than the one rejected. Those who
demonstrate the skills and inclinations to accomplish the relevant
tasks, therefore, elicit the support of those with an interest in having
these accomplished satisfactorily. A boss who wants greater profits
will, assuming he is rational, favor the applicant for promotion who
has demonstrated the best track record. This puts a premium on
professionalization for those who are ambitious. They know, or
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should know, that they can improve their chances to obtain more
potent roles by pursuing the appropriate education and personal
qualities.
In the end, the marketplace usually determines who rises to the
52
top. What constitutes expertise is not merely a matter of prejudice.
Efficiencies in production, distribution, and social organization
decide who will have the most power and, in the rawest terms, who
will be able to defeat whom. Those who believe in the superiority of
cultural appearances essentially commit themselves to the potency of
detached interpersonal reputations. On one level, they understand
that in the same way that tests of strength are generalized through
the reputations earned in victory, symbols of competence can, per se,
persuade others to support their role aspirations. Should they articulate
popular indicators of role dexterity, they expect to be rewarded with
a confidence in their ability to deliver on their promises. In this, they
are not totally wrong. People often confuse seductive appearances
with underlying substances. Indeed, politicians depend upon this
propensity when they appeal for public support. In telling others
that they feel their pain or that they have a compelling solution to
their problems,53 politicians rely on a conventional wisdom that can
be deceptive. But eventually many of these charlatans are found out.
When their schemes fail, they are turned out of office. Substance
does matter, and in the long run appearances that outrun their
ability to come through tend to be replaced by understandings more
in conformity with emerging realities. It may take centuries for this
sort of realignment to occur, but that which works is liable at some
point to be recognized.
Besides eventually endorsing efficiency, the marketplace
tends to reward flexibility. Caste systems54 were replaced by class
systems precisely because of the latter’s superior ability to adjust
to unforeseen circumstances. The same applies on an individual
level. People who can modify their roles to fit emerging conditions
have an advantage over those wedded to obsolete methods. One of
liberalism’s great failings was its attempt to control social behavior
through a proliferation of centralized rules. Whether these were
the price controls of the New Deal55 or the political correctness of
diversity-based labor regulations, they attempted to coerce people
into conforming to utopian visions. In essence, the populace was
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to be frozen into theoretical versions of perfection. Yet, in their
hubris, their advocates overestimated their own levels of expertise.
They believed that centralized planning would be more rational than
private greed, whereas their inability to assimilate local deviations
doomed their decisions to irrelevance. Dedicated more to uniformity
than to efficiency, they could not imagine that decentralized role
players might make better decisions than they. This, however, has
turned out to be the usual state of affairs. Individual role players,
in their ability to react to here-and-now discrepancies, have an
advantage in suppleness. Operating in accord with role scripts that
have a narrower purview than do the absolute imperatives of the
centralizers, they can make modifications without throwing entire
societies off-kilter. Such individuals must, to be sure, contend with
their own inclinations toward role conservation, but these are easier
to manage than are the simple-minded prescriptions of large-scale
social reforms—and they are less coercive to boot.
Critical Relativism
If role negotiations and role scripts are to live up to their promise,
they must occur within a framework of rules that facilitate flexibility
and responsiveness. What counts as a strength and what is considered
fair must enable people to create divisions of labor that meet individual
and collective needs. Those who get to make the decisions should be
the ones best suited to do so, as determined by appropriate forms of
conflict and association. Adaptable competence is essential in a mass
technocommercial society; hence, such communities must possess a
moral framework that encourages decentralized and socially mobile
self-direction. This framework, however, is not a given. Despite the
historically near universal belief that morality should be absolute, it
is constantly adjusted to accommodate nascent conditions. Yet, the
recent faith in ethical relativism is equally flawed.56 Moral rules, if
they are to mean anything, cannot be so plastic that they are alterable
at anyone’s whim. These regulations may be subject to modification,
but this will be via moral negotiations over which no single person
has total control. The consensus that emerges and that provides the
clout to impose shared standards will have been tediously hammered
out by millions of contributors over what may be centuries of
development.57
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The Great Middle-Class Revolution has been a major incentive
toward moral reform. Liberalism58 has, in fact, been a response to
this impetus. So has the reaction of the social conservatives. Together
they have participated in Culture Wars59 that are, in reality, a massive
renegotiation of the operative rules. Though the romantic relativists
favor a do-your-own-thing philosophy and religious conservatives
appeal to divine authority, more appropriate than either of these
viewpoints is a critical, that is to say, a realistic relativism. Moral
rules need to be evaluated according to their potential impact.
Surprisingly, this is what many of the participants are in the process
of doing. From their private perspectives they are reacting to the
world they, and their associates, experience to demand adjustments
that seem to address their concerns. As a result, although often
unconsciously achieved and all too often by way of a series of deadends that announce their unsuitability in unexpected failures, all sorts
of constraints get factored into the final product. People compare
evolving alternatives and gradually settle on those that seem the most
efficacious.
In the case of the rules guiding role negotiations, this process
is ongoing. The very passions that permeate contemporary politics
testify to their unsettled status. When liberals accuse conservatives of
being fascists or conservatives counter by labeling liberals communists,
the resulting anger is a sign of how far they are from agreement. One
of the pivotal areas of contention has been society’s master values.
Since its inception, the United States has been torn by disputes
over the relative importance of freedom and equality.60 Both have
been deemed important, as is reflected in the last line of the Pledge
of Allegiance. Schoolchildren know that it concludes by praising
the nation as standing for “liberty and justice for all.” Liberty is
obviously synonymous with freedom, whereas justice implies fairness
for all. The problem is that the meanings of these commitments have
been transformed over the centuries. The language is never stable,
and its applications are always in flux.
Equality once meant an equality of rights.61 People were supposed
to be equivalent before the law. This, however, has transmuted
into an equality of results. Liberals, under the unacknowledged
sway of neo-Marxists, have insisted that a mass society cannot be
fair unless everyone participates equally in its rewards.62 They deny
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the validity of hierarchy and demand that resources and power be
evenly distributed. This dispersal is supposed to be across the board.
Thus, they would use the federal government to ensure that jobs
are doled out in proportion to the representation of various groups
within the larger population. Women, African Americans, and
the disabled, according to this program, are all entitled to what is
deemed their rightful shares of the spoils. This proportionality even
extends to schoolrooms where grades are to be inflated so that no
one feels slighted and also to Little League ballparks where no one is
allowed to lose. Conservatives, of course, demur. Where once their
forebears distrusted democracy as dangerously egalitarian, today
they vigorously defend the principle of one person, one vote, and
are as scandalized as any libertarian by pretensions of noble birth.
Nevertheless, they continue to believe in an equality of opportunity,
rather than of results. They want people be given a comparable
chance to prove themselves, not to have the game cancelled by a
premature determination to award trophies to all. They know that
this will result in an inequality of success, but consider this both fair
and essential for social competence.
Beyond this, conservatives place a greater emphasis on
freedom.63 They demand a reduction in government regulations
to permit people more control over their lives. Their antecedents
among the American Founding Fathers had less to say about these
matters because, for them, liberty was still about being released from
the indignities of feudal serfdom. Jefferson, Adams,64 and their
contemporaries worried about a reemergence of royalism, not about
imperious federal regulators or imperialistic judges. What troubles
modern conservatives is the lack of respect liberals display toward
personal liberties. Although left-leaning reformers continue to
express an allegiance to freedom, in favoring government imposed
economic and social regulations, they have redefined the significance
of personal autonomy. As a case in point, where once individuals
were thought completely free to enter or leave employment, presentday labor lawyers argue for strict limitations on how this is achieved.
Similarly, where once free speech implied an ability to engage in
casual insults, these have been proscribed on the grounds that they
create a hostile work environment.65 Liberals also continue to endorse
legacies like academic freedom, whereas in practice they deny right-
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wing dissenters tenure. One Duke University philosophy professor
went so far as to insist that his university did not hire conservatives
because they were not sufficiently bright. To this, the conservatives
again strenuously dissent. They insist that true freedom must contain
the ability to express out-of-favor opinions, even boorish ones. They
also insist that the ability to adjust to unpredictable contingencies
depends on people being allowed to follow their private inclinations.
They would agree with Walter Olson,66 who concluded in his book
on labor law that, “for all its risks and disappointments, liberty—the
simple policy of refusing to force others to deal with us against their
will and without their consent—turns out to be the best method to
elicit the greatest willingness and enthusiasm to cooperate from those
who might do us good.” This would certainly apply to the ability to
construct competent social roles, including those with hierarchical
implications.
Besides the master values applicable to contemporary
conditions, a myriad of subsidiary values are in dispute. There
are genuine disagreements about the goals and norms that should
apply to embryonic roles and role negotiations. Liberals have either
disparaged or profoundly modified the traditional commitments
on the grounds that they are no longer relevant within diverse
democracies. Conservatives, in contrast, find many time-honored
standards still viable. Indeed, they strongly commend them as
sustaining the competence and flexibility essential for a mass-marketbased civilization. One of these old-fashioned values is merit. Some
personal and social qualities are deemed superior to others and,
therefore, deserving of encouragement. These traits are literally
thought to be better than others and hence worthy of respect. To
this, the liberals demur. They find merit to be either fraudulent67
or situationally dependent. According to them, elites arbitrarily
decide what is best so that this favors their own strengths. Either
that, or superior performances are called forth by the demands of
individual circumstances and consequently can come from anyone
having these. Tests or evaluations that purport to measure merit
are, accordingly, illegitimate. They are spurned as excluding the
powerless and, therefore, as in need of being superseded by a random
selection of jobholders. Let chance, not elite bias, decide who gets
the plum assignments.
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To this, the conservatives shudder in horror.68 They do not
believe that abilities and skills are randomly distributed. Nor do
they agree that everyone will be equally competent when thrown
into identical circumstances. For them, knowledge, talent, and
motivation have uneven outcomes. For a job to be done right,
it is vital to support the processes that increase the probability of
competence. This conviction, it should be noted, is crucial to the
notion of professionalism.69 If professionals are those with greater
expertise and motivation, then it must be possible for them to
exhibit superior proficiency in practice.70 Support for a complete
interchangeability among individuals suggests that skill is automatic,
whereas history indicates that this is not the case. Some people are
indeed smarter, more diligent, or more insightful than others. If
anything, a failure to recognize that some role performances, and
individuals, are more accomplished than others provides evidence of
an inability to make sound judgments. It suggests that one cannot
distinguish quality from rubbish. It also implies an unwillingness
to encourage the personal dedication needed for self-improvement.
Why try to be better if there is no better? The sad fact is that, were
everything as good as everything else, in the end nothing, and no
one, would be very good at anything.
This divergence in attitudes has expressed itself in related
attitudes toward education. Nowadays, everyone, whether on the left
or the right, believes that education is important. The conflicts come
from an inability to define education the same way. Because liberals
are committed to equality, they are dismayed by manifestations of
intellectual superiority. They, therefore, favor curricula that, while
universal, are not especially demanding.71 Learning, they declare,
must be fun. It must also be relevant to the student’s personal
concerns. That which does not come easily is for that reason
dismissed as elitist and scorned as beside the point. Conservatives,
in contrast, value rigorous standards.72 They shudder when teachers
boast that they learn more from their students than the other way
around. Nor are they moved by pleas that a poor grade will ruin a
student’s chances in life. For them, education is not equivalent to the
number of years spent in the classroom or to the credentials amassed
but to lessons mastered.
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For the traditionalists, education and merit are intimately
related to personal responsibility. If people are to be self-directed,
if they are to be given the authority to make important decisions,
they are expected to be internally motivated to do their best. If they
are to manage decentralized roles, they must likewise be prepared to
defend their choices and to take the blame when things go wrong.73
Liberals, too, believe in responsibility74 but apparently not with the
conventional trappings. Since they believe in niceness, they want
everyone—with the exception of articulate conservatives—to be
rewarded. They are even more adamant that no one be punished.
All individuals must be instructed that they are beautiful just the way
they are, irrespective of what they may ever achieve.75 Nor should
individuals be held responsible for their personal welfare. This is
the bailiwick of the central government. Because the state, in its
disembodied wisdom, always knows what is best and everlastingly
commands the necessary resources, it is accountable for protecting
its citizens from themselves and from almost any potential threat.
To this, the traditionalists respond that the fundamental spring of
professional motivation is personalized responsibility. They claim
that individuals are best situated to know what they need. Were they
not to assume responsibility for their decisions, but instead to hide
under a mantle of victimization,76 they would not work hard to get
things right. Nor would the results be nearly as good.
This attitude, in its turn, is related to an exaltation of American
individualism.77 Ever since the days of the frontier, a sturdy sense
of independence has been admired on the western shores of the
Atlantic. People have seen themselves as being in control of their
destinies and hence as responsible for their success. This facilitated
efforts at innovation and entrepreneurship from which the society as
whole gained. Liberals, however, tend to confuse self-determination
with greed.78 They declare it selfish when people wish to stand out
from the crowd. Their ideal is cooperation,79 not free enterprise.
People are supposed to submerge their egos in shared endeavors that
extol loving relationships over private ambition. The part of this that
is on target is that coordination is essential for large-scale activities.
Common goals cannot be attained unless the participants are
willing to accommodate to joint plans. Nevertheless, the originality
that animates these undertakings rarely derives from committees.
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Individuals can be obnoxious in the manner in which they stir
the pot, yet without provocation they can provide inertia to slow
progress to a crawl. For better or worse, market-oriented, socialrole-dominated communities could not forge ahead without a fair
number of individualists.
By now, also, customary to capitalism is an emphasis on
interpersonal trust.80 Though often honored in the breach, honesty
and integrity continue to be widely respected. People understand
that, if they are to survive within a community of strangers,81 they
must have confidence in most others most of the time. Yet, if this
trust is to endure, they cannot shrug off public untruths as indicative
of a culture of deceit. Political expediency has led some to defend
lying as the norm, but, were this true, no one could leave his or
her back undefended. On the other hand, tolerance is a liberal
value that has become more useful as social migrations bring diverse
populations into contact. People need to understand the world from
one another’s point of view if they are to reduce the numbers of
superfluous conflicts.82 Nevertheless, they cannot take this insight
to the romantic extent of declaring that no value is superior to any
other and no cultural artifact preferable to potential alternatives.
This would invite anarchy.
Lastly, family values matter.83 Standards that uphold intimate
relationships and parental obligations are more necessary than ever,
given the impersonality and mobility of a middle-class-dominated
society. Changes in how families are organized are inevitable, but that
families are preferable to a pandemic of promiscuity is irrefutable. In
general, it seems certain that the culture wars will terminate in a
moral consensus that is closer to the time-honored values than to
their liberal replacements.84 Traditional values may sometimes be
too rigid for contemporary purposes, but their provenance bespeaks
a different interpretation. Though dismissed as conservative, these
tenets have undergone an evolution in conjunction with the spread
of commercialization. The evaluation of merit, for instance, has been
continually modified to reflect alterations in technology and social
organization. Similarly, the estimation of personal responsibility has
grown as decentralization forced decision-making to become more
widespread.
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This said liberalism, too, has contributed essential revisions.85
Social rules could neither be as flexible nor as professional as they
need to be were they not responsive to progressive critiques. Even
when they are misguided, these observations introduce elements that
require examination. Such has been the case with feminism.86 Its
notions of gender equality are self-indulgent, but they call attention
to legitimate gender problems. This has obliged people to expand
their knowledge of gender differences and to incorporate this into
evolving gender norms. Men and women have been discovered to
vary; hence, this must be factored into an updated gender of division
labor more in harmony with contemporary requirements. In any
event, proposed moral adjustments can be compared with one
another to evaluate their implications. An expanded professionalism
with respect to social role and hierarchical arrangements depends
on achieving an expertise in this sort of moralism. People need to
understand how ethical negotiations operate. They must similarly be
prepared to examine the consequences of particular norms and values,
whether proposed by themselves or their rivals. Facts matter—as do
honest appraisals of where these lead.
The Professionalized Self
None of this, however, can be socially constructive without the
active participation of a growing segment of the population. As
more individuals become middle class, it is incumbent upon them to
become professionalized, not just at work, but also in the rest of their
lives. As has already been commented upon, middle-class society,
because it is decentralized and mobile, distributes decision making
ever more broadly. People must, therefore, be prepared to make the
requisite choices and to make them wisely. They must develop the
expertise and the motivation to assemble determinations about their
family life, their civic responsibilities, and their private amusements.
It is up to them to choose their own occupations, religious
commitments, and friendship patterns. If they do not possess the
knowledge and personal qualities to do this well, it is unlikely to be
done to their satisfaction—or that of their neighbors. Their personal
roles, how these relate to those of their role partners, including in
terms of relative power, are more than ever in their hands. If they do
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not commit themselves to growing into these tasks, they only have
themselves to blame for their frustrated ambitions.
A professionalized self, as opposed to a professional career, is not
acquired through a professional education. There are no credentials
for managing one’s own life, no college degrees in choosing a
livelihood, a wife, or a residential lifestyle. Plans for raising one’s
children, techniques for maneuvering through the political shoals of
career advancement, or methods for controlling intense emotions in
moments of stress do not come neatly packaged in self-help books or
university courses. To the contrary, these must be individually crafted
to meet unique circumstances. Role players must themselves decide
to grow up and, having done so, to turn what they have learned
into reality. They need, in sum, to take charge of their futures.
Unless they summon the courage to confront life’s uncertainties and
make preparations to meet its challenges, they, of necessity, consign
themselves to exogenous domination. Much to their chagrin, they
will find that there are always some individuals eager to govern the
timid or the ignorant, and if they qualify as one of the governors,
they will one day encounter these others.
Potentially self-directed people need to learn how to participate
in isolated nuclear families.87 They must be able to make good
choices about potential spouses and then discover how to live in
comfortable intimacy with them and their offspring. This clearly
requires competence in role negotiations, and also a knowledge of
the potential resolution of private divisions of labor. As significant,
those who wish to start families must understand the needs of
children and how to prepare them for disciplined, self-directed
futures. Negotiating roles with dependent youngsters requires
both firmness and restraint. Though these qualities are ostensibly
incompatible, they must nevertheless be mastered if children are to
internalize a capacity for independent decision-making. Life never
offers total satisfaction, but those who know how to love and how
to compromise dramatically improve their chances of achieving
contentment.
Another skill advantageous for the professionalized self is
organizational competence.88 Successful members of the emerging
middle class need to be able to answer questions about what they
want to be when the grow up, then realistically to implement their
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conclusions. Since so much contemporary work is performed within
large, impersonal organizations, most will need to understand how
bureaucracies operate. Unless they recognize the parameters of the
functional divisions of labor, defined offices, hierarchies of authority,
rules and procedures, and files and records within these, they will feel
adrift in apparently irrational and hopelessly rigid morasses. Once
they perceive what is happening, however, they can join the political
fray to recruit allies in their quests to negotiate the best possible
deals consistent with their personal goals. Moreover, if they wish
to be leaders, they will need to understand how power is exercised.
If they do not, they are apt to display an aura of weakness precisely
when a test of strength requires the opposite. Clearly, those who aim
to be influential require the ability to develop authentic strengths.
Furthermore, those who would exercise interpersonal control need
to incorporate qualities that facilitate authority within the contexts
in which they will operate. They have to be able to do something
that others value and are willing to exchange for their collaboration
or compliance.
Needless to say, in a world where so many alliances depend on
coordination through shared norms and values, professional selves
have to be capable moral negotiators.89 They must understand that
important social rules are neither absolute nor romantically relative.
Many of their commitments will have been acquired during the
moral negotiations of their youth, yet many of others will derive
from their current living and working conditions. If they are to
contribute to the evolution of universalistic standards, they will have
to speak up when things seem out of whack and must do so in a
manner calculated to recruit the enthusiastic support of people with
different points of view. This will require emotional and cognitive
flexibility, combined with an appropriate firmness of purpose when
they are contradicted. Truly moral individuals possess both personal
commitments and the ability to adjust when confronted with
evidence that their commitments are counterproductive.
All of this suggests that those who would be professional in
their personal lives have to be emotionally mature.90 They cannot be
terrified by the challenges of ordinary living. Nor can they become
unyieldingly furious over grievances that should have been overcome
in the distant past. They cannot even afford to be so ravenous for
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love that they will sell their souls for the proverbial mess of pottage.
Those who would be strong enough to master the demands of a
mutable and confusing technocommercial society must be able
to deal with their own fears, rages, and emotional longings. They
must, likewise, be able to cope with their personal guilt, shame,
and disgust. Individuals who cannot, who are instead swept away
in the bewilderment inherent in intense passion, are vulnerable
to manipulation by the more clear-headed. They may wish to be
strong but are more likely to revert to infantile spontaneity when
overwhelmed.
In the end, people who wish to be self-controlled experts in
surviving within a middle class environment must be capable
of personal growth.91 Everyone begins life as a frail child, but
not everyone learns to overcome the barriers this engenders.92
Many become fixated in juvenile patterns thanks to severe losses
encountered along the way. Having ineffectually sought to assert
themselves in hierarchical, social role, attachment relationships, they
are thrown back into defensive postures from which they have not
discovered the means to extricate themselves. More concerned with
getting revenge or with preventing further losses, they are not able
to let go of what went wrong in order to move forward to something
better. Frequently conceiving of themselves as victims, they do not
understand what they must do to get on with their lives. Filled
with self-pity, they blame others—or what they may refer to as the
system—for weaknesses over which as adults only they have the most
control.
Many of these limitations have been rationalized as mental
disorders.93 People are encouraged by the mental-health establishment
to interpret their unhappiness as a sign of a functional disease
and, then, to ingest medication in order to feel better. Anxieties
and depressions that result from the wear and tear of interpersonal
conflict are attributed to chemical imbalances and, hence, are never
directly dealt with. This is unfortunate because many individuals
would be capable of personal growth if they realized what was
happening to them. If they understood, for instance, that they were
trapped in dysfunctional roles whose point of origination was in
childhood, they might choose to engage in role change. They would
then comprehend their need to let go of the unsatisfying patterns
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to which they are emotionally committed to adopt more satisfying
ones. They would, in short, decide to engage in resocialization.
Thanks to the dominance of medical ways of thinking,94 few
people appreciate the conservative power of role scripts.95 When
coerced into dysfunctional patterns of behavior, they do not choose
to renegotiate them because they do not recognize what is holding
them back. Tossed about by strong feelings, they perceive themselves
as defective precisely because they cannot voluntarily turn these off.96
Having never been instructed that the anxiety and depression they
are experiencing are normal parts of the processes of attempting to
change, they seek to suppress them through chemical means. Their
discomforts, rather than their dysfunctional roles, are perceived as
problems, and efforts are, therefore, made to eliminate them. In fact,
resocialization operates by inducing a mourning process whereby a
person reactivates a dysfunctional role, determines that it represents
an irretrievable loss, then grieves this defeat.97 Only then can the role
script be modified to meet the present exigencies. Only then can the
person adopt patterns of living that are competent and sustainable.
Ironically, individuals who are forever sabotaging their life chances
rarely realize that they are not allowing themselves to succeed for the
very reason that they hate the roles in which they are confined. They
do not even perceive these as dysfunctional. Because their energies are
being directed toward conquering long departed role partners, they
cannot accurately discern the here and now. As a result, they do not
recognize that they are neither fully using their brains nor applying
their best efforts. Nevertheless, were they to disengage emotionally
via resocialization, they would find this potential liberated.
As a bonus, society too would benefit from their liberation. A
middle-class world that is dependent upon decentralized decisionmaking works best when its members are able to respond to their
personal circumstances. The whole becomes more flexible when its
separate elements are free to adapt to their diverse situations. Since
people trapped in dysfunctional roles are unthinkingly conservative;
once freed from these, they can apply their intelligence to solving
problems that may affect the lives of others beside themselves. Also,
once released to meet their own needs, they are apt to be more
productive, thereby increasing the size of the pie from which all
share. Professionalization has worked well in the economic domain;
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it can do the same on other fronts. The more people are able to
be themselves, competently, the more likely they are to realize the
utilitarian ideal of the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
A genuine social science,98 rather than one engaged in ideological
posturing, is apt to be useful to achieving this end. The answers to the
problems generated by an increasingly commercialized, middle-class
society are better served by knowledge than by comforting fantasies.
Most empty promises are eventually exposed, whereas hard truths, no
matter how difficult, can elicit improved coping mechanisms. Life is
not fair and never will be, but it can be less unjust the better people
understand what is happening. This will permit them to unleash their
ingenuity and to pool their resources on joint ventures. Egalitarian
collectivism is a chimera, but intelligence and cooperation are not.
Conflict and inequality are ineluctable aspects of our social nature;
nevertheless, they are not implacably at odds with collaborative
ventures. As previously indicated, predicting the future is a fool’s
errand, but we can still learn from history. A middle-class future
need not be resisted. It is not automatically barren or conformist.
If we are up to the challenge of adjusting to its many capricious
twists, a significant proportion of these may prove exciting and even
productive.
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